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Why GAO Did This Study. DOD operates a complex, multibilliondollar distribution system for delivering supplies and equipment to U.S. forces globally. DOD's goal in operating this global distribution pipeline is to deliver the right item to the right place at the right time, at the right cost. GAO has reported on weaknesses in DOD s distribution performance and has identified management of DOD s entire supply chain as a high-risk area. This review assesses the extent to which DOD (1) has established metrics for its distribution performance, (2) is able to accurately measure its performance against distribution standards, and (3) has taken actions to identify causes and develop solutions for any gaps in distribution. GAO analyzed DOD s distribution metrics, DOD s responses to data-reliability questionnaires, and corrective actions, and interviewed DOD officials. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD (1) revise guidance to ensure its metrics incorporate cost, (2) revise guidance to ensure the Marine Corps establishes a customer wait time metric, (3) incorporate performance information from the final destination, and (4) develop policy requiring data-reliability assessments. DOD concurred with the second and fourth recommendations and partially concurred with the first, stating that there would be no value to affix cost to time-definite delivery. DOD did not concur with the third recommendation, stating that data to the final destination should not be incorporated into DOD s performance metrics. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study. The 2005 BRAC round resulted in 125 closed bases with over 73,000 acres of surplus property available. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, requires DOD and HUD to assist communities in determining the best reuse of land and facilities, balancing needs of the local economy with those of homeless individuals and families. GAO was mandated to review the extent to which DOD and HUD implemented the homeless assistance provisions while disposing of BRAC surplus property. This report addresses (1) the assistance provided as a result of BRAC 2005 and the extent to which DOD and HUD track its implementation and (2) any benefits and challenges encountered as DOD, HUD, and LRAs addressed homeless assistance provisions. GAO reviewed homeless assistance plans; interviewed DOD and HUD officials; and interviewed LRAs and homeless assistance providers from a nongeneralizable sample of 23 closed bases, selected based on size, geography, and types of assistance provided. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD and HUD track conveyance status and provide clear information on four steps of the homeless assistance process. HUD generally concurred, and DOD either partially concurred or did not concur with these recommendations, stating its existing guidance is sufficient. GAO believes these recommendations are still valid as discussed in the report. GAO also recommends that HUD address staff resources during a BRAC round, and HUD generally concurred., Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study. According to DOD, its ability to deploy military forces from the United States to a conflict area is being increasingly challenged as potential adversaries pursue capabilities designed to deny access. Access can be denied by either preventing an opposing force from entering an operational area or limiting an opposing force s freedom of action within an operational area. DOD has a joint concept that broadly describes how DOD will operate effectively in such access-denied environments. DOD s initial efforts have emphasized the roles of the Air Force and Navy. GAO was mandated to review the role of the Army and Marine Corps in access-denied areas. This report (1) describes Army and Marine Corps efforts to address operational access challenges and (2) analyzes the extent to which DOD is able to gauge how its efforts support implementation of its concept for future operations in access-denied environments. GAO analyzed DOD, Army, and Marine Corps concepts; reports on service-level exercises; DOD policy and guidance on concept implementation; and documents specifically related to the joint concept. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD establish specific measures and milestones in future iterations of the JOAC Implementation Plan to improve DOD s ability to gauge implementation progress. DOD agreed with the importance of assessing the plan and said it is developing measures and milestones and will continue to refine these tracking tools in the future., Report to Congressional Committees.

VA estimates that approximately 10 percent of the veterans in the United States, or over 2.1 million veterans, did not have reasonable access to burial options in a veterans cemetery at the end of fiscal year 2013. In 2012, VA announced an initiative to improve access to burial options for veterans living in rural areas. Subsequently, in Public Law 113-6, Congress mandated that VA develop a strategy to serve the burial needs of rural veterans. The law also mandated GAO to review VA s strategy to ensure that it included all of the elements required by the law. This report includes, among other things, an evaluation of the extent to which (1) NCA s methodology identifies whether veterans have reasonable access to burial options and supports future cemetery location decisions, and (2) VA s rural burial strategy includes the eight elements required by law. GAO reviewed NCA s methodology for estimating the percentage of veterans who have reasonable access to burial options for fiscal year 2017. GAO also reviewed VA s rural burial strategy, and spoke with agency officials responsible for developing and implementing the rural burial strategy., Report to Congressional Committees

DOD Instruction 4151.2012 prescribes a depot maintenance core capabilities determination process to identify, in part, the (1) required core capabilities for depot maintenance and (2) planned workload needed to support those capabilities. Within OSD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness is responsible for, among other things, maintaining the instruction. The instruction describes a series of mathematical computations and adjustments which the military services use to compute their core capability requirements and to identify planned workload needed to support these requirements. The military services identify the weapon systems required to execute the Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency scenarios, which represent plans for responding to conflicts that may occur in the future. After the systems are identified, the military services compute annual depot maintenance capability requirements for peacetime in direct labor hours to represent the amount of time they regularly take to perform required maintenance. Next, the military services make contingency requirements and resource adjustments to account for applicable surge factors during the different phases of a contingency, such as preparation/readiness and sustainment. The military services make further adjustments to account for redundancy in depot capability. For example, a military service may determine that repair capabilities for specific systems maintained in military depots are so similar that they share common base repair processes, technologies, and capabilities that can effectively satisfy the repair requirements of other systems. The military services adjust the core capability requirements when one service s maintenance requirements will be supported by the maintenance capabilities of other military services., Report to Congressional Committees

