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This paper investigates whether regulatory forbearance for savings banks iii Korea affects the market discipline of depositors using data from 2000 to 2010, which are characterized by a series of exits of savings banks. We find that depositors' sensitivity to the savings banks' asset quality decreases when there is regulatory forbearance for failing savings banks. This forbearance effect is also observed in the behavior of the depositors of the neighboring savings banks in the same business area. These results suggest that regulatory forbearance may cause depositors to misjudge bank risks, increasing the expected costs of bank failure. (JEL G21, G28), I. INTRODUCTION Market discipline constrains the risk-taking behavior of banks and thus has the potential to. help reduce the probability of bank failures and minimize the cost of failures that [...]

This study focuses on a credit-related informal risk-sharing mechanism and analyzes the effect of informal credit on household welfare. We use two-stage least squares regression to avoid the endogeneity problem and the Heckman correction procedure to remove possible self-selection bias. We find that informal credit is positively associated with welfare; each thousand Ethiopian Birr (approximately US$ 28) received in the form of informal credit improves the welfare expenditure of a household by approximately 4.3%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates whether the transmission of monetary policy depends on the degree of competition in the banking sector. Applying an interacted panel VAR methodology consisting of a panel of 23 advanced economies, we find that GDP and credit respond less strongly to monetary policy shocks in economies where the bank market is more concentrated. We use the Lerner Index as a measure of banking competition and find evidence – albeit less clear – that monetary policy transmission is stronger when the banking sector is more competitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effectiveness of the ‘Twin Peaks’ supervision model, in which consumer protection and prudential regulation are carried out by two separate regulatory agencies. We use a dataset from 143 countries for the period of 2004–2011 to find that the Twin Peaks model is associated with a higher quality of banking supervision in terms of the efficiency and stability of financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]