Search

Norway’s global pension fund invests in 1.3% of all listed companies in the world. Its chief advisor responsible for the fund's ethical guidelines talks about dialogues with companies accused of corruption and possible exclusions from investment.

While there are no definitive best practices for specialised anti-corruption courts, existing models and experience provide some guidance to reformers considering the creation of similar institutions.

La frustration générée par l'incapacité du système judiciaire ordinaire à traiter les affaires de corruption de manière satisfaisante a motivé de nombreux États à se doter d'une agence spécialisée dans la lutte contre la corruption. Si les agences anti-corruption dotées de compétences d'enquête et/ou de poursuite ont attiré beaucoup d'attention, la spécialisation judiciaire est un aspect de plus en plus populaire des stratégies nationales de lutte contre la corruption. L'argument le plus commun en faveur de la création de tribunaux anti-corruption spécialisés est le besoin d'une plus grande efficacité dans la résolution des affaires de corruption et la nécessité de montrer aux citoyens comme à la communauté internationale que l'État prend la lutte contre la corruption au sérieux. Dans certains pays, il existe une certaine anxiété vis-à-vis de la capacité des tribunaux ordinaires à traiter les affaires de corruption de manière impartiale et sans être eux-mêmes affectés par la corruption. Ceci a également joué un rôle important dans la décision de créer des tribunaux anti-corruption spécialisés. Les tribunaux anti-corruption existants ne sont pas tous identiques. De nombreux aspects varient d'un tribunal à l'autre: leur taille, leur place au sein de la hiérarchie judiciaire, les processus de sélection et de révocation des juges varient, de même l'étendue de leur sphère de compétence, le déroulement des procès, les recours en appel, ainsi que leur relation avec les procureurs anti-corruption. Ces choix institutionnels nécessitent des compromis: bien qu'il n'existe pas de vér

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are often considered a last resort against corruption and are expected to solve a problem that other institutions have failed to address effectively or may even be part of. When national anti-corruption strategies yield no result, and a country's corruption rankings do not improve, ACAs often take the brunt of the criticism. External institutional assessments can help to pinpoint successes and shortcomings and often shape public perceptions, but they cannot replace the consistent collection of data on progress by ACAs themselves. ACAs can proactively manage expectations as part of their public outreach and show their worth by clearly stating their objectives at the output and outcome levels and by collecting and analysing information on a raft of indicators. Measuring the completion and outcome of activities by the ACA can also provide important lessons on what works and what does not, allowing the agency to adjust its approaches.

Frustration with the capacity of the ordinary machinery of justice to deal adequately with corruption has prompted many countries to develop specialised anti-corruption institutions. While anti-corruption agencies with investigative and/or prosecutorial powers have attracted more attention, judicial specialisation is an increasingly common feature of national anti-corruption reform strategies. The most common argument for the creation of special anti-corruption courts is the need for greater efficiency in resolving corruption cases promptly and the associated need to signal to various domestic and international audiences that the country takes the fight against corruption seriously. In some countries, concerns about the ability of the ordinary courts to handle corruption cases impartially, and without being corrupted themselves, have also played an important role in the decision to create special anti-corruption courts. Existing specialised anti-corruption courts differ along a number of dimensions, including their size, their place in the judicial hierarchy, mechanisms for selection and removal of judges, the substantive scope of the courts? jurisdiction, trial and appellate procedures, and their relationship with anti-corruption prosecutors. These institutional design choices imply a number of difficult trade-offs: while there are no definitive ?best practices? for specialised anti-corruption courts, existing models and experience may provide some guidance to reformers considering similar institutions. They must decide whether such a court should adopt procedures that are substantially different from those of other criminal courts, and/or special provisions for the selection, removal, or working conditions of the anti-corruption court judges.

The Indonesian Court for Corruption Crimes, or Tipikor court, has handled corruption cases for more than a decade. Initially there was only one Tipikor court in Jakarta, exclusively hearing cases from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Now, all 34 Indonesian provinces have Tipikor courts, which take on cases from both the KPK and the public prosecution service. One challenge in expanding the court to the regional level has been human resource constraints. The court?s original rationale was to ensure maximum integrity on the judges? panel, but a lack of highly qualified and dedicated judges has undermined this goal. One solution to retain integrity and competence could be to assign ad hoc judges on a case-by-case basis rather than giving judges fixed-time contracts. This brief is part of a series of case studies on special anti-corruption courts. The case studies discuss the courts? design and whether they have lived up to the expectations that led to their establishment. We draw lessons for their particular country context, but also specialisation of courts more generally. These case studies will be complemented by a forthcoming issue paper discussing and comparing specialised anti-corruption courts around the world.

