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1. Background and explanation of rationale The number of international migrants in the world has been rising, reaching 244 million (3.3 percent of the world population) in 2015. While most people migrate legally, there are large and increasing numbers of irregular migrants. Estimates on the stocks of irregular migrants in the European Union in 2008 range between 1.8 and 8 million. These numbers increased significantly in the last years with the European Border Agency (FRONTEX) recording almost 3 million irregular migrants crossing European borders since 2015. In order to address the large potential for migration from Africa to Europe and manage the resulting migrant flows, we need to begin by better understanding the interaction of individual, household, origin-country, and destination-country characteristics that drive migration. Only then can we design policies that effectively target migration intentions – with appropriate distinctions between internal and regional (i.e. within Africa) migration and intercontinental migration to Gulf countries, to Europe, and elsewhere. The conjoint experiment studies individual migration decision making. It incorporates several aspects which are important for the individual migration decision and the goal is to disentangle the effects. We focus on dimensions covering the destination country, the migration journey and the origin country. The migration journey not only costs money but also contains a large risk. In 2020, there were 125,100 irregular border crossings to the EU and in 2021 already 85,700 illegal border crossings (January-July 2021), which is an increase of 66% compared to the same period in 2020 (Frontex 2021) and thereby 1 904 persons were reported dead or missing in January-August 2021 on the three main routes. We focus in our study on 2 countries, Senegal and Uganda. Senegal was chosen because it is one of the most important Sub-Saharan origin countries of regular and irregular migrants to Europe. The percentage of Western African migrants in Europe grew from 12 per cent at mid-1990 to 19 per cent at mid-2020, and the share in North America increased from 3 per cent to 10 per cent over the same period, with destinations driven in part by residual colonial ties and common languages (UN DESA, 2020). It also provides ample statistical variation with respect to many important drivers of migration whose influence on the migration decision we will study. Due to this high amount of variation, our research findings will have high external validity as they will be applicable to other countries of origin where migration is driven by similar factors. In the mid-2000s, the migration corridor from Senegal to the Canary Islands was the most widely discussed irregular pathway to Europe. Today, flows to the EU remain strong, but have shifted to other corridors as European policy and security interventions target different Mediterranean routes. As citizens of ECOWAS, aspiring migrants from Senegal may also move to other parts of West Africa and legally do business there – bringing to the fore the relevance of regional integration in Africa. Senegal’s population will more than double to 34 million until 2050. This rapid population growth will increase the migration potential. In spite of (relatively) good governance, economic growth is too low to absorb the growing cohorts of young people entering the labor force. Also, agriculture will not provide sufficient income for most of them unless there is a productivity revolution and the lack of water can be addressed. The potential for additional extensive agricultural production is already low in most of the country due to arid conditions. In coastal areas, local fisheries are still affected by overfishing in Senegal’s coastal waters by international fleets. These problems are likely to grow because environmental change will strongly affect the semi-arid parts of the Sahel that make up most of Senegal. Thus, the country provides an ideal setting to study in shaping migration flows within the region and to Europe. Furthermore, Senegal already has well-developed migrant networks abroad so that potential migrants face relatively low obstacles in obtaining relevant information and access to employment. Hence, we expect migration to respond strongly to changing conditions. Uganda was chosen because it is remarkable as a major host country for refugees, especially from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uganda promotes the economic integration of refugees through labor market access, distribution of farming land and donor-funded social services for refugees and their non-migrant neighbors, Uganda is often cited as a best practice case when it comes to hosting refugees in the countries neighboring conflicts. At the same time, Uganda is itself a post-conflict country emerging from decades of civil wars. The experience of hosting and integrating large numbers of internally displaced persons has contributed to informed policymaking and probably improved popular attitudes towards international refugees. As in most Sub-Saharan countries, the population of Uganda, which consists of about 60 ethnic groups that share an area about two thirds the size of Germany, is growing fast, potentially leading to competition over resources. Parts of the country face continuing ethnic tensions (particularly between herders and farmers) that will likely become worse as climate change markedly reduces rainfall and conditions for agriculture deteriorate. Despite these difficult circumstances, Uganda has so far managed the hosting of refugees remarkably well. 2. Research questions and approach This study explores the interaction of origin-country, migration journey and destination-country characteristics that drive migration. In the literature there is a debate about the importance of push and pull factors of migration starting with Jerome (1926) stating that destination region conditions are more important in pulling immigrants into a region than origin region conditions are in pushing emigrants out. Chiswick (1999) added that a higher destination wage tend to enhance migration’s lure more than a lower origin wage. Other researchers highlight the importance of origin level factors. Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) use large-scale micro data to show that the propensity to migrate decreases with the level of contentment with the current location. More specifically both the quality of public services like education, health services, and security and economic opportunities drive migration aspirations. The vast variety of relevant factors affecting the decision calls for empirical designs that can clearly tell causal effects apart. Experimental approaches are particularly suited because they allow actively varying certain explanatory factors. In this study, we apply a conjoint experiment to disentangle effect of origin-country, migration journey and destination-country characteristics on migration and also the interaction between these characteristics. Our approach is also motivated by research done by Bah & Batista (2019) who used incentivized conjoint task to analyze effects of destination and journey characteristics, especially those which involve risk. But besides including destination and journey attributed, we expanded our task to an attribute of the country of origin and choose a sample which also contains women and individuals aged between 18 and 40 years. We build in our study on individual Migration model introduced by Heidland & Schneiderheinze (2021) which is explained in the Migration model file.

