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Understanding that hypothesis testing is aimed at seeking information rather than producing desirable outcomes is indispensable for designing informative experiments. This study investigated the developmental course of information seeking compared to producing an effect in young children. In a between-subjects design, 4- to 6-year-olds (N = 109) were presented with the same pattern of events and asked to choose an intervention to either seek information on whether a hypothesis is right or produce an effect. The results revealed a developmental change between 4 and 6 years of age. From 5.5 years and onwards, children selectively chose the correct interventions in both conditions, whereas 4- and younger 5-year-olds did not. Contrary to the general view that producing desirable outcomes developmentally precedes engaging in information seeking, the present findings indicate that they follow a similar developmental line in the early childhood years.

Research on the role of moral emotions in moral judgment, both in hypothetical dilemmas and in real-life moral decision making, has focused on preschool and elementary school age, with few studies spanning a larger age range, into adolescence and adulthood. The present special issue addresses a neglected area, the development of moral emotions and moral motivation in adolescence and adulthood. The focus is on the "Happy Victimizer Phenomenon", a pattern of emotion attributions to a moral transgressor that has been primarily observed in childhood, but that does not seem to disappear with age. We will begin by briefly reviewing 30 years of developmental research on moral emotion attribution and the "happy victimizer phenomenon". This review will be followed by a discussion of the present papers.

Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in 3- to 4-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A. D., Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. [2017]. "Developmental Science," 20(5), e12445). The present study is a large-scale replication attempt of this paradigm. The task was administered three times to the same sample of N = 185 children at 2, 3, and 4 years of age. Using the original stimuli, we did not replicate the original finding of above-chance belief-congruent looking in a combined score of two false belief conditions in either of the three age groups. Interestingly, the overall pattern of results was comparable to the original study. Post-hoc analyses revealed, however, that children performed above chance in one false belief condition (FB1) and below chance in the other false belief condition (FB2), thus yielding mixed evidence of children's false belief-based action predictions. Similar to the original study, participants' performance did not change with age and was not related to children's general language skills. This study demonstrates the importance of large-scaled replications and adds to the growing number of research questioning the validity and reliability of anticipatory looking false belief paradigms as a robust measure of children's implicit tracking of beliefs.

First-order theory of mind (ToM) development has shown to conform to a Guttman scale, with desire reasoning developing before belief reasoning. There have been attempts to test for internal consistency and scalability in advanced ToM, but not over a broad age range and only with a limited set of tasks. This 2-year longitudinal study (N = 155; M[subscript age] = 4.2; SD = 0.85 months; 68 girls, 87 boys) tests for the scalability of a broader range of ToM tasks, and we model the developmental "transition" from first-order to advanced ToM in 4- to 6-year-olds. Rasch analyses showed that psychometrically sound and developmentally sequenced scales emerge when measures of morally relevant and second-order false belief, as well as mental verb understanding, metacognition, and recognition of nonliteral speech are included. Individual differences were moderately stable over time, and there were systematic transitions from failure to success in children's performance, suggesting that conceptual continuity exists between first-order and advanced ToM.

Both theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning have been related to children's academic abilities. In a longitudinal study with 112 children, we investigated the influence of these two abilities on children's math and reading performance at 7 years of age. We found that math performance was predicted by concurrent working memory as well as by preschool numerical abilities and ToM. Reading performance was predicted by concurrent working memory and verbal IQ at 6 years. This corroborates earlier research demonstrating the importance of executive functioning (working memory) and ToM for later academic abilities. We argue that ToM may be an important developmental precursor of math performance because both require an understanding of representations.

