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Sociologists of science and technology, mostly have not engaged directly with the sociology of culture, and most sociologists of culture have been slow to extract the implications for their own work of studies of scientific authority and technological production. In this article, the author analyzes how sociologists of science and technology in fact have performed cultural analyses. The author argues that recent moves to extend studies of science and technology 'outward' beyond formal scientific settings have created new possibilities for interchange with the sociology of culture, particularly around studies of material culture, classification, cultural cartography, scientific citizenship, epistemic cultures, and civic epistemologies. The author concludes that the sociology of science and technology holds important lessons for sociologists of culture because of its focus on a key source of cultural authority, its attention to material objects, and its commitment to rethinking divides between the instrumental and the expressive and between nature and culture. Keywords: sociology; science; technology; culture; knowledge; practice

An overview is presented on scientific research of Palestine prior to World War I, and its religious, social, economic and political implications. The article specifically examines the Palestine Exploration Fund, launched in 1865, and its German counterpart, Deutsche Verein zur Erforschung Palastinas, and assesses the impact of the groups' motivations for research, the background of their memberships, and their focuses of study.

A discussion is presented on feminist applications to scientific disciplines, and resulting frameworks for interpreting social, economic, historical and geographic data. Topics include crossing boundaries between discipline, seeking commonality while respecting difference, uniting research and action, and transnational collaboration.

The author discusses the question of why research in Science and Technology Studies tends to be uncritical of social conditions. The Parisian School of STS and its actor-network theory is used as a case study.

This article focuses on the relationship between science and myth. Its author (1) suggests that the theory of evolution provides the most powerful mythic structure for our times; (2) points out the problems that arise from the fact that, historically, evolution became yoked to the earlier concept of material, technological 'progress'; (3) argues for an interpretation of evolution that is based on religious and psychological models of human development; and (4) proposes that such an interpretation, in which personal and social growth is seen as the possible outcome of evolutionary forces, may act as a corrective to a myth based on material progress. Keywords: cultural evolution; directive function; evolutionary myth; explanatory function; myth system; reflective consciousness

A discussion is presented on the evolution of science and its applicability to human existence, focusing on previous analytical structures and methodological assumptions. The author argues that a framework allowing for differing perceptions, priorities and anticipated outcomes is needed to develop sustainable-use practices that are critical to humanity's future.

Environmental policy-making has been hampered by the effects of technology on the environment. The article argues that effective policy-making can be better reached with full public participation. The policies drawn up by Robert Dahl, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry Ravetz are included to serve as models to achieve better environmental policy-making strategies.

The objectivity of science gives it the ability to shape culture in several ways, beyond the will of individuals in society. Science provides a common sense to which all members of society are subject, and exerts a pronounced influence over cultural institutions. It is also recognized as an authoritative and privileged means of obtaining information as opposed to other methods.

Cognitive and social conceptualizations are insufficient to define what is good and bad in scientific practice. Since they are intertwined within the methodology of science, attempting to separate them to assess values or ethics is problematic. Instead, a more comprehensive discourse on values is needed so that the worth and relevance of science can be explored.

The adoption of theory and practice by the public sphere demonstrates the expanding influence of science to a non-scholastic audience. While the Scientific Revolution was limited to academia, the Enlightenment is defined by the dissemination of science processes and discoveries to and within the general public. This restructured popular perception of authoritative knowledge.

Current and past cultures have various explanations for the rainbow, most of which conflict with the scientific explanation that rainbows are created by the interaction of raindrops and light rays. The 6th century BC Greek philosopher Anaximenes believed that rainbows are due to collisions between sunlight and clouds, while the 14th century Teutonic philosopher, Theodoric, maintained that they are made through a combination of reflection and refraction. Meanwhile, a rainbow is actually an iridescent ring and not a bow or arch.

Thomas Kuhn's work on science and society has had a major impact on sociologists, but there are problems with his approach. His notion of an organic community being involved in scientific developments is flawed, rather, such developments tend to arise from the activities of specialists and lay people. The idea of a scientific community itself is dubious, and since Kuhn stressed the notion of community in his arguments, his ideas have to be questioned.

