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National policy support in the United Kingdom for the social and solidarity economy is complex, often caught between central and local interventions, both direct and indirect. According to the authors, there has been legislation, underpinned by an ideology of business deregulation and a more enterprising mindset, that has stimulated a very particular idea of the social economy at the national level. At the same time, two further pieces of legislation have impacted local-level SSE: the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, which required public service providers to consider economic, social and environmental value in their procurement decisions, and thus provided opportunities for local governments to support the SSE; and the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. The authors discuss the importance of devolution for the SSE in the Liverpool City Region. The SSE has been recognized as an important part of efforts to build a more inclusive economy. The Metro Mayor considers the SSE a necessary partner in achieving city-region objectives, and the Combined Authority has implemented new means of collaboration. New governance arrangements have produced a political voice for the sector through the Liverpool City Region SSE Reference Panel. Collaboration has also led to a finance initiative that delivers better forms of social investment into the sector. Overall, however, the authors conclude that the UK remains a highly centralized state and much remains to be done to face the needs that exist in the city region - both the needs of communities, and the help required to ensure the development and successful growth of the SSE.

Judges' ideas, beliefs, and values are central to adjudication. Empowering the courts was a crucial step in third-wave democracies and, after some unfulfilled promises regarding the potential of the judicialization of politics for rights expansion, we need to learn more about the individuals that were empowered and what their legal culture can tell us about judicial behavior. Do judges consider themselves political actors having a legislative role? What type of legal culture do they have? To advance our understanding of these key determinants of judicial behavior, I use a survey with federal judges in Mexico to explore to what extent judges adhere to a positivist or a principle-based constitutionalist legal culture. Findings suggest that there is a tension in the judiciary, with some judges embracing the idea of legislating from the bench while others prefer to play the role of being "the mouthpiece of the law.

Die Studie 'Deutschlands nächste Unternehmergeneration' ist ein langfristig angelegtes Forschungsprojekt, innerhalb dessen regelmäßig deutschlandweit umfassende Datenerhebungen vom Friedrichshafener Institut für Familienunternehmen | FIF der Zeppelin Universität im Auftrag der Stiftung Familienunternehmen durchgeführt werden. Die 5. Auflage wertet die Entwicklung der Werte und Einstellungen der jungen Unternehmergeneration im Zeitverlauf der vergangenen zehn Jahre aus. 5. Auflage

The success of non-pharmaceutical interventions to contain pandemics often depends greatly upon voluntary compliance with government guidelines. What explains variation in voluntary compliance? Using mobile phone and survey data, we show that during the early phases of COVID- 19, voluntary social distancing was higher when individuals exhibit a higher sense of civic duty. This is true for U.S. individuals, U.S. counties, and European regions. We also show that after U.S. states began re-opening, social distancing remained more prevalent in high civic capital counties. Our evidence points to the importance of civic capital in designing public policy responses to pandemics.

National policy support in the United Kingdom for the social and solidarity economy is complex, often caught between central and local interventions, both direct and indirect. According to the authors, there has been legislation, underpinned by an ideology of business deregulation and a more enterprising mindset, that has stimulated a very particular idea of the social economy at the national level. At the same time, two further pieces of legislation have impacted local-level SSE: the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, which required public service providers to consider economic, social and environmental value in their procurement decisions, and thus provided opportunities for local governments to support the SSE; and the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. The authors discuss the importance of devolution for the SSE in the Liverpool City Region. The SSE has been recognized as an important part of efforts to build a more inclusive economy. The Metro Mayor considers the SSE a necessary partner in achieving city-region objectives, and the Combined Authority has implemented new means of collaboration. New governance arrangements have produced a political voice for the sector through the Liverpool City Region SSE Reference Panel. Collaboration has also led to a finance initiative that delivers better forms of social investment into the sector. Overall, however, the authors conclude that the UK remains a highly centralized state and much remains to be done to face the needs that exist in the city region - both the needs of communities, and the help required to ensure the development and successful growth of the SSE.

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal - at least partly - from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights. Providing clean evidence for the existence of this intrinsic value and measuring its size, however, is intricate. Here, we develop a method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal that the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefit. The intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially important consequences for corporate governance, human resource management, and optimal job design: it may explain why managers value power, why employees appreciate jobs with task discretion, why individuals sort into self-employment, and why the reallocation of decision rights is often very difficult and cumbersome. Our method and results may also prove useful in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for concepts such as "freedom of choice" and "individual autonomy".

