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Noch in den 2000er Jahren galt die Türkei auf dem Balkan als ein verlässlicher Partner der EU. Die Abstimmung der Balkan-Politik zwischen der EU und der Türkei nahm allerdings in den letzten Jahren zunehmend ab, verstärkt auch durch den rauen Ton zwischen der EU und der Türkei in den letzten Jahren. Diese Kurzanalyse geht der Frage nach, wie sich die Entfremdung der beiden Parteien auf dem Balkan auswirkt und wie stark tatsächlich der türkische Einfluss - sowohl politisch als auch wirtschaftlich - in der Region ist. Die Türkei präsentiert sich als Schutzmacht der MuslimInnen und ist für viele Menschen am Balkan ein Vorbild. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in dieser Kurzanalyse der schwierigen Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit Erdogans kompetitiv autoritäres System (mit islamisch-nationalistischer Färbung) einen Referenzpunkt für lokale PolitikerInnen auf dem Balkan darstellt und inwieweit die Türkei damit in Konkurrenz zur Politik der EU steht.

Für die Regierungen der westlichen Länder ist der Gang der Dinge in Syrien und im Irak ernüchternd. Für die Kurden, die in diesen beiden vom Krieg gezeichneten Staaten leben, ist er dramatisch. Denn mit dem Sieg über den IS endete für die Kurden Syriens und des Irak eine Periode, in der sie sich einerseits einem existenzbedrohenden Gegner gegenübersahen, andererseits aber Teil militärischer Bündnisse waren, auf die sie sich -auch weil die kurdischen Kämpfer für diese Bündnisse unverzichtbar waren- verlassen konnten. Mit dem Ende des Krieges gegen den IS ist diese Unverzichtbarkeit zur Disposition gestellt und die Kurden beider Länder sind erneut mit der Tatsache konfrontiert, dass sie keine natürliche Schutzmacht haben. Doch wie steht es um die Kurden selbst? Auf welcher wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Basis beruhen ihre Forderungen nach Selbstbestimmung? Wieweit deckt sich die Politik kurdischer Akteure mit ihrer Rhetorik von einer kurdischen Nation, die durch das Gefühl eines gemeinsamen Schicksals und die Erwartung einer gemeinsamen Zukunft geeint sei und die indes über einen minimalen politischen Konsens verfügt? Die Autorinnen und Autoren der Studie werfen einen kritischen Blick auf die zeithistorischen, ökonomischen und politischen Parameter des Handelns und Entscheidens kurdischer Akteure. Martin Weiss analysiert die Gründe für das politische Scheitern des Unabhängigkeitsreferendums der irakischen Kurden 2017. Caner Yildirim und Gülistan Gürbey leuchten das energiepolitische Potential des kurdischen Nord-Irak aus. Arzu Yilmaz deckt Dynamiken des Verhältnisses zwischen den beiden größten kurdischen Parteien des Nahen Ostens auf. Und Katharina Lack schildert die Machtverhältnisse unter den Kurden Syriens. (Autorenreferat)

Seit Aufhebung des Kriegsrechts 1987 hat sich Taiwan in beeindruckendem Tempo zu einer reifen Demokratie entwickelt. Anfang 2016 gewann die Kandidatin der Demokratischen Fortschrittspartei (DPP), Tsai Ing-wen, die Präsidentschaftswahlen. Während ihrer bisherigen Amtszeit folgten Meilensteine für die Achtung der Menschenrechte, etwa die Aussetzung der Todesstrafe. Allerdings steht die Entwicklung in Taiwan im Kontrast zur zunehmend autoritären und nationalistischen Herrschaft unter Xi Jinping auf dem chinesischen Festland. Die sich weiter vertiefende politische Kluft zwischen den beiden Seiten der Taiwanstraße erhöht das Konfliktpotential. (Autorenreferat)

The rise of new powers and attendant shifts in the global balance of power have led to calls for UN Security Council reform. Established powers have often responded by linking increased influence in the international system with the assumption of more international responsibility by aspirant powers. Based on ethical and philosophical approaches from the individual and state levels, and a case study of Brazil, this article analyses the way in which the notion of responsibility is discursively constructed, demonstrating the manner in which it has been used as an ever-shifting goalpost to deny emerging powers participation at the highest levels of global strategic decision-making. Most often, this is done by equating "responsibility" with the ability and willingness to use robust military force.

Wladimir Putin hat sich auf ukrainischem Staatsgebiet eine "humanitäre Mission" zum Schutz russischer Minderheiten vorbehalten. Er erzeugte damit Parallelen zur internationalen Schutzverantwortung (Responsibility to Protect), seit 2005 Handlungsprinzip unter den UN-Mitgliedstaaten. Wenngleich Putins Völkerrechtsbruch in juristische Legitimationslücken dringt, die im Kosovokrieg oder der Libyen-Intervention deutlich wurden, geschah die Annexion der Krim nicht zu vergleichbaren Bedingungen.

