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Research on declining marriage rates in Korea has predominantly focused on economic-structural factors. This study uses five nationally representative cross-sectional surveys from 1991–2018 to examine the marital intentions of never-married Korean women and men aged 20–29 by their education, employment, and partnership. The analysis shows that the share of single young adults not intending to marry increased, especially between 2015 and 2018, when uncertainty about marriage intentions also grew. Marital intentions vary little by education and employment but are closely related to partnership status. The ambivalence toward marriage grew in tandem with a fall in the number of young Koreans having a dating partner. The rise in negative and uncertain marriage intentions suggests that the decline in marriage rates is likely to continue, contributing to a further rise in childlessness and a decline in fertility as reproduction in Korean society occurs almost exclusively within marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of research shows that demographic attitudes and behaviors across the life course are socially stratified. Building on this and focusing on the transition to parenthood, we hypothesize that (i) parental socioeconomic status is associated with multiple dimensions of the transition to parenthood, including fertility norms (perceived lower age limit at first birth), ideals (ideal age at first birth), and behaviors (age at first birth), and that (ii) this association varies across national contexts, as national contexts determine the opportunities and constraints that guide young adults' life course attitudes and behaviors. Drawing on the European Social Survey 2006 and 2018 data, we analyze early fertility norms and ideals and later fertility behaviors of a pseudo-panel of individuals born between 1976 and 1988. We show that (i) parental socioeconomic status is positively associated with later fertility norms, later fertility ideals, and later childbearing, even when controlling for respondents' own socioeconomic status, and that (ii) national contexts partially moderate these associations. We conclude by discussing implications for theories of fertility and highlighting avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The study makes use of the 2016 Household Multipurpose Survey of Family, Social Subjects, and Life Cycle to demonstrate that family‐related behavior is now rapidly changing in Italy. The country is often taken as a stronghold of traditionalism. We, instead, highlight recent and substantial changes in cohabitation, dissolution, and nonmarital fertility in the country. In doing so, we carefully assess the predictions made by the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) and show that trends in Italy are monotonically moving in the direction of the SDT. There are, though, important differences across educational groups and regions, that is, family‐related behavior is also changing in the South of Italy in much the same way but not at the same speed as in the rest of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines childbearing in and outside of marriage as a manifestation of the Second Demographic Transition among immigrant populations in Switzerland. Based on full-population register data, we simultaneously analyse fertility and partnership changes at different stages of the migration process. Results from a multistate event history model show that most of the differences in family formation patterns between migrant groups and natives are in the sequencing of marriage and first birth among childless unmarried women. Out of wedlock family trajectories prove to be a common experience for European migrants, but a sustainable family pathway only among natives, as well as among immigrants from France, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Among married women, it is the risk of a third birth that marks the differences between groups; first and second birth rates are relatively similar across migrant groups. Distinguishing between the transition patterns of newly arrived immigrants and settled immigrants (characterised by various residence durations) support the disruption hypothesis among EU migrants and the interrelated life events hypothesis among non-EU groups. Family size and the partnership context of fertility highlight which family regime prevails in different population subgroups and the role that immigrants play in the Second Demographic Transition and family transformation in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cohabitation has become more common in communities that have experienced demographic transitions, including in Taiwan, and hence it has become a research interest. However, our understanding of cohabitation in Taiwan has been limited to indirect estimations and cross-sectional analysis due to the lack of appropriate data. These analyses can provide a quick overview of the prevalence of cohabitation at specific periods, but they cannot portray the risk of cohabitation over the life course. Using recent panel data from the Taiwan Youth Project, we estimate cohabitation risk among young adults in their mid-20s to early-30s. We also examine the determinants of cohabitation. Results show that being a woman, not employed, living in emerging regions, not having varying residential locations, ever having sex (especially at an earlier age), and being more open to premarital intimacy were associated with higher odds of cohabitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central premise of the first demographic transition theory is that demographic change would occur more slowly in rural than urban areas. Few studies, however, have investigated whether rural areas remain holdouts during the second demographic transition. To address this gap, this study (1) examines trends among rural and urban families in Canada