The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351765633, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. In the 21st century, Norway, Denmark and Sweden remain the icons of fair societies, with high economic productivity and quality of life. But they are also an enigma in a cultural-evolutionary sense: though by no means following the same socio-economic formula, they are all cases of a "non-hubristic", socially sustainable modernity that puzzles outside observers. Using Nordic welfare states as its laboratory, Sustainable Modernity combines evolutionary and socio-cultural perspectives to illuminate the mainsprings of what the authors call the "well-being society". The main contention is that the Nordic uniqueness is not merely the outcome of one particular set of historical institutional or political arrangements, or sheer historical luck; rather, the high welfare creation inherent in the Nordic model has been predicated on a long and durable tradition of social cooperation, which has interacted with global competitive forces. Hence the socially sustainable Nordic modernity should be approached as an integrated and tightly orchestrated ecosystem based on a complex interplay of cooperative and competitive strategies within and across several domains: normative-cultural, socio-political and redistributive. The key question is: Can the Nordic countries uphold the balance of competition and cooperation and reproduce their resilience in the age of globalization, cultural collisions, the digital economy, the fragmentation of the work/life division, and often intrusive EU regulation? With contributors providing insights from the humanities, the social sciences and evolutionary science, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of political science, sociology, history, institutional economics, Nordic studies and human evolution studies.

Finland is characterized by a substantial heterogeneity across its regions. Key economic indicators, such as the GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, vary widely for different areas, with Uusimaa, the region where Helsinki is located, being significantly richer than regions such as Kainuu and Savo. This heterogeneity, however, has not been stable over time. We find that many important indicators, namely the GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and real wages and salaries per employee, have been converging across regions over the years going from 2000 to 2014. Moreover, we examine regional values and attitudes, using surveys from the Finnish Business and Policy Forum, and find that there has been a strong regional convergence in terms of trust in political parties and in the EU. In particular, we find that the trust in these institutions has increased more in regions where there was a more negative attitude toward parties and the EU during the initial years of our analysis. On the other hand, we do not find a significant convergence with respect to the attitude towards immigration.

Die AfD war bei der Bundestagswahl in Ostdeutschland etwa doppelt so erfolgreich wie in Westdeutschland. Beobachter machten dafür bisher vor allem wirtschaftliche Faktoren verantwortlich. Wir können dagegen zeigen, dass nicht das ökonomische Ungerechtigkeitsgefühl, sondern die Ablehnung von gesellschaftlicher Vielfalt und staatlichen Institutionen in Ostdeutschland mit höheren AfD-Stimmanteilen einhergeht. Will die Politik populistischen Tendenzen begegnen, muss sie in Toleranz und Vertrauen investieren. Mehr Geld in Beton und Asphalt geht am Problem vorbei.

Der Brexit, die Wahl Donald Trumps, die Zugewinne des Front National in Frankreich, der AfD in Deutschland und Geert Wilders in den Niederlanden: Der Populismus erlebt derzeit einen Höhenflug. Was sind die Ursachen und die Effekte dieser Erfolgswellen? Nach Ansicht von Norbert Berthold, Universität Würzburg, spricht einiges dafür, dass die Globalisierung populistische Entwicklungen begünstigt. Wichtiger scheinen allerdings der technische Fortschritt, da er die einfache Arbeit benachteilige, und die Migrationsströme in reiche Länder zu sein. Zudem spielen auch kulturelle Elemente, Informationslücken, Vorurteile und Stereotypen eine wichtige Rolle. Adalbert Winkler, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, sieht unter anderem die Ursachen für das Erstarken populistischer Strömungen darin, dass die Finanz-, Euro- und Flüchtlingskrise die Zahl der Menschen, die abgehängt sind oder sich abgehängt fühlen, erheblich haben steigen lassen und die etablierten Parteien überfordert sind, diese Krisen zu bekämpfen. Sascha O. Becker, Thiemo Fetzer und Dennis Novy, University of Warwick, kommen nach der Analyse von Daten aus 380 Landkreisen Großbritanniens zu dem Schluss, dass Faktoren, wie Demographie, Bildung und Wirtschaftsstruktur, einen deutlich größeren Einfluss auf die Brexit-Entscheidung der britischen Wähler hatten als Faktoren, die eine direkte Verbindung zur EU beinhalten. Für Marianne Kneuer, Universität Hildesheim, waren die Krisen sicher ein trigger, aber nicht die Ursache für das derzeitige Phänomen von Populismus. Hier seien tieferliegende strukturelle Gründe verantwortlich: zum einen die wirtschaftlichen Unsicherheiten, wie wachsende Ungleichheit, das Gefühl, ein Globalisierungsverlierer zu sein, Angst vor sozialem Abstieg, zum andern politische Gründe, da die repräsentative Demokratie in einer tiefen Vertrauenskrise stecke und Populisten von den funktionalen Defiziten, die in den Parteien und den Parteienlandschaften über die Jahre Eingang gefunden haben, profit

Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to succeed than more indirect approaches when it comes to suppress genderbiased customs. This implies discussing the main possible interaction frameworks leading to antiwomen equilibria, and deriving policy implications from the corresponding games. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples drawn from available empirical works, thus providing a reasoned survey of the literature.

Summary We show that changes in assortative mating patterns along the dimensions of age, ethnicity, religion and education are not responsible for the increasing marital instability over the last four decades in Austria. Without the rise in the age at marriage, divorce rates would be considerably higher. Immigration and secularization, and the resulting supply of spouses with diverse ethnicity and religious denominations had no overall effect on divorce rates. Countervailing effects—in line with theoretical predictions–offset each other. The rise in the incidence of divorce is most probably caused by increased social acceptance of divorce.

[Introduction] Regarding moral concerns in the business sphere, integrity is often mentioned as one of the core values that guides the behavior of companies. Daimler for instance states: "Acting with integrity is the central requirement for sustainable success and a maxim that Daimler follows in its worldwide business practices." Reference to integrity is mostly supposed to signal that the company acts morally responsibly. Although some companies specify what acting with integrity means for them, it generally remains unclear what the concept of integrity entails - both broadly speaking and referring to business. This conceptual gap shall be filled by developing a concept of integrity that can be transferred to the business context. For this purpose, the main criteria that constitute moral integrity will be discussed before reflecting on how these could be integrated into a practical and comprehensive concept of corporate integrity.

When measuring inequality, value judgements are imposed, often implicitly, at several stages. In particular, the choice of ‘welfare metric', adult equivalence scale, unit of analysis and the inequality measure itself cannot avoid value judgements. This paper illustrates the effects of using different distributions and summary measures, using New Zealand data for the period 2007 to 2011. Using an annual accounting period, alternative welfare metrics and units of analysis are investigated. In addition, the sensitivity to assumptions about economies of scale within households is examined, and changes in inequality are decomposed into those arising from population and tax structure changes. When considering the period 2007 to 2010 all measures agree that inequality fell, although the extent of the reduction varies. For the period 2007 to 2011 (after the tax reforms of 2010) the answer to the question of whether inequality in New Zealand has risen or fallen depends crucially on the combination of welfare metric, income unit, adult equivalent scale and inequality measure used. In empirical studies it is therefore important to explore a wide range of alternative approaches, providing information for readers to make their own judgements.

Der Autor beschäftigt sich in seiner Forschung mit Ziel-und Werteänderungen der ungarischen KMU-s in der Nachwendezeit seit 1989. Als Leitgedanke dient ein Vergleich mit den Zielen und Werten der in Staatseingentum befindlichen Unternehmen vor der politischen Wende. Vor der Folie aufschlussreicher und strategisch bedeutender Tatsachen über die Arbeitsweise, spezifische Unternehmenskulture(en) und zu Paradigmen der politisch-wirtschaftlichen Prägung v.a. des letzten Jahrzehntes vor der Wende werden die Korrelationen und Asuwirkungen des politisch-sozialen Paradigmenwechsels auf Management- und Führungsmodelle, Corporate Policy/Identity und Unternehmenskultur(en) erörtert. In der Schlussfolgerung hebt vorliegende Betrachtung auf relevante Aspekte dieser Korrelationen für ausländische Investoren allgemein sowie konkrete Asuwirkungen auf das Tagesgeschäft und die Ergebnisrelevanz ab.

