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Introduction. Infectious mononucleosis (IM), caused by the Epstein–Barr virus (EBV), typically presents with fever, tonsillopharyngitis, and lymphadenopathy while rare, renal, and hematological complications such as gross hematuria and hemolytic anemia can occur, particularly in children. Case Presentation. We describe a 15‐year‐old male with infectious mononucleosis presenting with abdominal pain, sore throat, and red‐colored urine for three days. Laboratory findings revealed leukocytosis, elevated liver enzymes, and hemoglobinuria. Serological testing confirmed EBV infection. Despite intravascular hemolysis, the patient's anemia was mild, and he responded well to supportive care. Discussion. Gross hematuria and hemolytic anemia are uncommon in IM, with limited reports. Proposed mechanisms include viral‐induced renal injury and autoimmune hemolysis. Differential diagnosis should consider other causes of hematuria, which can be differentiated through urine microscopy and serological tests. IM should be considered in patients with pharyngitis and hematuria, especially when other causes are excluded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Google, iPhones, the national power grid, surgical operating rooms, baby monitors, surveillance technology, and wastewater management systems all run on open-source software. Open-source software, or software that is free and publicly available, powers our day-to-day lives. As a resource, it defies economic logic; it is built by developers, many of whom are volunteers, who build projects with the altruistic intention of donating them to the digital commons. Developers use it because it saves time and money and promotes innovation. Its benefits have led to its ubiquity and indispensability. Today, over ninety-seven percent of all software uses open source. Without it, our critical infrastructure would crumble. The risk of that happening is more real than ever. In December 2021, the Log4Shell vulnerability demonstrated that the issue of open-source security can no longer be ignored. One vulnerability found in a game of Minecraft threatened to take down systems worldwide--from the Belgian government to Google. The scope of damage is unmatched; with open source, a vulnerability in one product can be used against every other entity that uses the same code. Open source's benefits are also its burden. No one wants to pay for a resource that has an unlimited supply, available for free. Open source is not, however, truly unlimited. The open-source community--the individuals, nonprofits, and companies actively contributing to its production and maintenance--is buckling under the weight of supporting over three-fourths of the world's code. Rather than share the load, many of its primary beneficiaries, companies that build proprietary software, add to it. By failing to take basic precautionary measures in using open-source code, they make its exploitation nearly inevitable--when it happens, they free ride on the already overwhelmed community to fix it. This doom cycle leaves everyone worse off because it leaves our critical infrastructure dangerously vulnerable. Since it began, open source has worked behind the scenes to make society better. Today, its struggles are going unnoticed and unaddressed. The vanguard of public and private entities already supporting open source cannot carry the burden alone--the rest of open source's beneficiaries must also be conscripted. So far, government interventions have been lacking. Secure open source requires much more. To start, it is time we treated open source as the critical infrastructure that it is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internet consists of disparate websites that, though built independently by separate developers, must interact with each other to provide a seamless user experience. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which enable these interactions, were originally built out of necessity but expanded in functionality as businesses matured. Some of the most familiar names on the Internet-- Facebook, Amazon, Google--have long made APIs available to allow smaller players the chance to gain a foothold in a data marketplace controlled by a concentrated few. In turn, these platforms rose to prominence as the downstream success of these third parties using APIs generated upstream value for the provider via user traffic or valuable data. Increasingly, however, dominant platforms have begun closing off access to information and features by restricting APIs. This Article shows APIs are critical to Internet interoperability, which in turn fosters a truly competitive online marketplace. Conversely, overly restrictive APIs can amount to violations of competition law. However, this Article argues that while traditional antitrust is illsuited to redress these harms, the Federal Trade Commission's Section 5 authorities are sufficiently flexible to fill the void. Given the political push to check "big tech" and the rise of Section 5 activity in data privacy, now is the time for the FTC to begin using this authority to monitor detrimental API designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internet consists of disparate websites that, though built independently by separate developers, must interact with each other to provide a seamless user experience. Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which enable these interactions, were originally built out of necessity but expanded in functionality as businesses matured. Some of the most familiar names on the Internet--Facebook, Amazon, Google--have long made APIs available to allow smaller players the chance to gain a foothold in a data marketplace controlled by a concentrated few. In turn, these platforms rose to prominence as the downstream success of these third parties using APIs generated upstream value for the provider via user traffic or valuable data. Increasingly, however, dominant platforms have begun closing off access to information and features by restricting APIs. This Article shows APIs are critical to Internet interoperability, which in turn fosters a truly competitive online marketplace. Conversely, overly restrictive APIs can amount to violations of competition law. However, this Article argues that while traditional antitrust is illsuited to redress these harms, the Federal Trade Commission's Section 5 authorities are sufficiently flexible to fill the void. Given the political push to check "big tech" and the rise of Section 5 activity in data privacy, now is the time for the FTC to begin using this authority to monitor detrimental API designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]