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INTRODUCTION I. THE ROLE OF LAND USE IN CARBON EMISSIONS II. CONVENTIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSES A. From Sprawl to Smart Growth and Back Again B. Green Building Codes III. A PARABLE [...], As the urgency of the climate crisis becomes increasingly apparent, many local governments are adopting land use regulations aimed at minimizing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The emerging approaches call for loosening zoning restrictions to unlock greater density and for strict new green building codes. This Article argues that both approaches are appropriate in some places but not in others. Not all density is created equal, and compact multifamily housing at the urban fringe may actually increase GHG emissions. Moreover, where density is appropriate, deregulation will not necessarily produce it. And, finally, green building codes will increase housing costs and so will actually increase GHG emissions if they discourage growth in low-carbon places. Those are appealing in the abstract but are unlikely to be adopted in many places anytime soon. This Article therefore offers a set of regulatory prescriptions specifically for local governments aimed at producing density in low-carbon places and minimizing emissions in high carbon ones.

INTRODUCTION 892 I. RELIANCE IN PROPERTY 900 A. Defining Reliance 900 B. Transactional Reliance 904 C. Evolutionary Reliance 910 II. EVOLUTIONARY RELIANCE IN PROPERTY DOCTRINES 913 A. Adverse Possession 914 [...], For centuries, scholars have wrestled with seemingly intractable problems about the nature of property. This Article offers a different approach. Instead of asking what property is, it asks what property does. And it argues that property protects people's reliance on resources by moderating the pace of change. Modern scholarly accounts emphasize voluntary transactions as the source and purpose of reliance in property. Such "transactional reliance" implies strong, stable, and enduring rights. This Article argues that property law also reflects a very different source of reliance on resources, one that rises and falls simply with the passage of time. This new category of "evolutionary reliance" is at the heart of core property doctrines like adverse possession, waste, and the rule against perpetuities. Focusing on evolutionary reliance reveals a new vision of property, not as a bundle of sticks or a bare right to exclude, but instead as a nexus of competing and dynamic reliance interests that can change over time. This new vision has important conceptual and doctrinal consequences for common law doctrines and the Takings Clause, and it highlights the surprising dynamism and change in property.

Introduction 1879 I. The Wicked Problem of Zoning 1883 A. Historical Uses and Justifications of Zoning 1883 B. Contemporary Uses of Zoning 1886 C. Contested Land Use 1894 II. Zoning [...]

Due to a remarkable convergence of criticisms from both the right and the left, zoning is under more sustained attack than at any time in the last seventy-five years. A [...]

In the article, the author discusses the issue of stategraft or the illegal use by governments of their regulatory power to raise money from the politically powerless and poor citizens by examining the U.S. Supreme Court case Sheetz v. County of El Dorado and the concept of stategraft by Professor Bernadette Atuahene. Other topics include whether constitutional rules that are used in ad hoc development exactions can also be applied to legislated exactions.

ABSTRACT Penn Central v. New York City is the most important regulatory takings case of all time. There, the Supreme Court upheld the historic preservation of Grand Central Terminal in [...]

According to its many critics, zoning bears significant responsibility for the housing crisis in America and.for promoting unsustainable development patterns. Reformers argue that zoning reduces the supply of new housing and therefore drives up prices in thriving communities. Zoning also increases carbon emissions by restricting density in the urban core and promoting carbon-intensive, landconsuming, automobile-dependent sprawl in single-family suburbs. A growing chorus calls for relaxing zoning limits in order to promote growth in the urban core as a response to the twin crises of housing costs and climate change. Relaxing zoning limits will almost certainly promote growth but may not promote density. Some of the most loosely zoned cities in America are also the least dense. This symposium contribution examines the relationship between density and zoning intensity andfinds that density is loosely correlated with more intensive zoning, not less. This is not a causal claim but nevertheless raises questions whether zoning deregulation jt'ill necessarily produce both growth and density. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction I. The Local Focus of Exclusionary Zoning II. The Spatial Dynamics of Exclusionary Zoning A. The Needs of Lower-Income Households B. The Problem of Exclusion Reassessed C. Modern Forms [...]

Introduction I. Entrenchment by Another Name II. Eminent Domain in New York A. The Built Environment 1. Rejuvenating Times Square 2. Reclaiming the Waterfront B. Vested Rights 1. Reinventing Taxis [...]

Should religious landowners enjoy special protection from eminent domain? A recent federal statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), compels courts to apply a compelling interest test [...]

The article identifies the goals being pursued by local governments in the U.S. today through zoning. Topics covered include the costs and benefits of this zoning objectives, the divergence in the purposes of land use regulations of local governments, and the minimization of the conflicting uses of property by separating residential, commercial and industrial uses.

Exactions are demands levied on residential or commercial developers to force them, rather than a municipality, to bear the costs of new infrastructure. Local governments commonly use them to address the burdens that growth places on schools, transportation, water, and sewers. But exactions almost never address energy needs, even though local land use decisions can create significant externalities for the power grid and for energy resources. This Article proposes a novel reform to land use and energy law: "energy exactions"--understood as local fees or timing limits aimed at addressing the energy impacts of new residential or commercial development. Energy exactions would force individual developers to internalize the costs of growth on the energy grid, generate important information about community energy needs and their externalities, decentralize risk-taking, promote technological change in new sources of power supply, and stimulate useful forms of regulatory competition between local communities and state utility regulators. In the process, they would induce greater energy conservation as new residential and commercial buildings are approved for development. This Article defends the implementation of energy exactions by local governments. It then analyzes the potential legal hurdles energy exactions face, including their authorization, preemption by state utility laws, and implications under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Energy exactions provide local governments a unique, pragmatic, and valuable tool to integrate community values into energy grid planning, promote demand reduction, and enable new investments in low-carbon energy infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusess environmental impact of carbon emissions, and role of natural gas in addressing the same in the U.S. Topics discussed include role of government in preventing climate change; enactment of Clean Air Act for addressing the same; and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council court case addressing the same.

This is a Response to Bethany R. Berger's recent Article, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings. In that Article, Professor Berger argues against the view that governments should be forced to compensate for regulatory burdens because they suffer from fiscal illusion and will only internalize the costs that they, in fact, have to pay. She demonstrates that property taxes already provide a mechanism through which governments internalize both the costs and benefits of their property regulations, and that compensation for regulatory takings is therefore unnecessary and even perverse for creating efficient regulatory incentives. This Response argues that she is correct and that her criticism joins many others before it. However, despite these significant criticisms, fiscal illusion continues to inform takings theory. This Response ultimately demonstrates that even if Professor Berger is correct, her proposed responses do not entirely address the problem that compensation will over-deter government regulations, and so this Response proposes both municipal insurance and liability for regulatory inaction as potential interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on traditional politics of property protection and then catalogues a number of ways in which those politics have been changing in Takings Clause. It mentions deliberately simplifies the characterization of preferences across the political spectrum and judges and scholars discussed below might also object to being lumped together in one group or another. It also mentions intersection of public power and private rights which by the Takings Clause.