Tourism has a wide range of impacts on the economy, the natural environment and the people living in a destination. In the context of poor, rural societies, many scholars have emphasized the positive impacts of tourism on local economic growth. Concern has been voiced, however, about the social and cultural impacts of tourism due to observed changes in local norms, values and behaviour. This paper proposes the concept of social capital to analyze the social and cultural effects of tourism in Nepal. Empirical evidence from a household survey and four village case studies reveals a decline of bonding social capital and an increase in bridging social capital in the concerned communities. Tourism can exacerbate local conflicts and reduce the relevance of indigenous self-help mechanisms. At the same time, tourism has promoted the formation of new institutions and offers opportunities to develop and expand hierarchical, extra-community networks, which are an important precondition for upward economic mobility. Highlighting the interdependencies and trade-offs between economic advancement and changes in social capital, the paper calls for a more pragmatic and less normative academic debate on the social and cultural impacts of tourism in developing countries.

We exploit information on compulsory schooling reforms in 11 European countries, implemented mostly in the 1960s and 70s, to identify the impact of education on religious adherence and religious practices. Using micro data from the European Social Survey, conducted in various years between 2002 and 2013, we find consistently large negative effects of schooling on self-reported religiosity, social religious acts (attending religious services), as well as solitary religious acts (the frequency of praying). We also use data from European Values Survey to apply the same empirical design to analyze the impact of schooling on superstitious beliefs. We find that more education, due to increased mandatory years of schooling, reduces individuals' propensity to believe in the power of lucky charms and the tendency to take into account horoscopes in daily life.

Novija istraživanja pokazuju da komplementarnu i alternativnu medicinu (KAM) koristi veliki broj stanovnika zapadnih zemalja. Polazeći od ranijih istraživanja i postojećih objašnjenja ovoga fenomena, u ovome se radu testiraju tri hipoteze: hipoteza postmodernih vrijednosti, hipoteza dehumanizacije te hipoteza komplementarnosti. Rezultati korelacijskog istraživanja provedenog na uzorku hrvatske populacije (N=500) pokazali su da je oko 15% sudionika istraživanja koristilo KAM u posljednjih 5 godina, kao i da oko 45% sudionika istraživanja ima više ili podjednako povjerenja u KAM u usporedbi s konvencionalnom medicinom. Također je utvrđeno da se na temelju podataka iz ovoga istraživanja hipoteza dehumanizacije može u potpunosti odbaciti, dok hipoteza postmodernih vrijednosti može biti djelomično, a hipoteza komplementarnosti potpuno prihvaćena. Testiranje sociodemografskih korelata pokazalo je rezultate slične onima iz prethodnih istraživanja – obrazovaniji pojedinci, pojednici s višim prihodima i žene češći su korisnici KAM-a. Autori ovoga rada stoga zaključuju da u Hrvatskoj KAM predstavlja dodatnu opciju za one pojedince koji vjeruju da se zdravlje treba definirati i postizati na holistički način, a ne isključivo korištenjem farmaceutskih sredstava. Ovi rezultati mogu biti protumačeni pomoću hrvatskog društvenog konteksta, tj. djelomično objašnjeni specifičnim razvojem hrvatskog zdravstvenog sustava. Uz metodološka ograničenja ovog istraživanja, ovakav specifičan društveni kontekst u određenoj mjeri otežava generaliziranje utvrđenih rezultata., Recent studies show that complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) is being used by a large number of citizens in Western countries. Based on the previous research and various explanations of this phenomenon, in this study three hypotheses have been tested: postmodern, dehumanization and complement hypotheses. The results of the conducted cross-sectional research based on a nationally representative sample of Croatian population (N=500) revealed that around 15% of respondents had used CAM in the previous five years, and that around 45% of all respondents have more trust in CAM or equally trust CAM and conventional medicine. The data also showed that dehumanization hypothesis can be fully rejected, whilst postmodern hypothesis can be partially and complement hypothesis fully accepted. The test of sociodemographic correlates showed results that are similar to the previous research. These results can be interpreted within Croatian social context, i.e. tentatively explained by specific developments of Croatian health care system. In addition to methodological limitations, this social context hinders the generalizability of the obtained results to some extent., Die neuste Forschung zeigt, dass sich eine große Anzahl von Bewohnern in westlichen Ländern der komplementären und der alternativen Medizin (CAM) bedient. Von früheren Studien und bestehenden Erklärungen dieses Phänomens ausgehend werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit drei Hypothesen getestet: Hypothese der postmodernen Werte, Hypothese der Dehumanisierung und die Hypothese der Komplementarität. Die Resultate der Korrelationsforschung, die an einem Muster der kroatischen Bevölkerung (N=500) durchgeführt wurde, zeigen, dass etwa 15% der Befragten in den letzten 5 Jahren CAM in Anspruch genommen haben, außerdem haben 45% der Befragten mehr oder gleich viel Vertrauen in CAM im Vergleich zur konventionellen Medizin. Es wurde auch festgestellt, dass man auf Grund der Angaben aus der Forschung die Hypothese über Dehumanisierung völlig verwerfen kann, während die Hypothese der postmodernen Werte teilweise, und die Hypothese der Komplementarität vollständig akzeptiert werden kann. Das Testen von soziodemographischen Korrelaten hat Resultate gezeigt, die ähnlich denen aus der vorhergehenden Forschung sind – Personen mit besserer Bildung, Personen mit einem höheren Einkommen und Frauen nehmen CAM öfter in Anspruch. Die Autoren dieser Arbeit schließen deshalb, dass CAM in Kroatien eine zusätzliche Option für diejenigen darstellt, die glauben, dass man die Gesundheit auf eine holistische Art und Weise definieren und erzielen soll und nicht nur ausschließlich durch Anwendung pharmazeutischer Mittel. Diese Resultate können im Kontext der kroatischen Gesellschaft erklärt werden, d.h. man kann sie teilweise mit der spezifischen Entwicklung des kroatischen Gesundheitssystems erklären. Neben methodologischen Einschränkungen dieser Forschung erschwert ein solcher gesellschaftlicher Kontext im bestimmten Ausmass die Verallgemeinerung der festgestellten Ergebnisse.

