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This paper provides a tentative reading of proposed English planning reform under the Labour government elected in July 2024. Key aspects of the agenda are reviewed, together with the proposed extension of an ongoing devolution and decentralisation programme. Labour’s reforms are characterised as the leading-edge of a generally cautious ‘new state capitalism’. Though there are similarities with previous ‘roll-out neoliberal’ arrangements under the New Labour governments from 1997 to 2010, the altered political-economic context will likely reinforce some distinctiveness in terms of the meaning and implementation of reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If anthropology once concerned itself with politics in stateless societies outside Euro-America over and against prevailing Euro-American political theory, today anthropologists see the state at work everywhere. Anthropologists have sought to trouble spatial metaphors of state power that assumed, among other things, its centralization and the unitary character of sovereignty. Locating the state through an attendant question of region, we explore recent literatures on everyday state practices in Central and Eastern Europe and South Asia to show how different regional histories and configurations of knowledge continue to structure our assumptions about the state and its functions as well as the grammar of our descriptions. We suggest that the state could prove to be a useful optic for the study of region, which provides an alternative to an overly rigid local/global dichotomy that continues to shadow our theorizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid increasing geopolitical tensions between Western powers and China over the alleged state-capitalist nature of Chinese corporate internationalization, European governments have introduced a set of political measures tightening their trade and investment regimes on grounds of national security and economic competitiveness. This article analyzes how this "geoeconomic turn" in Europe affected the internationalization of (state-backed) Chinese firms into Europe and hence the establishment of Sino-European corporate relations. With a focus on the Chinese ICT and automotive industries, we zoom in on corporate internationalization by distinguishing two modes: (a) outward foreign direct investments (greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions) and (b) the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) with European companies--a hitherto underexplored form of Sino-European corporate relations. Our analysis is predicated on a comprehensive dataset consolidating information on both modes of internationalization for the period 2000-2023. We show that, in relation to investment numbers, Chinese companies continue to expand into Europe, even if values are decreasing. We also find that the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) has not halted but increased in the wake of Europe's geoeconomic turn, indicating a further intensification of Sino-European corporate relations, though under the radar of tightening investment policies and mechanisms. When unpacking the variegated impact of the geoeconomic turn on Chinese companies' internationalization strategies in Europe, our study also finds, however, that its ramifications vary substantively-not only per sector but also among companies exposed to varying degrees of party-state permeation. Applying a novel fine-grained measure to party-state permeation, the article shows that the geoeconomic turn seems to have affected predominantly those leading Chinese firms with a high party-state exposure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been theorised as a spatial fix to China's overaccumulation problem, and as such, an implicitly productivist endeavour. This article opens up conceptual space to consider how historically and geographically mediated forms of financialisation have tempered the unfolding of the BRI in peripheral economies. Drawing on the Serbian post-socialist transition context, financialisation has been characterised by underinvestment and a persistent dependency on foreign, market-based capital inflows which have (1) precipitated state transformations to mobilise Chinese financing for BRI projects, strengthening the role of the state in industrial rejuvenation; and (2) created an institutional palimpsest conducive to non-productive forms of surplus value appropriation that demonstrates the hybridity of accumulation imperatives underlying the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic nationalism and state intervention recently gained attraction in many countries including Turkey. This paper questions whether Turkey has changed its economic policy framework towards a statecentric model and, if so, whether these changes are well thought-out and sustainable. The examination of key areas of state capitalism, that is the monetary, industrial, trade, financial, and state economic enterprise (SEE) policies put forward in the officially adopted five-year plans and annual programs, suggests that the changes in the economic policy framework began after the 2008 global crisis and accelerated after the transition to a presidential system. Upon examination, the policy framework does not reflect a definitive, coherent, and wholistic approach but rather a pragmatic attitude that swings back and forth, which exposes the country to swings in the global system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions can the state discipline private equity firms into delivering the investment required to meet the coming needs of industrial transformation? States have sought to crowd in private capital to finance industrial development, but the results have so far been less than satisfactory. Prevailing accounts of financial industry power largely characterise an arms-length state-finance