Why GAO did this Study. The LCS was intended to be a low-cost surface combatant that uses innovative operational concepts, such as minimal crew size, to lower operations and support costs. In 2013, the Navy deployed USS Freedom, one of two LCS variants, to Singapore to prove its concept, demonstrate operational capabilities, and collect data on the ship s manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs. The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO analyze the Navy s sustainment plans for its LCS program including lessons from the USS Freedom deployment. This report addressed (1) the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have been collected on LCS ships; (2) the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment concepts for LCS; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other surface-ship classes. GAO analyzed documents from the 2013 deployment, and LCS and surface-ship life-cycle costs, and interviewed program officials and USS Freedom crews. What GAO Recommends. GAO is emphasizing its prior recommendations that, before buying more LCS ships, the Navy (1) conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment and (2) collect additional data and update cost estimates. The Department of Defense expressed concerns that its life-cycle cost data are not comparable across ship types. GAO believes the analysis provides a reasonable comparison using the best available data from the Navy, as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study. DOD purchases bulk fuel and sells it to customers, including the military services. Each fiscal year, DOD sets a standard price for budgeting purposes, endeavoring to closely approximate the price it will pay when it buys the fuel almost a year later. If this price is different than the standard price, DOD may need to take actions to manage its working capital funds funds used to purchase fuel and other commodities that are reimbursed through sales. Senate Report 113-44, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, mandated GAO to review DOD s approach for establishing its bulk fuel pricing. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how estimated bulk fuel costs have compared to actual costs since FY 2009 and the factors that have contributed to any differences; and (2) the extent to which DOD has considered options for adjusting its approach to estimating bulk fuel costs and managing working capital funds in light of any differences between estimated and actual fuel costs. GAO compared estimated and actual fuel costs for FY 2009 through 2013 and analyzed DOD actions to manage working capital funds. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD reevaluate its approach for estimating the components of the standard price and document the rationale for its assumptions. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second stating there is a closely-monitored, formal process. GAO continues to believe the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD operates three functional combatant commands, which provide special operations, strategic forces, and transportation. GAO was mandated to review personnel and resources of these commands in light of plans announced by DOD to reduce headquarters. This report (1) identifies the trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD s reductions to headquarters could result in cost savings. GAO analyzed data for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 on authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations for the functional combatant commands and their service component commands. GAO also obtained documentation such as guidance and budget documents and interviewed officials regarding the commands approach for implementing reductions to headquarters. GAO recommends that DOD (1) reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure meaningful savings, (2) set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and (3) track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation, questioning, in part, the recommendation s scope, and concurred with the second and third recommendations. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report., Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Why GAO Did This Study. In March 2013, DOD s discretionary budget was reduced by $37 billion as a result of sequestration across-theboard spending reductions to enforce certain budget policy goals. In response, the Secretary of Defense implemented an administrative furlough, among other things by placing most of DOD s civilian personnel in a temporary nonduty, nonpay status. An administrative furlough is a planned event by an agency to absorb reductions due to budget situations other than a lapse in appropriations. GAO was mandated to review DOD s implementation of its administrative furlough. This report (1) examined how DOD implemented its furloughs and any reported cost savings, (2) examined the extent to which DOD utilized up-to-date cost-savings information in the planning and implementation of furloughs, and (3) identified any reported examples of impacts that resulted from the furloughs. GAO reviewed DOD furlough guidance, interviewed officials, and conducted visits at selected sites that were selected to represent different categories of furlough exceptions and potential sequestration impacts, among other things. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD update and utilize its furlough cost-savings information as it becomes available in the event that it decides to implement another administrative furlough in the future. DOD partially concurred. GAO continues to believe the findings and recommendation are valid, as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

In today s fiscally constrained environment, the Navy must balance short- and long-term costs and risks. In February 2012, although it had concerns that its battle force was below the number of ships needed, the Navy announced plans to decommission nine ships. Congress mandated that GAO review the Navy s methodology and analysis that supported its decommissioning decision. This report evaluates (1) the extent to which the Navy followed its policy when deciding to decommission nine ships before the end of their service lives, and (2) the extent to which the Navy s policy incorporates federal standards for internal control. To evaluate these issues, GAO obtained evidence and interviewed officials about the process the Navy used to develop its decommissioning decision. GAO also analyzed the Navy s decommissioning policy, and compared its requirements to federal standards for internal control. GAO recommends that the Navy follow its policy to document its early decommissioning decisions and also update its policy to incorporate key federal standards for internal control including engaging external stakeholders and evaluating performance measures, such as risks. DOD partially agreed with both recommendations. DOD agreed that it should follow its policy but questioned the importance of updating the policy to incorporate certain internal control elements. GAO believes that these recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD relies on access to military land, airspace, sea space, and frequency spectrum to provide its forces a realistic training environment and ranges that will prepare them to face combat or complex missions around the globe. Section 366 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018. The act also mandated that GAO submit annual evaluations of DOD s reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD. In this report, GAO determined the extent to which DOD s 2014 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements., Report to Congressional Committees

DOD manages nearly $70 billion of conventional ammunition which includes many types of items other than nuclear and special weapons at eight Army depots. The military services use automated information systems to manage their inventory. They also compile annual reports that compare ammunition inventory levels against stated requirements. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD s management of conventional ammunition. This report addresses the extent to which (1) the services information systems facilitate efficient management of the conventional ammunition inventory and (2) the services collect and share inventory data to help them meet their stated requirements. GAO reviewed DOD guidance on materiel management and logistics systems, reviewed the services annual inventory reports for fiscal years 2009 to 2013, and discussed inventory management and related issues with service officials. GAO is making seven recommendations to improve the efficiency of the services' systems for managing DOD s conventional ammunition inventory and to improve data sharing among the services, including implementing data exchange standards, developing a plan for improving the accuracy and timeliness of ammunition data in the Army's LMP, enhancing DOD's ability to provide total asset visibility over conventional ammunition, and incorporating additional items as part of the services' current stratification and redistribution process. DOD concurred with all of these recommendations., Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.

DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain weapon systems. With the prospect of tighter defense budgets, DOD has placed more attention on controlling total life-cycle costs with initiatives aimed at ensuring that weapon systems are more affordable over the long term. Section 2337 of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires that each major weapon system be supported by a PSM and lays out the responsibilities of the PSM, including developing and implementing a comprehensive product support strategy for the system. GAO was asked to review DOD s progress in implementing PSMs for major weapon systems. This report examines (1) the steps, if any, that DOD and the military services have taken to implement PSMs for major weapon systems and (2) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the effects, if any, that PSMs are having on life-cycle sustainment decisions for their assigned systems. To conduct this review, GAO obtained information and interviewed product support personnel assigned to 12 of 332 major weapon systems that reflected varying characteristics such as military service and system costs and analyzed documentation from DOD and the military services. GAO recommends that DOD and the services develop a plan to institutionalize a career path for PSMs; issue clear, comprehensive, and centralized PSM implementation guidance; evaluate the effects PSMs have on sustainment decisions; and improve Army PSMs visibility over sustainment funding. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

The USS Port Royal, one of the Navy's newest cruisers, ran aground in 2009. Although it was repaired by the Navy, it was slated for decommissioning in fiscal year 2015. Two separate mandates directed the Navy to comprehensively assess the condition of the ship before its decommissioning. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) the Navy's 2013 assessment and report to Congress addressed congressional direction; and (2) Navy's decision to decommission the Port Royal aligns with current information and Navy decommissioning requirements. GAO reviewed the Navy's assessment and supporting documentation. In addition, GAO interviewed Navy personnel who performed the assessment or evaluated the results. GAO also interviewed officials from the independent organizations that reviewed the Navy's assessment and discussed the findings of their reviews. Finally, GAO interviewed Navy officials responsible for maintaining the Port Royal and officials involved with the decommissioning decision. GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to reevaluate the decision to decommission the Port Royal in light of the Navy's 2013 assessment and internal and external experts assessments subsequently provided to the Navy. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation, and the Navy has subsequently decided to retain the Port Royal and place it in a phased modernization program along with several other ships., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since 2008, the Air Force has more than tripled the number of its active-duty pilots flying RPAs, which is the term the Air Force uses to refer to unmanned aerial systems such as the MQ-1 Predator. Due to increases in demand, RPA pilots have had a significant increase in workload since 2007. GAO was asked to evaluate the Air Force's approach to managing its RPA pilots as well as their quality of life and promotion rates. For this review, GAO evaluated the extent to which the Air Force has done the following: (1) used a strategic human-capital approach to manage RPA pilots; (2) addressed concerns, if any, about the working conditions of RPA pilots that may affect their quality of life; and (3) analyzed the promotion rates of RPA pilots. GAO analyzed personnel planning documents, Air Force studies, and officer promotion data. GAO also interviewed unit commanders at selected Air Force bases and Headquarters Air Force officials and conducted focus groups with RPA pilots. While the results of these focus groups are not generalizable, they provide valuable insights. GAO recommends that the Air Force update optimum crew ratios; establish a minimum crew ratio; develop a recruiting and retention strategy; evaluate using alternative personnel populations to be pilots; use feedback from RPA pilots; analyze the effects of being deployed-on-station; and analyze the effect that being an RPA pilot has on promotions. The Air Force concurred with four recommendations, and it partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Army s modular force transformation affected the Army s combat units and the related command and support organizations in both the active and reserve components. The Army s objective in redesigning its force structure was to create more units to meet operational needs and be more flexible in deploying independently while maintaining combat capabilities of division-based brigades. According to the Army, having more combat brigades with specialized equipment and specialist personnel would increase combat capability and add value for combatant commanders. To increase the flexibility of units, the Army standardized brigade combat teams in one of three designs armored brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade (see fig. 1). The Army s new modular units were designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units they replaced, and thus the transformation required many changes, such as new equipment and facilities, a different mix of skills and occupational specialties among Army personnel, and significant changes to training and doctrine. A key change was the reduction in the number of maneuver battalions within the modular units from three battalions per brigade under the division-based organization to two battalions for most brigade combat teams. Critics of the decision to have only two battalions raised concerns about whether the new structure would maintain as much combat capability as the division-based battalion. However, the Army expected to increase the modular brigade combat teams capability through specialized equipment and personnel, called key enablers.

annually to prevent and mitigate corrosion of its assets, including military equipment, weapons, and facilities and other infrastructure.1 While the vast majority of these costs are related to corrosion issues on military equipment and weapons, the cost of corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure2 was estimated to be about $1.9 billion annually.3 Corrosion is defined in Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code as the deterioration of a material or its properties due to a reaction of that material with its chemical environment. DOD manages more than 555,000 facilities including barracks, commissaries, data centers, office buildings, laboratories, maintenance depots, storage tanks, and piers and linear structures, such as pipelines, roads, and runways, at more than 5,000 sites that cover more than 28 million acres. In its report accompanying HR 1540, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,4 the House Armed Services Committee directed DOD s Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as the Corrosion Office) to conduct an evaluation of corrosion matters related to the department s facilities and infrastructure, specifying that the study should (1) identify the key cost drivers5 for corrosion associated with facilities and infrastructure and recommend strategies for reducing their effect; (2) review a sampling of facilities that are representative of facility type, military department, and facility age; (3) include an assessment of at least one planned facility construction program; and (4) include information obtained from site visits and the examination of program documentation, including maintenance and facility engineering processes., Report to Congressional Committees