This U4 study investigates whether and how the judicial sector could benefit from anti-corruption measures that have proved useful in other sectors in improving the quality of the services they provide to users. Based on a survey and interviews among key informants in U4?s partner agencies in 2014, we found a variety of anti-corruption tools already included in the agencies? bilateral judicial reform programmes. The tools are not frequently employed, yet, and they are sometimes implemented under a different label to avoid the sensitive implications of tackling corruption among those charged with upholding the law. Remarkable is the absence of support for the use of many control and oversight tools, budgeting and procurement tools, and some human resource instruments to prevent and detect corruption in the judicial sector. The general perception of the survey respondents is that it is at least partly the lack of internal donor capacity and expertise in adapting existing anti-corruption tools to the judicial sector that underlies the absence of these instruments from bilateral judicial reform programmes. Closer collaboration and knowledge transfer between experts in the judicial sector and other sectors on oversight, human resources, and budgeting processes could help close this gap.

The Uganda High Court has an Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) with original jurisdiction over all corruption and related cases. The main rationale for its establishment was the speedier resolution of corruption cases, and by that measure the ACD has been successful. Court user meetings at the ACD and joint trainings with prosecutors have improved mutual understanding and the quality of prosecutions. However, a backlog at the Court of Appeal leads to delays and the withdrawal of witnesses, an issue that could be addressed by extending specialisation to the appeals level. This brief is part of a series of case studies on special anti-corruption courts. The case studies discuss the courts? design and whether they have lived up to the expectations that led to their establishment. We draw lessons for their particular country context, but also specialisation of courts more generally. These case studies will be complemented by a forthcoming issue paper discussing and comparing specialised anti-corruption courts around the world.

“A fish rots from the head” is the saying when an organisation’s leadership is seen as responsible for the unethical behaviour of its personnel. Undue external interference with an anti-corruption agency (ACA) is likely to target its top officials; if co-opted or corrupted, they can do serious damage to the effectiveness and reputation of an ACA. Appointment and removal processes affect the actual and perceived impartiality of ACAs. If an ACA head can be appointed and removed at will by a political stakeholder, the appointee has an incentive to defer to the will of the appointer. Some countries have therefore made such appointments the shared responsibility of several institutions to avoid potential misuse of the ACA by the government or a particular political group. In addition to who has responsibility for appointments, the criteria for eligibility and the transparency of the selection criteria and process also matter. The inclusion or exclusion of a certain group of candidates can have an effect on the actual and perceived impartiality, competence, and responsiveness of the head of the agency. The inclusion of non-state actors, for example, is likely to gain more public trust than limiting candidates to party office holders. Removal procedures can be as important as appointment procedures. Security of tenure needs to be weighed against accountability. The implicit or explicit threat of removal can be a powerful incentive for the ACA head to align with specific interests. Removal procedures become important when those whose interests are threatened try to influence and – if unsuccessful – remove key decision makers. Removal, however, can also be needed to replace leaders who are corrupt, politically driven, or simply incompetent. It is therefore important to outline clearly the removal procedures, keeping in mind both the independence of the agency and the accountability of top officials.

Ce document d’analyse U4 est destiné aux responsables politiques des pays en développement et à leurs citoyens, ainsi qu’aux partenaires U4 de la communauté des donateurs, et leur fournit un aperçu des éléments les plus sensibles à la corruption dans chacune des étapes de la procédure pénale, allant de la phase d’enquête, au procès et jusqu’à l’incarcération. Chaque chapitre est consacré à l’une des phases de la procédure pénale, établissant un panorama des principaux responsables impliqués, des tâches qu’ils effectuent, des risques de corruption les plus répandus et des outils d’évaluation disponibles, ainsi qu’une évaluation de la pertinence de ces outils lorsque cela est possible. Quelques approches de réduction des risques sont également présentées mais ce document porte surtout sur l’analyse et l’évaluation des risques. Les connaissances dont nous disposons actuellement sur la corruption dans les différentes étapes du système de justice pénale proviennent des expériences des pays développés. Les causes de la corruption sont néanmoins souvent les mêmes dans tous les pays. En utilisant les outils de mesure de la corruption disponibles, le défi qui se présente aux praticiens est d’identifier les sections pertinentes des évaluations générales qui traitent spécifiquement les risques de corruption liés au système de justice pénale. Ce document se conclut sur la nécessité de développer des outils intégrés d’évaluation des risques de corruption et de rendre les rapports d’évaluation accessibles. Seul une vis

This U4 issue paper provides policymakers in developing nations, their citizens, and U4’s partners in the donor community with an overview of where corruption is most likely to arise in the investigation, prosecution, trial, and incarceration stages of the criminal justice process. Each chapter focuses on a specific stage, providing a summary of the principal decision makers involved, the tasks they perform, the most common types of corruption risk, the tools available to assess the risks, and, where sufficient experience exists, an evaluation of the usefulness of these assessment tools. While some basic risk management approaches are noted, the emphasis is on analysis and assessment of problems. Much of what is known about corruption at the different stages of the criminal justice system comes from developed country experiences. In many cases, however, the drivers of corruption are the same across all countries. In using the available set of tools to assess corruption risks in criminal trials and appeals, the greatest challenge for practitioners is finding the relevant parts of general assessment tools that assess the particular corruption risks. The paper concludes with an appeal for integrated corruption risk assessment tools and accessible reporting. Only a sector-wide lens will allow identification of the linkages and dependencies within the criminal justice chain, providing a basis for targeted reform efforts and a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.

