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In the last few weeks, a great deal of nonsense has been said about the concept of the Spitzenkandidat. Some accuse the European Parliament of a power grab, subrogating the lawful role of the European Council in choosing the new Commission President. Others trivialise the role of the Parliament and doubt the democratic credentials of the process. Many believe that the candidate must always be drawn from the largest party come what may. All these assertions are wrong. The election of the Commission President is a joint endeavour between Parliament and Commission, democratically legitimate, and fully in conformity with EU law.

Televised debates represent an integral part of election campaigns and with the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten process also became part of the European Parliament (EP) elections campaign. Various characteristics of EP elections such as a generally lower (perceived) relevance of and participation in the elections, and also the relatively unknown lead candidates running for Commission President assign TV debates a crucial role to inform European citizens and assist them in their voting decision. Focusing on the second edition of the 'Eurovision debate' during the 2019 EP elections campaign, this article examines the impact of debate exposure on both the decision to turn out and party choice. The study uses original flash survey data collected after the debate in five countries (DE, DK, ES, HU, NL). These data are part of a larger panel-survey study, which allows to examine immediate effects in the days after the debate and also for the eventual decision on Election Day. Although citizens' debate exposure varies considerably across countries, and watchers further differ in their evaluations of the candidate performances, the results show a surprisingly negative effect of debate exposure on turnout, especially among more interested citizens, and basically no effects on party choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we show how exposure to debates primes specific candidate assessments as key factors of candidate appraisal. To fulfil this goal, we rely on quasi-experimental data collected in 24 European Union Member States and focus on a debate starred by largely unknown candidates (the 2014 European Spiztenkandidaten) engaged in a remarkably invisible campaign. Our results show that candidate perceptions become much more important factors of general candidate appraisal after the debate in the case of three out of the five lead candidates, namely those whose image benefitted from their participation in the debate. In several cases, personal likeability became more important in the general assessment of the Spitzenkandidaten, but there was also an increased relevance of the perceptions of leadership strength (Keller) and quality of the ideas to stimulate the European economy (Schulz and Tspiras). Moreover, in the cases of Schulz, Keller, and Tsipras, post-exposure candidate perceptions impacted more their general appraisal by participants without previous knowledge of them than by those who claimed to know them before the debate. Interestingly, leadership strength appraisal was more relevant for the former than for the latter participants. In short, by unveiling these patterns, this article not only provides evidence of the priming effects of debate exposure but also illustrates how such effects may vary according to citizens' previous knowledge and the candidates' general performance in the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Research has demonstrated how the European Parliament has expanded its powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions by strategically exploiting powers it already holds and appealing to its contribution to democratic legitimacy. However, established theories are challenged by the failure of the EP to secure the election of a so-called Spitzenkandidat to the post of European Commission President in 2019. Was this failure an incidental set-back or does it point to a structural limit to the EP's ability to expand its powers? Exploring the latter option, this article proposes that the 2019 events warrant the revision of the EP-centred parliamentarisation thesis that dominates our understanding of EU inter-institutional politics. Instead, it develops an alternative theory that departs from the conception of the EU as a demoi-cracy. Using the events in 2014 and 2019, the article constructs analytical narratives for both theoretical positions. Reading the 2019 case through the demoi-cratic perspective suggests that national leaders are unlikely to allow the EP to reclaim the Spitzenkandidaten-process. More generally, it follows from this perspective that the EP can only successfully get the member states to share powers, not to cede them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we show how exposure to debates primes specific candidate assessments as key factors of candidate appraisal. To fulfil this goal, we rely on quasi-experimental data collected in 24 European Union Member States and focus on a debate starred by largely unknown candidates (the 2014 European Spiztenkandidaten) engaged in a remarkably invisible campaign. Our results show that candidate perceptions become much more important factors of general candidate appraisal after the debate in the case of three out of the five lead candidates, namely those whose image benefitted from their participation in the debate. In several cases, personal likeability became more important in the general assessment of the Spitzenkandidaten, but there was also an increased relevance of the perceptions of leadership strength (Keller) and quality of the ideas to stimulate the European economy (Schulz and Tspiras). Moreover, in the cases of Schulz, Keller, and Tsipras, post-exposure candidate perceptions impacted more their general appraisal by participants without previous knowledge of them than by those who claimed to know them before the debate. Interestingly, leadership strength appraisal was more relevant for the former than for the latter participants. In short, by unveiling these patterns, this article not only provides evidence of the priming effects of debate exposure but also illustrates how such effects may vary according to citizens’ previous knowledge and the candidates’ general performance in the debate.