The Army initiated LMP in 1999 to replace two aging materiel management systems the Commodity Command Standard System and the Standard Depot System. In replacing these systems, which had been used for more than 30 years to manage inventory, depot maintenance, and arsenal manufacturing operations, the Army expected LMP to help transform its logistics operations. A modified commercial off-the -shelf system, LMP was intended to support AMC industrial operations and improve business processes and practices in areas such as operations at depots and arsenals and inventory management. By providing a single source of data and integrated decision-making tools, LMP was expected to increase efficiencies in AMC operations such as buying and managing spare and repair parts and conducting depot level maintenance. For example, in the area of planning future maintenance capacity, the Army expected improvements to AMC budget forecasts and adjustments through reduced repair cycle time, better resource allocation, increased production throughput, reduced production cost, and more accurate production schedules. With LMP s deployment, the Army expected to achieve benefits that included reduced equipment repair times, improved inventory forecasting, and cost savings. Additionally, LMP is part of the Army s broader strategy to implement enterprise resource planning systems in other areas and, as such, is expected to integrate with other Army systems, to include the General Fund Enterprise Business System and the Global Combat Support System-Army.

The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated security environment, as major disasters and emergencies, such as the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil authorities response to domestic incidents through an array of activities collectively termed civil support. In July 2012, DOD began to plan for federal military support during a complex catastrophe such as a large earthquake that causes extraordinary levels of casualties or damage, and cascading failures of critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to assess DOD s planning and capabilities for a complex catastrophe. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. To do so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and FEMA officials., Report to Congressional Requesters.

This report formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which mandates that we conduct a review of the Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and Other Exchange of Services (ATARES) program. ATARES is a European program through which member nations use a system of credits and debits to facilitate sharing of air force-related services-such as troop and cargo airlift-without monetary transactions. ATARES is managed by the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), a multi-national organization established in July 2007 to coordinate and optimize the use of airlift, sealift, and land movement assets owned or leased by member nations militaries. The Department of Defense (DOD) is not a member of ATARES but is seeking to join the program. DOD is a member of MCCE and pays a fee for this membership; there is no additional fee to become a member of ATARES. Currently, because DOD is not a member of ATARES, it utilizes Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements to exchange services with other nations- including ATARES member nations-often through monetary transactions. DOD believes it would benefit from membership in ATARES and requested approval from Congress in 2011 to participate in the program. Our objectives were to determine (1) the types of services exchanged through ATARES, (2) the extent to which information is available to determine whether ATARES is achieving its intended purposes, and (3) the extent to which information is available on the cost-effectiveness of ATARES. Enclosure 1 details the results of our review based on our briefing to your offices on September 10, 2013. To address our objectives, we visited U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany, and MCCE headquarters in Eindhoven, The Netherlands, to interview officials knowledgeable about the ATARES program and to gather documentation and information about the program s operations., Rept. to Congressional Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations.

DOD reports that more than 83,000 persons are missing from past conflicts in Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, the Persian Gulf, and World War II. Several DOD organizations, known as the accounting community, have a role in accounting for the missing. Between 2002 and 2012, DOD accounted for an average of 72 persons each year. In 2009, Congress mandated DOD to increase its capability and capacity such that the community could account for at least 200 missing persons annually by 2015. The law also added all World War II losses to the list of conflicts for which DOD was responsible, thus increasing from about 10,000 to 83,000 the number of missing persons for whom DOD must account. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review DOD s efforts to address the accounting-for goal. GAO assessed DOD s capability and capacity to accomplish the missing persons accounting mission. In doing so, GAO analyzed guidance and requirements, discussed accounting efforts and the structure of the community with community members, and surveyed accounting community members and related entities. GAO is making nine recommendations to DOD, including for example: examining options to reorganize; clarifying responsibilities for the accounting community; improving planning, guidance, and criteria to prioritize cases; and sustaining communication. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees

Congress and DoD need relevant, accurate, and timely readiness information to make informed decisions about the use of military forces, and related resource needs. To that end, Congress requires DoD to submit a quarterly readiness report addressing various elements related to overall readiness, personnel, training, and equipment. A committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO report on the type of readiness information available to Congress and DoD decision makers and the reported readiness of U.S. forces. In May 2013, GAO provided a classified report on the readiness trends of DoD forces. For this report, GAO evaluated the following: (1) the extent to which DoD addressed required reporting elements in its quarterly readiness reports to Congress; and (2) what additional information, if any, could make the reports more useful. GAO analyzed various readiness reports and supporting documentation, and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO recommends that DoD analyze alternative sources of information that could be used to meet the required reporting elements, issue guidance on the type and amount of information to be included by each service, and incorporate contextual information to improve the clarity and usefulness of reported information. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

