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Over the past three decades, the literature on the Reagan era has grown steadily. What really was Reagan's agenda and what eventually proved to be his personal role in the processes of ending the Cold War?. [Extracted from the article]

If we allow such a connection (i.e. as we do when we argue that the Soviet collapse was a "good thing" since the USSR was a monstrosity), then we may be called upon to follow this logic to the end and welcome the break-up of Putin's Russia, since it has embraced the same mechanisms of oppression once held dear by the Soviet authorities, and in this regard is a successor to the USSR and ruled by a repressive regime. A first hint at the danger Yeltsin and the Russian government might pose to the Soviet state came with Russia's declaration of sovereignty from the USSR on 12 June 1990. And, certainly under Putin, Russia has sought to gradually re-extend its control over key parts of the former USSR (most coercively in Ukraine/Crimea, Transnistria and South Ossetia).[56] Given this dichotomy, between how the Soviet Union's disappearance was perceived in 1991-2 and how it is presented officially in Russia today, we must ask: is Putin's apocalyptic interpretation historically merited? For example, between 1990-1, the government of the RSFSR, a key republic in the Soviet Union, was encouraging Union-owned enterprises and institutions located in Russia to change their jurisdiction to Russia. Aven's fellow reformer Anatolii Chubais echoed his former colleague's thoughts in a parallel interview: 'From that moment it was necessary to work on reforming Russia, not the USSR'.[80] From the perspective of Chubais, Aven and other former reformers of the late Soviet economy, by the final years of the USSR there was no doubt about the bankruptcy of the Soviet system: "disgusting lies from the first to the last word", as Chubais put it.[81] Hollowed out and unable to fulfil its promises of achieving, the USSR's socialist economy was sooner or later doomed; the question was how and in what circumstances this collapse might occur. [Extracted from the article]

Between them, the chancellorships of the “two Helmuts” span nearly a quarter-century of German history. Helmut Schmidt led the country from 1974 to 1982; his successor, Helmut Kohl, served until 1998. But the verdict on their respective tenures has been very different. Kohl was seen as a bumbling provincial when he came to office in 1982 but, by the end of his second term, he had won a place in the history books as the “Chancellor of Unity” (Einheitskanzler). By the time he lost the election for what would have been his fifth term, he was hailed as the “master-builder” (Baumeister) of Europe for his decisive role in furthering the European Community's political and economic integration through the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the Euro. Schmidt, by contrast, came to office with a reputation for high administrative competence and intellectual prowess, but left the chancellery under a cloud. Der Spiegel spoke for many commentators when it dismissed him as a “good chancellor with a bad record”; few features of his period in office stood out as “proof of success.” Schmidt, it was said, had been a mere crisis manager and “problem-solver” (Macher) who lacked broader vision, so that “little endured of historical significance.” This has also been the verdict of many historians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]