and the United States over a 30-year period and (2) determines whether compositional differences in demographic, socioeconomic, and religious factors explain current differences between rural and urban families. We find that rural Canadian women continue to have, on average, 0.6 more children than urban women. However, rural families do not trail behind urban families on any other indicator of family change. In fact, rural women in both countries are now significantly more likely to cohabit and roughly 10 percentage points more likely to have children outside of marriage than urban women. These differences are largely explained by lower levels of education and income among rural American women and fewer immigrants in rural Canada. Examining family change through a rural–urban lens fills important empirical gaps and yields novel insights into current debates on the fundamental causes of ongoing family change in high-income countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces the tentative concept of deep aging – a label used for a situation when the overall ageing effects of the second demographic transition, due to fertility below replacement level, are topped by the excessive emigration of the fertile contingent (additional loss of active population). Deep ageing thus accelerates population decline. But the loss of fertile contingent may affect the total fertility rates and its apparent rise (TFR). Here, the tempo effect of fertility plays the decisive role. The article first assesses the demographic change in the European macroregions in the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain (1990–2020). It then analyses the changes in the area of former Yugoslavia to assess the extent of population change in the last intercensal period, 2011–2022. Building on the previous research of population loss and migration flows after the break-up of Yugoslavia, the overall population change in the region is being assessed. It is also shown that tempo distortion of fertility rates considerably affects the realistic level of fertility and that approximate completed fertility rates fell less dramatically. Since the migration data are less reliable, the analysis of intercensal change was applied to assess the migration losses across the ex-Yugoslav space. To assess the extent of deep ageing, the intercensal projection of fertile contingent was introduced. The stage of deep ageing is the most pronounced in Croatia and Serbia, especially at the younger fertile group, while the overall loss of fertile population is profound and will certainly affect the further future decrease in population. Similarly difficult demographic situation is in other post-Yugoslav countries, where only Slovenia has not yet slid into the stage of deep ageing.

Over the past half a century many countries have witnessed a rapid fall in total fertility rates, particularly in the world's most advanced economies including the industrial powerhouses of Eastern Asia and Europe. Such nations have now passed through the first and second demographic transitions and are currently exhibiting fertility rates well below the replacement threshold of 2.1, with no sign of recovery. This paper examines the factors responsible for driving these demographic transitions and considers their impact on both fertility and fecundity (our fundamental capacity to reproduce). I argue that because the first demographic transition was extremely rapid and largely driven by socioeconomic factors, it has had no lasting impact on the genetic/epigenetic underpinnings of human fecundity. However, the second demographic transition will be different. A series of conditions associated with low fertility societies, including relaxed selection pressure for high-fertility genotypes, the indiscriminate use of assisted reproductive technologies to treat human infertility, and environmental contamination with reproductive toxicants, may impact our genetic constitution in ways that compromise the future fecundity of our species. Since any fundamental change in the genetic foundations of human reproduction will be difficult to reverse, we should actively pursue methods to monitor human fecundity, as sub-replacement fertility levels become established across the globe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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BACKGROUND: Growth in cohabiting unions and non-marital childbearing sits at the core of research on the second demographic transition and related discussions of family bifurcation and children's diverging destinies. OBJECTIVE: How should we think about these two highly influential and purportedly universal depictions of family change in low-fertility countries where the link between marriage and childbearing remains strong? Using data from large national surveys in Japan, we address this question by describing growing heterogeneity in pathways to first marriage, with a focus on the temporal ordering of cohabitation, pregnancy, engagement, initiation of living together as married, and registration of marriage. RESULTS: Our descriptive analyses demonstrate a substantial increase across marriage cohorts in variation in pathways to family formation in Japan, primarily reflecting growth in premarital cohabitation. Among women in the 2010-2015 marriage cohort, 39% cohabited with their husband prior to marriage. Educational differences in cohabitation experience are small, but cohabitation is more likely to be associated with premarital pregnancy for women with lower levels of educational attainment. CONTRIBUTION: Our descriptive summary of trends and differences in pathways to first marriage provides not only a needed update on changing pathways to family formation in Japan, but also a valuable empirical basis for contextual modification or adaptation of two of the most influential theoretical frameworks for understanding family change in low-fertility societies.

