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Many anthropological explanations of magical practices are based on the assumption that the immediate cause of performing an act of magic is the belief that the magic will work as claimed. Such explanations typically attempt to show why people come to believe that magical acts work as claimed when such acts do not identifiably have such effects. We suggest an alternative approach to the explanation of magic that views magic as a form of religious behavior, a form of communication that promotes or protects cooperative social relationships. We suggest that all forms of religious behavior involve persons communicating acceptance of a supernatural claim and that this act communicates a willingness to accept nonskeptically the influence of the person making such a claim. Thus, religious behavior communicates a willingness to cooperate with the claim maker and others who accept his or her influence. We suggest that magic, which can be distinguished by the communicated acceptance of the claim that certain techniques have supernatural effects, also promotes cooperation. Different types of magic, including sorcery, love magic, and curing magic, can be shown to communicate different types of messages, such as a threat to use violence to punish unsocial behavior, sexual desire, or concern for a person's well-being. Ethnographic examples are used to support this hypothesis. This approach requires no assumptions about whether the practitioners of magic do or do not believe that the magical acts work as claimed. It attempts only to account for the identifiable talk and behavior that constitute magical acts by examining the identifiable, and often important, effects of these acts on the behavior of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Totemism, a topic that fascinated and then was summarily dismissed by anthropologists, has been resurrected by evolutionary psychologists’ recent attempts to explain religion. New approaches to religion are all based on the assumption that religious behavior is the result of evolved psychological mechanisms. We focus on two aspects of Totemism that may present challenges to this view. First, if religious behavior is simply the result of evolved psychological mechanisms, would it not spring forth anew each generation from an individual's psychological mechanisms? Yet, Australian Totemism, like other forms of Totemism, is profoundly traditional, copied by one generation from the prior ones for hundreds of generations. Regardless of personal inclinations, individuals are obligated to participate. Second, it is problematic to assume that all practitioners of Totemism actually believe their religious claims. We propose an alternative explanation that accounts for the persistence of Totemism and that does not rely on an assumption that its practitioners are preliterate or naive because they have strange beliefs. We focus on Totemism as a cultural mechanism aimed at building and sustaining social relationships among close and distant kinsmen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describes the universality of ancestor worship. Characterization of belief in spirits of the dead; Outcome of survey on communication between ancestors and the living; Implications of rituals involving spirits of the departed.

Provides information on the means by which ancestors transmitted acquired phenotypic characteristics to their descendants using myths. Detailed information on Oedipus myth being used as an example; Interpretation of Oedipus's myth; Conclusion reached.

Examines ethnographic examples which were used to demonstrate the aspects of human kinship, focusing on evolutionary explanations of altruism. Definition of altruism; What are the proximate mechanisms of human kinship; Other information on the human social behavior.

The article presents information on the paper "Restaging the Will to Believe," by Thomas G. Kirsch published in the journal "American Anthropologist." Kirsch's paper exposes the difficulties of studying religious belief, but the reforms he suggests need to go even further. Kirsch emphasizes on the dynamic nature of religious behavior in the paper but his new terminology does not address the fundamental problem touched on -- but not solved -- in his paper. He is assumes that people do or do not possess a certain kind of talk, what he refers to as "my informants' assertions."

In this paper we present a reconceptualization of the social dimension of the human niche and the evolutionary process that brought it into existence. We agree with many other evolutionary approaches that a key aspect of the human niche is a social environment consisting primarily of cooperating and altruistic individuals, not a Hobbesian social environment of "war of all against all." However, in contrast to the conception of this social environment as consisting of individuals who, in Boyd and Richerson's words, "cooperate with large groups of unrelated individuals," we propose that it is more accurately described as consisting of cooperating individuals who currently are often nonkin but who, until relatively recently in human existence, were primarily, and in many cases almost exclusively, kin. In contrast to the conception of this social environment coming into existence by way of a process of selection within and between groups, we propose that it is the result of selection operating on traditions originated by ancestors and transmitted to their descendants. We use our fieldwork in three areas of the world (New Guinea, Ecuador, and Canada) to illustrate this process and how current social environments can be roughly placed on a continuum from traditional to nontraditional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]