We discuss the two-way link between culture and economic growth. We present a model of endogenous technical change where growth is driven by the innovative activity of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship is risky and requires investments that affect the steepness of the lifetime consumption profile. As a consequence, the occupational choice of entrepreneurship hinges on risk tolerance and patience. Parents expecting their children to become entrepreneurs have an incentive to instill these two values in their children. Cultural transmission is Beckerian, i.e., parents are driven by the desire to maximize their children's happiness. We also consider, in an extension, a paternalistic motive for preference transmission. The growth rate of the economy depends on the fraction of the population choosing an entrepreneurial career. How many entrepreneurs there are in a society hinges, in turn, on parental investments in children's patience and risk tolerance. There can be multiple balanced-growth paths, where in faster-growing countries more people exhibit an "entrepreneurial spirit." We discuss applications of models of endogenous preferences to the analysis of socio-economic transformations, such as the British Industrial Revolution. We also discuss empirical studies documenting the importance of culture and preference heterogeneity for economic growth.

Does the information provided by mass media have the power to persistently affect individual beliefs about the drivers of success in life? To answer this question empirically, this contribution exploits a natural experiment on the reception of West German television in the former German Democratic Republic. After identifying the impact of Western television on individual beliefs and attitudes in the late 1980s, longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel is used to test the persistence of the television effect on individual beliefs during the 1990s. The empirical findings indicate that Western television exposure has made East Germans more inclined to believe that effort rather than luck determines success in life. Furthermore, this effect still persists several years after the German reunification.

A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. Our results show that only those individuals who are willing to contribute to the welfare of others and, in addition, feel that by working in the public sector they contribute to a good cause are significantly more likely to work in the public sector. Our results are most pronounced for highly educated employees.

We study the role of the most primitive institution in society: the family. Its organization and relationship between generations shape values formation, economic outcomes and influences national institutions. We use a measure of family ties, constructed from the World Values Survey, to review and extend the literature on the effect of family ties on economic behavior and economic attitudes. We show that strong family ties are negatively correlated with generalized trust; they imply more household production and less participation in the labor market of women, young adult and elderly. They are correlated with lower interest and participation in political activities and prefer labor market regulation and welfare systems based upon the family rather than the market or the government. Strong family ties may interfere with activities leading to faster growth, but they may provide relief from stress, support to family members and increased wellbeing. We argue that the value regarding the strength of family relationships are very persistent over time, more so than institutions like labor market regulation or welfare systems.

