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We present a series of studies documenting what we call a 'thick skin bias' in people's perceptions of those living in poverty. Across a wide range of life events, from major to minor, people of lower socioeconomic status (SES) are systematically perceived as being less harmed by negative experiences than higher-SES people, even when this is patently false. In 18 studies, including a pre-registered survey of a nationally representative sample, we find that laypeople and professionals show the thick skin bias. We distinguish the bias from a tendency to dehumanize those in poverty and argue it cannot be attributed to the belief that the mere expectation that bad things will happen buffers people in poverty from suffering. The thick skin bias has potentially profound implications for the institutional and interpersonal neglect of those most in need of greater care and resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time and distance estimates were elicited with either unit-based (e.g., "How many days until...") or end-based (e.g., "On what date...") questions. For intervals of uncertain extent, unit-based estimates were consistently lower than were the corresponding end-based estimates. The observed patterns are consistent with an anchoring and adjustment process: When people generate unit-based estimates of uncertain dates or distances, they may anchor on the "here" or "now" and adjust incrementally by the unit; such adjustment, however, is often insufficient and yields systematic underestimation. Although this anchoring and adjustment cannot be directly observed, consistent with the hypothesized process, reliance on larger units yielded higher estimates and warning about insufficient adjustment reduced the effect. Implications for research on anchoring, the planning fallacy, and everyday judgment are discussed.

During Ramadan, people of Muslim faith fast by not eating or drinking between sunrise and sunset. This is likely to have physiological and psychological consequences for fasters, and societal and economic impacts on the wider population. We investigate whether, during this voluntary and temporally limited fast, reminders of food can impair the fasters' reaction time and accuracy on a non-food-related test of cognitive control. Using a repeated measures design in a sample of Ramadan fasters (N = 190), we find that when food is made salient, fasters are slower and less accurate during Ramadan compared with after Ramadan. Control participants perform similarly across time. Furthermore, during Ramadan performances vary by how recently people had their last meal. Potential mechanisms are suggested, grounded in research on resource scarcity, commitment, and thought suppression, as well as the psychology of rituals and self-regulation, and implications for people who fast for religious or health reasons are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Diagnostic reasoning requires clinicians to think through complex uncertainties. We tested the possibility of a bias toward an available single diagnosis in uncertain cases. Design: We developed 5 different surveys providing a succinct description of a hypothetical individual patient scenaric. Each scenario was formulated in 2 versions randomized to participants, with the versions differing only in whether an alternative diagnosis was present or absent. The 5 scenarios were designed as separate tests of robustness using diverse cases, including a cautious scenario, a risky scenario, a sophisticated scenario, a validation scenario, and a comparative scenario (each survey containing only 1 version of 1 scenario). Participants included community members (n = 1104) and health care professionals (n = 200) who judged the chances of COVID infection in an individual patient. Results: The first scenario described a cautious patient and found a 47% reduction in the estimated odds of COVID when a flu diagnosis was present compared with absent (odds ratio = 0.53, 95% confidence interval 0.30 to 0.94, P = 0.003). The second scenario described a less cautious patient and found a 70% reduction in the estimated odds of COVID in the presence of a flu diagnosis (odds ratio = 0.30, 95% confidence interval 0.13 to 0.70, P < 0.001). The third was a more sophisticated scenario presented to medical professionals and found a 73% reduction in the estimated odds of COVID in the presence of a mononucleosis diagnosis (odds ratio = 0.27, 95% confidence interval 0.10 to 0.75, P < 0.001). Two further scenarios—avoiding mention of population norms—replicated the results. Limitations: Brief hypothetical scenarios may overestimate the extent of bias in more complicated medical situations. Conclusions: These results demonstrate that an available simple diagnosis can lead individuals toward premature closure and a failure to fully consider additional severe diseases. Highlights: Occum's razor has been debated for centuries yet rarely subjected to experimental testing for evidence-based medicine. This article offers direct evidence that people favor an available simple diagnosis, thereby neglecting to consider additional serious diseases. The bias can lead individuals to mistakenly lower their judged likelihood of COVID or another disease when an alternate diagnosis is present. This misconception over the laws of probability appears in judgments by community members and by health care workers. The pitfall in reasoning extends to high-risk cases and is not easily attributed to information, incentives, or random chance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across six studies (total N = 3,549), we find that participants who were randomly assigned to choose from larger assortments thought their choices were more self-expressive, an effect that emerged regardless of whether larger sets actually enabled participants to better satisfy their preferences. Studies examining the moderating role of choice domain and cultural context show that the effect of choice set size on perceived self-expression may be particular to contexts in which choices have some initial potential to express choosers' identities. We then test novel predictions from this theoretical perspective, finding that self-expression mediates the effect of choice set size on choice satisfaction, the likelihood of publicly sharing choices, and the perceived importance of choices. Together, these studies show that choice set size shapes perceived self-expression and illustrate how this meaning-based theoretical lens provides both novel explanations for existing effects and novel predictions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seven articles of this special issue showcase the continuing intellectual legacy of Amos Tversky (1937-1996) in cognitive psychology. Tversky made fundamental contributions to many areas, including decision making, belief revision, and judgments of similarity. These papers are by some of his recent students. (SLD)