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Research on conspiracy theories tends to frame conspiracy believers as isolated individuals falling prey to irrational beliefs caused by a variety of pathological traits and cognitive shortcomings. But evidence is accumulating that conspiracy theory believers are also linked together in social movements capable of effectively coordinated collective action. We propose that conspiracy theory beliefs evolve over time, as part of a process of increasing disengagement from mainstream groups, and concomitant engagement in a community of like-minded individuals, capable of coordinated collective action. This approach allows portraying extreme conspiracism as attractive not despite its apparent irrationality, but precisely because of it. As such, conspiracy theories could not only be conceived as “beliefs”, but also as “social signals” advertising a subversive “counter-elite” posture.

Glossolalia is defined as the ritual oral production of phoneme sequences without recognizable semantic content. The functional underpinnings of glossolalia, and notably whether it consists of a highly specific or ordinary behavior, remain largely unresolved. We addressed this question by measuring the structural brain remodeling associated with the extensive practice of glossolalia in thirty experts. This approach enabled us to circumvent the limitations of functional imaging to reveal the neural correlates of behaviors elicited in specific contexts and involving movements incompatible with most imaging methods. Whole-brain regression analyses of glossolalia expertise with indices of grey and white matter structure revealed positive associations between practice time and grey matter volume within the left frontal pole and the right middle frontal gyrus. These findings suggest that glossolalia involves a degree of neurocognitive specialization, though not at the level of language control and production networks, but within domain-general executive areas. They further call for including multi-tasking and interference suppression as key processes in models of unrecognizable speech production. Our results also concur with current demonstrations that measures of brain structural remodeling may help identifying whether cognitive skills depend on networks specialization or on a recycling of already existing processes.

Background Macrosomatognosiais the illusory sensation of a substantially enlarged body part. This disorder of the body schema, also called “Alice in wonderland syndrome” is still poorly understood and requires careful documentation and analysis of cases. The patient presented here is unique owing to his unusual macrosomatognosia phenomenology, but also given the unreported localization of his most significant lesion in the right thalamus that allowed consistent anatomo-clinical analysis. Case presentation This 45-years old man presented mainly with long-lasting and quasi-delusional macrosomatognosia associated to sensory deficits, both involving the left upper-body, in the context of a right thalamic ischemic lesion most presumably located in the ventral posterolateral nucleus. Fine-grained probabilistic and deterministic tractography revealed the most eloquent targets of the lesion projections to be the ipsilateral precuneus, superior parietal lobule,but also the right primary somatosensory cortex and, to a lesser extent, the right primary motor cortex. Under stationary neurorehabilitation, the patient slowly improved his symptoms and could be discharged back home and, later on, partially return to work. Conclusion We discuss deficient neural processing and integration of sensory inputs within the right ventral posterolateral nucleus lesion as possible mechanisms underlying macrosomatognosia in light of observed anatomo-clinical correlations. On the other hand, difficulty to classify this unique constellation of Alice in wonderland syndrome calls for an alternative taxonomy of cognitive and psychic aspects of illusory body-size perceptions.

Some people publicly pretend to be experts while not being ones. They are pseudoexperts, and their presence seems to be ubiquitous in the current cultural landscape. This manuscript explores the nature and mechanisms of pseudoexpertise. We first provide a conceptual analysis of pseudoexperts based on prototypical cases of pseudoexpertise and recent philosophical work on the concept of expertise. This allows us to propose a definition that captures real-world cases of pseudoexpertise, distinguishes it from related but different concepts such as pseudoscience, and highlights what is wrong with pseudoexpertise. Next, based on this conceptual analysis, we propose a framework for further research on pseudoexpertise, built on relevant empirical and theoretical approaches to cultural cognition. We provide exploratory answers to three questions: why is there pseudoexpertise at all; how can pseudoexperts be successful despite not being experts; and what becomes of pseudoexperts in the long run. Together, these conceptual and theoretical approaches to pseudoexpertise draw a preliminary framework from which to approach the very troubling problem posed by persons usurping the capacities and reputations of genuine experts.