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To protect consumer privacy, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) mandates that businesses provide consumers with a straightforward way to opt out of the sale and sharing of their personal information. However, the control that businesses enjoy over the opt-out process allows them to impose hurdles on consumers aiming to opt out, including by employing dark patterns. Motivated by the enactment of the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), which strengthens the CCPA and explicitly forbids certain dark patterns in the opt-out process, we investigate how dark patterns are used in opt-out processes and assess their compliance with CCPA regulations. Our research reveals that websites employ a variety of dark patterns. Some of these patterns are explicitly prohibited under the CCPA; others evidently take advantage of legal loopholes. Despite the initial efforts to restrict dark patterns by policymakers, there is more work to be done.

As broadband Internet speeds continue to increase, the home wireless ("WiFi") network may more frequently become a performance bottleneck. Past research, now nearly a decade old, initially documented this phenomenon through indirect inference techniques, noting the prevalence of WiFi bottlenecks but never directly measuring them. In the intervening years, access network (and WiFi) speeds have increased, warranting a re-appraisal of this important question, particularly with renewed private and federal investment in access network infrastructure. This paper studies this question, developing a new system and measurement technique to perform direct measurements of WiFi and access network performance, ultimately collecting and analyzing a first-of-its-kind dataset of more than 13,000 joint measurements of WiFi and access network throughputs, in a real-world deployment spanning more than 50 homes, for nearly two years. Using this dataset, we re-examine the question of whether, when, and to what extent a user's home wireless network may be a performance bottleneck, particularly relative to their access connection. We do so by directly and continuously measuring the user's Internet performance along two separate components of the Internet path -- from a wireless client inside the home network to the wired point of access (e.g., the cable modem), and from the wired point of access to the user's ISP. Confirming and revising results from more than a decade ago, we find that a user's home wireless network is often the throughput bottleneck. In particular, for users with access links that exceed 800~Mbps, the user's home wireless network was the performance bottleneck 100% of the time.

Unencrypted DNS traffic between users and DNS resolvers can lead to privacy and security concerns. In response to these privacy risks, many browser vendors have deployed DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to encrypt queries between users and DNS resolvers. Today, many client-side deployments of DoH, particularly in browsers, select between only a few resolvers, despite the fact that many more encrypted DNS resolvers are deployed in practice. Unfortunately, if users only have a few choices of encrypted resolver, and only a few perform well from any particular vantage point, then the privacy problems that DoH was deployed to help address merely shift to a different set of third parties. It is thus important to assess the performance characteristics of more encrypted DNS resolvers, to determine how many options for encrypted DNS resolvers users tend to have in practice. In this paper, we explore the performance of a large group of encrypted DNS resolvers supporting DoH by measuring DNS query response times from global vantage points in North America, Europe, and Asia. Our results show that many non-mainstream resolvers have higher response times than mainstream resolvers, particularly for non-mainstream resolvers that are queried from more distant vantage points -- suggesting that most encrypted DNS resolvers are not replicated or anycast. In some cases, however, certain non-mainstream resolvers perform at least as well as mainstream resolvers, suggesting that users may be able to use a broader set of encrypted DNS resolvers than those that are available in current browser configurations.

Recent developments to encrypt the Domain Name System (DNS) have resulted in major browser and operating system vendors deploying encrypted DNS functionality, often enabling various configurations and settings by default. In many cases, default encrypted DNS settings have implications for performance and privacy; for example, Firefox's default DNS setting sends all of a user's DNS queries to Cloudflare, potentially introducing new privacy vulnerabilities. In this paper, we confirm that most users are unaware of these developments -- with respect to the rollout of these new technologies, the changes in default settings, and the ability to customize encrypted DNS configuration to balance user preferences between privacy and performance. Our findings suggest several important implications for the designers of interfaces for encrypted DNS functionality in both browsers and operating systems, to help improve user awareness concerning these settings, and to ensure that users retain the ability to make choices that allow them to balance tradeoffs concerning DNS privacy and performance.