The Russian air attacks on Aleppo have diverted attention from Moscow’s intervention intended to secure Bashar al-Assad’s position in Damascus. Extending beyond northern Syria, Moscow’s direct military involvement has instilled fear in the countries backing the non-Jihadist rebel units in the south. Known as the Southern Front, they are based in the area stretching from south of the capital to the Jordanian border and close to the Israeli border. Hardline Islamist rebels, as well as so-called Islamic State (IS), are poised to gain as moderates are undermined. A rethink on ways to empower the Southern Front and once more put pressure on Assad is overdue if the region and its civil structures are to escape capture by the regime and further penetration by the Jihadists is to be prevented – scenarios that could create a new wave of refugees towards Jordan. Due to the south’s strategic importance, Israel has emerged as a veto player in the neighborhood, helping to curb Russian bombing as Moscow acts with different interests in the south and the north. (Autorenreferat)

This editorial introduces the special issue, and considers what the articles in it tell us about the prospects of mass atrocity prevention. (author's abstract)

The adoption of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) by all United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states in 2005, and its reaffirmation in dozens of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, indicate that there is a growing consensus around the world that egregious human rights violations necessitate a cooperative and decisive international response. But just as the political debates raged surrounding the precise articulation of RtoP between 2001 and 2005, so too goes the contemporary debate surrounding the implementation of RtoP. Regional divergences in RtoP implementation, in particular, have been noted by many scholars, as regional organizations implement those elements of RtoP that best suit their policy goals. This paper will apply recent scholarship on normlifecycles, specifically on “norm localization” to the operationalization of RtoP by regional organizations. We seek to explore regional divergences on RtoP implementation between the European Union (EU), League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union (AU) on Libya and Syria. From this assessment, three main arguments will be put forward: (1) regional organizations remain politicized, reframing RtoP in divergent ways that dilute the strength of the norm, (2) politicization of the RtoP discourse constrains regional norm localization processes, (3) politicization and reframing of RtoP inhibit regional normative change and limit the potential for timely and decisive responses to protect civilians. (auhtor's abstract)

In recent years the UN Secretary-General has promoted mass atrocity prevention as the priority agenda for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN, redirecting debates on R2P away from military interventionism towards improved state capacity to prevent atrocity crimes and protect populations. This focus has been illustrated in the UNSG’s annual reports on R2P since 2009, and the 2014 “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes”, that emphasise state institutional capacity and the identification of atrocity-risk indicators. Through a case-study of Pakistan, this article problematizes the relationship between internal security and the UN agenda on atrocity prevention to evaluate the viability of promoting atrocity prevention as currently conceived by the Office of the UNSG in high-risk contexts. It argues that an atrocity prevention agenda informed by a responsive regulation framework would be more effective in taking into account the relational dynamics of atrocity crimes. This includes accounting for the interaction between the microdynamics of political violence with macro-dynamics created by lengthy historical conflicts and strategic repertoires. (author's abstract)

Ten years ago the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet today, horrific violence against civilians continues in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This article examines some of the progress and gaps in the international community’s efforts to better protect civilians against mass violence over the past decade. It proposes two emerging directions for advancing the R2P agenda in the coming years: 1) greater focus on upstream prevention, and 2) increased support for locally-led peacebuilding and prevention actors and capacities. (author's abstract)

The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments - Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and NATO's bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated - to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. (author's abstract)

The case for turning R2P and genocide prevention from principle to practice usually rests on the invocation of moral norms and duties to others. Calls have been made by some analysts to abandon this strategy and "sell" genocide prevention to government by framing it as a matter of our own national interest including our security. Governments' failure to prevent atrocities abroad, it is argued, imperils western societies at home. If we look at how the genocide prevention- as-national security argument has been made we can see, however, that this position is not entirely convincing. I review two policy reports that make the case for genocide prevention based in part on national security considerations: Preventing Genocide: A Blue Print for U.S. Policymakers (Albright-Cohen Report); and the Will to Intervene Project. I show that both reports are problematic for two reasons: the "widened" traditional security argument advocated by the authors is not fully substantiated by the evidence provided in the reports; and alternate conceptions of security that would seem to support the linking of genocide prevention to western security - securitization and risk and uncertain - do not provide a solid logical foundation for operationalizing R2P. I conclude by considering whether we might appeal instead to another form of self interest, "reputational stakes", tied to western states’ construction of their own identity as responsible members of the international community. (author's abstract)

