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Entrepreneurship is important in economic growth and development. This study explores the likelihood that societal-level well-being and country-level self-expression values positively influence individual entrepreneurship across countries. Self-expression values mediate and reinforce the effect of societal well-being on entrepreneurship. Well-being is not simply an individual-level expression of positive emotions or an individual’s accumulated human capital alone. It is also a country’s stock of psychological as well as social resource and a macrolevel culture-specific emotion supporting entrepreneurship. This study provides a multidimensional approach to exploring the effects of societal well-being and country-level self-expression values on entrepreneurship. The proposed conceptual model uses three theoretical propositions to delineate an indirect effect of societal well-being mediated through country-level self-expression values. The study also compiles measures of societal well-being terms from secondary data sets for use in cross-country comparative empirical research into entrepreneurship.

This exploratory study examines the roles journalists rely on when covering social justice topics and what these role conceptions reveal about emotion and self expression values in news production....

Research adopting the ideological-conflict hypothesis indicates that low religiosity, nonbelief, and antireligious sentiments predict prejudice toward ideological opponents. How to understand this, from an individual differences perspective, given that nonbelievers are typically open-minded and low in authoritarianism? We investigated, among 422 UK adults, social distance from antiliberals (antigay activists), fundamentalists, and religionists of major world religions (Catholicism, Islam, and Buddhism). Nonbelievers showed prejudice toward all religious targets—but not toward an ethnic outgroup (Chinese). Furthermore, antireligious sentiment implied (1) valuing rationality and, in turn, social distance from fundamentalists and (2) low empathy and low belief in the benevolence of others and the world and, in turn, social distance from religionists. Finally, (3) valuing liberty predicted social distance from antiliberals but failed to mediate the effect of antireligious sentiment. Though general processes (e.g., perceived threat) explain all prejudices, specific individual differences seem to distinguish non-believers’ and believers’ prejudice toward each other.

In article is given the author's concept of management through cooperation of the Russian state and society on the basis of the analysis of the sociological researches connected with development of their relationship during the Post-Soviet period. The Author is based on the theory of modernization by R. Inglehart and C. Velzel which leans on the main conclusions of classical concepts of modernization by K. Marx and M. Weber. The genuine democracy depends on extent of partnership of the people in management. Emancipation of the society capable to management through cooperation with the state, passes through certain stages of his modernization: social and economic development leads to system shift from traditional values to values of self-expression and creates conditions for formation of democratic institutes. Effective democracy more likely arises in society where carriers of values of self-expression are more than 45% of the population. It is natural that at emergence of threat to physical survival of people the prevailing value is received by survival values that leads to consolidation of institute of authoritarianism and then the question of management through cooperation of the state and society isn't urgent, or this cooperation turns into formal democracy when there are "fake institutes", the civil and political rights, but the ruling elite ignores them and acts at own discretion. Such situation can provoke not conventional forms of behavior of citizens.

Schools as agents of political socialisation are important in the context of building democratic political culture. Hence, it is relevant to research which citizen orientations indicate a well-functioning and stable democracy. Recent studies have revealed that self-expression values have considerable impact on the existence and functioning of democracy. Based on the theoretical examination of self-expression values, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that self-expression values reflect human dignity. The analysis is substantial since the concept of human dignity is considered a foundation of democratic political culture. Thereby, schools should put a larger emphasis on strengthening human dignity, which is reflected by values that drive democratic performance. Keywords: School, education, political socialisation, values, democracy, self-expression, human dignity, political culture.

Received 4 June 2017. Accepted 24 August 2017. Published online 29 September 2017. A society’s culture is shaped by the extent to which its people grow up feeling that survival is secure or insecure. This article presents a revised version of modernization theory – Evolutionary Modernization theory – which argues that economic and physical insecurity are conducive to xenophobia, strong in-group solidarity, authoritarian politics and rigid adherence to their group’s traditional cultural norms – and conversely that secure conditions lead to greater tolerance of outgroups, openness to new ideas and more egalitarian social norms. Earlier versions of this theory have been presented in publications by Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, Abramson, Baker and others (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013), and a forthcoming book (Inglehart, 2018) tests this theory more extensively, analyzing survey data gathered from 1970 to 2014 in over 100 countries containing more than 90 percent of the world’s population.