DoD may be required to meet specific statutory requirements before closing or realigning installations that are authorized to employ 300 or more DoD civilians. In light of these requirements, DoD has historically used the BRAC process for closing or realigning bases that are above statutory thresholds. However, in March 2012, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that because of fiscal and strategic imperatives, in the absence of an additional BRAC round, DoD may be forced to use its existing authorities to begin to realign and close bases. Subsequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review the processes that DoD uses to close and realign military installations outside of the BRAC process. This report describes the extent to which DoD has processes in place to implement installation closures and realignments within the United States, and the extent to which DoD has implemented closures and realignments outside of the BRAC process. To conduct its work, GAO examined DoD's approach to implementing basing actions and interviewed DoD officials to identify how their approach ensures compliance with 10 U.S.C. Section 2687. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DoD stated that the report, in general, explains the processes it follows to comply with requirements for closing or realigning installations outside of a congressionally authorized BRAC process., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD has emphasized innovative and low-cost approaches to build the defense capacity of foreign partners, and it uses its five Regional Centers to administer programs to foster partnerships and deepen foreign officials' understanding of U.S. objectives. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 112-705) mandated GAO to conduct a study of the Regional Centers. GAO's report does the following: (1) describes how the Regional Centers' activities compare with those of other DoD training and education organizations, and (2) evaluates the extent to which DoD has developed and implemented an approach to oversee and assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. This report also provides information on the process used to approve Regional Center requests to waive reimbursement of the costs for nongovernmental and international organizations that participate in the Regional Centers' activities. GAO reviewed public law and departmental directives and conducted an analysis comparing aspects of the Regional Centers with other selected DoD training and education institutions. GAO recommends that DoD develop measurable goals linked to key programming priorities for the Regional Centers, metrics for assessing performance against these goals, and a methodology to assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD used expeditionary forensics for collecting fingerprints and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to identify, target, and disrupt terrorists and enemy combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The increased incidence of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other asymmetric threats has increased the demand for expeditionary forensic capabilities. Many of DoD's expeditionary forensic activities are resourced through DoD's Overseas Contingency Operations funds. DoD estimates that it cost between $800 million and $1 billion of these funds from 2005 through 2012 to support expeditionary forensics activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as military operations are projected to draw down in Afghanistan, this funding is expected to substantially decline by the end of 2014. Consequently, DoD is taking steps to establish expeditionary forensics as an enduring capability in DoD's base budget. GAO was asked to examine DoD's expeditionary forensic capability. This report assessed the extent to which DoD has taken steps to establish an enduring expeditionary forensic capability. To address this objective, GAO reviewed relevant policy, plans, and budget estimates, and interviewed cognizant DoD officials. GAO is making four recommendations to DoD, including incorporating key elements in its strategic plan, periodically reviewing and evaluating DoD components' proposed forensic budget estimates, including expeditionary forensics, and issuing guidance on collecting and reporting forensic budget data. DoD concurred with all four recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of facility maintenance and the expected service life of DOD facilities. While corrosion is not always highly visible, it can lead to structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental damage. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed DOD s corrosion prevention and control program for facilities and infrastructure. In this report, GAO assessed the extent that DOD (1) met reporting requirements, (2) maintained accurate return-on-investment data in its records, and (3) fully informed relevant officials of its corrosion-control efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies and plans, met with corrosion-control officials, and visited and interviewed officials at 32 installations. GAO recommends five actions to improve DOD s project reporting and tracking, the accuracy of its return-on-investment data, and its communication with stakeholders on corrosion-control activities for facilities and other infrastructure. DOD partially concurred with three recommendations and did not agree with two. DOD plans to implement a web-based tracking tool to improve data timeliness and standardization, among other actions. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations to improve project reporting are warranted, that the Corrosion Office should use its existing authorities to identify and implement other incentives for project managers to meet reporting milestones and that DOD should revise its guidance so that Corrosion Executives would assist with the oversight of project reporting., Report to Congressional Requesters

Due in part to challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) faces in reducing excess infrastructure, DoD's Support Infrastructure Management is on GAO's High Risk List of program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DoD has relied on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as a primary means of reducing excess infrastructure or capacity and realigning bases to meet changes in the size and structure of its forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress required DoD to submit reports that, among other things, estimated the amount of DoD's excess capacity at that time. Also, in March 2012, DoD testified that it had about 20 percent excess capacity. The methods used to develop such preliminary excess capacity estimates differ from the data intensive process -- supplemented by military judgment -- that DoD has used to formulate specific base closure and realignment recommendations. A Senate Armed Services Committee report directed GAO to review how DoD identifies bases or facilities that are in excess of its needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DoD has estimated its excess capacity, outside of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO reviewed excess capacity estimates from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed DoD's data; reviewed supporting documentation; assessed assumptions and limitations of DoD's analysis; and interviewed DoD officials. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD stated that GAO had properly highlighted the limitations of its approach to estimating excess capacity and contrasted it with the method used to develop BRAC recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Corrosion costs DOD billions of dollars annually by taking critical systems out of action and creating safety hazards. Recognizing the need for coordinated corrosion prevention and control efforts and planning, House Report 112-78 directed the military departments to develop corrosion prevention strategies that support the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. The House Report directed GAO to evaluate the long-term strategies developed by the Corrosion Executive of each military department and to report the findings to both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. GAO assessed the extent to which the military departments (1) coordinated with the Corrosion Office to ensure consistency of their strategic plans with DOD s overarching goals and objectives and conformity with DOD Instruction 5000.67; and (2) included characteristics of a comprehensive strategic plan in their respective plans. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, the corrosion prevention strategic plans of DOD and the military departments, and interviewed DOD corrosion officials. GAO is making two recommendations to improve future updates of the military departments strategic plans for corrosion prevention and control. DOD did not concur with the recommendations. DOD stated that the military departments plans linked to overarching goals and objectives and disagreed with the criteria GAO used to assess the plans. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are valid as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees

In response to congressional direction in House Report 112-479, the enclosed briefing provides information on the wage rates of the Department of Defense s (DOD) federal civilian chiropractors compared with the wages of other federal civilian health care professionals within DOD with similar training and education. We provided this briefing to the staff from the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services on February 4, 2013 and January 29, 2013, respectively. We found that DOD employs 90 chiropractors at 62 military treatment facilities as of January 2013. Further, the mean salary of DOD s federal civilian chiropractors is similar to the mean salary of those serving in comparable DOD federal civilian health care occupations. Specifically, we found that the mean salaries of our selected health care professions ranged from approximately $77,000 to approximately $94,000 with the mean salary for chiropractors approximately 7 percent higher than the lowest mean salary and approximately 12 percent lower than the highest mean salary. Although these health care positions have similar education and training requirements, they have some different responsibilities., Briefing to Congressional Staff of House and Senate Committees on Armed Services.

