Search

We focus on market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, where the introduction of generics in different markets provide a sequence of quasi natural experiments involving a significant competitive shock for the molecule experiencing Loss of Exclusivity. We show that generic entry alters competitive constraints and generates market-wide effects. Paradoxically, entry may soften competitive pressure for some originators. We obtain these results by econometrically estimating time-varying price elasticities and apply the logic of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to delineate antitrust markets. They provide strong empirical support to the approach consisting in defining relevant markets contingent on the theory of harm. We discuss the relevance of these findings in the context of ongoing cases., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Generic drugs are sold at a fraction of the original brand price. Yet, generic entry typically produces a drop in the quantity market share of the molecule losing exclusivity. This effect is economically and statistically significant for a large dataset covering hundreds of prescription drugs sold in the US during the period 1994Q1-2003Q4. This paper proposes the first systematic analysis of what appears to be a market anomaly.We propose a model to characterize the market equilibrium before and after generic entry. We identify precise conditions under which entry reduces the quantity market share of the molecule. Intriguingly, this is more likely to occur when the remaining patent-protected molecules feature low horizontal differentiation. We test this and other theoretical predictions of the model and find they are validated empirically., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In the past, times of severe economic crisis regularly led to the weakening of competition policy. In retrospect, this reaction appears to have deepened the crises it was meant to alleviate, at least in the United States at the beginning of the New Deal. This precedent suggests that a backlash against competition policy would be a wrong answer to the current challenges, even though exceptional economic conditions call for flexibility and adaptations. This set of three articles addresses competition policy in times of crisis. Andrea Amelio and Georges Siotis describe the European Commission's handling of competition cases in the current unusual circumstances. Antoine Winckler and François-Charles Laprévote focus on State aid, and Carlos Winograd tells the story of the long-lasting negative impact of the Argentinian crisis of 2000 on the nascent competition policy.

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs) market to competition. In Spain, both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. The latter abused its dominant position by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the subscribers’ database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. We use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share substantially below what it would have obtained in the absence of abuse.

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

We use a large firm-level data-set on Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) formed under the umbrella of the Eureka and European Union’s Framework Programmes for Science and Technology (EU-FP). Based on the results presented in Hernán, Marin, and Siotis (2003), we focus on firms that are known to have a high probability of forming RJVs, with the latter identified as firms with a previous experience with collaborative research. This allows us to gain insights regarding the influence of the programmes’ institutional design on the process of RJV formation. The findings pertaining to EU-FP RJVs are consistent with a ‘top-down’ and ‘mission oriented’ research policy. By contrast, Eureka RJVs appear as more market driven and ‘bottom-up’.

This Paper empirically tests the ‘bounds approach’ to industry structure proposed by Sutton ((1991), (1998)). To carry out this task, we focus on the chemical industry. Part of the novelty in this exercise is that we work on the finest possible level of disaggregation. Also, we identify demand substitutability from direct industry sources. This allows us to carefully define markets, and identify R&D intensity for each of them. Our empirical specification allows us to simultaneously test the predictions of Sutton (1991) and Sutton (1998). Our results provide strong support to Sutton’s theoretical framework.

We develop a theoretical model of long-run investment decisions on capacity in the context of a liberalized electricity market. The sector's idiosyncrasies such as the uncertainty surrounding future supply and demand, as well as technological constraints, are explicitly modelled. The model is sufficiently flexible to describe the situation in different systems. We derive the level of capacity that maximizes social welfare, and compare it to a decentralized outcome. We show that in the absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and we illustrate these results using simulations.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques, info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished