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Although armed conflicts and crises affect people of all ages, children are particularly susceptible to the effects of war. One significant consequence of armed conflict that is especially critical for children's well-being, is when the belligerents use tactics specifically focused on harming children, including child soldier recruitment. Despite the increased attention of policy-makers, we still lack systematic knowledge of how many children are directly and indirectly at risk of being recruited by state and non-state actors. In overcoming this gap, we have collected data on the use of children by state and non-state actors from 2010 onwards. Moreover, we estimate the number of children at risk of recruitment. The results of our mapping and estimation sketch a dark picture. According to our estimates, in 2020, approximately 337 million children (or 14%, or more than one in eight of all children globally) were living in a conflict zone with reported child soldier recruitment—that is less than 50 km from ongoing conflict, which involved at least one actor who has been reported to recruit children. We close the paper by taking stock of the current knowledge on the root causes of child soldiering, and we discuss some policy implications.

Climate change is a major threat to sustained economic growth and wellbeing in the Global South. To what extent does official development assistance (ODA) strengthen recipient communities’ capacity to cope with climatic extremes? Here, we investigate whether inflow of development aid mitigates adverse health impacts of subsequent drought among children under 5 years of age, drawing on survey data of nearly 140,000 respondents across 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in combination with georeferenced data on World Bank-sponsored ODA projects and historical weather statistics. A coarsened exact matching analysis reveals little benefit of development aid on child nutritional status under normal meteorological conditions. However, among children exposed to drought, prior aid allocation is associated with significantly reduced weight loss. While the merit of ODA in facilitating long-term growth remains debated, this study finds consistent indication that multilateral development aid improves recipient communities’ capacity to cope with future drought. © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Ceasefires are arrangements through which conflict parties commit to stop fighting. They are a common part of intra-state conflict. Existing research on intra-state ceasefires is largely limited to case studies and guidance notes for the policy and practice community. What has to date been lacking is a complementing body of comparative quantitative analysis to identify broader ceasefire trends and test the wider applicability of theory. Recent advancements in ceasefire data offer new opportunities to broaden the research agenda on ceasefires. This special section sets out the current state of the art in ceasefire research and provides the intellectual foundations to advance a new sub-field of quantitative ceasefire research. We discuss the conceptual challenges facing the study of ceasefires, offer a brief overview of ceasefire research focusing on the functions, timing, and sustainability of arrangements, and discuss the collective contributions of the articles included within this special section, and the implications for research and practice.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an important means to address conflicts, support local development and build trust between businesses and civil society. Yet CSR often fails to live...

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East coincides with an emerging trend of attacks on healthcare. Protection of health personnel, health services and humanitarian workers is no longer respected. This compromises the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 3 – towards health for all, and 16 – towards justice and peace. The Centre for Global Health at the University of Oslo, the Peace Research Institute Oslo and the Norwegian Red Cross co-organised a meeting exploring how conflict impacts health systems and potential solutions to protect and maintain health care services.

When does inequality lead to conflict? Despite recent studies highlighting the effects of group exclusion, this question has not been fully answered. We argue that objective group inequality is not...

While there is a vast literature studying the effects of official development aid (ODA) on economic growth, there are far fewer comparative studies addressing how aid affects health outcomes. Furthermore, while much attention has been paid to country-level effects of aid, there is a clear knowledge gap in the literature when it comes to systematic studies of aid effectiveness below the country-level. Addressing this gap, we undertake what we believe is the first systematic attempt to study how ODA affects infant mortality at the subnational level. We match new geographic aid data from the AidData on the precise location, type, and time frame of bilateral and multilateral aid projects in Nigeria with available georeferenced survey data from five Nigerian Demographic and Health Surveys. Using quasi-experimental approaches, with mother fixed-effects, we are able to control for a vast number of unobserved factors that may otherwise be spuriously correlated with both infant mortality and ODA. The results indicate very clearly that geographical proximity to active aid projects reduces infant mortality. Moreover, aid contributes to reduce systematic inter-group, or horizontal, inequalities in a setting where such differences loom large. In particular, we find that aid more effectively reduces infant mortality in less privileged groups like children of Muslim women, and children living in rural, and in Muslim-dominated areas. Finally, there is evidence that aid projects are established in areas that on average have lower infant mortality than non-aid locations, suggesting that there are biases resulting in aid not necessarily reaching those populations in greatest need.