The notion that cultural characteristics influence political regimes remains popular, despite mixed supporting evidence. In particular, democracy is argued to emerge and thrive in countries where liberal or freedom-oriented values (so-called self-expression values) are widespread. Inglehart and Welzel, for instance, report such an effect, mainly drawing inferences from cross-country comparisons. Yet cross-country correlations between self-expression values and democracy could stem from different processes. Reinvestigating this relationship, this article finds no empirical support when employing models accounting for sample-selection bias, country-specific effects and the endogeneity of values to democracy. Self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies. In contrast, this study finds indications that a country’s experience with democracy enhances self-expression values.

The present study concerns how culture connects to perceptions of equity and relational maintenance behavior in the United States (US), Malaysia, and Singapore. In doing so, this study extends findings that employed cultural modernization theory (CMT) and equity theory to explain cultural and individual variations in relational maintenance behavior. Sex differences were also examined. Three countries were selected for their proximity in Traditional (vs. Rational ) Values and divergence in Survival (vs. Self Expression ) Values , according to the World Values Survey (WVS) cultural map. Consistent with CMT assumptions, participants in the United States and Malaysia (i.e., countries that espouse self expression values) reported greater use of relational maintenance strategies than did those in Singapore (i.e., a country endorsing survival values). As hypothesized, curvilinear associations between equity and relational maintenance strategies were found for the US participants only. This finding concurs with CMT-grounded assumptions and facts that romantic partners in Western (vs. Eastern), high-income societies (e.g., the US) seek equitable relationships. Sex differences also emerged but only for the US participants.

Our purpose in this article is to determine the degree to which the cultural requisites to democracy are present in the contemporary political culture of the USSR. We focus on support for core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions. Data for this project come from a survey of 504 citizens of the Moscow Oblast conducted between February 17, 1990, and March 4, 1990. In absolute terms, support for democratic values is fairly widespread in the Moscow Oblast. We found significant levels of endorsement of competitive elections and for many democratic rights and liberties such as liberty and the norms of democracy. Many of the scales measuring support for democratic rights were intercorrelated, leading us to hypothesize the existence of a general underlying dimension of democratic values. The best predictors of attitudes toward general democratic values were education, gender, and age. The better educated, males, and the young tended to be more supportive of democratic institutions and processes. We take...

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have made two strong claims for the index of “self-expression values” introduced in 1997 by Inglehart using responses from the World Values Survey (WVS): first that these values are getting stronger worldwide and second that this is a necessary condition for a flourishing democracy. In this research note, we document that the shift to more emphasis on tolerance, trust, and post-materialism—principal components of the self-expression index—is indeed visible in many countries, but not in East Asia. Also, the combination of these components into one index is fine on average, but makes little sense for the East Asian region. Many East Asians maintain some different attitudes toward work, family, and social issues that would appear traditional and conservative by today’s Western standard where such conservative values today are held typically by people who are less trusting and more suspicious of democracy. By contrast, trust, measured in six different ways, as well as post-materialism, appears compatible with these conservative work and family values in East Asia. The claim that self-expression values as defined by Inglehart are a necessary condition for a healthy democracy makes sense in many parts of the world, but not in East Asia.

The current decline of the developmentalist paradigm, and its view of the rural as increasingly residual, revitalizes rural sociology. The blossoming of studies of rurality and ecology is paralleled by the growing currency of globalization as an object of analysis. This is more than a coincidence—in fact, globalization crystallizes local diversity. The two phenomena go hand in hand. But each needs to be understood as an historical construct; that is, they need to be problematized. In problematizing “globalization,” I argue that it must be understood as a post-developmentalist construct. The postwar goal of national development, institutionalized in the international Bretton Woods regime, has run its course—dramatized by the assault on developmentalist states and institutions in the monetarist regime established under the auspices of the 1980s debt crisis. The nationally oriented institutions of the developmentalist era are now being replaced by globally oriented institutions under the legitimizing cloak of efficiency and financial credibility. Related to this trend, producing communities scramble to reposition themselves either through finding niches in a new global economy or through resistance to global pressures. Either way, there is a new emphasis on defining the local. This article explores the conjunction of global and local definition.