The metarepresentational aspect of early pretend play (make-believe activities where children create or participate in creating a new situation different from a real one) has been theoretically debated. In the present longitudinal study of N = 83 children, we tested for predictive relations of shared attention at 12-18 months, implicit false belief (FB) at 18 months, and pretend production at 18 months, as well as comprehension at 24 months. We also tested for long-term predictive relations of pretense production and comprehension with theory of mind (ToM) at the age of 4-5 years. Only pretense production directed toward others (but not self) was specifically related to infancy measures of shared attention. Early pretense, either production or comprehension, was not related to implicit FB or later ToM measures. The findings are discussed in terms of different theoretical accounts of early pretense.

The reluctance of children to revise their prior beliefs is a prominent phenomenon in the reasoning literature. One way to facilitate belief change is offering explanations, and this study examined whether highlighting (counter) evidence with diagrams leads to belief revision to the same extent. Altogether 134 preschoolers and second-graders (5- and 7-year-olds, respectively) were presented with either counterintuitive data or explanations, both refuting a strong commonly held belief concerning the relation between two variables (e.g. eating carrots improves vision). In the explanation condition, we presented children with an explanatory underlying mechanism for the unexpected causal relation (e.g. spinach and carrots contain the same amount of vitamin A, with both improving vision). In the diagram condition, children were presented with empirical data displayed in a bar graph (non-covariation), which also disconfirmed the initial belief. In both age groups and both conditions we found significant numbers of belief revision with high certainty ratings concerning the new belief. Belief change was more pronounced in second-graders, who in addition showed significantly more changes in the diagram condition than in the explanation condition. These findings suggest that the perceptual saliency of (counter) evidence helps children to correctly evaluate hypotheses, which supports changes in their prior belief.

The present longitudinal study aims at investigating the interplay between child temperament, mother-child interaction quality and child Theory of Mind (ToM) at preschool age with regard to the development of child problem behavior at school age in 115 participants. Maternal sensitivity and child temperament were assessed when children were 4 years old. At 5 years of age, child ToM was assessed. At 8 years of age, child problem behavior was assessed. Results showed that child problem behavior was independently predicted by child temperamental negative affectivity and maternal sensitivity. The current study underlines the important role of both endogenous as well as exogenous factors for healthy child development.

An action's end state can be anticipated by considering the agent's goal, or simply by projecting the movement trajectory. Theories suggest that individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have difficulties anticipating other's goal-directed actions, caused by an impairment using prior information. We examined whether children, adolescents and adults with and without ASC visually anticipate another's action based on its goal or movement trajectory by presenting participants an agent repeatedly taking different paths to reach the same of two targets. The ASC group anticipated the goal and not just the movement pattern, but needed more time to perform goal-directed anticipations. Results are in line with predictive coding accounts, claiming that the use of prior information is impaired in ASC.

In a longitudinal study (N = 54), we investigated the developmental relation between children's implicit and explicit theory of mind and executive functions. We found that implicit false belief understanding at 18 months was correlated with explicit false belief understanding at 4 to 5 years of age, with the latter being closely related to second-order false belief understanding at 5 years of age. Also, replicating a number of studies, explicit first- and second-order false belief understanding, in contrast to implicit false belief understanding, were related to executive functioning. This indicates that executive functions play a role in standard explicit false belief tasks, but not in implicit false belief understanding. We argue that spontaneous, implicit false belief understanding does not require conscious control, whereas explicit false belief understanding is based on conscious, reflective processing. In sum, we suggest a developmental enrichment account of theory of mind development, with belief processing becoming increasingly reflective and controlled with advancing age.

Scientific reasoning is a crucial ability in modern knowledge societies. An increasing body of developmental and educational research shows that already primary-school children possess emerging scientific-reasoning skills. The Science-P Reasoning Inventory (SPR-I) is a novel classroom-based paper-and-pencil instrument that was developed to measure children's conceptual advances across diverse components of scientific reasoning (experimentation, data interpretation, understanding the nature of science). The SPR-I comprises 19 items, and a reduced, 7-item version is available: the SPR-I(7). Both versions measure broad scientific-reasoning skills and they can be used for whole-class testing. The administration of the SPR-I(7) requires only 30 min, allowing for its use across diverse research settings and the economic assessment of large samples of primary-school students. This article reports on the first empirical test (IRT analysis) of the theoretical, conceptual-development model that guided the construction of the SPR-I. Both the SPR-I and the SPR-I(7) are available from the Supplementary Materials.

Experimentation skills are a central component of scientific thinking, and many studies have investigated whether and when primary-school children develop adequate experimentation strategies. However, the answers to these questions vary substantially depending on the type of task that is used: while discovery tasks, which require children to engage in unguided experimentation, typically do not reveal systematic skills in primary school, choice tasks suggest an early use of adequate experimentation strategies. To acquire a more accurate description of primary-school experimentation, this article proposes a novel multiple-select paper-and-pencil inventory that measures children's understanding of experimental design. The two reported studies investigated the psychometric properties of this instrument and addressed the development of primary-school experimentation. Study 1 assessed the validity of the item format by comparing 2 items and an interview measure in a sample of 71 third- and fourth-graders (9- and 10-year-olds), while Study 2 investigated the reliability and the convergent validity of the inventory by administering it to 411 second-, third- and fourth-graders (8-, 9- and 10-year-olds) and by comparing children's performance in the 11-item scale to 2 conventional experimentation tasks. The obtained results demonstrate the reliability and validity of the inventory and suggest that a solid understanding of experimental design first emerges at the end of primary school.

It has been argued that the distinction between factivity and non-factivity is more fundamental to mental state understanding than that between false beliefs and reality. The present study examined children's growing understanding of all possible contrasts between the factive verb "know" and the non-factive verbs "think" and "guess" longitudinally between the ages of 50 and 94 months and investigated its relations to first- and second-order FB skills independently of general language skills. For this purpose, 140 monolingual children (63 females) were tested at 50, 60, 70, and 94 months in a task measuring their understanding of degrees of speaker (un)certainty expressed by the verbs "know," "think," and "guess" and in first- and second-order FB tasks. Results showed that by 60 months of age, "know" was differentiated from "think" and from "guess" in the majority of the sample. However, longitudinal results revealed protracted development over the preschool years. Further, there was a link between first-order FBU and a partial understanding of the factivity/non-factivity contrast at 70 months, while the consistent mastery of the know-contrasts at 94 months was predicted by second-order FBU. Results also suggested that false belief precedes a full-fledged concept of factivity rather than vice versa. The results are discussed in light of theories of socio-cognitive development.

An action's end state can be anticipated by considering the agent's goal, or simply by projecting the movement trajectory. Theories suggest that individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC) have difficulties anticipating other's goal-directed actions, caused by an impairment using prior information. We examined whether children, adolescents and adults with and without ASC visually anticipate another's action based on its goal or movement trajectory by presenting participants an agent repeatedly taking different paths to reach the same of two targets. The ASC group anticipated the goal and not just the movement pattern, but needed more time to perform goal-directed anticipations. Results are in line with predictive coding accounts, claiming that the use of prior information is impaired in ASC., Author(s): Kerstin Ganglmayer [sup.1] [sup.2] , Tobias Schuwerk [sup.1] , Beate Sodian [sup.1] , Markus Paulus [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.5252.0, 0000 0004 1936 973X, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, , Munich, Germany [...]

Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from others, and a few studies of children's selective teaching, the evidence almost exclusively comes from Western cultures, and cross-cultural comparison in this line of work is very rare. In the present research, we investigated Japanese and German children's selective learning and teaching abilities. We found clear cultural differences. Japanese children were better at selectively teaching an ignorant person over a knowledgeable person than at selectively learning from knowledgeable others. By contrast, German children were better at choosing to learn from a knowledgeable rather than from an ignorant person than at selectively teaching ignorant others. The present findings suggest that the development of human learning and teaching, especially the tendency to take into account others' knowledge status, is strongly affected by cultural background.

