Search

I A RADICAL REPORT [I]t is worth remembering that the apparent heresies of one generation become the orthodoxies of the next. (1) More than a half-century after publication of the [...], The radical principles behind the 1967 Woodhouse Report were eclipsed by shifting political styles--and gradually abandoned as heretical. We can now turn to Sir Owen's own notion, that "the apparent heresies of one generation become the orthodoxies of the next", to explore how core Woodhouse heresies might themselves perform this transition: providing fresh support for a generation grappling with headline challenges of climate change and pandemic control.

1 Introduction The Secretary-General's Our Common Agenda (OCA) report presented in 2021 responds to a mandate by Member States as part of the UN75 Declaration in 2020. (1) The report [...]

Thinkers central to the formulation of contract theory in the Western political tradition, notably Hobbes and Locke, (1) articulated their theories in worlds marked by immense political and social strife. [...]

Equality before the law is an axiom of public law, perhaps the most fundamental public law axiom of all. Our commitment to this equality is deepened by the knowledge that [...]

James Nugent OVER THE PAST DECADE, collective bargaining in Ontario--and Canada as a whole--has come under increasing pressures from 'back-to-work' legislation, neoliberal austerity (e.g., the Ontario government's 'net zero compensation' [...]

ABSTRACT The claim that businesses have a social license to operate acquires concrete form in the second pillar of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in [...]

III. CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY Hobbes's earlier, canonical works of political theory provide much better evidence for his views on these matters, and I rely on them in developing [...]

ESSAY CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER A. Instituting the Commonwealth B. The Domestic Analogy II. THE REFUSAL OF A GLOBAL LEVIATHAN III. CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY AND [...], This Essay reexamines Thomas Hobbes's understanding of international order. Hobbes defended the establishment of an all-powerful sovereign as the solution to interpersonal conflict, and he advanced an analogy between persons and states. Extending this "domestic analogy," theorists following Hobbes have supposed that a global sovereign would prove the solution to interstate conflict. Yet Hobbes himself never proposed a global sovereign, which has led some scholars to diagnose an apparent inconsistency in his philosophy. This Essay seeks to resolve that inconsistency, drawing on Hobbes's theory of the passions and his hope for radical political transformation. Hobbes believed that the solution to international disorder was not analogous but rather identical to the solution to domestic strife: both would be overcome through the establishment of a "well-ordered commonwealth." Hobbes argued that a state capable of securing peace within its borders was unlikely to make aggressive war outside them. The radical transformation he envisaged in domestic politics would thus in itself mitigate and perhaps even overcome international conflict. This "realist-utopian" position aligns Hobbes more closely with later social-contract theorists, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls. It also invites a reconsideration of the foundational principles of international law, with implications for contemporary problems from humanitarian intervention to economic integration. Hobbes's realist-utopianism provides a needed corrective not only to the narrowly defined realism that has long claimed his imprimatur, but also to realism's rivals, which unwittingly share its premises.

Society granted physicians status, respect, autonomy in practice, the privilege of self-regulation, and financial rewards on the expectation that physicians would be competent, altruistic, moral, and would address the health [...]

Improving the use and impact of science-based policies and practices at the national and transnational level is important for enhancing the quality and legitimacy of democratic governance systems. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the major drivers behind strengthening the creation, application and mediation of scientific expertise for policy-making. Science-based policy-making can take different forms, such as evaluation of practices, implementation of independent or commissioned research, application of quantitative and qualitative analyses, or the development of statistical and environmental monitoring systems. However, scientific evidence is only one among several factors contributing to sound democratic decisions. Scientific expertise needs to be mediated through a complex process of social and political deliberation. The paper aims to identify the main policy challenges behind science advisory bodies and to set out an agenda for rebuilding public trust in science-based policy-making. Keywords Epistemology * Expertise * Normativity * Politics * Science, Science-based policy-making has grown ever more important in recent years. In parallel with the dramatic increase in the complexity and uncertainty of the ways in which science and technology interact [...]

Introduction 'NEW YORK -- Today's 20-somethings are the first generation, as a whole, to face downward economic mobility compared to their parents' generation,' according to a new report from national [...]

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is examined from the perspective of experimental methods in economics and complex adaptive systems simulations. This paper first discusses the justice principle selection process in Rawls's representation of it as a hypothetical experiment. This hypothetical experiment fails to satisfy reasonable experimental controls, particularly as reflects the conception of the individual it employs. The second section of the paper discusses the differences between Rawls's two conceptions of rational persons associated with his distinction between thin and full theories of the good. The third section uses his fuller conception of rational persons, life plans, and psychological laws in the third part of the book to offer an alternative view of the selection process understood as a complex adaptive system. The fourth section turns to a topic raised by this complex system approach, the status of normative reasoning in political-economic systems. The fifth section summarizes. Keywords: complex adaptive systems, economic models, hypothetical experiments, normative reasoning, Rawls IEL Classification Codes: D63, C9, B40, A12, A13, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice ([1971] 1999) is remarkably influential for a book that has arguably failed in a number of major respects. (1) Though powerful in its vision [...]

