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In this paper I explore the notion of collective moral responsibility as it pertains both to nation-states contemplating humanitarian armed intervention in international social conflicts, and as it pertains to social groups perpetrating human rights violations in such conflicts. I take the Rwandan genocide as illustrative of such conflicts and make use of it accordingly. I offer an individualist account of collective moral responsibility, according to which collective moral responsibility is a species of joint responsibility.

Liberalism is based on the recognition of conflict arising out of pluralism, but the liberal response has tended to minimize the significance of that conflict, making it seem incomprehensible. The two main liberal strategies for accommodating conflict have involved the subordination of the private sphere to the public sphere and the substitution of justice for fate. Both strategies are based on unstable distinctions that distort the true significance of conflict. A new form of tragedy arises out of the idea that fate can be evaded by extending the scope of justice, combined with the belief that justice takes precedence over all other values.