DOD has invested heavily in its logistics operations, estimating that its overall spending on logistics including supply chain management was more than $171 billion in fiscal year 2011. GAO has previously reported that one of the most complex and vital tasks facing DOD is managing its supply chain to effectively and efficiently provide spare parts, food, fuel, and other critical supplies in support of U.S. military forces. GAO has identified DOD s supply chain management as a high-risk area and has previously reported that limitations in asset visibility including the visibility of assets in transit make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on the assets that are present in the theater of operations. As part of GAO s work to update its highrisk areas, this report assesses the extent to which DOD (1) is aware of its components efforts to improve intransit visibility and (2) has a strategy to achieve in-transit visibility that includes the key elements of a comprehensive strategic plan. To conduct these assessments, GAO obtained and analyzed information from the defense components, reviewed and analyzed relevant defense policies, guidance, and plans regarding in-transit visibility, and interviewed officials from DOD and the defense components. GAO recommends that as DOD finalizes its in-transit visibility strategy it should ensure that it receives complete information from the components that addresses all key elements of a strategic plan. DOD concurred with GAO s recommendation., Rept. to Congressional Committees.

Since 2002, the United States has operated military detention facilities at its Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to hold individuals detained during overseas counterterrorism operations. In 2009 the President directed the closure of these facilities within 1 year. Since then, a number of statutes have prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States. GAO was asked to review existing U.S. facilities and identify factors to be considered in the event that restrictions were lifted and Guantanamo Bay detainees were transferred to the United States. This report describes the (1) current Guantanamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure, (2) DOD corrections facilities and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees, and (3) DOJ facilities holding individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies on detention operations; visited several facilities at Guantanamo Bay and DOD and DOJ sites in the United States selected for their range of housing configurations; and interviewed officials at both agencies. GAO s review is descriptive and did not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. facilities would be suitable for holding Guantanamo Bay detainees, nor did GAO address legal factors that are still being adjudicated. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOJ stated that it has no plans to transfer detainees to the United States. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in November 2012., Report to the Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.

Why GAO Did This Study. Defending U.S. territory and citizens is the highest priority of DOD, and providing defense support of civil authorities is one of the department s primary missions. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for homeland defense, whereas for civil support missions DOD provides assistance to the lead civilian federal agency, such as DHS, when requested by the agency or directed by the President for major disasters, emergencies, and special events. This report examines the extent to which DOD has issued current guidance, including doctrine, policy, and strategy, for its homeland defense and civil support missions. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD homeland defense and civil support guidance and plans and met with select DOD and National Guard officials. What GAO Recommends. This report makes several recommendations to address gaps in DOD s guidance for homeland defense and civil support, including for DOD to assess and, when needed, update its primary strategy; develop implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct; and align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. In comments on the draft report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD concurred with our strategy and dual-status commander recommendations and partially concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation. DHS concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation., Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

In 2010, the Navy concluded that decisions it made to increase the efficiencies of its surface force had adversely affected ship readiness and service life. To improve ship readiness the Navy developed a new strategy, which includes several initiatives. House Report 112-78, accompanying a proposed bill for the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.1540), directed GAO to review the recent Navy initiatives. GAO assessed the following: (1) how the Navy evaluates the material readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships and the extent to which data indicate trends or patterns in the material readiness of these ships; and (2) the extent to which the Navy has taken steps to improve the readiness of its surface combatant and amphibious warfare ships, including implementing its new readiness strategy. GAO analyzed Navy policies, material, and readiness data from January 2008 -- two years prior to the release of the Navy's 2010 report on the degradation of surface force readiness -- through March 2012, two years after the release of the report, and interviewed headquarters and operational officials and ship crews. GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks the new strategy faces and develop alternatives to mitigate these risks. DoD partially concurred, but felt that current assessments sufficiently identify risks. GAO continues to believe that a comprehensive assessment that takes into account the full range of risk to the overall strategy is needed., Report to Congressional Committees.

Section 1047 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required us to update our September 1991 report on the nuclear weapons targeting process. Since we last reported on this subject, the United States now faces a more complex security environment that potentially affects U.S. nuclear weapons employment policy and targeting. The Department of Defense s (DOD) 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States could reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security strategy. Although the threat of nuclear or conventional war with Russia has been reduced, DOD s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report identified new threats and a small number of contingencies that may require the use of nuclear weapons, even as the United States has substantially reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. In particular, DOD stated that the United States would only consider employing nuclear weapons against states that possess nuclear weapons or are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The United States and Russia also agreed to the New START Treaty, which would reduce the number of deployed weapons by February 2018.

The Department of Defense (DOD) operates a complex, multibillion-dollar distribution system for delivering needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces across the world. DOD's goal in operating its global distribution system is to deliver the right item to the right place at the right time, and also at the right cost. The materiel distribution system covers multiple legs, from the movement of supplies in the continental United States to tactical movement on the battlefield, and must be capable of reaching its military customers whether they are located on large, well-established bases or at small, remote outposts. As we have reported, the federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for federal discretionary funds. Given the fiscal environment DOD must operate in now and into the future, the distribution of supplies and equipment to the warfighter must be performed as effectively and efficiently as possible to ensure the best use of limited resources. Strategic guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012 emphasized that DOD must continue to reduce the cost of doing business, in particular finding further efficiencies in overhead, business practices, and support activities.