A conference was held at the University of Durham on the relevance of science to society. It was prompted by the increasing perception that science has become unable to discover absolute truths about nature since it was prone to contention and its theories were constantly being overturned by new discoveries. Scientists were also concerned about the increasing importance given to the marriage of religion with formerly exact sciences such as physics, producing pseudo-religious explanations of cosmology and existence that borders on philosophy.

Sociologists and historians have grown more interested in scientific enterprise since they believe that it is influenced by social value systems as much as any other social construct or activity. They point out that scientific discoveries cannot claim to be truths and are merely valuable in relations to other social activities, and have equal standing with non-rational practices such as religion and magic. However, they ignore the fact that hypotheses are built upon accumulated and accepted observations, where the belief system is based on reason and observation and not an act of faith.

Historians have proposed contradictory evaluations of the value of scientific knowledge according to their own realist or relativist agendas. They have involved the public in these disputes, thus, undermining the trust that has been placed on research as if conferring a set of values would change the results that would emerge from scientific inquiry. The debates have obliged scientists to participate in questioning how science functions within political and economic spheres.

Science is being questioned for the lack of certainty in its discoveries after repeated revolutions that seem to reduce past findings to irrelevance. However, science continues to provide society with practical and true discoveries. Scientific endeavour has contributed to general welfare in the fields of medicine, transportation and communication and despite objections that it cannot possibly attempt to comprehend all the complexities of natural phenomena. Perhaps the attacks that science has sustained are due to the methods that invite questioning, when these methods are arguably the bets way of assuring that all inquiries produce accurate results.

Weber's ideas about science and technology have largely been neglected by comparison with his views of modern politics and economics. Yet his notion of disenchantment is central to his conception of modern society and to his comparative studies of the rise of Western rationalism. This importance is underlined by the use to which Weber's ideas have been put by two contemporary thinkers. Ernest Gellner extends the notion of disenchantment in his account of the cognitive style of industrial society, but argues that it does not necessarily pose the threat which Weber's cultural pessimism suggests. Randall Collins, on the other hand, develops a Weberian account of the social basis for technological change, arguing that geopolitical centres give rise to technological innovation. In view of the urgency of the question of the role of science and technology in modern society, these Weberian perspectives provide an important theoretical tool since they offer a framework in which this question can be addressed.

Some historians have hurled baseless accusations against dynamic nonlinear models of history. To support their accusations, these historians cite several problems that supposedly beset narratives resulting from covering-law methodology. Closer analysis, however, reveals that these problems do not exist at all. In addition, there is no basis to the contention that scientific concepts cannot be used in explaining historical events.

Some historians have argued for the adoption of chaos theory as a model for explaining historical events. Historians' views regarding the use of chaos theory in history can be divided into two types. These are the causal thesis, which explains chaos theory in terms of a model for understanding historical events, and the convergence thesis, which holds that the analogy between chaos theory and history lessens history's deviations from science. Closer analysis of the alleged analogy between chaos theory and history, however, reveals no existence of a link between the two.

China's scientific and technological level in the 14th century was unsurpassed by any other civilization at that time. In those times, technological and scientific discoveries were made by artisans and farmers, of which China had a good number because of its large population. However, China failed to progress to the scientific method of mathematized hypotheses, controlled experiments and test replications because of bureaucracy and the lack of genuine inquiry due to domination by leaders with absolute political power. This explains why China did not have an industrial revolution in the 14th century and continues to lag behind the Western world in modern times.

Western civilization has appropriated the scientific achievements of all Other civilizations, declared that they are not science and written them out from the history of science. Nevertheless, Western science is a product of the scientific achievements of all non-Western cultures. In its 'modern' form science is Eurocentric and based on a racial economy. Will postmodern science, of which chaos and complexity are the most noteworthy examples, treat non-Western cultures differently? Will emphasis on holism and new perceptions of nature transform science into a pluralistic enterprise? What is the significance of Western obsession with discovering a Theory of Everything? This essay explores these and related questions. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Scientists have the obligation to inform the public of the results of their experiments. In this task, science makes use of the mass media. Of the various scientific disciplines, meteorology has the most frequent access to the public, with meteorologists successfully utilizing media to spread weather information. However, information sent by meteorologists through the media is often misunderstood by the public.

Following discussions by Callicott and Zimmerman, I argue that much of deep ecology's critique of science is based on an outdated image of natural science. The significance of the quantum revolution for environmental issues does not lie in its alleged intrusion of the subjective consciousness into the physicists' description of nature. Arguing from the viewpoint of Niels Bohr's framework of complementarity, I conclude that Bohr's epistemological lesson teaches that the object of description in physical science must be interaction and that it is now mistaken to imagine that physical science aims to represent nature in terms of properties it possesses apart from interaction.

One of the central, abiding, and unresolved questions in environmental ethics has focused on the criterion for moral considerability or practical respect. In this essay, I call that question itself into question and argue that the search for this criterion should be abandoned because (1) it presupposes the ethical legitimacy of the Western project of planetary domination, (2) the philosophical methods that are and should be used to address the question properly involve giving consideration in a root sense to everything, (3) the history of the question suggests that it must be kept open, and (4) our deontic experience, the original source of ethical obligations, requires approaching all others, of all sorts, with a mindfulness that is clean of any a priori criterion of respect and positive value. The good work that has been done on the question should be reconceived as having established rules for the normal, daily consideration of various kinds of others. Giving consideration in the root sense should be separated from giving high regard or positive value to what is considered. Overall, in this essay I argue that universal consideration - giving attention to others of all sorts, with the goal of ascertaining what, if any, direct ethical obligations arise from relating with them - should be adopted as one of the central constitutive principles of practical reasonableness.

A fundamental misapprehension of the nature of our being in the world underlies the general inhumanity and incoherence of modern culture. The belief that abstraction as a mode of knowing can be universalized to provide a rational ground for all human knowledge and action is a pernicious and unacknowledged background to several modern diseases. Illustrative of these maladies is the seeming dichotomy between the aesthetic and the analytic approaches to nature. One critical arena in which the incoherences of our current understandings of our place in nature come to light is in the battle over the environment. I argue that a more adequate conceptualization of our place in the natural world can be erected if the central metaphors for our understanding are grounded in notions derived from the sciences of life. The key concepts must include contingency, historicity, evolution, organism, and imaginative interaction with concrete reality in individual human beings.

Studies in history, philosophy and sociology of science have aided and shaped current views of science. Several perspectives from sociologies of science are discussed. Mertonian sociology of science is dissected, the work of Strong Program for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, laboratory studies, feminists' stance on science and other complementary writings are discussed. Three problems of science with respective recommendations are volunteered. The problems range from the implications of the field for science education, classroom science characterization and authority substitution.

Henry Adams' criticism of Charles Lyell's uniformitarianism stemmed from his frustrations with Victorian society. Victorian society and Lyell, particularly, believed in the rationalityof the forces controlling human and natural history and resisted any evidence of a random and chaotic universe. Thus, Adams concentrated on catastrophism andmodern science to help himself during the difficult transition to the modern era.

Technological innovations have stunted the spiritual growth of mankind. It would not be a surprise if mankind advances the frontiers of the universe at the pace technology marches. Despite modern man's progress in science, he is still wandering in the spiritual world. His excellence is temporary and transitory. Modern man has neglected the sacred which during the ancient times symbolized power and the source of existence. His reliance on the natural sciences focuses only on the physical dimension which is only a part of reality.

The role that the history of science and technology can play in the development of a genuine scientific culture in Europe was the subject of a symposium organized in Florence in late 1991. This article summarizes the papers and discussions presented at that meeting, on subjects such as the status of research, the history of science in teaching and its place in the media, scientific, economic and political issues, and above all opportunities for European cooperation in the field.

Science and technology are largely being credited as the fuel for economic growth in the West. Ironically, these fields also largely contribute to the production of life-threatening weapons. This situation exists because of the inability of morality to advance with material progress and the continued practice of having varying concepts of morality to different time periods. The goal of society should be overhauled by impartial moral philosophers to rescue society from this predicament.