The efficacy of the Responsibility to Prevent suffers from two key problems; causal indeterminacy, and a dependence on the political will of states, particularly the permanent five members of the Security Council. The vast array of factors which can be cited as potentially contributing to the outbreak of conflict and atrocity crimes mitigates against the determination of definite “conflict triggers”. This does not mean prevention is impossible but does limit the efficacy of "early warning systems". The dynamics of the "four crimes" within R2P's purview further limits the efficacy of prevention as the decision to engage in mass atrocities is taken in response to a perceived existential crisis. This significantly limits the scope for leveraging the "internal" aspect of R2P as the decision to commit these acts is invariably born from a belief that no other option is available to the potential aggressors. Thus the specifics of atrocity crime prevention places great emphasis on the operationalisation of the external dimension of R2P, namely the role of the international community. So long as the response of the "international community" is predicated on the political will of states, however, the efficacy of prevention in these areas will be limited, as the "international" response is prey to narrowly defined national interests. (author's abstract)

This paper examines early warning of, and political responses to, mass atrocities in East Timor in the late 1970s. Using newly-declassified intelligence and diplomatic records, it describes Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 and its three year military campaign to crush the East Timorese resistance. It shows that the campaign resulted in mass deaths due to famine and disease, and considers the United Nations’ response to the unfolding crisis. It evaluates the level of international awareness of the humanitarian crisis in East Timor by inspecting contemporaneous eyewitness reports by foreign diplomats from states with a keen interest in Indonesia: Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Canada. In contrast to a popular, highly lauded view, the paper shows that these states did not “look away”; rather, they had early warning and ongoing knowledge of the catastrophe but provided military and diplomatic assistance to Indonesia. The paper contrasts a counter-productive effort by civil society activists with a very effective one, and thus demonstrates the role that robust scholarship can play in terminating atrocities. (author's abstract)

In the passages referring to the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), the resolution of the 2005 UN reform summit confirms the responsibility of every government for the protection of its people from mass atrocities. The consensus on this issue was reconfirmed by various Security Council resolutions since 2005 and also through resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Human Rights Council. However, the role of the international community with regard to the responsibility of individual governments remains contested. The domestic conflicts in the Arab world underline the urgency of a consistent international engagement within the framework of the R2P. They also demonstrate the basic predicaments of any endeavor to protect people from domestic violence through outside interference. The present paper addresses these predicaments with regard to the tension between the responsibility to protect and the "responsibility to peace", the interplay between humanitarian and non-humanitarian issues in the politics of protection and the difficulties to establish the appropriateness of protective measures in view of the complexities of any international protective measure. The paper argues that the politics of protection will continue to reflect these dilemmas. Nevertheless, the R2P provides a normative framework within which the shortcomings and inconsistencies of the politics of protection can be addressed in a constructive way.

'UNO-Vermittler Dr. Norbert Holl hat Afghanistan eines der vertracktesten sicherheitspolitischen Probleme der Welt nach dem Kalten Krieg genannt. Dabei hatte der Westen, allen voran die USA, seit dem sowjetischen Truppenabzug 1989 bis in die jüngste Zeit alles Interesse an dem Land verloren. Auch Rußland hat seit 1991 1ängere Zeit - wenn auch nicht aus identischen Gründen - eine analoge 'Linie' verfolgt. Doch aufgrund seiner Rolle als militärische Schutzmacht der GUS ist Moskau von den Geschehnissen im Land am Hindukusch weiterhin mehr oder minder direkt betroffen. Stellt doch Afghanistan mit seiner anhaltenden Anarchie und ihren destabilisierenden Auswirkungen für die zentralasiatischen GUS-Staaten die unmittelbar gefährlichste sicherheitspolitische Bedrohung dar. Hinzu kommt seit geraumer Zeit das Interesse an der Rolle Afghanistans als Transitland für geplante Pipelines und Verkehrsverbindungen mit dem Süden, wodurch die vom Meer abgeschnittenen zentralasiatischen Kontinentalstaaten hoffen, ihre Wirtschaft aus der Krise führen sowie ihre politische Souveränität absichern zu können.' (Autorenreferat), 'UN mediator Dr. Norbert Holl has called Afghanistan one of the most intractable security problems in the world since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, until recently the West, and above all the U.S., had lost all interest in that country since the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. Russia, too, for quite some time since 1991 followed an analogous 'line', although its reasons for doing so have not been identical. However, Moscow in its role as military protector of the CIS continues to be affected more or less immediately by events in the country at the Hindukush. For Afghanistan with its continuing anarchy and its destabilizing repercussions presents the most direct security threat to the Central Asian CIS states. Besides, there has emerged an interest in Afghanistan's role as a country of transition for planned pipelines and traffic connections with the south by means of which the Central Asian states, cut off from the sea, hope to be able to lead their economies out of crisis and thus to secure their political sovereignty.' (author's abstract)