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The origin of the Moon 4.56 Gyr ago, its subsequent evolution, and the implications of both relative to the Earth remain subject to lively debate. Because the internal geochemistry and geophysics of the Moon does not appear consistent with an origin by the giant impact of a Mars-sized asteroid on the Earth, this hypothesis is challenged by one that proposes the capture of an independently formed planetesimal. The Moon—s internal structure also indicates that it and all the terrestrial planets initially had relatively cool, chondritic proto-cores prior to formation of metallic cores. Evidence exists that these proto-cores delayed formation of metallic cores for periods that correlate with the final mass of a planet. The impact history of the inner solar system has been broadly outlined by the modern investigation of the Moon. First, soon after the formation of a coherent lunar crust and against an intense background of smaller cratering events, the Moon was subjected to extremely large impacts that formed basins up to 3200km in diameter. On Earth, the melt sheets from these continental-scale impacts may have been responsible for the formation of the first continental crust at ∼4.4 Gyr. Second, ∼50 impact basins >300 km in diameter formed between 4.5 and 3.8 Gyr probably by pulses of impactors produced during the migration and interaction of the giant planets within a structured solar disk of planetesimal rings. The last of these pulses at about 3.85 Gyr, producing the ∼14 mascon basins, resurfaced most of the Moon, and suggested an apparent "cataclysm" at that time. This period of 700 Myr may have been one of "punctuated cataclysm" as one or more giant planets encountered separate planetesimal rings and gaps during outward orbital migration. Finally, the implication of this violent impact history in the inner solar system prior to 3.8 Gyr relative to the surfaces of the hydrous terrestrial planets, that is, Earth, Mars and probably early Venus, is that clays were the dominant mineral species. These clays, as well as volcanic sulfides, may have provided the templates for the formation of complex organic precursors that made up the first living cells. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A privately financed and managed lunar resource and helium-3 fusion power initiative, as well as any government-sponsored effort, will require a permissive if not helpful financial, managerial, regulatory, political, and treaty environment. For like initiatives to ever occur, the broad spectrum of "space law" cannot preclude such endeavors and, indeed, should encourage the private investment of human and financial resources to advance civilization's reach. A preliminary evaluation of financial and managerial approaches to a lunar resource and helium-3 fusion power initiative (Chapter 8) strongly suggests that a private approach to a Return to the Moon has significantly more chance of success than those approaches requiring major United States government or international involvement. On the other hand, the success of any approach, particularly an all-private approach, will require government's assistance in the maintenance of or, if necessary, the creation of supportive regulatory, treaty, and political environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Production of helium-3 and other resources on the Moon will require a permanent base of operations on the lunar surface even with a high degree of automation of various mining, processing, and refining activities. Individuals, groups, and the United States government have studied the establishment and operation of lunar bases since the mid-1960s.1 In addition, there exists the foundation of technical and operational experience in space from Apollo, Skylab, Mir, Spacelab, the Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station. Relevant experience on Earth includes supporting terrestrial resource production in geographically isolated locations and supplying remote settlements and polar research stations. Use of this experience, with the appropriate perspectives on its applicability, will be highly beneficial to establishing cost-effective production operations related to helium-3 and other resources at a lunar settlement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, "Space exploration" has implied both human and robotic exploration of the Moon, planets, and asteroids — that is, exploration of deep space. This is in contrast to other space activities that take advantage of both the weightless environment found in Earth orbit and the special benefits of observing the Earth and stars from that vantage point. Human activities in Earth orbit now have less to do with exploration and more to do with international responsibilities and commitments, as in the case of the International Space Station, and prestige and technological development, as in the case of certain efforts by the United States, Europe, China, India, and Russia. Unique and unexploited research opportunities, however, still exist in near-Earth space, but these have not been fully recognized even after half a century of repetitive access. For example, research initiatives in biomedicine and weightless manufacturing have yet to be undertaken in comprehensive ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comparative analysis in Chapter 8 indicates that a privately financed and managed initiative would be the most efficient and productive approach to returning to the Moon in the foreseeable future. Any large-scale private initiative focused on a Return to the Moon will have as its ultimate aim a return