J. B. Thompson's recently proposed 'depth hermeneutical' method for the study of culture and ideology provides a clear and systematic account of the expectations of a critical approach to culture. However, in attempting to apply the method to one particular area of modern culture -- science -- certain unanticipated difficulties arise. In particular, there is exposed a crucial ambiguity regarding the relative status of the accounts offered by analysts and audiences, which if left unresolved threatens to undermine the whole intent of the method. This ambiguity is explored with reference to current research into one example of the public understanding of science -- creationism -- and the nature of scientists' discourse. It is suggested that the source of difficulty resides in Thompson's conception of the 'mobilised meaning' of cultural products, a conception that artificially restricts the range of possible meanings a given cultural product may have, in such a manner as to accord priority -- albeit unintentionally -- to analysts' readings, thereby undermining the stated view of audience readings as critical appropriations. Consequently, it is considered doubtful that Thompson has been fully successful in his aim to go beyond the limitations of 'semiotic' analyses., In a recent paper to this journal, J. B. Thompson (1988) presented an outline of a theory of culture and ideology derived from his proposed 'depth hermeneutical' method, using the [...]

It is with pleasure that I accept the invitation of the editors of Sociology to reply to Simon Locke's thoughtful and engaging paper. While Locke sets out to examine critically [...]

In his review (Inquiry 32 [1989], pp. 343-69) of Paul Feyerabend's Farewell to Reason, Harvey Siegel makes a fairly simple point: Feyerabend provides a bad argument for a good cause. In particular, Siegel maintains that the argument suffers, first, from self-inflicted depreciation: having been rendered impotent by Feyerabend's views of objectivity and rationality, what claim to persuasion can his argument possibly hold? And second, the argument is said to be incoherent: instead of respecting and leaving alone diverse cultures and traditions as required by his views, Feyerabend fails to honor the right of people in several ways by formulating from afar abstract principles of cultural autonomy. Having debunked the argument, what remains is at least a semblance of agreement when Siegel identifies a shared concern with the value of cultural diversity on a world-wide scale. In response to Siegel this paper argues: yes, in an important sense, Feyerabend's argument is admittedly impotent and admission of that is a mere matter of acuity and intellectual honesty; but no, the argument is not incoherent, nor is there even a shared concern with the preservation of traditions in non-Western cultures. In other words, misunderstanding runs deep: a rationalist's objective misapprehension of Feyerabend's rhetorical devices. From this criticism of Siegel's criticism an alternative account emerges. Farewell to Reason poses a simple, but deeply troubling question: do the success and the benefits of science and technology warrant or require a social arrangement which privileges the highly specialized development of certain human faculties at the expense of others? The response to Siegel concludes with a survey of more creative ways in which philosophy can and should take up Feyerabend's challenge.

The transition from the industrial to the informational revolution is a major current global issue. Its complex dynamic trajectories are explored by means of a methodological modelling framework, based on cybernetics and dynamic systems, taking into account alternative value and social contexts.

Science is recovering its basic mission of making sense of the world. As a search for meaning it is similar to spirituality. The difference between science and spirituality is not in the end they seek, but in the way they seek it. Science uses rational thinking in analyzing and interpreting what experience and experiment discloses, whereas spirituality combines experience with the immediacy of an intuition that speaks to a reality that underlies the world conveyed by the senses. In our day science and spirituality, the great streams of human endeavor, are on a converging course. They share the realization that the cosmos is not a domain of unconscious matter moving about in passive space; it is a dynamic, self-evolving whole, integral at all scales and in all domains. This convergence is important in itself, and it is also important in regard to its consequences. On the one hand it tells us that our intuitive insights about the nature of life and reality are not illusory: they are confirmed in their essence by cutting-edge science. On the other, it offers motivation for entering on a positive path to our common future because wholeness is a defining characteristic of the kind of civilization that could overcome the problems created by the mechanistic manipulative rationality of today's dominant civilization. KEYWORDS: Civilization, meaning, science, spirituality, wholeness.