Metacognitive control is an important factor for successful learning and has been shown to increase across childhood and adolescence. Only few studies have attempted to investigate the cognitive processes and psychological mechanisms that subserve metacognitively-based control and the development thereof. Accordingly, the aim of the current study was to gain an insight into the cognitive and psychological correlates that relate to metacognitively-based control processes. Specifically, we were interested in two measures of metacognitive control: learners' ability to self-regulate their study time in a study time allocation paradigm, as well as the efficiency with which they allocated their study time. It was of particular interest to explore the relation between declarative metamemory and procedural metacognitive skills. In addition, we assessed learners' general cognitive and executive abilities. We tested a group of 10-year olds and a group of adults. Surprisingly, and in contrast to previous studies, the current study does not support a relation between declarative metamemory and procedural skills, or executive functions and intelligence and procedural skills. We interpret our results in line with a dual systems view of metacognitive abilities and further speculate whether procedural skills might become increasingly independent and automated with age.

Do social cognition and epistemological understanding promote elementary school children's experimentation skills? To investigate this question, 402 children (ages 8, 9, and 10) in 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grades were assessed for their experimentation skills, social cognition (advanced theory of mind [AToM]), epistemological understanding (understanding the nature of science), and general information-processing skills (inhibition, intelligence, and language abilities) in a whole-class testing procedure. A multiple indicators multiple causes model revealed a significant influence of social cognition (AToM) on epistemological understanding, and a McNemar test suggested that children's development of AToM is an important precursor for the emergence of an advanced, mature epistemological understanding. Children's epistemological understanding, in turn, predicted their experimentation skills. Importantly, this relation was independent of the common influences of general information processing. Significant relations between experimentation skills and inhibition, and between epistemological understanding, intelligence, and language abilities emerged, suggesting that general information processing contributes to the conceptual development that is involved in scientific thinking. The model of scientific thinking that was tested in this study (social cognition and epistemological understanding promote experimentation skills) fitted the data significantly better than 2 alternative models, which assumed nonspecific, equally strong relations between all constructs under investigation. Our results support the conclusion that social cognition plays a foundational role in the emergence of children's epistemological understanding, which in turn is closely related to the development of experimentation skills. Our findings have significant implications for the teaching of scientific thinking in elementary school and they stress the importance of children's epistemological understanding in scientific-thinking processes.

Recent research suggests that impaired action prediction is at the core of social interaction deficits in autism spectrum condition (ASC). Here, we targeted two cognitive mechanisms that are thought to underlie the prediction of others' actions: statistical learning and efficiency considerations. We measured proactive eye movements of 10-year-old children and adults with and without ASC in anticipation of an agent's repeatedly presented action. Participants with ASC showed a generally weaker tendency to generate action predictions. Further analyses revealed that statistical learning led to systematic accurate action predictions in the control groups. Participants with ASC were impaired in their ability to use frequency information for action predictions. Our findings inform etiological models of impaired social interaction in ASC.

In a series of 3 experiments, the authors investigated the influence of symmetry of variables on children's and adults' data interpretation. They hypothesized that symmetrical (i.e., present/present) variables would support correct interpretations more than asymmetrical (i.e., present/absent) variables. Participants were asked to judge covariation in a series of data sets presented in contingency tables and to justify their judgments. Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were elementary school children (Experiment 1: n = 52 second graders, n = 44 fourth graders; Experiment 2: n = 50 second graders). Participants in Experiment 3 were adults (n = 62). In Experiment 1, children in the symmetrical variables condition performed better than those in the asymmetrical variables condition. Children in the symmetrical variables condition judged more data patterns correctly and they more frequently justified their choices by referring to the complete table. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that this effect was caused by differences in question format. Even when question format was held constant, second graders performed better with symmetrical variables. Experiment 3 showed that adults' data interpretation is also affected by symmetry of variables. Collectively, these results indicate that symmetry of variables affects interpretation of covariation data. The authors argue that symmetrical variables provide a context for meaningful comparison. With asymmetrical variables, the importance of the comparison is less salient. Thus, the symmetry of variables should be considered by researchers as well as educators.