The anti-corruption world has witnessed increasing institutional specialisation, including the emergence of anti-corruption courts. Indonesia’s Special Court for Corruption Crimes in Jakarta gained prominence for a nearly 100 per cent conviction rate from 2004 to 2011. However, after corruption courts were established in all provincial capitals in 2011, scandals and acquittals have raised questions and criticism about the courts’ integrity. While conviction and acquittal rates are popular proxies for court performance in Indonesia, they should not be used as stand-alone indicators. This case illustrates that institutional specialisation when rolled out to a larger scale must go in hand with broader judicial reform.

© 2012 Dr. Sofie Arjon Schütte, KKN, an Indonesian acronym denoting corruption, collusion and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme), encapsulated popular resentment against the authoritarian Soeharto regime during the financial and political crisis of 1998. Public demands to control widespread corruption were transformed into a set of legislation enacted between 1998 and 2002. Because corruption was endemic in existing law enforcement agencies, the centrepiece of the new legislation was the establishment of a new and independent agency to enforce them. Since 2004, this new entity, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), equipped with a broad mandate in both prevention and enforcement, has spearheaded the government’s efforts against corruption. It has done so more effectively than any previous attempts in Indonesia and more successfully than comparative studies of specialized agencies in other developing countries would predict. This thesis examines the factors contributing to the KPK’s initial success. My research applies a theoretical framework derived from new institutional economics with reference to the growing body of literature on anti-corruption agencies. The analysis is based on a detailed review of legislation and associated policy documents. Application of the new laws by the KPK and its impact on formal and informal institutions is examined by drawing on semi-structured interviews during 2009 with more than sixty decision-makers and observers including academics, NGOs and donor agency representatives. These data are supported by content analysis of selected Indonesian media. This study finds that effective anti-corruption reform can be achieved in a highly corrupt environment if the third-party enforcement agencies maintain their political independence and integrity and in turn retain public support, so that the incentives that lead to corruption can be changed through consistent preventive measures and law enforcement. In Indonesia, the economic crisis, regime change and popular pressure led to a political consensus on the establishment of new formal anti-corruption institutions including new third-party agencies. The design of these anti-corruption institutions was influenced but not predetermined by international precedents and donor intervention. Precautions were put in place to maintain the integrity and political independence of the KPK, most notably the sequential selection recruitment of its leadership, thereby diluting loyalties of the nominees to particular groups. The KPK’s human resource management system has avoided the weaknesses of the Indonesian civil service system through higher, more transparent remuneration that aligns individual performance with organisational objectives. The KPK has increased the risks of engaging in corruption but, impeded by its organisational design, has as yet failed to reduce the opportunities and systemic weaknesses that lead to endemic corruption. The KPK’s law enforcement has generated public support but also resistance from vested interests. Resistance to the KPK has mostly taken legal form, allowing for examination by the courts and public pressure that have in turn consolidated the KPK and the Anti-Corruption Court. The long-term sustainability of the KPK and other formal anti-corruption institutions is dependent on consistent law enforcement, more preventive measures at national level and on maintaining public trust in their integrity.

Progress in the fight against corruption in Indonesia is slow and faces many obstacles and countervailing forces. Since the fall of Soeharto, a number of new Laws establishing a more effective anticorruption legislative framework and institutions were put on the statute books. With the presidency of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Executive has shown more commitment to the fight against corruption than under his predecessors. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the special Anticorruption Court established in late 2003 and 2004 respectively are seen by many as the last resort in a judicial system infested with corruption. The KPK has a wide-ranging mandate in both the prevention and prosecution of corruption, and has secured public trust through the bringing of a number of high-profile cases to court and upholding its own institutional integrity. Due to a recent ruling by the Constitutional Court, however, the fate of the Special Anticorruption Court post-2009 is now in the hands of the National Legislature. Many believe the Special Anticorruption Court is crucial to the fight against graft, and would favor allowing the Attorney General’s Office to also prosecute corruption cases in the special court. Although the Attorney General’s Office cannot prosecute former President Soeharto on the grounds of ill-health, it is preparing a civil case against the Soeharto foundations, and investigating a case against his son, Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy). Next year will be crucial for the fight against corruption due to the drafting of a new legal framework for antigraft efforts, the selection new KPK commissioners for the next four years, and the hosting of a number of international anticorruption events by Indonesia.