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The emergence of the political party Sinn Féin as an electoral force, and its gradual displacement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as the primary vehicle for Provisional Irish republicanism, was an indispensable precondition for the peace process that brought an end to the long-running Northern Irish 'Troubles'. Unsurprisingly, this process has been a subject of close academic scrutiny, with much attention focusing on the dramatic, early breakthroughs made by Sinn Féin, particularly in the years 1981–1983. By contrast, the mid-to-late 1980s are often represented as something of a fallow period for the party, when its initial, seemingly meteoric rise stalled. Within this narrative, the 1985 local elections are typically passed over relatively quickly. Yet this article makes the case for revisiting those elections, seeing them as marking a somewhat under-appreciated political earthquake in Northern Ireland. It does so on the basis that first, the elections laid bare the ambiguities and tensions arising from the Irish republican movement's 'Armalite and Ballot box' strategy. And second, the consequences of the 1985 elections proved decisive in reshaping both Irish republicanism and the wider political landscape of Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The forthcoming general election will be the most consequential electoral contest for the Republic of Ireland in a century. The polity is situated in truly novel territory with the potential for an historic first: the incoming of a Sinn Féin‐led, left‐wing government. Any such government would portend change in the North of Ireland, symbolising a critical juncture on the path towards the ending of partition. Analysing electoral and ideological shifts across the post‐2008 period, this article examines the immediate prospects for the coming to power of a left‐wing government and an historic first in Irish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The electoral growth of Sinn Féin on both sides of the Irish border has generated much political and academic attention in recent years. The party could form part of the government in Dublin for the first time at the next Irish general election, though that outcome is far from certain. If it were to gain power, Sinn Féin is likely to pursue policies which address the core socioeconomic issues its new supporters south of the border are concerned with, namely housing and healthcare. It will also be expected to push for an Irish unification referendum in the coming decade. While Sinn Féin entering government would clearly constitute a seismic event in the politics of the Irish state, there would also be knock‐on effects for politics in Northern Ireland, as well as British‐Irish and EU‐Irish relations. This article examines the impact Sinn Féin gaining power in Dublin could have on these various political dynamics, arguing the party exerts a unique influence on Irish, UK and European politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The stability of Irish democracy since 1922 is often a cause for contentment with lines of succession drawn from 'Grattan's parliament', O'Connell's popular movement, and the achievements of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) at Westminster through to Dáil Éireann. The IPP certainly disrupted the Commons, yet Irish politics was also shaped by the 'mother of parliaments' – MPs mastered parliamentary procedure and home rule legislation drew on British and colonial parliamentary models. By 1918, the party's machine and parliamentary behaviour were rejected as much as British rule – but as Michael Laffan suggested, Sinn Féin triumphed by beating the home rulers at their own game. However, the 1922 constitution gave generous expression to the sovereignty of the people, and for judicial review. But, within short succession, facility for popular initiative was overridden. Ironically, the Irish Free State would never be amended by popular will or judicial review but by parliamentary majority in 25 amendments as the people only voted to adopt it in 1922 and replace it in 1937. In practice then, it was closer to a vision of Dicey's supremacy of parliament dogma that prevailed, so much so, that Seán Lemass acrimoniously proclaimed in 1934: 'this is a sovereign assembly'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of French Journal of British Studies / Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique is the property of Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes en Civilisation Britannique and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Gerry Adams was the foremost Irish Republican leader in The Troubles (1968–1998). This paper analyses the extent to which he was a transformational leader, shifting Republicanism from armed struggle to politics. The paper analyses three texts by Adams at milestone points in the conflict. The first (1976) at the height of the armed campaign; the second (1986) as political engagement was increasing; and the third (2003), after the conflict had formally concluded. The paper uses four criteria to signify transformational leadership. The paper argues that, while Adams does not meet all four transformational leadership criteria equally, he transformed his organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper surveys leadership in the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin in The Troubles (1968–1998), using four typologies to frame its analysis: position-based leadership; person-based leadership; results-based leadership; and process-based leadership. The paper considers the question—Are the four typologies a useful way of analysing leadership within the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin in The Troubles? The paper examines milestone points in The Troubles, including the formation and coming to prominence of Provisional IRA; the conflict in the prison system culminating in the hunger strikes of the early 1980s; the growth of the political party Sinn Féin; and the peace talks which brought about the end of The Troubles. The paper argues that, over time, the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin shifted towards process-based leadership as they moved from an armed struggle to political engagement. Position-based and person-based leadership were also evident as key figures switched towards electoral participation. Political engagement also served results-based leadership, given Sinn Féin's electoral presence and influence in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Northern Irish question is the product of conflicting community interests, and as a consequence of diverging constructions of History. Contemporary Irish republicanism is one of those constructions. It was characterised by its numerous splits connected to the “messianic” spirit of its non-negotiable doctrine. The growing participation of the movement to political processes and the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement presided over a new pragmatic approach based on tolerance and inclusiveness epitomised by the association Coiste na nIarchimi. Sinn Fein and the republican movement have paradoxically become agents of political stability in Northern Ireland. Brexit, with the influence it exerts on loyalists, puts to the test this process started at the end of the previous century, as it brings the Border issue back to the centre of the Irish national question.

