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The present study was designed to provide empirical tests of some of the mechanisms thought to operate in mindfulness-based treatments. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that appraising distress judgmentally (as a needless and useless indication of personal weakness) would be associated with experiencing meta-distress (e.g., feeling ashamed about being distressed), which would, in turn, be associated with increased experiential avoidance (i.e., suppression or distraction from the distress) and shorter distress tolerance. In addition, I examined the hypothesis that compassionately appraising distress (as normal, understandable, and potentially a source of growth) would be associated with spending more time curiously exploring that distress and thereby be associated with being able to tolerate distress for longer periods of time. Finally, I examined the prediction that compassionately appraising distress would be associated with even greater curious exploration and distress tolerance than viewing distress from a distanced perspective (as a passing mental event), which is often taught along side or as a prerequisite for compassionate appraisal. One-hundred-sixty-seven psychologically healthy college students and members of the academic community at a large Mid Southern University underwent a series of distress inductions and were told to either simply monitor their level of distress (Awareness), judgmentally appraise distress (Judgment), maintain a distanced perspective from distress (Distancing), or compassionately appraise distress while also maintaining a distanced perspective (Compassion). As expected, some support was found for the hypothesis that compassionately appraising distress was associated with greater curious investigation of distress, if not longer distress tolerance. Moreover, compassionately appraising distress was associated with greater curious investigation than simply viewing distress from a distanced perspective, but only for the idiographic sadness induction. Hypotheses regarding the impact of judgmental appraisal could not be fairly evaluated in the present study, as it appeared that the judgment manipulation failed to sufficiently alter behavior.

The present study probed the concurrent relation of two theoretically associated risk factors for coping-motivated substance use - non-acceptance of negative affect and anxiety sensitivity - with coping-motivated drinking frequency (drinking to cope). A two-factor model of coping-motivated substance use put forth by Brown, Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, and Zvolensky (2005) suggests that both non-acceptance and the physical and Social dimensions of anxiety sensitivity might be related to coping motives for substance use broadly. The present study represents a particularly stringent test of this model in the field of alcohol use motives. It was hypothesized that the individual facets of AS (physical and Social) and non-acceptance would predict coping-motivated drinking frequency, controlling for gender, negative affect, and the cognitive facet of AS. Data was obtained from a sample of 253 (51% Women; 89% Caucasian, Mage = 19.30, SD =1.39, range = 18-25) college students. Contrary to hypotheses, the results of hierarchical regression analyses suggested that the predicted AS facets and non-acceptance were unrelated to coping-motivated drinking. Trend-level findings suggested that the cognitive dimension of AS and non-acceptance might influence drinking to cope indirectly by increasing levels of trait anxiety and negative affect, respectively. Moreover, the physical facet of AS was significantly associated with conformity-motivated drinking and non-acceptance evidenced a strong trend-level relation with conformity-motivated drinking. Findings are discussed in relation to Brown and colleagues' (2005) model, the broader body of literature on the relation between AS and drinking to cope, and the findings contained in Bonn-Miller et al. (2008). Limitations are presented and future work is proposed.