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This paper aims to describe why entrepreneurs choose to act, and continue to do so, given the lack of information in uncertain contexts. We incorporate the concept of psychological capital to explain why entrepreneurs positively evaluate opportunities in both risky and uncertain contexts. Further, we describe how psychological capital can act as a double-edged sword by motivating initial actions and creating inertia toward an uncertain future. However, we posit that perspective-taking can act as a brake on that inertia enabling entrepreneurs to incorporate feedback from customers. We contribute to existing literature on opportunity evaluation by incorporating psychological capital to explain potential systematic differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs depending on the context in which they evaluate opportunities. We also contribute to literature on psychological capital by describing its potential downside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how individuals can gain the beneficial outcomes of social support even when social support is low or absent. We propose that perspective-taking is a means by which individuals can create their own imaginary social support via creating social bonds, thus realizing similar benefits of actual social support. In two studies, we investigate if perspective-taking can stand in for social support when it is low or absent and still produce its beneficial outcomes, namely increased employee engagement and performance through the mediating effect of self-efficacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizations constantly strive to maximize individual performance. One intriguing route is via superstitions, with luck-related sayings (e.g., good luck) and lucky charms having been shown to improve performance (Damisch, Stoberock, & Mussweiler, 2010). Grounding our work in theory on compensatory control, the present research examines how people choose between multiple sources of structure - superstitions (i.e., lucky objects) or institutional systems (i.e., high-status managers) - and proposes that these luck-related superstitions are not always effective. Study 1 demonstrated that receiving a lucky (vs. neutral) message from a low-status grantor increases task performance via greater self-efficacy, but that these effects do not emerge with a high-status grantor. Study 2 revealed that negotiators interacting with a low-status luck-grantor performed as well when they had little power (possessed a weak alternative) as when they had ample power (possessed a strong alternative). This immunizing effect against lacking power was not found when interacting with a high-status luck-grantor: negotiators with a strong alternative performed better than those with a weak alternative, in line with previous research on negotiations (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). These findings contribute to compensatory control theory in exploring how status differentials can have consequences on the performance benefits of luck-related superstitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rewards and punishments are critical in forming and maintaining social norms. Whereas research has clearly demonstrated that mobility and culture affect choices to monetarily reward and punish, less is known about how mobility and culture affect non-monetary norm enforcement strategies. Experiment 1 tests enforcement via social inclusion and exclusion and demonstrates a significantly different pattern of effects from previous monetary findings, with high mobility individuals punishing more but rewarding less than low mobility individuals. Experiment 2 tests enforcement via reporting to an authority and finds that, in contrast to Experiment 1, high mobility individuals punish less but reward more than low mobility individuals. Experiment 3 compares reactions of Americans (high mobility) versus Koreans (low mobility) and largely replicates the previous experiments' patterns of results cross-culturally. This paper illustrates critical boundary conditions for past findings and implications for the development and utilization of norm enforcement strategies across different cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]