Comparing the emigration rates of countries at different stages of economic development, an inverse u-shape emerges. Although merely based on cross-sectional evidence, the "migration hump" is often treated as a causal relationship. Since the peak is located at rather high per capita incomes of 6000-10 000 USD policy makers in rich destination countries worry that supporting economic development in poor origin countries might increase migration. In this paper we systematically test whether the migration hump holds up to more scrutiny, finding that the crosssectional pattern is misleading. Using 35 years of migration flow data from 198 countries of origin to OECD destinations, we successfully reproduce the hump-shape in the cross-section. However, more rigorous fixed effects panel estimations that exploit the variation over time consistently show a negative association between income and emigration. This result is independent of the level of income a country starts out at and thus casts doubt on any causal interpretation of the migration hump. Revised Version: June 17, 2020

In this study, we review existing research, both theoretical and empirical, on the impact of forcibly displaced persons on residents' livelihoods in host communities in developing countries, with an emphasis on African experiences. An inflow of a large number of refugees represents a large challenge to any host community. This is especially true in developing countries with their limited financial and administrative capacities. Immediately, refugees require accommodation, housing, and key public services such as health care and education. Sooner or later, refugees will seek to provide for their own livelihood, look for work in the informal or formal labor market, and interact economically with the host economy in multiple ways. When developing countries host refugees, they receive financial and technical support from the international community. This support typically covers the subsistence needs of refugees and may also finance other host country expenditures related to their presence. We explain (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) why there is a strong presumption that, with sufficient international financial and technical support, the aggregate impact of refugees on the host community will be at least neutral and maybe even positive. The main insight is that refugees, equipped with international financial support, provide a stimulus to the local economy through their demand for locally produced goods and services, which translates into higher output prices, more demand for local workers, and higher real incomes. This presumption is borne out by the few existing empirical studies.