Pilgrimages arranged by the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sweden are a relatively new, but growing phenomenon. Th is study examines Swedish pilgrims’ background, motivations, and experiences. Most pilgrims are highly educated, middle-aged persons with a strong relation to the church. However, a group of religiously interested persons with weaker bonds with the church was also identifi ed. Th e pilgrims uphold a multitude of motivations both on an individual as well as on a group level. The most common motivation is a longing for nature, but three different motivation groups were identified: a leisure group, a spiritual–religious group, and an escape group. Depending on their motivations, the pilgrims appreciate diverse parts of the pilgrimage. One exception is the silent walk, which gets the highest score by almost everyone. The author discusses if the highly valued silence in group might reflect the power of strong selfexpression values among Swedes found in other studies. (Less)

The circumstances under which societies adapt their cultural values to cold, temperate, and hot climates include the availability of money to cope with climate. In a country-level study, collective income, household income, and economic growth were conceptualized as moderators of the climate-culture link because money is primarily used to satisfy homeostatic needs for thermal comfort, nutrition, and health. The results demonstrate that members of societies in more-demanding climates endorse survival values at the expense of self-expression values to the extent that they are poorer ( n= 74 nations), that household incomes in these lower-income societies are lower ( n = 66 nations), and that they face more economic recession ( n = 38 nations). In addition to theoretical implications, the findings have practical implications for the cultural consequences of global warming and the effectiveness of financing for human development.

An influential analysis by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argued that a pro-democratic culture may help existing democracies survive, but political culture does not contribute to the process of democratization, which is entirely done by elites. We challenge this conclusion, arguing that it neglects the very nature of democratization. For (as Human Development theory argues), democratization is a liberating process that maximizes human freedom by establishing civil and political rights. Consequently, the aspect of political culture that is most relevant to democratization is mass aspirations for freedom - and if a given public emphasizes these values relatively strongly, democratization is likely to occur. To test this thesis, we use data from the Values Surveys, demonstrating that a specific component of postmaterialism ('liberty aspirations') had a major impact on the extent to which societies gained or lost freedom during the Third Wave of democratization. This effect holds up in tests of Granger causality, remaining strong when we control for prior levels of freedom. No other indicator, including GDP/capita and social capital, can explain away the impact of liberty aspirations on democratization. Mass liberty aspirations play a role in democratization that has been greatly underestimated. An influential analysis by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argued that a pro-democratic culture may help existing democracies survive, but political culture does not contribute to the process of democratization, which is entirely done by elites. We challenge this conclusion, arguing that it neglects the very nature of democratization. For (as Human Development theory argues), democratization is a liberating process that maximizes human freedom by establishing civil and political rights. Consequently, the aspect of political culture that is most relevant to democratization is mass aspirations for freedom - and if a given public emphasizes these values relatively strongly, democratization is likely to occur. To test this thesis, we use data from the Values Surveys, demonstrating that a specific component of postmaterialism ('liberty aspirations') had a major impact on the extent to which societies gained or lost freedom during the Third Wave of democratization. This effect holds up in tests of Granger causality, remaining strong when we control for prior levels of freedom. No other indicator, including GDP/capita and social capital, can explain away the impact of liberty aspirations on democratization. Mass liberty aspirations play a role in democratization that has been greatly underestimated.

Most studies posit and identify a linear and negative relationship between democracy and the violation of human rights. Some research challenges this finding, however, suggesting that nonlinear influences exist. Within this article, we examine the structure of the relationship between democracy and repression during the time period from 1976 to 1996. To conduct our analysis, we utilize diverse statistical approaches which are particularly flexible in identifying influences that take a variety of functional forms (specifically LOESS and binary decomposition). Across measures and methodological techniques, we found that below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner. The implications of this research are discussed within the conclusion.

In general, the literature on democratic transitions has focused on political processes and choices of actors in explaining regime change, thereby failing to investigate whether structural factors affect the recent rise in transitions to democracy. An analysis of the influence of these structural factors is however important, and it has not yet been done in a systematic way in order to explain recent transitions to democracy since 1989. It will be shown that some structural factors indeed play a role in generating transitions to democracy. These results contradict the idea that structural factors can be ignored when explaining recent transitions to democracy. An additional finding in this article is that some structural factors, such as economic development, growth and a country's role in the world-system had an unexpected impact on democratic transitions since the end of the Cold War. These findings set bounds to the strength of the modernization and world-system theories to explain transitions to democracy, but on the other hand, democratic diffusion played a significant role after 1989. In the (structural) context in which a state had a peripheral role, a low level of economic growth and a high proportion of democratic neighbors, the probability of a state's transition to democracy was high. This structural context seemed to be fertile soil for recent transitions to democracy.