The article deals with the result of the European Parliament elections of May 2019. European policy has been dominated for a long time by two political families, center-right and left but this coalition has been replaced by one that includes also a new European political party, Renew Europe. The fragmentation of the national political spectrum, the emergence of a new cleavage (sovereignists – globalists) gave way to the fragmentation of the European political spectrum. This is called “overlapping fragmentation” that have a double meaning (fragmentation at the European level determine fragmentation at the national level). The “overlapping fragmentation” is the ground for an updated procedure spitzenkandidaten, that is named spitzenkandidaten 2.0. Another consequence is the change of the FrenchGerman engine with many medium power engines were different Member States take part.

How transnational are European Parliament (EP) campaigns? Building on research on the European public sphere and the politicisation of the EU, this study investigates to what extent the 2019 EP campaign was transnational and which factors were associated with 'going transnational'. It conceptualises Twitter linkages of EP candidates as constitutive elements of a transnational campaign arena distinguishing interactions with EP candidates from other countries (horizontal transnationalisation) and interactions with the supranational European party families and lead candidates (vertical transnationalisation). The analysis of tweets sent by EP candidates from all 28 member states reveals that most linkages remain national. Despite this evidence for the second-order logic, there are still relevant variations contingent on EU positions of parties, the adoption of the Spitzenkandidaten system and socialisation in the EP. The findings have implications for debates on the European public sphere and institutional reform proposals such as transnational party lists that might mitigate the EU's democratic deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how Europarties selected lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) for the 2019 European Parliament elections, and investigates why these parties changed or did not change their procedural processes compared with the 2014 election. As external and internal factors incentivized Europarties to democratize their selections, the main hypothesis expects more inclusive procedures in 2019. The empirical analysis examines seven parties – EPP, PES, ALDE, EGP, PEL, ACRE and EFA – based on sixteen interviews with high-ranking party officials, internal party documents, and party websites. By leveraging analytical frameworks for the analysis of national parties we first provide a detailed account of these Europarties' selection procedures and subsequently present crucial factors explaining reforms (or lack thereof). The results show that mainly intra-party dissent hampered large democratic reforms. Our findings contribute to scholarly understanding of intra-party decision-making in Europarties, and have important consequences for the role of Europarties in future democratizing efforts of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El proceso de integración europea ha evolucionado a través de crisis de gobernanza hacia una integración cada vez mayor de las sociedades europeas, provocando nuevas preguntas sobre la organización política del continente europeo. A la vez, las sociedades europeas se han hecho más diversas, haciendo surgir nuevos y complejos problemas de coexistencia. Ahora, Europa también debe gestionar las consecuencias de su modelo económico basado en el consumo de recursos finitos. Más allá de crisis y acontecimientos específicos, Europa se enfrenta, por tanto, a un desafío multifacético de sostenibilidad ecológica, democrática y social. Abordar los desafíos desde el punto de vista de la sostenibilidad significa ver la viabilidad ecológica, democrática y social a largo plazo de Europa como posible gracias a la reconstrucción continua de las sociedades europeas mediante prácticas culturales, sociales, económicas y políticas innovadoras, dentro de las limitaciones ecológicas definidas por los límites de nuestro planeta.

The process of European integration has evolved through crises of governance towards ever greater integration of the societies of the participating member states, giving rise to new questions about the political organization of the European continent. At the same time, European societies have become ever more diverse, giving rise to new and complex problematiques of coexistence. Europe must now also deal with the consequences of an economic model based on the consumption of finite resources. Beyond specific crises and events, Europe is therefore faced with a multifaceted challenge of ecological, democratic and societal sustainability. To approach the challenges from the point of view of sustainability means to see the ecological, democratic and societal long-term viability of Europe as made possible by the continuous reconstruction of European societies through innovative cultural, social, economic and political practices under the ecological constraints posed by the limits of our planet.

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received: 03 February 2021 Accepted: 25 March 2021

The introduction of a new method of electing the President of the European Commission in 2014, based on a specific interpretation of art. 17 of the TEU, has become a crucial event in the political life of the EU. In particular, the new method's potential to strengthen democracy and the parliamentary nature of EU governance has been recognized. However, in reality, slightly different results have been produced. The Spitzenkandidaten mechanism turned out to be a formula based on immature solutions and electoral behavior and did not result in a clear reinforcement of the democratic factors of European integration. Instead, it has proved to be one of the expressions of inter-institutional rivalry, in which the intergovernmental European Council did not allow its competence for the appointment of the Head of the Commission to be diminished. The Commission itself, led by Jean-Claude Junker, in an attempt to exploit its „democratic" origins in 2014, has become more of a political than a managerialadministrative body. In 2019, the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism was not re-implemented, despite forced attempts of the European Parliament to do so. It seems that pragmatism has prevailed, with a clear goal - to protect one's own prerogatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The representativeness of the European Parliament has usually been a subject of controversy which is currently enhanced by Brexit and the development of several populist movements within the EU. In this context, the elections to the European Parliament in 2019 were the second time in which the Spitzenkandidaten system was applied. Bearing this in mind, the objective of this research is to know the thematic agenda set by these transnational candidates on Twitter, trying to find differences with the issues raised by the traditional national leaders. To this end, the technique of quantitative content analysis is used, referring to the issues addressed on Twitter by the six candidates to chair the Commission, as well as the thematic agenda expressed by a selection of the national candidates. The sample includes politicians from the four most populated countries of the Union: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The results show a more thematically concentrated agenda in the Spitzenkandidaten than in national candidates. Therefore, the European elections seem to move on two levels: the national, in which the candidates by countries confront national issues, and the transnational, in which the Spitzenkandidaten address topics from a European approach, together with references to domestic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the attention parties devote to a topic contributes to expanding the opportunity structure to acquire information that party supporters have. We evaluate this proposition in a comparative manner by focusing on an elite-driven new topic, namely the Spitzenkandidaten system in European Parliament elections. We link candidate recognition survey data from 28 countries with over 175 party electoral programs, press releases, and Twitter communication before the 2014 European Parliament elections. Our results show that especially what parties emphasize or decide to talk about on Twitter contributes to what their supporters will know. As proposed, this is an indirect effect through a general contribution to the information environment in election campaigns. However, party communication portfolios should not discount traditional tools given that these can also contribute to the opportunity structures available to party supporters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union suffers from a «communications gap» with citizens, which overlaps to the lack of «domestication» and «politicization» of EU affairs. One of the measures to solve this structural problem has been to develop transnational candidates («Spitzenkandidaten»). To this end, this article analyzes the strategic communication implemented on Twitter by these candidates in the 2019 European Parliament elections. A content analysis is applied to study their strategic approaches. As a result, it is concluded that there is homogeneity in the elements used, without achieving to Europeanize the agenda. Significant differences only come up in the Europeanism / Euroscepticism axis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Parliament elections in 2014 and 2019 were different insofar as European citizens had the possibility to ‘directly’ influence who could become the next president of the European Commission. This innovation is based on the idea of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’, where a vote for a given political party also represents a vote for its lead candidate. This article examines the process behind the institutionalisation of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, with attention focused on the actors involved and their motivations for supporting this institutional innovation. Using a qualitative content analysis of EU institutional and party documentation, the article confirms that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure should be perceived as the culmination of a long-term process beginning in the pre-Amsterdam era. It also concludes that the procedure, as firstly applied in 2014, represents the common effort of two supranational institutions and four European political parties. It is also argued that while the emergence of the Spitzenkandidaten is primarily a result of perceived shortcomings of the EU’s democratic quality, actors’ self-interest was also driving force.

