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Alcohol misuse and related harm costs money, drains resource and takes lives. Alcohol brief interventional advice forms an important method to moderate alcohol consumption at both individual and population level. Alcohol exerts a significant negative influence on the oral cavity and is implicated in the development of oro-mucosal and dental disease. Alcohol and tobacco smoking are recognised a key aetiological agents in the development of oral cancer which is the 14th most common cancer, accounting for approximately 2% of new cases, killing over 2300 people in the UK every year. A crucial weapon to tackle the disease is prevention through management of those modifiable lifestyle factors. The role of the general dental practitioner (GDP) in providing alcohol advice has received sparse attention, however evidence suggests that GDPs do not routinely engage in this activity. The aim of this research was to identify factors preventing or facilitating GDP engagement and develop strategies to support them to deliver alcohol advice. GDPs salient beliefs were applied, using behaviour change theories (the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Social Cognitive Theory), to formulate a theory based questionnaire. A postal survey (n=300, RR 60%) identified that few (17%) GDPs routinely provide advice to patients exposing potential for improvement. Subsequent exploratory multiple regression analysis identified 5 key items which might act as targets. The resultant five-item model accounted for 41% of the variance in intention [Adjusted R2 for this model is .41; F = 15.34 (.001)].A theoretically informed intervention was administered as a multi-centre, parallel group, three-arm randomized controlled pilot study. The aims were to test the feasibility and acceptability of implementing an alcohol advice intervention in dental primary care. The intervention was not entirely acceptable to patients or dentists. Qualitative analysis revealed factors (not limited) to remuneration, perceived relevance, confidence, embarrassment and fear of consequences mar progress. Modifications to study processes and methods would seem a sensible prior to further study.

This thesis describes the research leading from the conception, through development, to the practical implementation of a comprehensive security architecture for use within, and as a value-added enhancement to, the ISO Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. The Comprehensive Security System (CSS) is arranged basically as an Application Layer service but can allow any of the ISO recommended security facilities to be provided at any layer of the model. It is suitable as an 'add-on' service to existing arrangements or can be fully integrated into new applications. For large scale, distributed processing operations, a network of security management centres (SMCs) is suggested, that can help to ensure that system misuse is minimised, and that flexible operation is provided in an efficient manner. The background to the OSI standards are covered in detail, followed by an introduction to security in open systems. A survey of existing techniques in formal analysis and verification is then presented. The architecture of the CSS is described in terms of a conceptual model using agents and protocols, followed by an extension of the CSS concept to a large scale network controlled by SMCs. A new approach to formal security analysis is described which is based on two main methodologies. Firstly, every function within the system is built from layers of provably secure sequences of finite state machines, using a recursive function to monitor and constrain the system to the desired state at all times. Secondly, the correctness of the protocols generated by the sequences to exchange security information and control data between agents in a distributed environment, is analysed in terms of a modified temporal Hoare logic. This is based on ideas concerning the validity of beliefs about the global state of a system as a result of actions performed by entities within the system, including the notion of timeliness. The two fundamental problems in number theory upon which the assumptions about the security of the finite state machine model rest are described, together with a comprehensive survey of the very latest progress in this area. Having assumed that the two problems will remain computationally intractable in the foreseeable future, the method is then applied to the formal analysis of some of the components of the Comprehensive Security System. A practical implementation of the CSS has been achieved as a demonstration system for a network of IBM Personal Computers connected via an Ethernet LAN, which fully meets the aims and objectives set out in Chapter 1. This implementation is described, and finally some comments are made on the possible future of research into security aspects of distributed systems.