Funktionsfähige Demokratien hängen von interessierten, aktiven und informierten Bürgerinnen und Bürgern ab. Allerdings ist deren Interesse an Politik und deren bürgerschaftliches Engagement deutlich zurückgegangen. Gleichzeitig ist ein Wandel in den familiären Lebensformen zu beobachten: Sie sind brüchiger und vielfältiger geworden, oft auch kurzlebiger. Gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen diesen beiden Phänomenen? Engagieren sich Kinder, die nicht mit beiden Elternteilen aufgewachsen sind, später im Erwachsenenalter seltener für die Gesellschaft, weil in nicht-intakten Familienverhältnissen zu wenig Sozialkapital aufgebaut wird? Die Frage wurde anhand von Daten aus 26 Wellen des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels aus den Jahren 1984–2009 untersucht. Die Daten geben Auskunft über den Familienstatus in der Kindheit. Als Maß des bürgerschaftlichen Engagements wurde ein Index gebildet, der aus Daten zu folgenden vier Komponenten besteht: politisches Interesse, Parteiidentifikation, Mitwirkung in Organisationen und freiwillige/ehrenamtliche Tätigkeit. Das Ergebnis zeigt, dass das Aufwachsen in einer nicht-intakten Familie zu einem signifikanten Rückgang des bürgerschaftlichen Engagements im Erwachsenenalter führt.

Die Eurokrise und die Reaktion der Politik auf sie hat das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in die gemeinsame Währung erschüttert. Um das Vertrauen in das Eurosystem neu aufzubauen, sind verschiedene Maßnahmen erforderlich: Regeln für Verlässlichkeit und gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz, Aussichten auf Wachstum und Teilhabe, und nicht zuletzt eine Debatte über gemeinsame europäische Werte. Political gridlock, violations of European law and inconsistent political communication have turned the euro crisis into a crisis of confidence in public policy. To re-establish trust in the system, Europe needs a comprehensive approach consisting of three elements. First, rules can invigorate societies if they provide for cross-border competition in a revived single market and abstain from top-down provisions. Second, new growth perspectives - e.g. by reassigning major parts of the EU budget - can enhance the selfconfidence of societies. And finally, a pan-European debate on common goals and values can help answer the essential question of Europe's sense and purpose. As the euro can only ever enjoy as much trust as the institutions governing the euro area, the solution of the European confi dence crisis is crucial to the fate of the common currency.

In this paper, we analyze the link between effort and preferences for redistribution. If individuals hold standard preferences, those with higher ability exert more effort. Higher effort leads to a higher income. Individuals with a higher income oppose redistribution. Yet, under non-standard preferences, the link between effort and redistribution is not clear-cut. If aversion to inequity is sufficiently strong, even individuals with high ability may support redistribution. In a lab experiment, we indeed find that participants with higher ability are willing to help the needy if earning income becomes more difficult for everybody. To check whether this finding is externally valid, we use data from the World Value Survey. We do not find a significant positive effect of preferences for effort on preferences for redistribution, but we also do not find the significant negative effect predicted by standard theory. Also, in the field, those who have to pay for redistribution are not more likely to be opposed than the recipients.

Der unter anderem durch Elektrifizierung, Leichtbau, zunehmende Variantenvielfalt und Produktkomplexität stattfindende Wandel in der automobilen Produktion verändert gegenwärtig in starkem Maße Arbeitsinhalte und Arbeitsbedingungen in der Planung und Fertigung der AUDI AG. Parallel dazu ändern sich durch den demografischen Wandel und den generationsbedingten Wertewandel auch die Leistungsvoraussetzungen der Mitarbeiter. Vor diesem Hintergrund steht die AUDI AG vor der Herausforderung, sowohl technische als auch organisatorische Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen, um weiterhin mit motivierten und leistungsfähigen Mitarbeitern den gesteigerten Anforderungen effizient begegnen zu können. In diesem Zusammenhang spielen Werte und Grundsätze, welche die Einstellung und das Verhalten der Audi-Mitarbeiter bestimmen, eine bedeutende Rolle. Der Mensch rückt zunehmend in den Mittelpunkt. Das Ziel der Arbeit bestand in der Identifizierung des Audi-Wertesystems sowie der Wirkmechanismen zwischen unternehmensseitig geförderten Maßnahmen, beobachtbarem Verhalten, inneren Einstellungen und der Präsenz der Werte bei den Audi-Mitarbeitern. Im Kontext der Veränderungen der Lebens- und Arbeitswelt stellt das Audi-Wertesystem ein bedeutendes Steuerungsinstrument für die AUDI AG dar, um mit adäquaten Maßnahmen den Veränderungen begegnen zu können.

