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The fast growth of biomedicine in Germany and its relationship to the economy in 2014 is examined.

Background: Rigid age limits in the current allocation system for post-mortem donor kidneys in Germany may have problematic effects. The new German national transplantion registry enables data analysis with respect to this question. Methods: Using anonymized data from the German national transplantion registry, we extracted and evaluated information on the recipients and postmortem donors of kidneys that were allocated in Germany through Eurotransplant over the period 2006-2020. Results: Data on 19 664 kidney transplantations in Germany from 2006 to 2020 were analyzed. The median waiting time for kidney transplantation was 5.8 years. Persons under age 18 waited a median of 1.7 years; persons aged 18 to 64, 7.0 years; and persons aged 65 and older, 3.8 years. Over the period of observation, post-mortem kidneys were transplanted into 401 people of age 64 (2.0% of all organ recipients) and 1,393 people of age 65 (7.1% of all organ recipients). The difference in waiting times between allocation programs for persons under age 65 (ETKAS, „Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation System“) and those aged 65 and older (ESP, „Eurotransplant Senior Program“) increased over the period of observation, from 2.6 years in 2006-2010 to 4.1 years in 2017-2020. Conclusion: The rigid age limits in the current allocation rules for post-mortem kidney donations in Germany are prolonging the waiting times for transplants among patients aged 18 to 64. We think these rules need to be fundamentally reassessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Ethics" is used as a label for a new kind of expertise in the field of science and technology. At the same time, it is not clear what ethical expertise consists in and what its political status in modern democracies can be. Starting from the "participatory turn" in recent social research and policy, we will argue that bioethical reasoning has to include public views of and attitudes towards biomedicine. We will sketch the outlines of a bioethical conception of "public understanding of ethics," addressing three different issues: (a) the methodological relevance of moral questions and problems raised by lay persons in everyday life regarding biomedicine and technology, (b) the normative relevance of such lay moralities for the justification of ethical decisions, and (c) the necessity of public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw conclusions in view of the concepts and methods such a conception of "public understanding of ethics" should employ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The professional and institutional responsibility for handling genetic knowledge is well discussed; less attention has been paid to how lay people and particularly people who are affected by genetic diseases perceive and frame such responsibilities. In this exploratory study we qualitatively examine the attitudes of lay people, patients and relatives of patients in Germany and Israel towards genetic testing. These attitudes are further examined in the national context of Germany and Israel, which represent opposite regulatory approaches and bioethical debates concerning genetic testing. Three major themes of responsibility emerged from the inter-group and cross-cultural comparison: self-responsibility, responsibility for kin, and responsibility of society towards its members. National contrast was apparent in the moral reasoning of lay respondents concerning, for example, the right not to know versus the duty to know (self-responsibility) and the moral conflict concerning informing kin versus the moral duty to inform (responsibility for kin). Attitudes of respondents affected by genetic diseases were, however, rather similar in both countries. We conclude by discussing how moral discourses of responsibility are embedded within cultural (national, religious) as well as phenomenological (being affected) narratives, and the role of public engagement in bioethical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore and discuss the use of the concept of being affected in biomedical decision making processes in Germany. The corresponding German term 'Betroffenheit' characterizes on the one hand a relation between a state of affairs and a person and on the other an emotional reaction that involves feelings like concern and empathy with the suffering of others. An example for the increasing relevance of being affected is the postulation of the participation of people with disabilities and chronic or acute diseases in the discourse, as partly realized in the German National Ethics Council or the Federal Joint Committee. Nevertheless, not only on the political level, the resistance against the participation of affected people is still strong; the academic debate seems to be cross-grained, too. Against this background, we explore the meaning and argumentative role of the concept of being affected as it is used by affected and lay people themselves. Our analysis is based on four focus group discussions in which lay people, patients and relatives of patients discuss their attitudes towards biomedical interventions such as organ transplantation and genetic testing. This setting allows for a comparison of how affected and non-affected people are concerned and deliberate about medical opportunities, but also of how they position themselves as being affected or non-affected with respect to (scientific) knowledge and morality. On this basis, we discuss the normative relevance of being affected for the justification of political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background The increasing debate on financial incentives for organ donation raises concerns about a "commodification of the human body". Philosophical-ethical stances on this development depend on assumptions concerning the body and how people think about it. In our qualitative empirical study we analyze public attitudes towards organ donation in their specific relation to conceptions of the human body in four European countries (Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). This approach aims at a more context-sensitive picture of what "commodification of the body" can mean in concrete clinical decisions concerning organ donation. Results We find that moral intuitions concerning organ donation are rooted in various conceptions of the human body and its relation to the self: a) the body as a mechanical object owned by the self, b) the body as a part of a higher order embodying the self, and c) the body as a hierarchy of organs constitutive of the self. Conclusion The language of commodification is much too simple to capture what is at stake in everyday life intuitions about organ donation and organ sale. We discuss how the plurality of underlying body-self conceptions can be taken into account in the ethical debate, pointing out consequences for an anthropologically informed approach and for a liberal perspective.