The political crisis in Northern Ireland, which has been continuing since 2022, threatens its stable development. It undermines the Belfast Agreement, which ended the bloody conflict between Catholics and Protestants and allowed devolution in the region. The catalyst for inter-party disagreements was the Northern Ireland Protocol – it introduced a special customs regulation regime that did not suit the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The actions of London (the approval of the Windsor Framework and The Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act), as well as the Sinn Féin’s winning Northern Ireland Assembly and local elections, only intensified the contradictions that had previously arisen. DUP has promised to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland if key provisions of the Windsor Framework are changed. London has no plans to renegotiate the new deal with the EU, but it will be impossible to overcome the political crisis without the cooperation of the unionists. In this article, the author examined the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the consociational democracy in Northern Ireland, the features of different mechanisms of customs regulation in the region, and the key differences between the DUP and Sinn Féin on issues of its further development. According to the author, the new crisis of power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland is associated with the prevalence of narrow interests of unionists over the collective task of the political establishment to achieve inter-party consensus and compliance with the Belfast Agreement, which remains the legal basis for maintaining civil peace in the region.

Copyright of Historia i Polityka is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Political communication is central to the electoral ascension of populist parties across the world. Several studies investigate how communication is used by populists to gain power, but we know very little about how the communication varies when moving between opposition and government office. The few studies on the topic focus exclusively on right-wing populist parties and neglect left-wing populism. This article addresses this gap in the literature and analyses the political communication of left- and right-wing populist parties by comparing their periods in opposition and in government. It focuses on the Northern Ireland case and compares Sinn Féin and the DUP and uses deductive thematic analysis for each election manifesto for the Northern Ireland Assembly between 1998 and 2022. The analysis includes four themes: people-centrism, anti-elite bad manners, crisis talk and volonté générale solutions. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that the right-wing populist DUP has changed more substantively its political communication than the left-wing Sinn Féin when moving from opposition to government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arthur Griffith founded Sinn Féin. From 1899 onwards, through detailed articles in his weekly papers and otherwise, he strongly advocated the economic development of Ireland and the adoption of qualified protectionism to achieve it. As minister for foreign affairs in the revolutionary government of Ireland in 1921, he chaired the Irish delegation that negotiated with Lloyd George's government articles of agreement for an Anglo-Irish Treaty. In January 1922 he was elected president of Dáil Éireann, the revolutionary Irish parliament, but died suddenly in August 1922 before the new Irish Free State formally came into existence. This essay underlines the importance that he attached to economic affairs, not least in making fiscal autonomy a central ambition of his negotiations with the British. The author concludes that Griffith was far-sighted, and calls for a discrete and empathetic study of his economic ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2017 an application to de-proscribe The Red Hand Commando (RHC) loyalist paramilitary organisation was submitted by an organisation known as the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC) which has the backing of other proscribed loyalist groups including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and RHC. The application was understandably considered negatively by some relatives of RHC victims as well as by Sinn Féin. The application was rejected for failing to comply with the necessary process of de-proscription which reinforces the criticism and difficulty for proscribed organisations that are no longer engaged in terrorism to de-proscribe. If the Northern Ireland Assembly and Commissions set up in Northern Ireland (NI) following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) with support from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) are to dismantle paramilitary groups, then they must take bold decisions and decide whether it is time to support the de-proscription of paramilitary groups that have relinquished political violence. This article recommends that agencies should set out a staged process which can be followed by proscribed organisations in NI interested in applying for de-proscription thereby enabling them to self-evaluate whether or not they are ready for de-proscription. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examining the writings of more than 150 IRA prisoners, this article explains why a majority of jailed republicans supported the movement's strategic reorientation between the anti-criminalisation protests of the late 1970s and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. First, it argues, experiences of prison protests, culminating in the hunger strike of 1981, inclined prisoners to endorse electoral interventions to counter their isolation. Sinn Féin's subsequent successes impelled prisoners to back electoralism more constructively, envisioning an all-Ireland 'pan-nationalist' front. By the end of the 1980s, many republican prisoners regarded tactical eclecticism as vital for their campaign's advance. Second, the article contends, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prisoners pragmatically approved new methods as open-ended experiments. Electoralism, pan-nationalism, and, in the 1990s, peace talks were supposed to aggregate and strengthen the struggle. Tactics were dispensable, and worthwhile only insofar as they enhanced the perceived prospects of victory. By the Good Friday Agreement, prisoners espousing a transitional, constitutional route to Irish unification regarded even the IRA's 'armed struggle' as suspensible. Woven through prisoners' voluminous acclaim for tactical adaptability, traditions of intra-movement discipline and unity cohered the bulk of the IRA's prison population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Treaties & Documents / Razprave in Gradivo is the property of Institut za Narodnostna Vprasanja and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Treaties & Documents / Razprave in Gradivo is the property of Institut za Narodnostna Vprasanja and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)