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Getting a grip on issues of administrative delegation is key to the performance of public organizations. The oversight game models delegation as a conflict of interest between an inspector and an inspectee to act in the interests of the former. This study tests alternative solutions to overcome 'shirking' in the oversight game. Specifically, we test the effect of external incentives, as implied by the game-theoretical solution, against the role of intrinsic factors, namely, public service motivation and job-related risk aversion. Evidence from a laboratory (N = 208) and survey experiment (N = 794) show that both the game-theoretical approach, which inspired new public management, and public service motivation, as its antithesis, fail to explain subjects' behaviour. Instead, job-related risk aversion makes oversight more and 'shirking' less likely. This finding hints towards a more differentiated view of public employees' risk attitudes to improve administrative delegation. Points for practitioners: The promise of new public management that oversight issues in administrative delegation disappear with setting appropriate extrinsic incentives is too simplistic. Public service motivation, on the other hand, which started as an antithesis of the self-interested bureaucrat, also fails to solve the issue of 'shirking' in administrative delegation. Instead, job-related risk aversion appears to improve administrative delegation, which presents a remarkable counterpoint to the popular opinion in public management that risk aversion is problematic for public organizations' performance. Rather than avoid selecting risk-averse public employees generally, more attention might be paid to the domains of administrative decision-making in which such traits can be beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is little doubt that supply-side populism associates with radical platforms of the left and the right. However, few empirical analyses have focused on the connection between left-right ideological radicalism and populism at the individual level, even less in countries where populist discourses are not only associated with the radical right. This paper considers the association between populist attitudes and ideological radicalism in two countries where left-wing populist parties exist: France and Spain. For that, it uses an approach to political ideology that distinguishes political-economic issues and political-cultural ones. Main results show that radically minded individuals, located at the left and the right of the ideological axis, display stronger populist attitudes in France and Spain. However, differences between the two countries exist that highlight the relevance of context-dependent associations between populism and other (thick) ideologies in the electoral arena. In France, individuals located at the extreme right of the cultural dimension tend to show stronger populist attitudes than those located at the far left. In contrast, in Spain, individuals located at the extreme left of the economic and cultural dimensions display stronger populist attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]