This study aims to highlight the changes in fertility patterns of Russians which occurred after the USSR’s dissolution or disintegration, taking a long historical perspective. After that disruption, thirty cohorts were born and raised who never lived under the Soviet system. Fifteen more cohorts (those who were born between 1975 and 1990) remember that system only as a part of childhood, but their adult life started after the iron curtain had fallen and a flood of new ideas and practices spilled into all spheres of life. At the same time, the increased concern among the Russian elite about the declining population and low birth rates led to the adoption of a pronatalist family policy based on monetarist approaches reinforced by conservative-traditionalist ideology. Our main research question asks: To what extent did state social and family policies in Russia, which are based on the ideology of traditionalism and conservatism, derail or slow down the modernization of the quantitative and structural parameters of fertility patterns within the Second Demographic Transition context? Our analysis is based on indicators from period and cohort fertility tables, specific for age and parity. Extrapolations are used for Russia’s female cohorts born 1971-1994 to arrive at expected ultimate fertility outcomes. Our evidence, obtained from the comprehensive analysis of fertility tables, reveals that the transformation of the Russian fertility model continues to be in line with the Second Demographic Transition common to developed countries, and that two decades of active pronatalist policy in the context of strengthening the conservative family ideology did not stop the modernization of fertility patterns. * This article belongs to a special issue on “Demographic Developments in Eastern and Western Europe Before and After the Transformation of Socialist Countries”.

The invention of the Internet and rapid technological advancements have transformed Millennials (born between 1980 and 1999) into the first generation that is truly global in its connectivity and experiences. To what extent are the changes in the transition to adulthood for Millennials global and universal? We compared Millennials in France, Finland, Estonia, and Russia to answer this question. Using data from the European Social Survey (conducted in 2006 and 2018), we examined six key events that mark adulthood: completion of professional education, leaving the parental home, first employment, first cohabitation, first marriage, and first childbirth. By comparing the structure, timing, and tempo of the occurrence of these starting events in the selected countries, we found that the transition to adulthood is becoming more unified but still retains country-specific characteristics. Socioeconomic events occur for the majority of Millennials (50-90%) at the ages of 18-20 in a more gradual way in France and Finland, and more abruptly in Estonia and Russia. Cohabitation is the most common event from the demographic part of transition to adulthood. In comparison to cohabitations, first marriages and childbirth occur for less than 50% of respondents and at much older ages. Russians have the highest prevalence of these events and experience them at a younger age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Psychology & Sociology is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the past decade, various and heterogeneous types of households have emerged in Iran, resulting from economic, social, and demographic changes. One of the most significant demographic changes in the country is the increase in the frequency of female-headed households. Comparing the establishment of female-headed families in developed and developing countries indicates that social, economic, and demographic factors have different effects on these types of households. Therefore, through a Critical study of all existing research, which has focused on central averages and disregards micro-level changes, it is possible to establish a clear foundation for policies affecting female-headed families. Focusing on female-headed families, as a distinct group, this study examined their similarities and differences in social, economic, and demographic aspects at the county level, and studied their distribution within the theoretical frameworks of second demographic transition and inequalities concerning drive and pressure mechanisms. Based on the current theoretical and experimental literature, this study classifies the existing components in terms of their role in the formation of female-headed families as "driver" and "pressure." Voluntary drivers of the feminization of household headship were analyzed using the second demographic transition theory and the forced pressures of feminization of household headship were investigated in the context of inequality theory. This paper examines the role of driver and pressure mechanisms on the distribution of female-headed households in 429 Iranian counties in 2016 using data from the Statistical Center of Iran and spatial autocorrelation (Moran's I and Getis index), K-mean clustering and ordinary least squares regression methods. The results of spatial autocorrelation revealed that southeast counties have the highest concentration of female-headed households, while the lowest concentration is observed in northwest counties extending in a line to the center. According to the spatial clustering model and the hierarchical exploratory analysis method on the variables of the percentage of female-headed households, economic, demographic, and social status, the counties are divided into five clusters with the smallest difference from the central average in each cluster and the greatest difference with the next cluster in the best case: cluster 1 includes only three counties and is considered an outlier; cluster 2 contains the north-west, south, and north-east counties and affected by economic drivers; cluster 3 contains central and northern counties and affected by social and demographic drivers; cluster 4 contains western and southwestern counties and affected by demographic and economic pressures; and cluster 5 contains southeastern and eastern counties and affected by social and economic pressures. Furthermore, the results of ordinary least squares regression revealed that the covariates explain 75% of fluctuations in the frequency of female-headed families. The three economic components of the percentage of jobless families, employment rate of urban women, and economic participation rate had a positive and significant impact (at an error level of less than 0.001) on the development of female-headed households. The socio-demographic components of the percentage of widowed women, early marriage, percentage of divorced women, and the literacy rate of women had a positive and significant effect, and the two components of the percentage of the ever-married population and the percentage of the urban population had a negative and significant effect (at an error level of 0.001) on the formation of female-headed households in counties of Iran. Generally, Social, economic, and demographic changes have a relatively strong impact on the formation of female-headed households via two driving and pressuring mechanisms. As a result, empowering women in the context of the second demographic transition can increase these households in districts (central and north counties) influenced by the driving mechanism. Continued social, economic, and demographic pressures can increase these households in districted (southeast counties) affected by the pressuring mechanisms. Thus, policymaking based on the role of these mechanisms may help the state to empower and support these families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past half a century many countries have witnessed a rapid fall in total fertility rates, particularly in the world’s most advanced economies including the industrial powerhouses of Eastern Asia and Europe. Such nations have now passed through the first and second demographic transitions and are currently exhibiting fertility rates well below the replacement threshold of 2.1, with no sign of recovery. This paper examines the factors responsible for driving these demographic transitions and considers their impact on both fertility and fecundity (our fundamental capacity to reproduce). I argue that because the first demographic transition was extremely rapid and largely driven by socioeconomic factors, it has had no lasting impact on the genetic/epigenetic underpinnings of human fecundity. However, the second demographic transition will be different. A series of conditions associated with low fertility societies, including relaxed selection pressure for high-fertility genotypes, the indiscriminate use of assisted reproductive technologies to treat human infertility, and environmental contamination with reproductive toxicants, may impact our genetic constitution in ways that compromise the future fecundity of our species. Since any fundamental change in the genetic foundations of human reproduction will be difficult to reverse, we should actively pursue methods to monitor human fecundity, as sub-replacement fertility levels become established across the globe.

I examine the implications of a modern psychological theory of values for the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). The SDT derives its values theory and measurement from Maslow, who noted that resource-rich environments cause value shifts towards personal-focused growth values. However, Maslow has been replaced by the theory of basic human values (TBHV) which distinguishes person and social-focused growth values. This distinction has two important implications for the SDT. First, some individualistic and self-expressive values identified by the SDT are not growth but basic need motivated and therefore functions of resource-poor environments. Second, the TBHV values on interdependence and independence are strongly influenced by gender and reflect preferences for family and care or career. Therefore, these values can be used to address critiques of the SDT based on the stalled gender revolution. I show that distinguishing values as described in the TBHV can be useful for the SDT. I find that benevolence (interdependence) is positively and openness to change (autonomy/stimulation) is negatively related to marriage in the Netherlands using longitudinal panel data and discrete event history models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory proposes that rising individualism and secularism lead to new attitudes that drive new family and fertility behaviors. Scholars have argued that analyzing heterogeneity in attitudes and behaviors in populations experiencing family change can clarify SDT processes. This study uses data from the Relationship Dynamics and Social Life study to describe how attitudinal heterogeneity in one small geographic area relates to predictions of SDT theory. We draw on earlier latent class analysis (LCA) that identified groups that share patterns of attitudes in a sample of young women from a midwestern US county. LCA allows inductive identification of heterogeneous subgroups defined by attitudes themselves, which SDT theory posits as a key causal factor in demographic change. We compare the heterogeneous patterns of attitudes in these subgroups of young women to predictions of SDT theory, then compare groups' subsequent fertility at early adult ages. We find that most groups endorse some attitudes predicted by original SDT theory, but only one group matches most of those predictions. We identify other groups with attitudes consistent with the American religious exceptionalism model and the diverging destinies model, as well as heterogeneity beyond that predicted by these theories. Subsequent fertility at early ages is patterned by membership in these attitude groups. We discuss how the findings might shed light on possible demographic trajectories in the USA and argue for the value of identifying and tracking the prevalence of such groups in nationally representative samples over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Births outside of marriage are comparatively rare in East Asia, but numbers appear to be rising. Such fertility tends to be concentrated among lower educational and socioeconomic groups which can entrench pre-existing inequalities in systems where such 'non-traditional' family forms are penalised. Most research in this area, however, has focused on the relationship between marriage and first birth. Using a large microdataset from Hong Kong, we explore the relationship between marriage and childbearing across the life-course. In particular, we examine the frequency of marriage between parities, and the various predictors of marrying (or not). Rather than 'life-long' cohabiters, we find roughly half of all couples who have a first birth outside of marriage do, in fact, marry before having their second child. The study concludes with some exploratory reasons for the apparently strong continuation of the relationship between marriage and childbearing in Hong Kong and in East Asia more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Consensual unions have increased greatly in Brazil over the last few decades. Initially, restricted to less-educated groups, they have now been observed in all educational groups, leading some to suggest a diffusion of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in the country. In this paper, we examine the characteristics of women choosing consensual unions in Brazil between 1980 and 2010, with a focus on differentials by education. The results show that higher educated women, when compared to the least educated group, prefer marriage over consensual union both in 1980 and 2010. In addition, we show a growing difference between educational groups over time for choosing informal unions, as the probabilities for higher educated women to choose this type of union have increased less than for lower educated ones. For women with high educational levels in 2010, the likelihood of being in a consensual union is greater than among those from lower socioeconomic groups and among blacks, browns, and Catholics. Our results question the explanations given by the SDT for the expansion of consensual unions in upper socioeconomic groups in Brazil.