Launched in 2003, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has become a global standard for transparency in extractive sectors. Yet, there remains much debate over the success of the EITI. In this article, we establish a conceptual categorization of goals for organizations like the EITI, systematically identify the various goals associated with the EITI, and then examine empirical evidence to evaluate its specific achievements. We find that the EITI has been most successful in reaching its institutional goals, notably by becoming a recognized brand and consolidating transparency as a global norm. The EITI has been fairly successful in reaching some of the operational goals, such as setting up standards for auditing, reporting, and civil society involvement in multi-stakeholder groups. Whether the EITI has had an impact on developmental goals remains an open question as it is challenging to identify the correct measurements for impact and many evaluations assess goals that are over-inflated compared to what the initiative formally seeks to achieve. We conclude that any evaluation of the EITI needs to be clear about which type of objective it is measuring, and that an evaluation should not deem the EITI in general as a success or failure based on evaluating only one or two aspects of the initiative. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. or its licensors or contributors. This is the authors' accepted and refereed manuscript to the article.

The natural resource abundance of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has featured in policy debates as the prime example of ‘conflict minerals’ driving conflict-related sexual violence. This narrative has dominated how the conflict in the eastern part of the country has been portrayed in the media and by high-level policy-makers. Despite increased attention to research on mining and gender, systematic analyses of the links between mining, conflict, and sexual violence are scarce. This paper contributes to filling this gap by exploring how artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and sexual violence are related in Eastern DRC. We combine new subnational data on the geographical location of ASM sites with detailed survey data from the 2013/2014 Demographic and Health survey of women aged 15–49 on their exposure to sexual violence committed by their intimate partners and by others (non-partners). The results indicate that women living in close proximity to ASM are indeed more likely to experience sexual violence of both types, although the effect is stronger for non-partner sexual violence. In the Kivus and Maniema, the risk of experiencing non-partner sexual is particularly high for women that live close to a mine with the presence of an armed actor.

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo there are several support programmes for sexual violence survivors, but their impacts are rarely systematically assessed. We investigated the effects for women from two support programmes that include both survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and others. Specifically, we estimated (1) the effect of SGBV on social exclusion and economic well-being, and (2) the effects of support programmes on social exclusion and economic well-being, as well as differential effects for SGBV survivors and others. Based on an original survey of 1,203 women, we found that survivors felt less included across various social settings, but their economic well-being was no different than that of other women. We also found that support programmes significantly improve both perceived social inclusion and economic well-being for survivors and non-survivors. The effects on economic well-being were larger for survivors. In conclusion, these support programmes brought important benefits to survivors and non-survivors alike, although there is potential for improvement, particularly on social inclusion for SGBV survivors.

In recent years, many oil finds were made along the shores of Africa, often triggering high hopes. But do expectations of the consequences of oil discoveries affect subsequent conflict? A number of arguments back this idea. Relative deprivation theory suggests that oil discoveries raise hopes of windfalls, which if not fulfilled, result in frustration and thus increase conflict risk. In contrast, cognitive psychology assumes that the effect of expectations largely works through a confirmation bias and thus depends on whether individuals attach positive or negative expectations to oil discoveries. Given the lack of appropriate data, these relationships have never been tested empirically. Using unique georeferenced data from a representative survey in Mali in 2006, this paper addresses this gap. Our results suggest that expectations indeed significantly contribute to subsequent conflict. The negative or positive character of expectations is critical, working as "self-fulfilling prophecy" rather than frustrated "great expectations": when people hold negative views on the future effects of oil, the risk of civil unrest increases.

Investigation of whether, how, and why inequality influences the dynamics of violent conflict has a long intellectual history. Inequality between individuals and households (vertical inequality) has dominated the literature, but recently attention has shifted to the role of group-based inequalities in triggering violence. Our review of research on the relationship between conflict mobilisation and violence, and “horizontal inequality” (inequalities based on group identities such as ethnicity, region, and religion) reveals solid support for the argument that high levels of horizontal economic and political inequalities among the relatively deprived make violent conflict more likely.