relationship that has unfolded in private-led markets where private equity firms have contributed to the secular growth in non-productive economic activity. This article problematises the assumption of private-led markets and argues that state-led markets present a counterfactual in which the disbursement of public money entails strict policy discipline and tight embedding between the state and private equity firms, which provides the conditions for them to emerge as unlikely champions of industrial policy. Two cases of co-investment between Chinese and European sovereign wealth funds demonstrate the power dynamics at play. Where PE firms in the Sino-Irish co-investment facilitated the international scaling of Irish firms in China, the PE firms operating in Europe failed to embed Chinese firms into regional supply chains in the Sino-Belgian co-investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The persistent and increasing domination of the state in China's contemporary capitalist development leads many to apply the vague concept of state capitalism to China's economic model. Comparing China with the earlier Asian developmental states, I discuss the distinctiveness of China's state capitalism, underlined by the state's paternalistic disposition toward capital and the weakness in private property protection. I argue that the subordination of capital to the political imperative of the Communist party-state, as well as the party-state elite's explicit reference to the state's paternalistic discipline of capital in the Qing dynasty, illustrates a connection between today's statist economic model and Qing dynasty's familial statism, under which the Manchu state conceptualized and governed the empire as an imagined hierarchal-communalist patrilineage. Comparing and connecting state-capital relations in China's past and present will help us better understand the nature of economic governance in China today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea's state-guaranteed bond market was nearly half the size of its sovereign bond market in 2022, and in the early 2000s, it was nearly twice the size of the latter. What explains the overwhelming prominence of this fixed-income market? This paper finds that the prominence of this market is a path-dependent consequence of developmental legacies and the Asian Financial Crisis. State-guaranteed bonds allowed the state to circumvent conditionalities that limited the state's ability to access domestic savings for policy objectives and helped shield the newly established sovereign bond market from premature supply pressure. This finding demonstrates that the state not only supports or creates markets but also uses markets to maintain its influence against external pressure. It also explains how the South Korean state was able to maintain its developmental policies after market liberalisation by tracking the post-crisis flow of domestic savings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines Dunayevskaya's original but underappreciated contribution to Marxism as a body of theory and practice. Focusing specifically on her Marxist-Humanist 'ontology of struggle' in its various dimensions, it draws out her engagement with Marx such that a new, vitalised account of social transformation is elaborated. From her critique of labour and state capitalism to her account of the dual movement between practice and theory, to her attentiveness to the 'voices from below' and to the 'new passions and forces that develop in the bosom of society', a theory is elaborated that expands the traditional Marxian dialectic to the struggles of racialised groups, women and other minorities. In so doing, it offers a basis from which to re-appraise liberatory politics, and to renew the emancipatory thrust of Marx's writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'new' state capitalism has garnered increasing attention among scholars due to the emergence of a polymorphism of state interventions in recent years. These interventions are now being examined through a spatial lens, departing from the previously dominant methodological nationalism. In this case, the 'new' Chinese state capitalism is particularly noteworthy. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has adopted a spatial state-led strategy to facilitate the Renminbi (RMB) transnationalization. This strategic approach transcends traditional national boundaries, stretching across different spaces. Our research focuses on the specific case of Luxembourg in relation to this spatial strategy. We assert that the RMB transnationalization represents a distinctive feature of the 'new' Chinese state capitalism, as it is underpinned by explicit Chinese state policies, unlike other currencies whose global use was the result of growing economies. Moreover, we contend that the PRC's explicit policies regarding the RMB do not aim for full convertibility and widespread acceptance like the US-Dollar (USD). Instead, they prioritise its role as a trade currency for international trade settlements, as the main goal is to reduce the dependence on the USD and to create a stable International Monetary System (IMS) that will bring benefits to its trade-oriented economic model. Overall, this paper significantly contributes to the existing literature by offering a novel perspective on the RMB transnationalization within the framework of the 'new' Chinese state capitalism, emphasising China's quest for autonomy from the USD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Business Administration Quarterly / Kwartalnik Nauk o Przedsiebiorstwie is the property of SGH Warsaw School of Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines the rise of inequalities in developed countries and challenges the effectiveness of post-war redistribution policies in reducing these inequalities. It discusses philosopher John Rawls's critique of welfare state capitalism (WSC) and his proposal for a property-owning democracy (POD) as an alternative. The article explores criticisms of both WSC and Rawls's proposal, highlighting the importance of fighting inequalities to strengthen democratic societies. It suggests that a just welfare state should aim to empower citizens and increase social mobility, rather than solely providing assistance. [Extracted from the article]

As in other countries, regulated savings in France are intricately woven into dense regulatory frameworks driven by explicit governmental objectives. The anticipated marketization of the French economy should have eradicated them; however, a substantial portion of regulated savings has managed to evade this process. Is this phenomenon attributable to the tenacious grip of the French state-led tradition? Not entirely, as another subset of these savings has indeed undergone marketization. The landscape of French regulated savings is notably distinguished by a growing dichotomy: on one side, non-marketized products offered by banks, and on the other, increasingly marketized products provided by insurers. Drawing upon process tracing, we contend that these ostensibly conflicting developments emanate from the distinct and precise institutional dependencies between state and private actors in which these products are enmeshed. The prevailing status quo within the banking sector is owed to banks' engagement in a mutually advantageous, long-term exchange of favors with state actors. Faced with the trade-off between offering less lucrative products and risking the endangerment of this relationship, banks have opted for the former. In contrast, an assertive strategy has gained traction in the insurance industry. Yet, strategies for the marketization of regulated savings aligned with state priorities have been implemented, even when insurers expressed opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a transcript of a dialogue between faculty and students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the renowned "new leftist" Chinese intellectual, Wang Hui. The immediate theme of the discussion concerned the two major socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, namely the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Wang Hui's recent work asks how these revolutions and their associated processes problematize typically Eurocentric assumptions about "modernity." Relatedly, there has been a recent tendency to subsume the Soviet Union and Mao's China under the history of capitalism. Such revisionist readings of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions echo earlier Marxist arguments about "actually existing" socialism being a form of state capitalism. The various discussants develop different positions on this issue, but they in general affirm the idea that the socialist revolutions partially succeeded in creating an alternative to capitalism, and this legacy continues to be meaningful to our social imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly argued that China's foreign policy and behaviour have become increasingly assertive since Xi Jinping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This strategic transformation is seen as paving the way for a direct confrontation between China and the USA since the Trump presidency. Drawing on the logic of international order-building, however, this article argues that the groundwork for this strategic change was laid when Hu Jintao was leading the CCP and that what made it possible was George W. Bush's China and East Asia policy after 9/11. Bush's subsequent reduced interest in East Asia enabled China to fill the void left by an absence of US presence and influence in the region. This article asserts that American policy-makers may need to ponder what their order-building project to weaken and exclude an illiberal China should include. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid increasing geopolitical tensions between Western powers and China over the alleged state-capitalist nature of Chinese corporate internationalization, European governments have introduced a set of political measures tightening their trade and investment regimes on grounds of national security and economic competitiveness. This article analyzes how this “geoeconomic turn” in Europe affected the internationalization of (state-backed) Chinese firms into Europe and hence the establishment of Sino-European corporate relations. With a focus on the Chinese ICT and automotive industries, we zoom in on corporate internationalization by distinguishing two modes: (a) outward foreign direct investments (greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions) and (b) the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) with European companies—a hitherto underexplored form of Sino-European corporate relations. Our analysis is predicated on a comprehensive dataset consolidating information on both modes of internationalization for the period 2000–2023. We show that, in relation to investment numbers, Chinese companies continue to expand into Europe, even if values are decreasing. We also find that the formation of collaborative ties (strategic alliances and joint ventures) has not halted but increased in the wake of Europe’s geoeconomic turn, indicating a further intensification of Sino-European corporate relations, though under the radar of tightening investment policies and mechanisms. When unpacking the variegated impact of the geoeconomic turn on Chinese companies’ internationalization strategies in Europe, our study also finds, however, that its ramifications vary substantively—not only per sector but also among companies exposed to varying degrees of party-state permeation. Applying a novel fine-grained measure to party-state permeation, the article shows that the geoeconomic turn seems to have affected predominantly those leading Chinese firms with a high party-state exposure.

For many cities, the entry of financial actors into housing opens new geopolitical relations with overseas entities, including state-backed investors such as sovereign wealth funds. These transformations raise the question of the extent to which real estate enables the urbanisation of state capitalism, understood as the expansion of the state's role as promoter, supervisor, and owner of capital. Our paper answers this question through an analysis of Manchester Life, a residential real estate joint venture between Manchester City Council and the Abu Dhabi United Group, an investment firm linked to the Abu Dhabi royal family. In doing so it explores state capitalism as a form of extended urbanisation, with oil revenues from the Persian Gulf used to extract urban land rents in the Global North. It further highlights urban geopolitical implications, theorising Manchester Life as an organisational fix that reworks the geographies of value extraction while eroding democratic accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci's famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, we engage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises with a necessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by finance capital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulation around the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being marked by the ever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmospheric commons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentrated wealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological life through various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenous organising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternative internationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economy in practice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalism at the state, corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a 'planetary political economy of the global majority', which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological life according to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the scholarly debate on industrial relations (IR) transformation is inclined toward the conclusion that the IR transformation is bound to take place with changes in the surrounding business environment, we observe a few exceptions in each economy. The current study investigates one of such curious IR contexts, that is, the Indian coal sector. We rely on the 'logic of the action' framework and the IR transformation measures to assess the sector at an aggregate and micro level. The coal sector in India consists of a mix of both permanent and informal workforce. With respect to the permanent workforce, we analysed the collective bargaining agreements spanned over five decades (1975–2021). For the informal workforce, we analysed the recommendations of the HPC on wages and working conditions, the provisions of relevant legislation, internal circulars of coal companies and important judicial pronouncements. Our analyses revealed vast differences in wages and working conditions between the permanent and informal workforce. Despite a significant decline in the permanent workforce, they could negotiate better terms as the growing size of the informal workforce was yet to form a collective bargaining mechanism for better wages and working conditions. These results are indicative of a paradox which needs to be explored further. Our study advances the thesis of adaptive state capitalism in the coal sector through functional and numerical flexibility despite a politicised multi‐union model in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on critiquing Ryan Murphy's stance on the developmental state in Singapore, emphasizing the importance of understanding the concept of developmental state capitalism and its broader implications in academic literature and policy practice. It argues that Murphy's response overlooks the essence of the earlier argument and demonstrates a lack of comprehension regarding the nature of developmental state capitalism.

As China has emerged as a great economic power in the 21st century, comparativists and China scholars have sought to explore the characteristics of China's statist development model. Most accounts, however, have not taken seriously the policy implications of China's macroeconomic imbalance and its tendency to overproduction since the mid‐1990s. This article examines China's industrial‐policy‐centred responses to waves of overproduction crises from the late 1990s to the 2010s. China's expansive industrial policy incorporates demand‐side macroeconomic policy and long‐term planning for upgrading. This policy framework, designed to preserve the status quo, has been inherently lopsided, and has only served to reproduce China's macroeconomic imbalance. In the context of this persistent imbalance, China's industrial‐policy‐centred responses have contributed to periodic investment expansion of the state sector relative to the private sector, deepening ambitions around upgrading, and growing controversies regarding its statist model. In short, the statist features of China's economy have been periodically amplified by its particular responses to overproduction. This research shows that far from a statist shift engineered by President Xi Jinping, China's recent statist tendency has deeper historical and structural‐macroeconomic roots. This implies that the Chinese state adjusted and intensified its state interventions just as it underwent a profound process of marketization in the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the end of the Cold War, the vocabulary of global power, space and economy received a qualitative update. Amongst the terms rapidly gaining prominence since the early 1990s has been the notion of geoeconomics, the coining of which has frequently been attributed to the strategist Edward N. Luttwak. In his interpretation, it signified a transition away from Cold War ideological and military geopolitical competition towards commerce and market‐based geo‐power. Over the past three decades, a 'geoeconomics boom' set in, characterised by think tanks and a varied body of politico‐economic literature making extensive use of the term. Conventionally treated as a neologism, the provenance and earlier iterations of geoeconomics, some dating back more than a century, have been largely ignored by both celebratory and critical accounts. In this paper, we trace and contextualise these earlier instances, leading us to the Geopolitik era in Germany and references to geoeconomics in the United States in the decades after WWII. We thereby offer a critical genealogy of geoeconomics, conceptualised as an object of definitional struggle. Proponents of the term sought to position it variously as a tool of national economic cohesion and competition or as a way of understanding and harnessing shifting global power relations, whilst others sought to subsume geoeconomics to geopolitics. These past struggles track forward into ongoing dialectical tensions between geoeconomics and geopolitics as competing but related geostrategic visions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the spatial history of agrarian capitalism in the state of Veracruz, Mexico, through the lens of a French farming colony on the Nautla river. While, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this region's rural landscapes were ostensibly redesigned at the hand of liberal state programs and capitalist desires, a closer look shows a more checkered reality. Using textual and geographic archives, my analysis examines the tensions and "cracks" that emerged in this process of economic "modernization," with an eye for the fugitive histories fashioned by French colonists in the face of capitalist abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to critically discuss the foreign policy of communist Romania, especially towards Western Europe and the socialist bloc. It does this firstly by reviewing Elena Dragomir's recent ample analyses of communist Romania's foreign policy. Its second section consists in a critical problematization of the allegedly "pragmatic" and "adaptative" nature of communist Romania's dealings with its Western and Eastern partners, as established both by Dragomir's recent contributions, as well as the traditional scholarship. The paper ends with some more general methodological and conceptual reflections on the role, weight, and meaning of "pragmatism," "realism," "context" and "ideology" in historiographical reconstructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their liabilities have been extensively examined in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to how SOEs overcome such liabilities and even flourish in a market transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. This study explores how China's SOEs continue to thrive in a system where state and market logics co-exist. The state appears to arrange an institutional field favoring SOEs, which are likely to transact and interact with co-located market-based firms, from which they acquire market logic elements through knowledge spillover. Three different market-based forms—previous SOEs that have been privatized, new privately owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises—enhance the survival chances of SOEs. Each market-based form is established for different reasons and operate through different processes, incorporating market logic elements and developing the ease of communication that affect how SOEs obtain market logic elements. Furthermore, government affiliation and industry structure generate different levels of support and demands for SOEs, and thus not all SOEs benefit equally from obtaining market logic elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the limits of central industrial planning through a case study of Singapore. While previous Austrian scholars have argued that successful industrial planning is impossible, and that its successes (if any) are limited to the resolution of technical problems, the positive economic record of Singapore under the auspices of its developmental state capitalism poses a strong challenge to these market-oriented perspectives. In response, I present a modest position. I concede that Singapore's industrial policy has to some extent contributed to genuine economic development but insist that its state-heavy approach has nonetheless hampered the market's entrepreneurial discovery by stifling local entrepreneurial talent and crowding out local small-medium enterprises. The top-down model has also limited the economy's adaptive potential. I draw from productivity, entrepreneurship, and innovation data to make my case and conclude that Singapore's experience with its developmental state model comes with a significant cost, notwithstanding its impressive achievements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the contextual role of public procurement for the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that partaking in procurement can erode grant effectiveness by relaxing a firm's preexisting financial constraints and diverting managerial attention away from market-centered resource configurations. To test our hypothesis, we use detailed firm-level data from Slovenia and combine matching with difference-in-differences. When firms are not involved in procurement, all investigated types of grants meet the intended policy goals, apart from productivity growth. In contrast, when firms participate in procurement, small-business grants exhibit generally weaker effects, R&D grants fail to have any impact, and employment grants lastingly reduce firm productivity. Given that public procurement occupies a large footprint in many economies, our analysis highlights an unintended adverse by-product of big government and underscores the limits of state capitalism. Plain English Summary: This study explores how public procurement shapes the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. If procurement loosens firm's preexisting financial constraints or induces businesses to prioritize contracting with the government over other market opportunities, then public procurement could reduce the effectiveness of government grants. Empirical evidence from Slovenia supports this perspective. When firms do not partake in procurement, all examined types of grants achieve their intended policy goals, except for productivity growth. However, when firms are involved in public procurement, the effectiveness of the grants diminishes dramatically: small-business grants have weaker effects in general, R&D grants do not exert any impact, and employment grants decrease firm productivity. Thus, the principal implication of this study is that public procurement can hamper the effectiveness of grants-based entrepreneurship policy. The research also contributes to the understanding of the unintended consequences of big government and the limitations of state capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Corona pandemic has led to the deepest economic slump since World War II. Economic crises in the past have often led to a change of direction in the development of capitalism. What are the consequences of the Corona crisis? How do experts and policy advisors articulate the desirable steps for economic recovery? This review essay takes stock of some 20 books published since 2020 on the topic of corona and the economy, in economics, critical social studies, political economy, and related disciplines. Even if many books avoid clear statements on the further development of our economic system, a common leitmotif can be identified. It is very clear that a less liberal economic system is expected in the near future. In any case, most of the analyses see the state as being significantly strengthened, as it will again intervene more strongly in the economy in the future, not only for social and economic stabilization after the pandemic but also in combating climate change. Whether this change will also translate into more social security and less inequality, however, remains unclear.

AbstractChina’s “economic juggernaut” is often noted to have arisen from successful market reforms carried out in the context of high state capacity. In contrast, we demonstrate that crucial reforms to replace central planning with markets have stalled as a result of major barriers of two types: institutional and ideational. Focusing on the electricity sector, we find that market reforms pushed by China’s central government are hindered by deep inefficiencies that arise from the legacy plan and “plan-derived” institutions of subnational governments and grid companies, against which the central state has been largely ineffective. We also uncover fascinating ideational differences of the nature and purpose of “markets” that show how they often are envisioned more as a way to extend the planner’s “toolbox,” or to offer “salvation” for ailing incumbent firms, rather than to induce efficiency. Our empirical focus on three prominent types of “market-oriented” experiments in the electric power sector demonstrate clear limits to state capacity, limits that emanate from state actors rather than merely industry, despite high-priority central government goals of increasing efficiency, integrating renewable energy, and reducing emissions from the electricity sector.

