Search

The study describes the analytical pragmatic structure of concepts and applies this structure to the legal concept of procedural due process. This structure consists of form, purpose, content, and function. The study conclusions indicate that the structure of the concept of procedural due process, or any legal concept, is not the same as the structure of scientific or moral concepts. Parts of the structure of legal concepts change in accordance with changing social and political norms, whereas other parts remain constant. The use of procedural due process in decisionmaking does not guarantee errorless judgment, nor does it guarantee a particular procedural requisite. (Edited copy may reproduce poorly.) (Author)

In the development of judicial criteria apparently governing the constitutional rights of students, the question arises as to what causes the various judges to select a particular precedent, as well as criterion, to resolve a student-school authority conflict. The answer might be mitigating and enhancing judicial observations that could be, in fact, reflective of attitudes, philosophies, and other personality dynamics associated with individual judges. It is this phenomena of dynamics which, in a court of equity or law, determines what, in fact, a student right is in the concrete form as contrasted to the abstract form. Most treatises on school law are void of either precedent -- i.e. case law -- statutory or constitutional law, which may very well determine what, in the concrete sense, a student right is in reference to a particular set of circumstances that were adjudicated. More consideration should be given to those cases or laws that arise outside the public school domain but which have relevancy within the public schools in order to properly advise students and others in the educational community. (Author)