This paper presents a new approach to the measurement of attitudinal polarization for cross-national or repeated cross-sectional studies. The proposed approach is a two-stage one. At the first step, order-constrained Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is used to identify a categorical latent construct underlying a set of observed items. Basing on the best LCA solution, class membership is assigned for each individual in the sample. At the second step, a broad family of categorical polarization indices may be computed for that categorical latent scale in respect to any grouping variable of interest (e.g., country of living, or wave of study). The data from the 4th wave of the European Values Study are used, and polarization between survival and self-expression values in 28 European countries is measured. The resulting polarization scores are used to test a hypothesis assuming positive aggregate-level association between values polarization and support for radical right parties and ideologies.

This paper intends to demonstrate three objectives: (1) Fukuyama’s theory of the triumph of liberal democracy is cross culturally plausible at the attitudinal level; (2) Fukuyama’s claim that Islam is resistant to modernity (characterized by liberal democracy and capitalism) does not hold up to empirical testing. That is, using Islam as an explanatory variable of democracy/authoritarianism is largely uncorroborated; and (3) Explore alternative explanations for the absence of democracy in most of Middle Eastern countries. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of Human Development and Political Opportunity Structure for the explanation of democracy/authoritarianism. The main conclusion of the paper is that Islam is largely irrelevant as an explanatory variable for authoritarianism/democracy.

Recent social and political theory has elevated political conversation among democratic citizens to new heights. Political talk is central to most current conceptions of how democracy functions (Schudson 1997). According to many prominent social theorists, democracy has a future only if “citizens come back out of their bunkers and start talking” (Gray 1995, 1; see also Elshtain 1995; Lasch 1995). The quantity and quality of political conversation have become “a standard for the accomplishment of democracy” (Sanders 1997, 347). Theorists extol the virtues of political talk, foundations spend millions of dollars to encourage it, and civic journalists and others plan special meetings to foster more of it. Yet what do we really know about beneficial outcomes of political talk as it occurs in day to day life? For the most part, arguments for the centrality of political discussion among ordinary Americans have been highly theoretical in nature. In other words, the contributions to democratic ends that political conversations are supposed to make depend critically on whether such talk reaches the standards necessary to be deemed “deliberation,” “discourse,” or, in Habermas’ (1989) terms, an “ideal speech situation.” It is one thing to claim that political conversation has the potential to produce beneficial outcomes if it meets a whole variety of as yet unrealized criteria, and yet another to argue that political conversations, as they actually occur, produce meaningful benefits for citizens (Conover and Searing 1998). Because the list of requirements for deliberation tends to be quite lengthy, 1 it is difficult, if not impossible, to test theories of this kind empirically.

Are Americans more individualistic and less collectivistic than members of other groups? The authors summarize plausible psychological implications of individualism-collectivism (IND-COL), meta-analyze cross-national and within-United States IND-COL differences, and review evidence for effects of IND-COL on self-concept, well-being, cognition, and relationality. European Americans were found to be both more individualistic-valuing personal independence more-and less collectivistic-feeling duty to in-groups less-than others. However, European Americans were not more individualistic than African Americans, or Latinos, and not less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans. Among Asians, only Chinese showed large effects, being both less individualistic and more collectivistic. Moderate IND-COL effects were found on self-concept and relationality, and large effects were found on attribution and cognitive style.

Approximately fifty years ago, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) published The Civic Culture, followed soon after by Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye’s (1965) Political Culture and Political Development. The importance of these two classic studies cannot be overemphasized. They widened the political culture approach into a global framework for the comparative analysis of political change and regime legitimacy in developed as well as developing countries. The guiding question of the Almond-Verba-Pye approach concerned what citizen beliefs make democratic regimes survive and flourish. With the expansion of democracy into new regions of the globe, this civicness question is even more relevant today.Political Culture and Political Development laid out the analytical tool kit and categories to examine the civicness question empirically. The volume was particularly important on conceptual grounds, yet it lacked systematic cross-national data to support its conclusions because such research was not feasible. Today, this situation has changed dramatically. The World Values Survey (WVS) and other cross-national projects have opened large parts of the developing world to public opinion research. Now there is an abundance of evidence on a wide range of social and political attitudes. This situation creates an excellent opportunity to evaluate contemporary political cultures in terms of the civicness question.

