Search

The information and communications technology (ICT) field is undergoing a period of tremendous change. The exponential growth rate of ICT capability in recent decades, which has had an undeniable effect on every aspect of our society, will likely have ramifications for military operations in austere environments. The Air Force's 689th Combat Communications Wing commissioned a study to forecast the future of mobile ICT in such environments. Researchers at the Air Force Institute of Technology chose to employ the Delphi technique as the methodology for executing this task. The following scenario, based on the results of that study, demonstrates how possible changes in ICT might affect military operations. The article then discusses relevant issues that one would need to address before such possibilities become reality., Published in Air & Space Power Journal, v27 n6 p82-94, Nov-Dec 2013.

Although the concept of command and control (C2) is firmly embedded in U.S. warfighting doctrine, organization, technology, and operations, a definitive method for cyberspace C2 has not been established across the joint force. This despite ample evidence that the joint force is not optimally organized for C2 of cyberspace operations. Ongoing intrusions to the tune of 6 million per day and massive exfiltration of information remain unabated. Attacks appear to be growing ever more sophisticated and difficult to detect. In addition, the Armed Forces' offensive capabilities are unnecessarily segmented, being that both the legal authorities and technical capabilities are wholly enabled by agencies other than the Department of Defense. This situation critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution., The original document contains color images.

Although the concept of command and control (C2) is firmly embedded in U.S. warfighting doctrine, organization, technology, and operations, a definitive method for cyberspace C2 has not been established across the joint force. Also, there is ample evidence that the joint force is not optimally organized for C2 of cyberspace operations. Ongoing intrusions to the tune of six million per day and massive exfiltration of information remain unabated. Attacks appear to be growing ever more sophisticated and difficult to detect. In addition, the armed forces' offensive capabilities are unnecessarily segmented, being that both the legal authorities and technical capabilities are wholly enabled by agencies other than the Department of Defense (DoD). This situation critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution. The central thesis of this paper is that any approach to cyberspace C2 must be founded on the nature of the cyberspace domain itself. To investigate this proposal, the paper examines possible alternatives for cyberspace C2 that are based on the nature of the strategic environment, the nature of the cyberspace domain itself, and the way in which conflict must be approached in this domain to improve the armed forces' ability to successfully compete in cyberspace. The paper provides background on the pertinent threats arising in cyberspace; the definition of cyberspace: and the nature of the strategic environment, cyberspace, and competition in cyberspace. Next, a review of C2 models and associated organizational forms, including the current DoD approach, is presented. A set of cyberspace C2 criteria is then derived, followed by an analysis of the models in light of the criteria. Using the results of the analysis, implications for C2 -- with particular emphasis on organizational structure -- are addressed., Maxwell Paper Series.

NCW relies heavily on complexity science concepts like complex adaptive systems self-organization and network effects to support its proponents' claims of decisive operational utility to the war fighter. While many commentators have critiqued NCW from the historical, national-strategic, and "human-centric" perspectives, little work has been done to analyze the science behind the concept. This despite the fact that leading scientists in the field of complexity science admit that much more work needs to be done before the science's relevance to organized human activities is definitively proven. With the U.S. staking so much on network-centric capabilities, it is vital that the purported benefits of NCW be balanced by a frank assessment of its risks and vulnerabilities in anticipation of adversary challenges. For a combatant commander, the effects of an adversary intent on neutralizing or denying NCW's advantage will be immediately felt in the operational battlespace. As part of the operational planning process, a combatant commander's planning staff must identify the critical vulnerabilities associated with network-centric forces and formulate courses of action that mitigate risk and ensure operational protection of vital NCW capabilities. The central thesis of this paper is that the use of network-centric forces introduces risks and vulnerabilities that affect a combatant commander's ability to conduct operational warfare. An analysis is presented that illustrates potential risks and vulnerabilities of NCW, and recommendations are made that might help a combatant commander and a joint planning staff cope with them.

Through its "Global Reach", the Air Force operates globally and in environments that are potentially dynamic, competitive, and lethal. "Information Dominance" has assumed a central role in such environments. In order to achieve Information Dominance, the Air Force must have trained and skilled personnel able to perform highly intensive activities using information technologies. Therefore, it is crucial that information technology training be able to deliver the requisite skills personnel need to attain and sustain performance on these systems. The importance of training gives rise to the need to determine how information technology training can be continually improved to maximize return on training dollars and produce adequately trained personnel. Evaluation of information technology training provides such an avenue by providing information that assesses how well the training program is meeting its goals, both during training and on-the-job. This thesis analyzes the impact of information technology training on trainee reactions, learning, and performance via an information technology training program for a global Air Force command and control (C2) system. Trainee confidence, perceptions, attitudes, test scores, and performance with regard to the C2 system are analyzed to discover if the training positively increases any of these factors. Among the most important results presented is the degree of trainee on-the-job performance improvement using the system following training. With training's relationship to these factors clearly outlined and understood, information technology training courses can be improved and resources allocated to those courses that consistently produce skilled personnel who can perform using information technology.