IT IS ONE OF THE MOST FAMOUS IMAGES IN MODERN POLITICAL philosophy, both iconically and metaphorically: the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' 1651 Leviathan, depicting the state as a giant monarch [...]

Joseph Schumpeter's famous Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy articulates a minimalist theory of democracy that he contrasts with what he calls the 'classical doctrine of democracy.' This 'classical doctrine' appears to be a thinly veiled democratic interpretation of Rousseau's social contract, although Schumpeter rarely mentions Rousseau. The use of the concept of the general will, including the direct use of the French phrase volonte generale often associated with Rousseau, makes this apparent. Although Rousseau seems on the surface an odd choice as the archetypal democrat, Schumpeter's reading of him has some merit; Rousseau's social contract can be a democratic society in a certain sense ofthe word. Rousseau, furthermore, provides an adequate defense against the criticisms Schumpeter makes against his theory. This article uses Rousseau's ideas to argue against Schumpeter's minimalist model and in favor of what he calls the classical doctrine ofdemocracy. Keywords: Political Theory, Democracy and Civil Society, Participation/Citizenship, General Will. El famoso trabajo de Schumpeter Capitalismo, Socialismo y Democracia expresa una teoria de la democracia minimalista que el contrasta con lo que llama la 'teoria clasica de la democracia.' Esta 'doctrina clasica'parece ser una interpretation encubierta del contrato social de Rousseau. El uso del concepto de la voluntad general, incluyendo el uso directo de la frase francesa volonte generale,a menudo asociada a Rousseau, hace esto aparente. Aunque a primera vista Rousseau parece una election extraha como el democrata ideal, la interpretacion de Schumpeter tiene su merito; el contrato social de Rousseau puede ser de cierto modo una sociedad democratica, ademas, provee una defensa adecuada en contra de las criticas que Schumpeter hace de su teoria. Este articulo utiliza las ideas de Rousseau para argumentar en contra del modelo minimalista de Schumpeter y apoyar lo que el llamaba la doctrina clasica de la democracia., Joseph Schumpeter s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (2008) articulates a critique of and an alternative to classical versions of liberal democracy. There is much to praise in his minimalist model [...]

History seems to demonstrate that a society of perfect freedom, immune from the habit of collective choice, perdures only for small and very poor societies of simple design in relative [...]

It's all in Marshall: 'Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is [...]

This article proposes a theory of group formation based on the motive to seek informed opinion. Because an individual evaluates whether others are informed or not using his own priors, he identifies people with similar beliefs to be more informed than those with different beliefs. The result is an equilibrium in which like-minded individuals self-select into distinct groups, with members of each group believing that their own group is superior. (JEL D71, D81, D83, D85), Birds of a feather flock together; presumably, they admire their peers' plumage. There is a wealth of evidence that members of a particular social group evaluate in-group members more favorably [...]

There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life is a non-starter, and that a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must do justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of self-referentiality, mineness or for-me-ness that it entails. I then consider and discuss various objections to this account, in particular the view that an endorsement of such a minimal notion of self commits one to an outdated form of Cartesianism. In the final part of the paper, I argue that the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity. DOI: 10.1080100201740903377826

This article develops contractarian business ethics by applying social contract arguments to a specific question: What are the pre-legal (or moral) rights and responsibilities of corporations? The argument uses a hypothetical social contract to show the existence of for-profit corporations in democratic capitalist societies is consistent with Rawls's fundamental principles of justice. Corporations ought to have recognised their rights to be autonomous, to pursue private purposes, and to engage in economic activities. Corporations have a responsibility to respect the freedom and human rights of all people, and not to interfere with government programs that ensure people have the education and training they need to find and keep corporate employment and that provide a safety-net that prevents destitution, if corporations have any other rights and responsibilities, those rights and responsibilities need to be established by actual social contracts, probably in the form of legitimate democratic processes.

An integrative social contracts theory that was developed to find out similarities and differences in ethical attitudes between members of national groups that are different is presented. The differences between individual level attitudes and society level behaviors that is important for ethical decision making in integrative social contracts theory.

An argument that the trend of social contract is not based on voluntary partnerships but on disguised relations of domination is presented.