Although socioeconomic inequalities are assumed to increase the risk of conflict, the mechanisms behind how inequalities affect attitudes toward violence are poorly understood. The differences between individual (vertical) and group (horizontal) inequalities, and the role that perception of inequality plays, have not been investigated to any great extent due to limited data availability. This study aims at providing a better understanding of the effects of different kinds of inequality by testing new survey data collected in the Niger Delta. Using attitudes of acceptance of the use of violence as the dependent variable, the study compares the effects of horizontal and vertical inequalities and actual versus perceived inequalities. The effect of access to oil resources is also tested for horizontal inequalities (actual and perceived). The results show that both vertical and horizontal inequalities matter for the acceptance of violence. While relatively deprived individuals are more likely to suppor...

In recent years, the focus of quantitative climate-conflict research has shifted from studying civil wars to studying different types of conflicts, particularly non-state and communal conflicts, based on the argument that these local-level conflicts are a more likely consequence of climate variability than civil war. However, the findings from previous research do not paint a consistent picture of the relationship between climate and communal conflict. We posit that a research design treating the climate variable as randomized is a better and more convincing strategy for estimating the relationship between climate variability and communal conflict compared to the conventional control method to account for confounders. In this paper, we ask two questions: (1) what type of research design allows us to treat climate variability as randomized and (2) what can we say about the relationship between climate variability and communal violence using this new design? To answer these questions, we analyze six large subnational areas, at a monthly time scale, and calculate the standardized precipitation index for each area for each month. We find that both short, unusually dry intervals and long, unusually wet intervals increase the likelihood of a communal conflict event.

A strong fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africaf could pave the way for a demographic transition on the continent that would open a demographic window of opportunity. However, it has been suggested that the demographic transition and increasing relative youth proportions are neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ in themselves, and that under unfavorable political and economic conditions, ‘youth bulges’ may be a curse rather than a blessing, increasing the risk of armed conflict. We show that the demographic transition seems to come later in African conflict countries south of the Sahara than to those who have not experienced conflict. This chapter will explore these two scenarios, and how different factors, such as education, fertility and health, ethnic distribution, migration and, urbanization, can affect the ways in which demographic change impacts the risk of conflict.

While the literature on peacekeeping has mostly focused on whether peacekeeping actually keeps the peace, few studies have systematically addressed the question of what explains variations in unint...

This article critically examines the notion that wealth sharing in the aftermath of internal armed conflicts can bring about long-lasting peace. While wealth sharing is increasingly considered a crucial element of peacebuilding, the evidence concerning its success is inconclusive. Previous studies unfortunately suffer from weak theoretical and empirical definitions of wealth sharing and from examining only a subset of postconflict societies. This article improves the research by disaggregating the concept of wealth sharing to concrete policy relevant natural resource management tools and by introducing new and better data on wealth sharing and including more postconflict peace periods than previous studies. This article examines the relationships between armed conflict, wealth sharing and peace by studying two independent but interlinked research questions: In which postconflict societies is wealth sharing most likely to be adopted? And can wealth sharing bring stable peace in postconflict societies? The analyses show that wealth sharing is more likely to be implemented after natural resource conflicts. Nonetheless, the article does not find that wealth sharing is successful in bringing postconflict peace after these conflicts. Reasons for this can be that (1) other factors than wealth sharing explain the outcome better, and (2) the wealth sharing policies are poorly designed and implemented. The article concludes that wealth sharing can only be a suitable path for societies recovering from armed conflict if such policies are carefully designed to fit the specific context and take into account the challenges that will arrive.

While a number of publications show that natural resources are associated with internal armed conflict, surprisingly little research looks at how natural resources affect post-conflict peace. This article therefore investigates the relationship between natural resources and post-conflict peace by analyzing new data on natural resource conflicts. We argue that the effect of natural resources on peace depends on how a country’s natural resources can constitute a motive or opportunity for armed conflict. In particular, three mechanisms may link natural resources to conflict recurrence: disagreements over natural resource distribution may motivate rebellion; using natural resources as a funding source creates an opportunity for conflict; and natural resources may aggravate existing conflict, acting either as motivation or opportunity for rebellion, but through other mechanisms than distributional claims or funding. Our data code all internal armed conflicts between 1946 and 2006 according to the presence of these resource–conflict links. We claim such mechanisms increase the risk of conflict recurrence because access to natural resources is an especially valuable prize worth fighting for. We test our hypotheses using a piecewise exponential survival model and find that, bivariately, armed conflicts with any of these resource–conflict mechanisms are more likely to resume than non-resource conflicts. A multivariate analysis distinguishing between the three mechanisms reveals that this relationship is significant only for conflicts motivated by natural resource distribution issues. These findings are important for researchers and policymakers interested in overcoming the ‘curse’ associated with natural resources and suggest that the way forward lies in natural resource management policies carefully designed to address the specific resource–conflict links.