Due to increasing heterogeneity in if, when, and under what conditions women have children, the timing, spacing, and other demographic aspects of childbearing have drastically changed in the US over the past century. Existing science tends to examine demographic aspects of childbearing separately, creating an incomplete understanding of how childbearing patterns are distributed at the population level. In this research brief, we develop the concept of childbearing biographies to emphasize that multiple childbearing characteristics cluster together. We analyze nationally representative US data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79; N = 4052). Using eight childbearing variables (e.g., age at first birth, number of children, whether unmarried at any birth), we use Mixed-Mode Latent Class Analysis (MM-LCA) and identify five classes, or childbearing biographies: (1) early compressed childbearing, (2) staggered childbearing, (3) extended high-parity childbearing, (4) later childbearing, and (5) married planned childbearing. A childbearing biography approach highlights the increasingly heterogeneous contexts of parenthood today, showing how women with similar characteristics around one aspect of childbearing (e.g., early age at first birth) can also be highly divergent from each other when taking into consideration other childbearing characteristics. In showing this complexity, we highlight that a childbearing biography approach has the potential to shed new light on widening inequality among contemporary midlife women, with implications for aging and population health and well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Family formation, a process that includes union formation, fertility, and their timing and order, has become increasingly diverse and complex in Europe. We examine how the relationship between socio-economic background and family formation has changed over time in France, Italy, Romania, and Sweden, using first wave Generations and Gender Survey data. Competing Trajectories Analysis, a procedure which combines event-history analysis with sequence analysis, allows us to examine family formation as a process, capturing differences in both the timing of the start of family formation and the pathways that young adults follow. Regarding timing, socio-economic background differences in France and Sweden have remained relatively small, whereas in Italy and Romania higher parental education has become more strongly associated with postponement. Pathways tend to diverge by socio-economic background, particularly in Sweden and France. These results indicate that while family formation patterns have changed, they continue to be stratified by socio-economic background. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the study was to diagnose the current and projected pace of ageing in the societies of European post-communist countries from the point of view of its being an increasing economic burden on the economically active population. The analysis covered the years 1990–2050. Ageing is already visible and, according to the forecast, the process will accelerate even more. The old-age dependency ratio (OADR) is expected to exceed 50 in half of the countries in the study by 2050. This will result in major threats to the further development of these countries and will lead to poverty and social exclusion of the elderly. In order to slow down the ageing process, the authorities of these countries should take a number of actions, the most important of which are the implementation of an effective and efficient pro-natal policy (so that the total fertility rate would increase above 2.1), and a well-thought-out migration policy.