Two, ostensibly different, versions of the social contract appear in Hobbes's Leviathan, a commonwealth by institution and one by acquisition. These versions unexpectedly converge in chapter 20 with his remarkable claim that both commonwealths have the same rights and consequences of sovereignty. I argue that the first of these versions gives rise to a disjunction that logically commits Hobbes to either an impotent state or a Thrasymachean styled tyranny. Alter this, I describe how he tries to distance himself from the unsettling implications of this disjunction by conflating two importantly different ideas, authorization and empowerment. Next, I explain how this conflation undermines his empowerment thesis for the first version, a difficulty further compounded by the failure of the jus naturalis to supply a normative foundation for this form of commonwealth. I then briefly detail his account of the second version and explain why a Thrasymachean styled tyranny emerges as the only possibility in a commonwealth by acquisition. Finally, alter conceding a measure of plausibility to his claim of equivalency for his two forms of commonwealth. I conclude that Hobbes's commitment to a coalescence of his two versions in chapter 20 effectively transforms his theory of a social contract into a defense of tyranny.

Byline: Henry S. Richardson (1) Keywords: Disability; justice; Martha Nussbaum; John Rawls; reciprocity; social contract; veil of ignorance Abstract: Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls's sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls's sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled--or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability--for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum's interpretive claims about Rawls's view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls's lead, the paper utilizes the idealized 'initial choice situation' as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls's, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls's social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles. This extension to Rawls's device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions but the paper argues that the ideal of reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls's thought in the 1950s. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA Article History: Registration Date: 09/10/2006 Received Date: 30/08/2006 Accepted Date: 01/09/2006 Online Date: 05/12/2006

This article explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups: one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or to exploit the weaker group. The opportunity for exploitation is limited: it reduces the incentives of the exploited to produce private goods and increases the chances of revolution. Social contracts consist of the exchange of security against a share of the private good, produced at a high effort level. The model allows the derivation of conditions for either compliance or exploitation to occur and provides a comparative static explanation for the transition from one form of government to the other. Thus, it contributes to positive constitutional economics, the research program that is interested in explaining the emergence and change of constitutions.

Restoring the American Dream requires a new social contract to replace the one revoked by extensive reliance on free-market ideologies. The industrial-era contract was based on the enormous productivity of the mass-production system and supportive policies to counteract some of that system's most serious weaknesses. Restoring the dream of good jobs and opportunities for all requires that highly stressed families demand more flexible high-road policies to unlock the knowledge economy's enormous potential, including stronger worker participation on corporate boards, at work, and in the larger society. Keywords: social contract; family-friendly policies; high-road development

Studies reveal that integrative social contracts theory is arguably the most promising theory of business ethics to date, but often criticized for its inability to produce substantive, action-guiding norms. The substantive norms for guiding and constraining business conduct that can be produced without relying on premises from outside the contractualist framework are presented.

This article was adapted from a speech given to the annual convention of Independent Sector, Oct. 25, 2005, Washington, D.C. In the sweep of history, twenty-five years is not a [...]

The concept of new economy, which is also called as a virtual, reflexive or network economy, is studied. The studies show that the comparison between relations of labor, ownership and people in the social contract and in the new economy shows a shift especially in relation to gender and the restructuring of the relations between people and labor suggests that the notions of personhood should also be considered rather than the temporality of exchange needs.

What ethical rationale is necessary to make the United Nations Global Compact a success? What justificatory account is required to support the Compact adequately? I propose that any such account [...]

As the most demographically complex nation in the world, the United States faces ever more formidable challenges to fulfill its commitment to the democratic values of equity and inclusion as the foreign-born share of the population increases. Immigration, the major source of the contemporary diversification of the population, provides several lessons about how to prepare for that future within a framework of social justice and how to realign recent demographic trends with cherished democratic principles. A review of historical and contemporary controversies about the representation of the foreign-born and alien suffrage both illustrates the reemergence of ascriptive civic hierarchies and highlights some potentially deleterious social and civic consequences of recent demographic trends.

Issues regarding the normative function of the manager in the modern corporation are discussed. Work done in the 1980s and 1990s in corporate social responsibility, social contract theory and stakeholder theory has focused attention on this function. Understanding this function will make it easier for managers to solve the frequent conflicts of interest in their jobs.

Social contracts theory and an institutional theory expanding on Douglass North's view of economic institutions as two theories subdividing the filed of business ethics are discussed. Institutional theory might be a better one for unifying the field, but both theories are primarily heuristic.

Game theory can be linked with concepts from evolutionary theory. Game theory can account for fairness norms and suggest why people sometimes engage in mutual aid despite personal cost.