Die Migration nach Europa hält weiter an. Seit der Flüchtlingskrise 2015 hat sich der Druck auf die EU und ihre am stärksten betroffenen Mitgliedstaaten erhöht, Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Einwanderung aus Entwicklungsländern zu ergreifen. Sollten die bisherigen Ansätze bei der Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen überdacht werden? Welche Möglichkeiten haben die Zielländer, die Situation in den Herkunftsländern zu verbessern? Reiner Klingholz, ehem. Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, macht darauf aufmerksam, dass die Gründe für Migration vielfältig sind und sich nur schwer oder nur langfristig beeinflussen lassen. Sie reichten von Bevölkerungswachstum über ein Wohlstands- und Sicherheitsgefälle, über funktionierende Migrantennetzwerke, Konflikte und politische Unsicherheit bis hin zu Umweltfaktoren wie Wassermangel oder Klimawandel. Unterm Strich habe Europa wenig Möglichkeiten, mittelfristig Flucht- oder Migrationsursachen zu bekämpfen. Nötig sei eine langfristige Strategie, die die Lebensbedingungen vor Ort verbessere. Felix Braunsdorf, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, unterstreicht, dass neben einer Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse in ärmeren Ländern mit entwicklungspolitischen Projekten auch die Auswirkungen europäischer Politik untersucht werden sollten. Hier seien die politischen Hebel wesentlich länger. Christian Müller, Jacobs University, Bremen, nennt drei Gründe für Migration: Krieg und Vertreibung, gesellschaftliche Instabilität und ökonomische Deprivation. Die Erfahrungen Deutschlands in den vergangenen 80 Jahren mit zwei der drei Gründe biete seiner Ansicht nach trotz des weitgehenden Scheiterns der Bekämpfung von innerdeutschen Migrationsursachen mögliche Lehren für eine erfolgreiche Migrationspolitik und zeige vor allen Dingen, welche Fehler zu vermeiden seien. Panu Poutvaara, ifo Institut, schlägt temporäre Arbeitsvisa als Lösung für irreguläre Zuwanderung vor. Der Verkauf temporärer Arbeitsvisa könnte auch geringqualifizierten Wirtschaftsmigranten einen legalen und sicheren Weg nach Europa ermöglichen, ohne das europäische Wohlfahrtssystem zu untergraben. Zudem ziele das Instrument darauf ab, Leben zu retten und das Geschäftsmodell krimineller Schmugglernetzwerke zu zerschlagen. Und die überschüssigen Einnahmen aus dem Verkauf temporärer Arbeitsvisa könnten, nach der Deckung von Verwaltungskosten, zur Förderung der Herkunftsländer genutzt werden. Thieß Petersen, Bertelsmann Stiftung, sieht die Notwendigkeit – auch im wohlverstandenen Eigeninteresse der entwickelten Volkswirtschaften –, dass in den Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern eine leistungsfähige Wirtschaftsstruktur etabliert wird. Das Ziel sollte dabei aber nicht die Verhinderung von Migration sein – alternde Volkswirtschaften wie Deutschland brauchten Zuwanderung –, sondern die unsichere und irreguläre Wanderung so weit wie möglich zu verhindern. Claas Schneiderheinze und Rainer Thiele, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, stellen die Frage, ob Entwicklungshilfe den Migrationsdruck mindern kann. Sie verweisen auf das Hauptergebnis aktueller empirischer Studien, die einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Entwicklungshilfe und Migration nachweisen, wenn sich die Entwicklungshilfe auf die Verbesserung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen konzentriert. Dies lege den Schluss nahe, dass Politiker in den Geberländern eine Aufstockung der Entwicklungshilfe zu Recht als mögliches Instrument zur Verringerung der Migration ansehen. Nach Ansicht von Kai Gehring, Universität Zürich, genügt Entwicklungshilfe allein nicht, sondern Priorität sollte vielmehr die Konfliktvermeidung haben. Auch die Unterstützung von Nachbarländern, die Flüchtende aufnehmen, sei von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Stabilisierung und Eindämmung von Konflikten.