This chapter explores young people’s perceptions of and beliefs in gender equality across 28 countries and the relationship between these two phenomena. The findings show that while the levels of young people’s beliefs in gender equality follow patterns of economic development (GDP) and are associated with actual measures of gender equality (Gender Empowerment Measure), nevertheless, young peoples’ perceptions of gender inequalities are found to be independent of beliefs in gender equality, actual levels of gender equality, and economic development. Sweden is found to be the only country where more than 50% of young people combine beliefs in equality with perceptions of inequality. In our analysis, we also find that the willingness to engage in political action is stronger among those young people who believe in gender equality and at the same time perceive reality not to be in accordance with this ideal. These findings suggest that political action is premised on the combination of not only believing in gender equality but also perceiving gender inequality.

Democratic regimes depend for their survival and effective functioning on the public's willing acquiescence and support; however, the measurement of support is problematic. The failure to appreciate the difference between established democracies and new regimes that may (or may not) be in the process of democratizing has prompted scholars to mismeasure support by relying on idealist measures. We propose a realist conception of political support and realist measures. We test these measures with data from the 1995-97 World Values Surveys, comparing their ability to describe and explain variations in support for both old and new regimes. Realist measures perform substantially better in all contexts and in ways that suggest the rationality of realist support.

The article compares the effect of political majority and minority status on attitudes toward government in mature and newly established democracies. Specifically, it examines whether being in the majority translates into more positive attitudes toward government than being in the minority. Using surveys conducted by the International Social Survey Project (ISSP) in 12 democracies in 1996, it finds that being in the majority generally translates into more positive attitudes toward government. However, this effect is not of uniform magnitude across countries, nor does it affect all attitudes toward government equally. Specifically, the data show that being in the political majority or minority strongly affects attitudes toward the performance of the political system and the power of government, but does not affect people's levels of political efficacy in systematic ways.

The doctrine of human rights has come to play a distinctive role in international life. This is primarily the role of a moral touchstone-a standard of assessment and criticism for domestic institutions, a standard of aspiration for their reform, and increasingly a standard of evaluation for the policies and practices of international economic and political institutions. International practice has followed the controlling documents of international law in taking a broad view of the scope of human rights. Many political theorists argue, however, that this view is excessively broad and that genuine human rights, if they are to be regarded as a truly common concern of world society, must be construed more narrowly. I argue against that perspective and in favor of the view implicit in contemporary international practice, using the right to democratic institutions as an example.

Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.

A general review of approaches to causality is given from a statistical perspective. Three broad notions are distinguished. In the final part of the paper the challenges of reaching potentially causal representations are outlined for a study of some German political and social attitudes

When the Soviet Union fell into shards, it was as if Western liberal democracy—at least on the level of words—suddenly vaulted far to the east, into the traditional heartland of “Oriental despotism.” Ten years later, all the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia now have parliaments, elected presidents, and (Turkmenistan excepted) multiple parties. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) extends across the steppes two-thirds of the way to the Yellow Sea, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council includes the homeland of Genghis Khan. When Western forms sprang eastwards, so did the hopes of Western democrats and the interest of Western businesses in the Caspian basin. Today, however, in response to the region’s authoritarianism, corruption, and limited oil, disillusionment has set in. It is an appropriate moment to take stock. A serious taxonomy of Caucasian and Central Asian regimes must separate out three political patterns. In the first, which predominates in most of the region, the ruler is a powerful president who typically was the Communist first secretary during Soviet days. There is no effective power sharing, whether with parliaments, local governments, or independent judiciaries. (Tajikistan is a special case. The Russian government forced its local allies into a fragile power-sharing agreement with Islamist guerrilla fighters.) Yet despite these elements of continuity, there are striking differences from Soviet times. First, the major role that the “center” in Moscow played in the government of the republics has disappeared. Because the center had directed most of the economy, the selection of officials, Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., is director of the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute and research professor of international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. His most recent contribution to the Journal of Democracy was “Russia Under Putin: The Feudal Analogy” (July 2000).