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Objective To explore the expression, correlation with clinicopathologic parameters, and clinical significance of MIS18 binding protein 1 (MIS18BP1) in bladder cancer. Methods TCGA and GEO databases were used to analyze the mRNA expression of MIS18BP1 in tumors and controls, and the results were verified via qRT-PCR. UALCAN online database was utilized in the analysis of the expression of MIS18BP1 and its correlation with clinicopathological parameters and the degree of immune cell infiltration. Immunohistochemistry was employed to analyze the expression of MIS18BP1 in bladder cancer and its relationship with clinicopathological features. The ROC curve was applied to evaluate the diagnostic value of MIS18BP1 mRNA in bladder cancer. Results Bioinformatics analysis and qRT-PCR results revealed the increased expression of MIS18BP1 mRNA in bladder cancer compared with that in the control group (P

In this study, we focus on the nexus between the populist domestic politics of Hungary and the Hungarian foreign policy. We find that conventional explanations involving pragmatism and nationalism are limited, so we take the analytical approach of political marketing to understand the rhetoric and behavior of the Orbán government, with special reference to its relations with China. We argue that through its high-profile "Opening to the East" policy, the Orbán government attempted, with mixed outcomes, to communicate its foreign policy promises and results as persuasion and contestation to its domestic audience largely for its own political gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have intensified their cooperation over the past decade or so. Despite some modest progress, this cooperation has performed below the expectations of the CEECs in general, and, even more so, generated negative feedback and implications more widely. This study is motivated by the puzzle over why there are widening discrepancies between the two sides after initially positive expectations. Informed by the role theory of international relations, this paper mainly argues that there is an intrarole conflict between China's perception of its international leadership role and the corresponding role expectations of China held by the CEECs. This framework is empirically assessed on the 17 + 1 cooperation, through which China strives to forge a leadership role for itself in relation to the CEECs. Amid generally low expectations of China's leadership role, three general patterns of responses can be identified among the CEECs, including those of dissenters, pragmatists, and persisting partners. Furthermore, China's leadership demands encountered challenges from other players, particularly the European Union and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2021, the European Union (EU) unveiled its first common Indo-Pacific strategy, demonstrating its emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region and plans to implement cohesive strategies as an autonomous actor outside of Europe. However, the EUs engagement in the Indo-Pacific region has yielded mixed results in terms of enabling the EUs exercise of strategic autonomy. Overall, deliverable actions fall short of the EUs vision of strategic autonomy. This shortcoming is attributable to three main problems: (1) the EUs strategic capacity is weak, (2) the Indo-Pacific strategy rebrands existing initiatives, and (3) the EU and the United States emphasise different strategy and policy domains. Nevertheless, the EU has opportunities to exercise its influence in the region, owing largely to its economic clout and policy choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro‐China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the "audacious" behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short‐term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public diplomacy has become increasingly important for countries around the world as a source of soft power. However, we still know very little about how international and supranational actors conduct public diplomacy. This Special Issue therefore looks at the public diplomacy of the European Union (EU) as a contribution to filling this research gap. Unlike existing research that has primarily focused on the institutional design and content of EU public diplomacy, the authors in this Special Issue examine the receptiveness of different countries and regions of the world to this specific type of diplomacy. Their key research findings are, firstly, an observed variation in the receptiveness of countries to EU public diplomacy, which correlates with the receiving country or region's social, economic and political context and past and contemporary experiences with the EU; secondly, a need for EU public diplomacy to be flexible in its application; and thirdly, a need for more extensive research on the effectiveness of EU public diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informed by role theory in international relations, this article argues that there is a role conflict between the European Union (EU) and China over the concept of 'Normative Power Europe' (NPE). This conflict has triggered a process of compromise in EU–China relations that is carefully managed by both parties. China filters the EU's role-projecting efforts in the country, whereas the EU attempts to gain recognition for its international role by selecting feasible approaches and channels to interact with China. As a result, the EU implements its public diplomacy (PD) in various channels to engage with Chinese society. In addition to conventional PD methods of publicity activities and cultural and educational exchanges, the EU targets technical professionals, elites, and policymakers in China through its various bilateral cooperation programmes with the country. As such, the EU's PD in China has become narrowly focused on social and technical elites, and it is unable to directly engage the general public in China. Therefore, the short-term impacts and implications of the EU's PD in China are generally indirect and difficult to measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between the Chinese government and domestic think tanks. Chinese think tanks in the cultural sector have a strong demand-side orientation; that is, they closely follow the instructions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in their stand on culture-related policies. Since 2018, the CCP has strengthened its control over the propaganda and cultural affairs, using think tanks to this end. Think tanks act as dual agents, maximizing the benefits offered by their two principals – the party government and private businesses, while prioritizing the former. The paper examines the development of the Putuo Island Park in Zhejiang Province and the Cultural Industry Research Institute, the key cultural industry think tank in this province. While upholding Xi Jinping's aspiration of developing China into a "cultural great power," cultural think tanks' main function is to endorse government policies and guide businesses to support those policies when necessary. The CCP under Xi has intensified its manipulation of think tanks to reinforce its control over ideology and the socialist market economy, resulting in a more complex relationship between the state and think tanks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's partnership with China has received significant academic attention. Experts have focused on both parties' economic and political objectives and have made efforts to grasp the dynamics of the institutionalisation of EU-China cooperation. However, little has been said about how this collaboration affects the lives of citizens, especially in China. Adopting a Foucauldian epistemology, this article's key contention is that EU-China cooperation imposes a joint form of post-liberal governmental power on the Chinese population, which socially constructs empowered but not liberal political subjectivities for Chinese citizens. The article first reviews Foucault's approach to governmentality. It then explores Sino-EUropean collaboration after 2013, when the two partners established the 'EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation'. We illustrate how the institutionalisation of the partnership has been consistent with a governmentalised political rationality, and how policy implementation has allowed a post-liberal form of governmental power to flow from both EU and Chinese policymakers towards the Chinese population, triggering processes of political subjectivisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]