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Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Return on investment (ROI) and residual income (RI) are two important accounting measures that are commonly used to evaluate managers' performance, and evidence suggests that both ROI and RI can help motivate long-term investments. Research is limited, though, regarding whether ROI and RI differentially affect managers' actions, and, more specifically, research has not examined the effects of ROI and RI on risk-taking. We conduct an experiment to examine the separate and interactive effects of individuals' risk preferences and ROI and RI performance measures on risk-taking in capital investment decisions. We predict and find that the use of ROI as a performance measure leads to riskier choices, as compared with RI, and that this effect is concentrated in relatively more risk-averse individuals. We also provide process evidence that reveals some of the ways in which ROI and RI performance measures affect decision making. Collectively, our results contribute to literature examining the effects of accounting information and performance measures on managers' risk-taking behaviors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: Financial support from the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: Data files are available at https://doi.org/mnsc.2022.4398. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper, we experimentally investigate the effects of budget-based contracts and budget levels (performance targets) on group performance. We compare a group piece-rate contract with two different specifications [...]

We present a framework for integrating profit variance analysis and capacity costing to provide better managerial information. The framework expands traditional variance analysis to incorporate planned and unplanned changes in [...]

We conduct an experiment to examine the effects of multi-level group identification on intergroup helping behavior. We predict and find that stronger identification with a sub-group and a superordinate group—separately and interactively—increase helping behavior. We provide evidence that the relationships between stronger identification and helping behavior operate in part through increased salience of superordinate group boundaries, perceived potential benefits to one's own group of intergroup helping, and positive affect. Collectively, our findings illustrate the importance of understanding how individuals identify with the different groups naturally present in organizations and highlight how identification can be used as an informal control to motivate important organizational behaviors. Such an understanding can help firms determine the best organizational hierarchy, develop communication and control strategies to build identification at appropriate levels, and establish evaluation and compensation systems that measure and reward outcomes in a manner that accounts for these group effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to determine whether the manner in which income is obtained (earned vs. endowed) affects the relation between tax [...]

Abstract: Management accounting information plays an important role in motivating individuals to improve performance (cf., Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young 1997). This role tends to be operationalized by linking compensation [...]

Participative budgeting allows superiors to elicit private information from subordinates, which, in turn, should enable superiors to make better decisions. Self-interested subordinates, however, may bias their budget reports for personal gain, thereby reducing the value of their budget reports to superiors. One potential way to affect subordinates' budget reports is through the framing of the budget request. Another factor that may affect subordinates' budget reports is which party sets the budget. In our study, we examine three different budget frames (honest, fair, and preferred) and whether the subordinate or the superior sets the budget. We find that the framing of the budget does not result in differences in overall slack. Moreover, we find that subordinates' reports have more slack when superiors set the budget than when subordinates set the budget. Furthermore, many budgets are rejected by subordinates when superiors set the budget and, as a result, superiors' welfare is actually greater when subordinates set the budget than when superiors set the budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a summary of articles related to taxation, published in the March 2001 issue of "The Journal of the American Taxation Association".