The present study investigates the influence of sociopolitical factors on the divorce rate in a sample of seven Color Revolution countries. The second demographic transition perspective and the concept of political anomie were used as the primary theoretical framework. Fixed effects method analysis was conducted for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine from 1995 to 2018. Results indicated that economic growth, rise in women's status, democratization, and political anomie were statistically and positively related to the divorce rate. The results show that sociopolitical factors, such as democratization and anomie, are promising for understanding changing family dynamics. The implications of the study are further discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of 'demodystopias' describes the narratives through which 'ultra-low fertility' is depicted in demographic reports and public media in Asia. In this paper I document how demographic knowledge about population dynamics is being disseminated and mobilized to the lay public within four countries, China, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand. I outline the imaginaries of population evident in the media reports of demographic matters from 2018 to 2019 and the targeting of specific groups in the population for policy interventions. The definition of the 'population problem' is one of the burden of the ageing upon the economy and the lack of the reproduction of particular ethno-nationalist citizens. There is a need to critique the epistemological assumptions inherent in such representations and recognize the importance of examining how demographic knowledge, both among demographers and the lay public is being disseminated and understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this study is to perform a critical literature review of empirical research that measures the effects of joint physical custody (JPC) on children's and parents' wellbeing from a sociological perspective. Its focus is Spain in the scope of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). The studies reviewed show no consensus on terminology that best expresses the condition of JPC, definition of the concept of JPC, or what it is meant by best interest of the child (BIC). A systematic search was performed to locate publications on Spain from 2015–2020. The review shows that the vast majority of JPC resolutions are granted to a specific family profile: highly educated parents who have experienced a low level of family conflict. The review of theoretical antecedents raises the following unanswered questions: Is SDT culture determining the progress of the legal system? Does existing law benefit a specific segment of the parent population? Is a correspondence occurring between family change, jurisprudence, and family and economic policies that benefits children and parents? This study highlights the need for consensus in defining the concepts of JPC and BIC, as well as the measures and methodology to be applied to analyze them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Cuban fertility has remained below the replacement level since 1978. Although it presents an early pattern, in some periods there are increases in the rates of the group of thirty years and over. Based on theoretical proposals and previous studies on the variable, the work presented is aimed at characterizing the fertility dynamics of Cuban women aged 30 and over, between 2005 and 2016. It is characterized, the fertility of this group from its evolution over time, its differential behavior and the particularities in the regions of the country. The results show that late fertility increases in some of its subgroups, where the increase in first-order births in the 30-34 age group stands out. The differential by schooling marks greater distances in the group and some provinces of the three regions of the country stand out with the highest rates in the study group. / RESUMEN La fecundidad cubana se ha mantenido por debajo del nivel de reemplazo desde 1978. Aunque presenta un patrón temprano, en algunos períodos se evidencian aumentos en las tasas del grupo de treinta años y más. Con la base de propuestas teóricas y estudios previos sobre la variable, el trabajo que se presenta se orienta a caracterizar la dinámica de la fecundidad de las mujeres cubanas de 30 años y más, entre 2005 y 2016. Para ello se caracteriza la fecundidad de este grupo desde su evolución en el tiempo, su comportamiento diferencial y las particularidades en las regiones del país. Los resultados evidencian que la fecundidad tardía aumenta en algunos de sus subgrupos, donde resalta el incremento de los nacimientos de primer orden en el grupo de 30-34 años. El diferencial por escolaridad marca mayores distancias en el grupo y destacan algunas provincias de las tres regiones del país con tasas más altas en el grupo de estudio.

Abstract Given the many linkages between education and family behaviour, the expansion of higher education especially among women in recent decades may have important consequences for fertility in Europe. This is a crucial factor in both the New Home Economics (NHE) theory and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) that predict a negative association between fertility and education. However, more recently, the Gender Revolution (GR) approach has emphasised the role of gender egalitarianism both in society and within households as a boost for fertility. By adopting a comparative perspective on six European countries, this paper reports our research on the effect of education on the fertility choices in light of the foregoing three different theoretical explanations. Using data from the second wave of Generation and Gender surveys (GGS) for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Poland, and the ISTAT survey “Famiglie e Soggetti Sociali” for Italy, we estimated the propensity to have the first and the second child birth on women born between 1940 and 1979 by means of multiprocess hazard models. For the first childbirth, the influence of education on fertility behaviours not only remains important but also tends to increase among younger cohorts. This result matches the NHE and SDT explanation, suggesting a similar evolution towards an erosion of the family. Conversely, for the second childbirth we found marked differences among countries suggesting an East-West polarisation giving support to the GR approach. However, peculiarities for the Italian case linked to a tempo effect emphasize the need to go beyond the West-East dichotomy.