on investment from production and sale of lunar resources and terrestrial power. In addition to helium-3 for fusion power, sales of by-products, such as hydrogen, water, and oxygen to customers in space will add to bottom-line income as well as to investor return. The same can be said of ancillary services based on the existence of a lunar settlement and the new space transportation systems required to establish and service that settlement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Returning to the Moon for its helium-3 fusion resource constitutes the most predictable and potentially the most successful approach to rejuvenating humankind's migration into deep space. The future implications of this event are profound. Lunar helium-3 fusion power systems would become part of an indefinitely viable portfolio of clean sources for global electrical power generation and process heat, consisting additionally of Generation IV nuclear fission power plants, clean coal-burning plants, and local use of solar power technologies including wind power. Although it will be some years before a case by case determination of cost competitiveness can be made between these energy sources, all would appear to be in the running as regional if not global competitors. In addition to meeting the rapidly escalating demand for energy, this portfolio also would provide low-cost supplies of hydrogen as this form of stored energy becomes the world's principal fuel for automobiles and other forms of transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apollo demonstrated that management constitutes the most A critical component of a human Return to the Moon and eventually of humans going on to Mars. An understandable tendency exists in government and the media to concentrate on advancement of technology; however, management and leadership of the creation, integration, and operation of that technology is demonstrably even more important. The history of terrestrial exploration and pioneering illustrates this truism equally well. The remarkably successful voyages of the British research ships the Challenger and Beagle, the Lewis and Clark expedition, Roald Amundsen's trek to the South Pole, and Fridtjof Nansen's North Polar Expedition — and even Ernest Shackelton's failed attempt to cross Antarctica — document the critical importance of management: good planning, preparation, implementation, and leadership. The tragic consequences of the lack of planning and preparation are also recorded in Robert Falcon Scott's expedition's failure and death in Antarctica. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many financial and managerial approaches exist that, hypothetically, could take us back to the Moon and access its resources as well as develop a terrestrial fusion power system dependent on one of those resources, namely helium-3 (see Figure 8.1). In order to examine the relative feasibility and cost of various approaches, each possibility must be evaluated against a reasonable spectrum of alternatives (see Figure 8.2). The six alternatives evaluated semiquantitatively in this chapter include all-United States government, all international, and all-private approaches and combinations of these three. The six approaches chosen are defined as follows: FIGURE 8.1Graphical representation of various historical, current and proposed approaches to managing large projects relative to their incorporation of private, national and international components of management and finance. 1.All-United States government.1 — This approach would be similar to that followed with the Apollo Program (see Chapter 9) and many other major national initiatives from world wars to the construction of the Panama Canal. The main difference between a modern, all-United States government initiative and Apollo presumably would be a significantly lower level of national urgency than that which sustained Apollo during the Cold War, although a major move by China, Russia, or others might change the current situation significantly. Otherwise, less urgency would be counterbalanced to some degree by a much clearer technical path to success based on the Apollo experience and more recent technical advances.With reference to a single government initiatives in 2004 and 2005, China has announced interest in prospecting for lunar helium-3 and the lunar science programs of Europe, India, and Japan have become increasingly active.2.Multilateral model, led by the United States government. 2 The current agreements and management system set up for the International SpaceFIGURE 8.2Possible management control approaches for the development of lunar helium-3 fusion power.Station (ISS) form a framework for this approach. Presumably, some lessons from the ISS experience would enhance its application to a new initiative, particularly if partners agreed to the United States as the lead decision-maker; however, having other countries in the critical path to success seriously delayed and raised the cost of the ISS.Any future European initiative presumably would be undertaken under this model with French leadership, as would any Chinese-led Asian effort.3.Intelsat model.3 Studies of Intelsat (Figure 8.3) and Inmarsat — that is, user-based financial and management systems — strongly suggest that their approach should be examined closely.… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic, technical and political potential of returning to the Moon for helium-3 to fuel fusion reactors on Earth must be evaluated in the context of probable global demand for energy and reasonably competitive alternatives for meeting that demand. In this context, the immediate challenge to civilization's global energy future lies in meeting the needs and aspirations of the 10 to 12 billion earthlings that will be on this planet by 2050.1 Current per capita use of energy is equivalent to about 12 barrels of oil per year for a global total equivalent of about 72 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) per year,2 or about 410 quads (1 quad = 1015 BTU) per year.3 It can be argued, conservatively, that at least an eight-fold increase in annual production will be required by the middle of this century (see Table 3.1). That includes a two-fold increase to account for the increase in the world population from 6.3 to 12 billion and a four-fold increase to meet the major aspirations of four-fifths of the world's peoples whose standards of living are far below those of developed countries. Even an eight-fold increase would not bring the rest of the world to the current average per capita energy use in the United States of about 62 barrels of oil per year equivalent. As seen in Table 3.1, that would take at least an 11-fold increase, not counting the demands of new technologies and climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President George W. Bush has challenged the United States to Return to the Moon and go to Mars and beyond through his Exploration Initiative for NASA.1 Fast-forwarding about 30 years from Apollo to the present, where does NASA stand today with respect to conducting major projects in deep space? With President Bush's election to his first term as President of the United States and before he articulated the new Initiative in January 2004, I volunteered a number of suggestions as to how NASA could be revitalized to potentially undertake Apollo-scale activities once again. Others have echoed these suggestions over the last few years.2 That advice was contained in several e-mails I sent to White House staff and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Slightly edited and annotated (text contained in brackets []) for clarity, those communications are given in Sections 10.1-10.9 below. These submissions provide a snapshot of how NASA appeared to me and many other outside observers at the turn of the twenty-first century, and what was needed for rebuilding and focusing that storied agency. NASA's newest Administrator, Dr Michael Griffin, has begun to address these concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A demonstration of commercially feasible helium-3 fusion power constitutes the first "long pole in the tent" that would make a private "Return to the Moon" financially feasible. Required investment capital cannot be attracted to the development of a new Saturn VI booster and other space-related hardware until investors are convinced that a clear path to commercial fusion power exists and that the fusion power market will support commercial demand for lunar helium-3. Fortunately, a reasonable probability has developed in recent years that these investment tests can be met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At this point in the development of a Return to the Moon strategy, it is too early to fully define all aspects of the engineering designs A and operational plans that will be necessary for success in such an enterprise. This level of definition must await the synergistic interaction of the initial corporate and engineering team that will form when adequate financing to begin the enterprise is available. It is possible, however, to outline many first-level, logical and experience-born constraints on the development of these plans. This chapter and Chapters 5 to 7 will discuss the overall economics of Moon rockets, helium-3 fusion, lunar helium-3 resources, and lunar helium-3 production, respectively, in relation to first-level technical, operational, and cultural constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic and technical chain tying lunar resources to commercial fusion power on Earth consists of three major links: (1) reliable low-cost payload transport to the Moon, (2) competitive helium-3 based fusion power plants on Earth, and (3) competitive helium-3 fuel costs. Payload costs and fusion power economics have been addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. The economics of the third link, competitive helium-3 fuel costs, depend largely on the costs of production and refining of lunar resources. Concentration or "grade" of helium-3 in the debris layer at the lunar surface generated by meteor impacts — the lunar regolith (Figure 6.1) — will largely determine those costs. That is, in what quantity and at what rate will regolith need to be mined and processed to obtain commercially significant resources? FIGURE 6.1View of largely undisturbed regolith in the Valley of Taurus-Littrow from the right window of the Apollo 17 Lunar Module Challenger. The largest boulder in the near field is about half a meter in diameter and the base of the valley wall to the northwest is about 5 km away. (NASA Photograph AS17 147 22472) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In considering a Return to the Moon, it would be illogical as well as foolish not to examine the origins and legacy of the first human exploration of that small planet — Project Apollo (Figure 2.1). Much can be learned about the benefits to expect and the lessons that should be remembered. The lessons from Apollo will figure prominently in later chapters; here, it may be helpful to conduct a brief review of the Cold War origins of Apollo and its broad, beneficial legacies in the national, cultural and scientific histories of the United States and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]