To determine the extent to which DoD carried out the original scope of work for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Technology Center and whether the building it constructed constitutes a complete and usable facility, we reviewed budget and project documents and interviewed officials from NGA, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In particular, we focused our information-gathering efforts on NGA's identified need for data-storage capability, the original scope of work for the NGA Technology Center, and the final status of that construction project as of September 2011, the end of the BRAC 2005 implementation period. We also identified guidance, directives, and policies that govern the process for BRAC military construction projects and compared the process used for the NGA project to the procedures outlined in those documents. To identify the scope of work for the proposed new military construction project to fit out the third floor of the NGA Technology Center, and DoD's rationale for this project, we reviewed budget and project documents and interviewed officials from NGA, the Department of the Army BRAC Office, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense about NGA's identified need for data-storage capability and the scope of work for the new military construction project.

The Department of Defense uses live training, simulators, and other virtual training devices to prepare its forces to conduct military operations. Virtual training can help the services mitigate obstacles to training, such as the high cost of conducting live training or range access issues, while allowing military personnel to replicate many of the interactions and procedures they may encounter on the battlefield. In an effort to achieve greater efficiency, maximize training opportunities, and potentially reduce training costs, each military service is in various stages of developing concepts and training programs that mix live and synthetic training (which is how the Navy typically refers to training that relies significantly on simulators or virtual training devices). The Navy, in particular, believes that effective training requires an efficient balance of live and synthetic approaches. H.R. Rep. No. 112-78 (2011), which accompanied a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, directed GAO to review the status of the military services training programs and report the results to the House and Senate Armed Services committees. It also stated that in reporting on each of the services, we may take a phased approach in undertaking our review and reporting to the committees. This Navy review is the first engagement in our phased approach, and an Air Force review is also underway. For this review, we assessed the following: (1) the principles the Navy considers in determining whether to use live or synthetic training to meet its training requirements, (2) how the Navy's mix of live and synthetic training has changed over time, and (3) how the Navy prioritizes its synthetic training investments. This report contains briefing charts.

The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activity -- shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic region -- could eventually increase the need for a U.S. military and homeland security presence in the Arctic. As a result, the Department of Defense (DoD) must begin preparing to access, operate, and protect national interests there. House Report 111-491 directed DoD to prepare a report on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, and specified five reporting elements that should be addressed. House Report 112-78 directed GAO to review DoD's report. GAO assessed the extent to which the following were accomplished: (1) DoD's Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Arctic Report) addressed the specified reporting elements, and (2) DoD has efforts under way to identify and prioritize the capabilities needed to meet national security objectives in the Arctic. GAO analyzed DoD's Arctic Report and related documents and interviewed DoD and U.S. Coast Guard officials. GAO recommends that DoD develop a risk-based investment strategy and timeline for developing Arctic capabilities needed in the near-term; and establish a forum with the Coast Guard to identify collaborative Arctic capability investments over the long-term. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security generally agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Citing long-term fiscal challenges affecting the federal government, in May 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake a departmentwide initiative to assess how the department is staffed, organized, and operated with the goal of reducing excess overhead costs and reinvesting these savings in sustaining DOD s current force structure and modernizing its weapons portfolio.1 1 Remarks as delivered by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, Kansas, May 8, 2010. The Secretary s initiative targeted both shorter- and longer-term improvements and set specific goals and targets for achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The initiative was organized along four tracks, each of which had a different focus (see enc. I). The fourth track focused on specific areas where DOD could take immediate action to reduce inefficiencies and overhead, in particular, to reduce headquarters and support bureaucracies and to instill a culture of cost consciousness and restraint in the department. As part of the fourth track, the Secretary of Defense announced a number of specific initiatives, including actions intended to address the need to reduce or eliminate reporting requirements for DOD reports and studies. For example, in his August 9, 2010, speech announcing the overall efficiency initiative, the Secretary of Defense stated that the department is awash in taskings for reports and studies and directed several specific actions, Remarks as delivered by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Abilene, Kansas, May 8, 2010.

The collection of biometrics data, including fingerprints and iris patterns, enables U.S. counterinsurgency operations to identify enemy combatants and link individuals to events such as improvised explosive device detonations. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which (1) DOD's biometrics training supports warfighter use of biometrics, (2) DOD is effectively collecting and transmitting biometrics data, and (3) DOD has developed a process to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO focused on the Army and to a lesser extent on the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command, since the Army collected about 86 percent of the biometrics enrollments in Afghanistan. GAO visited training sites in the United States, observed biometrics collection and transmission operations at locations in Afghanistan, reviewed relevant policies and guidance, and interviewed knowledgeable officials., Report to Congressional Requesters.

The Department of Defense (DoD), which includes the military services, selects mid- to upper-career-level military officers to participate in fellowship and training-with-industry programs conducted at non-DoD organizations such as universities, think tanks, private corporations, federal agencies, and Congress. For some fellowships, the military departments pay a fee or tuition to the host organization. GAO was directed to review DoD's use of these programs. GAO's objectives were to determine the following: (1) the statutory provisions that authorize DoD's fellowship and training-with-industry programs for military officers, (2) the extent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) visibility over these programs, and (3) the extent to which the services are able to determine that they derive benefits from these programs. GAO analyzed relevant laws and DoD policies, collected data, and interviewed OSD and military service officials on their oversight and management roles and responsibilities for these programs. GAO is making 11 recommendations to DoD for improving oversight and management of DoD's fellowship and training-with-industry programs -- for example, submitting DoD-required annual reports and performing service-required program reviews -- that would enhance OSD's visibility over the programs and better position DoD to determine the extent to which it derives benefits from them. In response to a draft of this report, DoD concurred with the 11 recommendations and stated its action plan to implement the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

