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I. INTRODUCTION II. THE DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR FORWARD-LOOKING COST MODELS III. COPPER PRICES AND THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION IV. COPPER PRICES AND THE NEW ZEALAND COMMERCE COMMISSION A. Biased [...], Around the world, since 1996, regulators have mandated that incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) offer competitors access to their network at regulated prices that reflect forward-looking cost. Regulated prices for unbundled network elements are based on total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC), which in turn is calculated using engineering models that est---imate the costs of a hypothetical carder employing the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the ILEC's actual wire centers. These cost models require detailed estimates of the equipment and installation prices of the numerous components that are used in a telecommunications network. When there is uncertainty about how these prices will change over the period for which costs and prices are required, the resulting cost estimates used for setting the regulated prices of unbundled network elements can be very inaccurate. Similarly, when regulators in other jurisdictions are considering such rates as 'benchmarks,' it is necessary to make adjustments to account for such large differences in critical input prices, so that the benchmark rates will be representative of the costs that actually will be incurred by efficient carriers offering unbundled elements in those jurisdictions. The precipitous rise in the price of copper since 2003 exemplifies this need to reevaluate the inputs used by regulators in their cost model, as well as the inferences drawn from those models. These increases differ from the type of constant annual expected input price growth (or decline) situation that some cost models used outside the United States have accommodated with 'tilted annuity' methods. Rather than a gradual anticipated price increase, copper prices escalated rapidly and are likely to remain well above the levels that regulators used to set existing loop rates. Accounting for such evidence would change the forward-looking costs of a hypothetically efficient ILEC network that one of the most prominent U.S. state regulatory commissions--the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)--established in 2006. Similarly, in 2007, the Commerce Commission in New Zealand employed a benchmarking methodology for the pricing of unbundled loops that failed to account for the increased price of copper. A global trend may be emerging among telecommunications regulators to ignore the input requirements of their own forward-looking cost models. Such a trend would be consistent with a version of regulatory opportunism in which regulators are forward-looking only when doing so produces lower regulated prices over time. The risk of regulatory opportunism and the high price of copper together create a strong incentive for an ILEC to replace its copper loops with optical fiber. Although some CLECS could be adversely affected by such a decommissioning of copper loops, an ILEC has no duty under U.S. antitrust or telecommunications law to keep copper loops in service for the benefit of its competitors.

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SERVICES A. The Retransmission of Distant Broadcast Signals B. Local Franchising of Cable Systems C. The Emergence of Rival Programming Distributors and Vertical [...], This Article examines whether, on legal or policy grounds, video services provided over a telephone network should be regulated as a traditional cable service or whether a different approach is warranted. The Authors find that municipal franchise requirements for video services provided over telephone networks would reduce consumer welfare. The Authors estimate that, even without considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, the consumer welfare gains from entry exceed the potential loss in franchise fee revenue to municipalities by a factor of nearly three to one.

I. INTRODUCTION Constitutional scholars cite three Supreme Court decisions arising from the undeclared Quasi War with France in 1798-1800 as support for the proposition that Congress may authorize war of [...]

I. INTRODUCTION II. THE U.S.-MEXICO ARBITRATION DECISION A. The Mexican Regulatory Regime B. The United States' Contentions C. The Panel's Findings 1. Mexico's Commitments under Section 2 of the Reference [...], In April 2004, a World Trade Organization ('WTO') arbitration panel found that Mexico had violated its commitments under the Annex on Telecommunications to the General Agreement on Trade in Services ('GATS') by failing to ensure that Telmex, Mexico's largest supplier of basic telecommunications services, provide interconnection to U.S. telecommunications carriers at international settlement rates that were cost-oriented. The WTO panel deemed long run average incremental cost ('LRAIC') to be the appropriate cost standard for setting settlement rates. Mexico thus became obliged to change its domestic telecommunications regulations or face trade sanctions. The decision is the first WTO arbitration to deal solely with trade in services under GATS. This Article shows that both the U.S. complaint against Mexico and the WTO decision misunderstood or ignored critical economic facts and principles. Both conflated international settlement rates and domestic interconnection pricing, and failed to recognize the factors that would justify Mexico's permitting Telmex to charge a settlement rate exceeding LRAIC. Moreover, the U.S. government failed to understand that U.S. long-distance carriers were not passing reductions in Mexico's international settlement rate on to their U.S. customers. Finally, both the U.S. government and the WTO incorrectly defined the relevant market and incorrectly evaluated market power.