Desde hace unas décadas se ha tratado de impulsar la democracia participativa y, en general, la participación de los ciudadanos en la vida política de la Unión, a través de diversas vías, con el fin de luchar contra la acusación de déficit democrático e incrementar la legitimidad de la Unión. Una de las vías ha sido la iniciativa ciudadana europea, que permite a los ciudadanos participar indirectamente en la formación del Derecho de la Unión, pero que no está obteniendo resultados importantes en la práctica. Otra vía que se está tratando de implementar es la de que los ciudadanos puedan influir en el nombramiento del Presidente de la Comisión Europea a través del sistema de los Spitzenkandidaten, que se empleó con relativo éxito en las elecciones de 2014 al Parlamento Europeo, pero que no es seguro que se termine implantando de forma definitiva. Se están barajando otras vías, como la de establecer una circunscripción electoral común única o la de implementar convenciones populares, pero su eficacia deberá ser valorada en los próximos años. Recibido: 21 diciembre 2018 Aceptado: 10 enero 2019 Publicación en línea: 30 abril 2019

The European Parliament elections in 2014 and 2019 were different insofar as European citizens had the possibility to 'directly' influence who could become the next President of the European Commission. This innovation is based on the idea of 'Spitzenkandidaten', where a vote for a given political party also represents a vote for its lead candidate. This article examines the process behind the institutionalisation of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, with attention focused on the actors involved and their motivations for supporting this institutional innovation. Using a qualitative content analysis of EU institutional and party documentation, the article confirms that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure should be perceived as the culmination of a long-term process beginning in the pre- Amsterdam era. It also concludes that the procedure, as firstly applied in 2014, represents the common effort of two supranational institutions and four European political parties. It is also argued that while the emergence of the Spitzenkandidaten is primarily a result of perceived shortcomings of the EU's democratic quality, actors' self-interest was also driving force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union became more politically salient and contested from the early 1990s onwards. Analysis of the impact of politicisation on the Union's directly elected Parliament has not been a central focus on the literature on politicisation. The objective of thee concluding reflections is to explore the interaction between the politicisation of European integration and the development of the European Parliament (EP). The reflections focus on three inter-related facets of how the EP addressed the emerging challenges to the Union's political system. First, it looks at the 2014 EP elections and reviews the EP party groups' deliberate attempt to introduce political choice in the Spitzenkandidaten process. Second, it analyses the outcome of the 2014 EP elections and the emergence of a fractured parliament with the political success of far-right parties. Third, it assesses how the arrival of far-right governments undermining the Union's normative order challenges the EP political groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate about the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election. Focusing on parties' efforts to make the candidates visible to voters, we argue that the multi-level character of these elections creates large differences concerning individual parties' incentives to promote the Spitzenkandidaten in their campaigns. Analysing a novel dataset of campaign communication on Facebook, we find that only a few parties highlighted them, while many did not. In line with our theoretical argument, this variation is systematic and can be attributed to lacking incentives for most parties. Especially nominating a candidate at the European level only has a modest positive effect on national parties' willingness to put the candidates in the spotlight. This lacking commitment to the nominated candidates should be considered in discussions about the reform of the current Spitzenkandidaten system for the 2019 EP elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2014 elections for the European Parliament (EP) witnessed a novel procedure: the lead candidate (or Spitzenkandidaten) procedure, which was to (and did in fact) link the polling results to the nomination of the new European Commission President. This article investigates the procedure's historical background from a long-term parliamentary perspective. It points out that there were three factors or developments that explain its introduction: the EP's assertive political culture, increasing attention for the EP's representative function and the support of prominent political actors who were able to make a difference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)