In 2008, the Army issued a field manual that identified the need to expand its training focus so units would be trained and ready to operate across a full spectrum of operations, including offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. To support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has focused its ground force training on preparing units for counterinsurgency operations. With the withdrawal from operations in Iraq, fewer units are engaged in counterinsurgency operations and now have more time to train for full-spectrum operations. To reflect the shift in training focus, the Army, in April 2011, updated its training strategy and also established a new metric to measure training activity -- referred to as the full spectrum training mile metric. This metric replaced the Army's traditional tank mile metric, which represented the average number of miles the Army expected to drive its tanks while conducting training. In its fiscal year 2012 budget materials, the Army provided background information on its transition to the new metric, and starting in fiscal year 2012, began using the new metric. House report 112-78 directed GAO to review the Army's transition to the full-spectrum training mile metric and report its findings by February 28, 2012. To address this mandate, we determined the following: (1) how the Army's full-spectrum training mile metric differs from its traditional tank mile metric; (2) the key assumptions associated with the full-spectrum training mile metric and to what extent these assumptions reflect actual conditions; and (3) to what extent the Army uses the full-spectrum training mile metric to measure training execution and develop training cost estimates. This report includes information on how training is reflected in the Army's operation and maintenance budget-justification materials. We briefed the congressional defense committees in January 2012 and have included the briefing in enclosure 1 of this report.

Whistleblowers help guard the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse. The Military Whistleblower Protection Act provides service members with a means to seek relief from reprisals and to hold subjects accountable. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DoD) has achieved the following: (1) satisfied statutory timeliness requirements for processing military whistleblower reprisal cases, (2) established and implemented oversight mechanisms for its process, and (3) taken corrective action in cases where the DoD Inspector General (DODIG) substantiated reprisal claims. GAO also analyzed case characteristics. GAO examined laws, regulations, and guidance documents; interviewed officials from DODIG, service IGs, service Boards for the Correction of Military Records (BCMRs), and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and collected and analyzed case data. GAO also conducted a detailed file review using a representative sample of cases closed between January 1, 2009 and March 31, 2011. GAO recommends that DoD implement procedures to track and report data on its case processing timeliness, take actions to improve oversight of its investigative process, and develop processes to ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken in substantiated cases. DoD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations., Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.

Over $18 billion has been appropriated to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, and there is widespread consensus that this threat will continue to be influential in future conflicts. DoD established JIEDDO in 2006 to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DoD actions in support of the combatant commanders' and their respective joint task forces' efforts to defeat IEDs. This report, one in a series on JIEDDO's management and operations, addresses the extent to which DoD has achieved the following: (1) provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan, including measurable objectives that determine the effectiveness of efforts across DoD to combat IEDs; and (2) identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, reviewed and analyzed relevant strategic planning documents, collected and reviewed data identifying DoD counter-IED efforts, and met with DoD and service officials. GAO recommends four actions for DoD to develop a comprehensive strategic plan with strategic outcome-related goals and a complete listing of counter-IED efforts to maximize its resources. DoD concurred with one of the recommendations but did not concur with the other three. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are warranted as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Requesters.

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its emphasis and spending on humanitarian assistance efforts outside of war and disaster environments. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD obligated about $383 million on its key humanitarian assistance programs. Because civilian agencies, such as the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also carry out many assistance efforts, DOD s efforts require close collaboration with these agencies. This report was conducted as part of GAO s response to a statutory mandate and reviewed (1) DOD s management of two key humanitarian assistance programs the humanitarian assistance program funded through its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation and its Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program and (2) the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility over each others efforts. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed funding and program information, and interviewed officials at DOD, State, USAID, nongovernment organizations, and 12 U.S. embassies.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized the importance of developing language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures to meet current and future needs and is investing millions of dollars to provide language and culture predeployment training to its general purpose forces. DoD also has noted that such training should be viewed as a long-term investment and that training and personnel systems should better account for the knowledge and skills of service members acquired through training to help manage its forces. The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 5136) directed GAO to review language and culture training for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which these services did the following: (1) captured information in training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture predeployment training and proficiency gained from training, and (2) developed plans to sustain language skills acquired through predeployment training. GAO analyzed service documents and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO made recommendations intended to improve the availability of information on training completion and proficiency and help DoD plan for sustainment training. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations, but stated that the definition of significant language training was not intended to describe training for initial skills. However, DoD noted that current guidance does not preclude language proficiency testing at this stage., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the authority to oversee DOD's ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD's ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR data--one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending.

The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment to help ensure combat-ready forces receive equipment in days rather than the weeks it would take if it had to be moved from the United States to their location. Prepositioned stocks may also support activities including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. As GAO's third report in response to Congress's annual reporting requirement, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) met the six reporting requirements in the annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether additional information may be needed related to those requirements; (2) developed effective department-wide guidance on prepositioned stocks to achieve national military objectives; and (3) organized effectively to provide joint oversight over its prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant DOD reports, strategies, and policies, and met with DOD and service officials in the U.S., Kuwait, and Qatar., Report to Congressional Committees.

Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Department of Defense (DOD) personnel with flame resistant (FR) uniforms were mainly aviators, fuel handlers, and tank crews. With the growing prevalence of the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, all ground forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have been exposed to the possibility of fire-related injuries. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 extended to 2015 the authority to procure fire resistant1 rayon fiber for the production of uniforms from certain foreign countries, provided by section 829 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and originally set to expire in 2013.2 This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing developed in response to the requirement in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 to report on the supply chain for FR fiber for the production of military uniforms. Specifically, the act required GAO to analyze several elements of the supply chain, including the current and anticipated sources of FR rayon fiber; actions DOD has taken to identify alternatives to FR rayon fiber; impediments to the use ofisuch alternatives; and the impediments posed to efficient procurement of FR rayon fiber by existing statutory or regulatory requirements; among others.3 On March 15, 2011, we provided a draft of the enclosed briefing to your offices to satisfy this requirement. Based on subsequent briefings to your offices, we updated the enclosed briefing by adding slide 28.