The EU faces major challenges in asylum and migration policy: reorganize the EU asylum system, secure the external border, curb irregular immigration through cooperation with African governments, and support developing countries that host large numbers of refugees from Syria and elsewhere. These challenges are inter-connected and require a comprehensive approach with broad support by all EU member states. However, member states are affected by immigration in substantially different ways and the political preferences of policy makers and voters also vary widely–necessitating implementable proposals to overcome the EU’s asylum and immigration impasse. In the '2018 MEDAM Assessment Report', we propose a comprehensive strategy for EU asylum and immigration policies that is both politically feasible and effective, based on the concept of flexible solidarity between EU member states. Die EU steht vor großen Herausforderungen in der Asyl- und Migrationspolitik: Reform des EU-Asylsystems, Sicherung der Außengrenzen, Begrenzung der irregulären Einwanderung durch die Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Regierungen sowie Unterstützung von Entwicklungsländern mit einer großen Zahl an Flüchtlingen. Diese Herausforderungen sind miteinander verwoben und erfordern nicht nur einen ganzheitlichen Ansatz, sondern auch die breite Unterstützung aller EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Dabei sind diese in unterschiedlicher Weise von Einwanderung betroffen, und auch die politischen Ansichten der Entscheidungsträger und Wähler unterscheiden sich erheblich. Es bedarf umsetzbarer Vorschläge, um den aktuellen „Stillstand“ in der Asyl-und Migrationspolitik der EU zu überwinden. Im "2018 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe" schlagen wir eine ganzheitliche Strategie für die EU-Asyl-und Migrationspolitik vor, die sowohl politisch machbar ist als auch auf dem Konzept der flexiblen Solidarität zwischen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten beruht.

Regional migration within Africa and other developing regions is vital for the economic development of countries of origin and destination and for the welfare of migrants and their families (as recognized by the Sustainable Development Goal 10.7). Going forward, regional migration will be a crucial tool for countries of origin and destination to adapt to demographic trends and environmental changes. Although regional organizations have invested increasing efforts in the promotion of orderly, safe and regular migration, they have received scant acknowledgment in international policies and processes. Yet, they are the most important and most promising entities to promote more liberal migration regimes. The international community, and G20 countries in particular, should support capacity building for these regional organizations and involve them fully in relevant policy dialogues.

How can the responsibility for refugees be distributed more fairly – globally and within the EU? And how can we curb irregular migration while expanding legal immigration to the benefit of all concerned? The large number of refugees and other migrants who have come to Europe over the last two years has caused the EU member states that received most of the asylum seekers, to reach their capacity limits. With a view to new arrivals and their long-term integration, it is now necessary to develop new and, above all, common strategies to address the migration flows to Europe. The '2017 MEDAM Assessment Report' focuses on two core Messages: - Distribute the responsibility for refugees more equitably. - Extending legal immigration from non-EU Member States into EU member states. Wie kann die Verantwortung für Flüchtlinge weltweit und in Europa gerechter verteilt werden? Und wie können wir irreguläre Einwanderung eindämmen und gleichzeitig die legale Einwanderung zum Nutzen aller Beteiligten fördern? Durch die große Zahl an Flüchtlingen und andere Migranten, die Europa in den vergangenen beiden Jahren erreicht haben, wurden insbesondere jene EU-Staaten, die die meisten Asylsuchenden aufgenommen haben, an ihre Kapazitätsgrenzen gebracht. Mit Blick auf weitere Neuankömmlinge und deren langfristige Integration ist es nun notwendig, neue und vor allem gemeinsame Strategien zur Bewältigung der Flüchtlingsströme nach Europa zu erarbeiten. Im Fokus des "2017 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe" stehen zwei Handlungsempfehlungen: - Die Verantwortung für Flüchtlinge weltweit und in Europa gerechter verteilen. - Die legale Einwanderung von außerhalb der EU in EU-Mitgliedstaaten erleichtern.

The authors call on G20 leaders to extend more predictable and substantial support to lowand- middle-income countries that host refugees, in recognition of the global public good that these countries provide. Together with other high-income countries, G20 countries should fully cover the cost of providing for the basic and social needs of refugees. They should also help to expand public services and infrastructure to cover the needs of refugees as well as resident populations. G20 countries should work with host countries to ensure that refugees are granted a firm legal status that promotes their social inclusion and opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship.