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Many approaches to political education take it to involve the construction of particular sections of the curriculum in which political matters are addressed -- named perhaps "civics" or "citizenship education". While these approaches have often been beneficial, they are all also problematic and controversial in some degree. Moreover, it is sometimes said that political education operates across a wide range of what happens in educational institutions -- for example, in the ways of behaving that are promoted inside and outside the classroom, in the general ethos of the school or college, and through its marking of significant dates or events. The approach adopted in this paper takes a more radical line, however, in that it resists the restriction of the political that these approaches assume. This is not to argue for the mobilization of schools and other educational institutions as instruments of politics. It is rather to try to show that matters of political significance are pervasive in the curriculum. The substance of the curriculum is an expression of what the culture takes to be important and of the values that the culture wishes to pass on. The fostering of those values must have some effect on the kind of society that is then promoted, and indeed this must be inherent in the aims of education.

Much thinking in psychology and related forms of psychotherapy is in the grip of a conception of inner-outer relationships that distorts the reality of our lives and world. In his later work, and in the last years of his life especially, Wittgenstein battled against this. In the course of his criticism, he developed vivid images that challenge this picture, revealing its limitations and opening the way to better understanding. Although 70 years have passed since Wittgenstein died, it remains the case that psychology and psychotherapy can be strengthened through more careful attention to his criticism. The present discussion endeavours to show why and how this is so.

The present discussion is motivated by a broad sympathy for the educational commitments that run through René Arcilla's "Wim Wenders's Road Movie Philosophy" (2020). His framing of these commitments is imaginative, as is the invitation to Wenders' films that the book provides. It is, however, with attention to the figures of the frame and the line that I call into question some aspects of the account, especially regarding its conceptions of time and narrative, and of the relation of the photographic still to the moving image. While appreciative of Arcilla's faith in education and of the importance of film in this, I endeavour to show that a liberal education can be more broadly and more practically conceived than Arcilla is ready to suggest. I try to show how this might be done.

Curiosity has rightly received much attention in epistemology and educational research. Although, through the centuries, it has been regarded with a degree of ambivalence, the trend now is towards its championing as an intellectual or epistemic virtue. The present discussion juxtaposes it against a contrasting way of knowing, which I refer to as knowledge by acquaintance. The notion of acquaintance pursued here parts company with Bertrand Russell's adoption of the expression, taking up instead a more ordinary use of the term. It is suggested that both curiosity and knowledge by acquaintance can present problems. Working through an example drawn from Stephen Poliakoff's film "Close My Eyes," the paper seeks to reappraise the value of knowing by acquaintance for epistemology and for educational practice and research.

The climate crisis is of a severity that fills many with a sense of hopelessness. The modest steps that ordinary citizens can take to reduce energy consumption and waste seem futile in relation to the massive changes that are needed from governments and industry, and inertia often results. The responses of philosophy and education have been conscientious and constructive in many respects, but again these endeavours are overwhelmed by the intransigence of economic interests. Perhaps because of this, such responses are in danger of becoming self-referential expressions of right-mindedness or nostalgic appeals for a simpler, more natural world. The discourse betrays signs of exhaustion--an exhaustion that seems to match the exhausted condition of the planet. The present discussion offers no easy solutions but asks what might be the best way to live in relation to such circumstances and how education might contribute to this.

The topic of testimony has gained increased prominence in recent years in epistemology, where it is typically taken to refer to the possible acquisition of knowledge through the understanding and acceptance of someone else's judgement. There is no doubt that learning in this way is a prominent feature of education. This conception of testimony contrasts, however, with the more restricted way in which it is commonly understood: everyday usage situates the concept in such contexts as places of worship and courts of law. Testimony in these contexts is likely to be seen by the epistemologist as a special case of testimony in the wider sense, but is this accurate? With reference to contrasting traditions in philosophy and drawing on examples from film and literature, this paper considers the relationship between the epistemological and the everyday senses of testimony, exploring the significance of these matters for questions of teaching and learning as well as for the understanding of language as a whole.

Educational research is subject to orthodoxies of old and novel kinds. The 'foundations' approach risks becoming stuck in footnotes to received ideas, while new-fangled disciplines seek to legitimate themselves in jargon and deference to new 'authorities'. The critical deficit in both tendencies obstructs responsible enquiry. I begin by sketching the weaknesses and the potential of the foundations approach and go on to identify a range of threats to this potential. The first and major concern is the rise of empiricism, understood as the view that it is only through empirical enquiry that research into education can take place. A second concern is the dominance of English in educational research, in relation not only to the inevitable unfairness this brings in opportunities for publication but also to the substance of thought and enquiry. Exploration of the key terms in David Bridges' '"Rigour", "discipline" and the "systematic" in educational research': and why they matter' (this issue) frames the discussion, raising questions of inter- and multi-disciplinarity. There is an internal relation between discipline, rigour and coherence, and these, though not systematicity, are requirements of argument. The notion of disciplined thought is prised apart from distorted conceptions of rigour and over-reliance on procedure.

In 'Levinas: Ethics or Mystification?' (Miller, 2017), Alistair Miller presents a searing indictment of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and a dismissal of claims for its importance for education. He provides a summary account of Levinas's philosophy and, in relation to this, refers briefly to a number of authors who have related Levinas's work to education. This account is at fault, however, in fundamental ways, and this leads to errors in the conclusions that he draws. The present short paper does not attempt to address these problems in the round but rather focuses on a particular aspect of his phrasing in constructing the account, taking this as a significant pointer to the nature of the misinterpretation as a whole.

This paper considers the contemporary prominence of the concept of social justice and identifies two influential strands of thought that currently affect thinking about education: John Rawls' notion of justice as fairness and a more emancipatory conception typified by critical pedagogy. With this prominence the term has gathered a rhetorical force and been subject to ideological degeneration. The paper goes on to consider ways in which the notion of social justice has been "borrowed", especially in the light of the hegemony of English in the international research field. Further colonising consequences are examined, with reference to the work of Naoki Sakai, in relation to the development of notions of subjectivity and identity, in what might be described as a new "Occidentalism". In conclusion, the emphasis on cooperation in Rawls is contrasted with a notion of conversation found in Stanley Cavell and Ralph Waldo Emerson. This is epitomised by values of receptivity, openness, and resourcefulness, and is suggestive of a more Eastern sensibility. (Contains 5 notes.)

This paper begins with the 'ancient quarrel' between philosophy and literature, which, with the subsequent splitting of "logos" into word and reason, comes to mark philosophy's self-conception and much other thinking besides--compartmentalising, in the process, what is understood by 'literature'. Philosophy, thus separated becomes atemporal and abstract, preoccupied with propositions rather than statements or sentences, and, in some of its incarnations, aligning itself with science. Language, thus separated, becomes 'literary'--that is, it comes to be epitomised by self-consciousness about literary form and style; and a casualty of this is the 'poetic', a term whose origins in "poiesis" (production of meaning) are forgotten. But the relationship has never been as settled as it may have seemed, and a series of examples from classical and contemporary philosophy and literature helps to demonstrate this. At stake in these examples are the ways in which reason requires that one means what one says. A classic expression of commitment to this view is provided in "Hamlet," by the much-quoted words of Polonius to his son, who is about to travel to Germany to study philosophy: 'This above all, to thine own self be true'. The implications of this in relation to the claims of reason are developed with reference to moral education and the development of judgement for learners and teachers.

Stefan Ramaekers and Joris Vlieghe's "Infants, childhood and language in Agamben and Cavell: education as transformation" is an insightful discussion of an important facet of educational experience. In the article, they consider a Fred Astaire dance sequence from the 1953 Vincente Minnelli film, "The Band Wagon," in combination with a remarkable article about this same sequence by Stanley Cavell. On the strength of this, they develop an interesting line of thought regarding the experience of language, exploring connections between the ideas of Cavell and Agamben. Rich and thought-provoking though their discussion is, I find that it deflects attention from the most important aspects of the film sequence and the literature that has developed in response--specifically regarding questions of race and praise. The present discussion attempts to address these matters.