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In a recent debate concerning the origin of the negative priming (NP) effect, evidence for the involvement of retrieval processes during the prime episode has accumulated. Rothermund, Wentura and De Houwer (2005) explain the effect as a product of a conflict between retrieved and current response. Since specific properties of the involved encoding and retrieval mechanisms were not investigated so far, we extend the response-retrieval framework by asking if encoding during prime processing and retrieval-specific processes during probe processing have a modulating influence on the priming effects. In an overlapping-picture task experiment with an explicit variation of the role of the objects in prime and probe, we reproduce the response-retrieval specific response repetition × priming interaction but find a modulation caused by the role of the repeated object in the probe trial. This modulation manifests in a vanishing interaction when the repeated object is a distractor in the probe. We interpret these findings in support of the response retrieval theory of NP and conclude that the retrieval mechanism is more flexible than previously believed since it is sensitive to relevance of the repeated object regarding the experimental task.

We introduce a computational model of the negative priming (NP) effect that includes perception, memory, attention, decision making, and action. The model is designed to provide a coherent picture across competing theories of NP. The model is formulated in terms of abstract dynamics for the activations of features, their binding into object entities, their semantic categorization as well as related memories and appropriate reactions. The dynamic variables interact in a connectionist network which is shown to be adaptable to a variety of experimental paradigms. We find that selective attention can be modeled by means of inhibitory processes and by a threshold dynamics. From the necessity of quantifying the experimental paradigms, we conclude that the specificity of the experimental paradigm must be taken into account when predicting the nature of the NP effect.

The present study addresses the problem whether negative priming (NP) is due to information processing in perception, recognition or selection. We argue that most NP studies confound priming and perceptual similarity of prime-probe episodes and implement a color-switch paradigm in order to resolve the issue. In a series of three identity negative priming experiments with verbal naming response, we determined when NP and positive priming (PP) occur during a trial. The first experiment assessed the impact of target color on priming effects. It consisted of two blocks, each with a different fixed target color. With respect to target color no differential priming effects were found. In Experiment 2 the target color was indicated by a cue for each trial. Here we resolved the confounding of perceptual similarity and priming condition. In trials with coinciding colors for prime and probe, we found priming effects similar to Experiment 1. However, trials with a target color switch showed such effects only in trials with role-reversal (distractor-to-target or target-to-distractor), whereas the positive priming (PP) effect in the target-repetition trials disappeared. Finally, Experiment 3 split trial processing into two phases by presenting the trial-wise color cue only after the stimulus objects had been recognized. We found recognition in every priming condition to be faster than in control trials. We were hence led to the conclusion that PP is strongly affected by perception, in contrast to NP which emerges during selection, i.e., the two effects cannot be explained by a single mechanism. peerReviewed