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This article describes recent progress in realizing verifiable state machines, a primitive that enables untrusted services to provide cryptographic proofs that they operate correctly. Applications of this primitive range from proving the correct operation of distributed and concurrent cloud services to reducing blockchain transaction costs by leveraging inexpensive off-chain computation without trust.

Resource disaggregation is a new architecture for data centers in which resources like memory and storage are decoupled from the CPU, managed independently, and connected through a high-speed network. Recent work has shown that although disaggregated data centers (DDCs) provide operational benefits, applications running on DDCs experience degraded performance due to extra network latency between the CPU and their working sets in main memory. DBMSs are an interesting case study for DDCs for two main reasons: (1) DBMSs normally process data-intensive workloads and require data movement between different resource components; and (2) disaggregation drastically changes the assumption that DBMSs can rely on their own internal resource management. We take the first step to thoroughly evaluate the query execution performance of production DBMSs in disaggregated data centers. We evaluate two popular open-source DBMSs (MonetDB and PostgreSQL) and test their performance with the TPC-H benchmark in a recently released operating system for resource disaggregation. We evaluate these DBMSs with various configurations and compare their performance with that of single-machine Linux with the same hardware resources. Our results confirm that significant performance degradation does occur, but, perhaps surprisingly, we also find settings in which the degradation is minor or where DDCs actually improve performance.

This paper introduces Mycelium, the first system to process differentially private queries over large graphs that are distributed across millions of user devices. Such graphs occur, for instance, when tracking the spread of diseases or malware. Today, the only practical way to query such graphs is to upload them to a central aggregator, which requires a great deal of trust from users and rules out certain types of studies entirely. With Mycelium, users' private data never leaves their personal devices unencrypted, and each user receives strong privacy guarantees. Mycelium does require the help of a central aggregator with access to a data center, but the aggregator merely facilitates the computation by providing bandwidth and computation power; it never learns the topology of the graph or the underlying data. Mycelium accomplishes this with a combination of homomorphic encryption, a verifiable secret redistribution scheme, and a mix network based on telescoping circuits. Our evaluation shows that Mycelium can answer a range of different questions from the medical literature with millions of devices.