Most quantitative assessments of civil conflict draw on annual country-level data to determine a baseline hazard of conflict onset. The first problem with such analyses is that they ignore factors associated with the precipitation of violence, such as elections and natural disasters and other trigger mechanisms. Given that baseline hazards are relatively static, most of the temporal variation in risk is associated with such precipitating factors. The second problem with most quantitative analyses of conflict is that they assume that civil conflicts are distributed uniformly throughout the country. This is rarely the case; most intrastate armed conflicts take place in the periphery of the country, well away from the capital and often along international borders. Analysts fail to disaggregate temporally as well as spatially. While other contributions to this issue focus on the temporal aspect of conflict, this article addresses the second issue: the spatial resolution of analysis. To adequately assess the baseline risk of armed conflict, this article develops a unified prediction model that combines a quantitative assessment of conflict risk at the country level with country-specific sub-national analyses at first-order administrative regions. Geo-referenced data on aspects of social, economic, and political exclusion, as well as endemic poverty and physical geography, are featured as the principal local indicators of latent conflict. Using Asia as a test case, this article demonstrates the unique contribution of applying a localized approach to conflict prediction that explicitly captures sub-national variation in civil conflict risk.

The transition from war to peace is fraught with tension and the risk of a return to bloodshed. With so much at stake, it is crucial that the international community and local stakeholders make sense of the complex mosaic of challenges, to support a lasting, inclusive and prosperous peace. Recent missions, such as in Afghanistan, Somalia or Sudan, have highlighted the fact that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to steering countries away from violence and towards stability. This Adelphi offers a series of economic perspectives on conflict resolution, showing how the challenges of peacebuilding can be more effectively tackled. From the need to marry diplomatic peacemaking with development efforts, and activate the private sector in the service of peacebuilding aims, to the use of taxes and natural-resource revenues as a financial base for sustainable peace, this issue considers how economic factors can positively shape and drive peace processes. It examines the complex ways in which power and orde...

Forests can provide refuge, funds, and food for combatants in civil war. Insurgents may also use forested regions to hide from government troops and the government may choose to ignore them if they remain in remote forested regions. Case studies of Burma, Cambodia, and other countries show that forest resources have served to fuel armed conflict. Several scholars and NGOs have portrayed this as a world-wide problem, but there are hardly any relevant statistical studies. This article first develops theoretically the different mechanisms relating forest resources to conflict. It then looks at the empirical relationship for the onset and duration of conflict at the country level and finds very little support for a general and direct relationship. At this level, it would appear that many have generalized too hastily from the case studies. The analysis then moves to the disaggregated level and looks at the duration of conflict when forest resources are available in the conflict zone. Again, no general relationship is found. We find that a shorter distance to the coast tends to make the conflicts in forested conflict zones longer. On the other hand many of the significant results we find are driven by one or two cases. While several generalizations from case studies seem overly ambitious, a more careful modeling of the mechanisms revealed by the cases finds some support in the statistical study.

Introduction Revenues from high-value natural resources such as oil, gemstones and timber, or minerals such as coltan, present both opportunities and challenges for countries in transition from war to peace. Resource sectors can greatly assist in postconflict economic recovery by attracting foreign investments,developing infrastructures, and generating tax revenues and local incomes. Yet resource sectors can also finance leaders orparties who seek to undermine a political settlement for theirown interests (known as ‘peace spoilers’), negatively affectlocal populations in resource-exploitation areas, and aggravate perceptions of government incompetence and corruption. Addressing these opportunities and challenges is particularlyimportant in the many post-conflict countries that are heavilyreliant on resource sectors. In Algeria, Angola, Timor Leste and Sudan, to name a few, resource sectors account for up to 60% ofGDP and 90% of government revenue.1 The stakes of post-conflict resource management are highgiven that countries with valuable natural resources are more likely to experience armed conflicts, which furthermore tendto last longer, be more severe and more likely to relapse after peace has been established.2 In Angola, Liberia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and many other countries resources have played an important role in motivating or at least financing hostilities. All these issues make management ofresources and revenues a primary concern in many resourcerich, post-conflict countries.

The recent escalation in the violent conflict in the Niger Delta has brought the region to the forefront of international energy and security concerns. This book analyses the causes, dynamics and p ...