"The State of Capitalism: Economy, Society and Hegemony" by Costas Lapavitsas and the EReSEP Writing Collective is a book that examines the expansion of financialization after the 2008 financial crisis and its implications for contemporary economic discourse in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors argue that core countries use fiscal policy instruments to exert hegemonic power over peripheral states, disciplining labor and capital interactions internationally. The book draws on Marxist theory and historical and theoretical literature to critique financialized capitalism as an extension of capitalist imperialism. It also explores the role of the United States in financialized accumulation and the global framework of financial capitalist imperialism. The authors conclude by calling for left political engagement to challenge capitalist hegemony and address inequalities based on race, class, sexuality, and gender. This book is a valuable resource for scholars studying financialization and Marxist political economy. [Extracted from the article]

Two rival visions of Europe's place in the world economy competed for primacy throughout the post-war era. The idea of an 'Atlantic Europe' promoted close economic ties to the United States and integration into the liberal international order. An alternative 'Fortress Europe' vision aimed to carve out a sphere of relative European autonomy backed by trade barriers and industrial protectionism. While many argued that the 'Fortress Europe' vision was defeated during the globalization of the 1990s and 2000s, concepts such as economic sovereignty, industrial strategy and 'strategic autonomy' have returned to EU circles. Is a rebuilding of 'Fortress Europe' taking place in this context? This paper argues that the old tension between 'Atlantic' and 'Fortress' Europe is re-emerging but in a new form and under a new set of international conditions. A 'selective fortification' of European industrial strategy and trade policy is taking shape, as EU policymakers develop targeted instruments and institutional capacities that aim to insulate European firms from new patterns of international competition. The selective refortification of European capitalism has implications for debates within international political economy (IPE) on the future of liberal international order, new patterns of competitive regionalization, and the restructuring of the relation between the state and global capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was created in the early 1990s to promote the transition to a market economy and advance democracy in the post-communist countries of East Central Europe. How and why did this international organization, established for an entirely different purpose, then become an active investor in Egypt? Building on field theory, we explain the EBRD's move to Egypt as an attempt to overcome the hysteresis effect of its anachronistic operational logic (habitus) within a changing field. Once in Egypt, the EBRD aspired to leverage its symbolic capital of technical assistance, democratic commitment and the privileging of the private sector. However, given Egypt's increasingly autocratic and state capitalist evolution, it found delivering on its symbolic capital problematic. Its solution was to adapt to the very active European development finance field's modalities. However, the European field's logic ultimately de-prioritized democracy, human rights promotion, and poverty reduction and instead focused on sustainable investment, migration mitigation and containing Europe's geo-economic rivals. In our case study, we demonstrate that the EBRD operated deftly within this field, while it also gained permission and even reward for its mandate management. It is a problematic finding for the future of the EU development policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores 'territories of accelerated development' (TORs) to reconstruct the economic policy-making, development institutions and macroeconomic framework of late Putinism since the 2010s. It argues that even with Russia's integration into the world economy and the developmental rhetoric of state elites, TORs and the national developmental regime around them reproduce the patronal management and recycling of rents rather than the transformative and state-permeated facilitation of productive investments and capitalist profits. This upscaling of rents has been systemic. The result—rentierism—challenges common understandings of rent-seeking and commodity rents as incidental features of Russian 'state capitalism', and, instead places them at the centre of a non-capitalist order of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Londongrad is at once a place, a process and a paradox. As a place, it refers to the manifold ways in which London has acquired a reputation for being a safe harbour for dirty money largely on account of a secure system of property rights, a cluster of professional enablers and a neoliberal politics that actively cultivated it. As a process, it illustrates the premier role that London plays in the global system of secrecy jurisdictions. As a paradox it signals the bizarre alignment of two nominally opposed systems, authoritarian state capitalism in Russia and neoliberal capitalism in the UK. Before the war in Ukraine, it was tacitly assumed that Londongrad was impervious to reform because no single political jurisdiction had the reach or the remit to confront this baroque system. Dismantling Londongrad is therefore a belated attempt to regulate the dark geography of dirty money. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Corona pandemic has led to the deepest economic slump since World War II. Economic crises in the past have often led to a change of direction in the development of capitalism. What are the consequences of the Corona crisis? How do experts and policy advisors articulate the desirable steps for economic recovery? This review essay takes stock of some 20 books published since 2020 on the topic of corona and the economy, in economics, critical social studies, political economy, and related disciplines. Even if many books avoid clear statements on the further development of our economic system, a common leitmotif can be identified. It is very clear that a less liberal economic system is expected in the near future. In any case, most of the analyses see the state as being significantly strengthened, as it will again intervene more strongly in the economy in the future, not only for social and economic stabilization after the pandemic but also in combating climate change. Whether this change will also translate into more social security and less inequality, however, remains unclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of current debates on development problems, it is very common to speak of economic transition, of the causes of social crises and to blame, only, national states with internal policies that prevent them from advancing to higher forms of material and spiritual growth, exonerating the great powers and the most important centers of economic and financial power from all kinds of influences. In this sense, even when is visible that most of the analyzes on these issues ignore the struggle sun leashed, historically, with in the socialist experiences and the tribulations because they went through to overcome the agro-industrial and social backwardness in general, it seems convenient to return to the original Marxism and to the practical experience of Lenin, to re-evaluate some of his most important theoretical-methodological contributions and determine which of these could be useful to us today in order to overcome under development. It is precisely what this paper proposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Socio-Jurídicos is the property of Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

By introducing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an international infrastructure investment strategy, China attracted a lot of attention. China's approach to state capitalism has opened a window of opportunity for other infrastructure investment strategies. In response, the world's largest and liberally minded economies, such as the United States of America, Japan, and the European Union, have focused on connectivity and embarked on similar strategies. In this article, I conduct a comparative analysis of infrastructure investment strategies. I analyze key tenets of the BRI and international responses through the prism of principles, priorities, funding, financing, governance, and implementation. The comparison of strategies highlights more commonalities than differences, and I identify several instances in which liberal economies act in contradiction to their variety of capitalism. The results suggest that China has opened a window of opportunity for proactive infrastructure investment strategies, and major economies have responded in kind. With overlapping emphases in similar geographic regions, these strategies lead to competition. Consequently, recipient countries profit from an advantageous negotiating position when seeking to attract foreign direct investment in infrastructure projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG) is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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We conduct a large-scale, nondeceptive field experiment to elicit preferences for government participation in China's venture capital and private equity market. Our main result is that the average firm dislikes investors with government ties. We show that such dislike is not present with government-owned firms and that this dislike is highest with best-performing firms. Additional results and surveys suggest that political interference in decision-making is the leading reason why government investors are unattractive to private firms. Overall, our findings point to the limits of a model of "state capitalism" that strongly relies on the complementarity between private firms and government capital to drive high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Chinese state capitalism may be transitioning towards a technology-assisted variant that we call "surveillance state capitalism." The mechanism driving this development is China's corporate social credit system (CSCS) – a data-driven project to evaluate the "trustworthiness" of all business entities in the country. In this paper, we provide the first empirical analysis of CSCS scores in Zhejiang province, as the Zhejiang provincial government is to date the only local government to publish the scores of locally registered firms. We find that while the CSCS is ostensibly a means of measuring legal compliance, politically connected firms receive higher scores. This result is driven by a "social responsibility" category in the scoring system that valorizes awards from the government and contributions to causes sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party. Our analysis underscores the potential of the CSCS to nudge corporate fealty to party-state policy and provides an early window into the far-reaching potential implications of the CSCS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorist Lauren Berlant defines inconvenience as an affect, one exerted by dominant forces onto subordinate populations. In the same way subordinate populations exert inconvenient affects as well, creating a dynamic of dominant and subordinate inconvenience through which social power relationships may be understood. Following this structure, this article charts the dominant and subordinate affects exerted by capitalism and trans* bodies, respectively, and how capitalist oppression responds to and shapes trans* embodiment. Through an autotheoretical lens, this relationship is here examined in the 2020 film Possessor and the 2015 film Tangerine, highlighting the points of interaction between trans*ness and capitalism's state structures of domination and oppression. Ultimately, I point to trans* joy as an affect that presents a danger to capitalism's domination, providing space for trans* persons to thrive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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