Abstract The article considers the evolution of two “Second Demographic Tradition” (SDT) core characteristics: fertility postponement and the rise of cohabitation, with particular attention being given to the first two decades of the new century. It can be considered as the sequel to the concise overview of the SDT published earlier in the US Proceedings of the National Academy (PNAS) (Lesthaeghe, 2014). In the first section, three optimistic views concerning the evolution of fertility are considered: (i) rises due to the end of postponement, (ii) rises connected with advancing human development and (iii) rises associated with advancing gender equality. The focus in this section is mainly but not exclusively on the European experience and its large degree of variation in fertility patterns. It is argued that these three optimistic predictions of sustained fertility rises are mainly based on observations prior to 2010, with too much weight being given to four Nordic countries and too little to other Western European countries with very similar fertility levels. However, these expectations have been thwarted during the second decade, even in the presence of advances in human development and/or gender equality. Hence, the original SDT prediction of 1986 of sustained sub-replacement fertility still holds after 35 years. We expect this to continue during the third decade as well. Furthermore, single-factor explanations are not likely to do justice to far more intricate situations that are responsive to varying structural and ideational influences. In the second section, the evolution of cohabitation is traced in Europe, the USA and Canada, the Latin American countries, three East Asian populations and selected sub-Saharan cases. At the onset, cohabitation can start either from a SDT basis among the better educated or among the poorer classes following a pattern of disadvantage (POD). It is argued that the feature of cohabitation spreads rapidly among all social classes and across all education groups and that in the process of increasing cohabitation, the POD versus SDT argument loses its significance. On a global scale, the rise in cohabitation is contingent on two dimensions: (i) contrasting historical patterns of kinship organisation, including the position of women, and (ii) further advances of the “ethics revolution”, indicating the growing dominance of individual autonomy over traditional societal norms. As a result, no breakthroughs in the near future are expected in countries with a Muslim or Hindu tradition in which no such major cultural shifts have occurred so far.

How does the association between gender attitudes and housework share vary across countries and time? We examine the second demographic transition as it unmasks in the association between gender attitudes and housework participation. Using data of the 2002 and 2012 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) for 24 countries, we find that the association between gender attitudes and housework share became stronger over time in most countries, signifying that the Second Demographic Transition was in place. The results also show that the association varied across the 24 countries, reaching an equilibrium in many but at different stages. Our findings suggest that equilibria in the domestic division of labour take various forms and paces in the ISSP countries.

This article examines same-sex couples as a sign of the Second Demographic Transition, investigating how gay and lesbian couples living together in Brasília build their family, whether they intend to have children, and what challenges they face. We conducted semi-structured interviews online to investigate the family formation process and parenting intentions of 42 couples living together in Brasília in 2019, 20 lesbian and 22 gay couples. The organizing themes in the interviews were marriage, children, work, and stigma. This study advances existing scholarship on families by articulating points of connection between the legal institution of same-sex marriage in Brazil, changing social norms regarding family life, and parental gender expectations as signs of the Second Demographic Transition. Studying same-sex couples contribute to a more complex understanding of the family, the gendered division of labor, and the dimension of fertility and parenting intentions.

The link between parental socio‐economic status (SES) and the likelihood of having a birth in cohabitation or in marriage varies considerably across countries. Previous studies have referred to the pattern of disadvantage perspective and the second demographic transition theory to explain this cross‐national variation. Yet no study has directly tested the explanatory power of both theories in this context. In the current study, hypotheses are formulated about the influence of economic inequality and norms regarding family formation on this relationship. The hypotheses are tested in 19 European and North American countries, using data of the Generations and Gender Survey and four other datasets. The analyses show that in societies that have more traditional family formation norms, women with lower parental SES are more likely to have a birth in cohabitation whereas such differences are not found in less traditional societies. The influence of economic inequality is less clear‐cut. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite changes in marriage's role in young adulthood, youth in the United States report similar or higher expectations to marry than those from decades before, and very few report explicit expectations to not marry. Marital expectations may be one way to understand if the U.S. is indeed experiencing a second demographic transition, and uncertainty in those answers may provide additional information beyond simply yes and no. Using public-use data from 1976 to 2017 from the 12th Grade Monitoring the Future annual cross-sectional surveys, I found that young men and women were more likely to report uncertainty than explicitly expect not to marry, and that boys were generally more uncertain than girls. Slight changes in past decades suggest that boys are becoming more certain regarding marriage, however, and gender differences have diminished over time. Additionally, between 2008 and 2017, I found that boys with the greatest educational prospects were the least likely to report uncertainty about marriage. Uncertainty is common in adolescent marital expectations and should be considered as a possibly informative answer to questions about hypothetical marriages. Results suggest that marriage continues to hold strong meaning in adolescents' ideals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]