Middle class values have long been perceived as drivers of social cohesion and growth. In this paper we investigate the relation between class (measured by the position in the income distribution), values, and political orientations using comparable values surveys for six Latin American countries. We find that both a continuous measure of income and categorical measures of income-based class are robustly associated with values. Both income and class tend to display a similar association to values and political orientations as education, although differences persist in some important dimensions. Overall, we do not find strong evidence of any middle class particularism: values appear to gradually shift with income, and middle class values lay between the ones of poorer and richer classes. If any, the only peculiarity of middle class values is moderation. We also find changes in values across countries to be of much larger magnitude than the ones dictated by income, education and individual characteristics, suggesting that individual values vary primarily within bounds dictated by each society.

We investigate why female labour market participation is low in the Arab region. Utilising Akerlof and Kranton's (2000) identity economics approach, we show in a simple gametheoretic framework that women socialised in a traditional family environment violate their identities by taking a job. In the empirical analysis, we study the respective impact of two determinants of identity in the Arab region, Islam and cultural tradition. Employing two waves of the World Values Survey, we find significant evidence that identity affects female labour market participation. Moreover, our estimates suggest that in the Arab region, Muslim women do not participate in the labour market less than non-Muslim women, whereas those with strong traditional identities have a 7 percentage point lower probability of entering the labour market.

Drawing on identity and social comparison theories, we propose and test a model of motivation to lead based on two types of self-to-role comparisons (i.e., self-comparisons with specific leaders and with more abstract representations of the leadership role). We propose that these comparisons imply different identity verification purposes and have different consequences on the motivation of individuals. The results obtained by using structural equation models and response surface techniques among a sample of 180 executives support our predictions. We hypothesize and find that a perceived similarity with a significant leader has a positive effect on the motivation to lead and that this relationship is mediated by self-efficacy perceptions. We also find that the affective, but not the social-normative component, is higher when there is self-role congruence with respect to leadership dimensions such as “power” and “affiliation”. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for leadership and the subjective fit at work.

Die Ausarbeitung unter oben stehendem Titel betrachtet die Bedeutung einer Werteorientierung als Erfolgsfaktor für Unternehmen. Dabei wird das Thema in die aktuellen gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen gebettet, die sich für Unternehmen in dem Verhalten der Konsumenten manifestieren und zu dem Begriff Societing führen. Es soll herausgestellt werden, warum Werteorientierung Unternehmen erfolgreich sein lässt und wie man Werte erfolgreich in die unternehmerische Arbeit einfließen lassen kann.

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Mis-calibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

In this paper, I conduct an international comparison of the financial health of households using data on household wealth and indebtedness for the Group of Seven (G7) countries and show that, even though household borrowings in Japan were the highest among the G7 countries, at least until 2000, household assets were also high in Japan, as a result of which household net worth and financial health in Japan were among the highest in the G7 countries. Turning to long-term trends in Japan over time, I find that Japan has shown a sharp increase over time in household borrowing, at least until 2000, and a sharp increase over time in both household assets and household net worth, at least until 1990. It is not clear whether the greater financial health of Japanese households is due more to culture or to government policies, institutions, and other non-cultural factors, but it appears that long-term trends over time in household assets, liabilities, and net worth in Japan can be explained much better by non-cultural factors than by culture.

This paper offers a comprehensive econometric investigation of the impact of income inequality on the values endorsed by people. Using survey data from all thirty-four OECD countries over a period of almost thirty years, the following dimensions of value systems are investigated: work ethic, civism, obedience, honesty, altruism, and tolerance. In most cases, no robust effects from inequality on values are detected. However, there is evidence that a more unequal income distribution strengthens the work ethic of the population. Thus, income inequality seems to generate work incentives not only via the pecuniary reward of work but also through the symbolic reward it receives.

A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30,000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. We find strong evidence for a mutually reinforcing role of altruism and mission alignment in sorting to the public sector, particularly among highly educated workers and among workers in less-developed countries.

This paper investigates the links between family values, social needs and individual preferences for welfare using data from the 2005 French Generation and Gender Survey (GGS). We analyse individual preferences, for financial assistance and the provision of care services, with respect to welfare support as opposed to within household production. The strength of family ties is based on individual's self-assessed family values (such as, duties, responsibilities and norms of reciprocity), both within the couple and between parents and children. We find a positive association between weak (strong) family values and the preferences for welfare state support (provision of domestic services). The relevance of family values is shown to be invariant to different socio-economic circumstances, such as: financial distress, bad health or family size. Using long term cultural determinants of selected ethnic and religious groups as instruments for family values, we also provide evidence for causal effects.