Advanced theory-of-mind (AToM) development was investigated in three separate studies involving 82, 466, and 402 elementary school children (8-, 9-, and 10-year-olds). Rasch and factor analyses assessed whether common conceptual development underlies higher-order false-belief understanding, social understanding, emotion recognition, and perspective-taking abilities. The results refuted a unidimensional scale and revealed three distinct AToM factors: social reasoning, reasoning about ambiguity, and recognizing transgressions of social norms. Developmental progressions emerged for the two reasoning factors but not for recognizing transgressions of social norms. Both social factors were significantly related to inhibition, whereas language development only predicted performance on social reasoning. These findings suggest that AToM comprises multiple abilities, which are subject to distinct cognitive influences. Importantly, only two AToM factors involve conceptual development.

While typically developing children can use referential gaze to guide their word learning, those with autism spectrum disorder are often described to have problems with that. However, some researchers assume that the ability to follow gaze to select the correct referent can develop in autism later compared to typically developing individuals. To test this assumption, we compared the performance of adults with and without autism on a word learning task while recording their gaze behavior using an eye tracker. Results showed that both groups mostly chose the correct referent, but less so for the autism spectrum disorder group when the distractor's saliency was increased, suggesting that the ability to learn novel words by referring to gaze develops in autism spectrum disorder, but not fully, relative to their typically developing peers.

Theories of social-cognitive development have attributed a foundational role to declarative joint attention. The present longitudinal study of 83 children, who were assessed on a battery of social-cognitive tasks at multiple measurement points from the age of 12 to 50 months, tested a predictive model of theory of mind (false-belief understanding). Thereby, declarative, but not imperative, point production predicted false-belief understanding at 50 months. Predictive relations, which remained significant beyond the influence of child gender and language abilities, and were unrelated to child temperament and emotion recognition, were not mediated by mirror self-recognition or Level 1 visual perspective taking, which were both related to joint attention. These findings conform to theoretical predictions and provide empirical support for conceptual continuity in the social domain.

This study aimed to investigate the relationship between explicit and implicit forms of Theory of Mind reasoning and to test the influence of experience on implicit Theory of Mind reasoning in individuals with autism spectrum disorders and in neurotypical adults. Results from two standard explicit Theory of Mind tasks are mixed: Individuals with autism spectrum disorders did not differ from neurotypical adults in their performance in the Strange Stories Test, but scored significantly lower on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Furthermore, in an implicit false-belief task, individuals with autism spectrum disorders differed from neurotypical adults in false belief-congruent anticipatory looking. However, this group difference disappeared by (1) providing participants with the outcome of a false belief-based action and (2) subsequently repeating this test trial. Although the tendency to fixate the false belief-congruent location significantly increased from the first to the second test trial in individuals with autism spectrum disorders, it differed in neither test trial from chance. These findings support the notion of an implicit Theory of Mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders, but give rise to the idea that anticipatory looking behaviors in autism spectrum disorders may be affected by experience. Additionally, the pattern of results from implicit and explicit Theory of Mind measures supports the theory of two independent Theory of Mind reasoning systems.

This study examined longitudinal relations between early measures of prosocial action in infancy as well as cognitive and social-cognitive abilities, and the sharing behaviour of preschool children. The results reveal relations between delay-of-gratification at 24 months and inhibitory control at 30 months, and children's sharing at 5 years. Moreover, the analyses showed specific relations between distress understanding at 24 months and preschool children's sharing with friends, and a relation between goal encoding at 7 months and sharing with a disliked other at 5 years. Yet, there were no relations between early measures of prosociality in infancy and preschool children's sharing. The results support the view that inhibitory control competencies and social-cognitive abilities play an important role in the early development of prosocial action.