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Why have most Latin American countries – traditionally pro‐Atlantic and staunch defenders of non‐intervention – remained conspicuously neutral during the Ukraine War? We argue that in an increasingly bipolar context, fence‐sitting produces clear strategic gains through partner‐diversification and bargaining power. However, this strategy becomes riskier with polarisation and, at a certain point, these risks may upset benefits. We formalise this argument and examine the foreign policy trajectories of several Latin American countries in the context of the Ukraine War to illustrate how their room for diplomatic flexibility has shrunk with polarisation. As a corollary, we think of scenarios where the costs of fence‐sitting can outweigh its advantages, forcing the region to align. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the nineteenth century, South America was plagued by internal rebellions that destabilized the region's economies and political systems. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, levels of political violence throughout the region declined dramatically. Existing scholarship has paid surprisingly little attention to this historic transformation, in part because comprehensive data on revolts have been lacking. Historical narratives and an analysis of a comprehensive new dataset on all revolts in South America from 1830 to 1929 show that the decline in revolts stemmed in large part from the expansion and professionalization of the region's militaries, which were driven by the export boom and the threat of interstate conflict. Nevertheless, not all types of rebellions declined precipitously during this period, as an original typology of revolts shows. Although the strengthening of the region's armed forces discouraged revolts by non-state actors, it did not significantly reduce rebellions from within the state apparatus, such as military coups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper integrates the scholarship on compliance with international human rights courts to reflect upon how the literature approaches delays and compliance cycles. Building on this review, we propose a new analytical approach that helps distinguish between reparations prone to immediate or protracted implementation. We introduce two metrics to facilitate the interpretation of delays: the yearly probability of compliance and the expected time to compliance. We also show, using machine-learning tools, how scholars can reconstruct life cycles of compliance. The article illustrates the utility of this approach with an analysis of all cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) between 1989 and 2019. This analytical framework provides critical insights for courts and activists seeking to promote interventions at key moments when compliance is most likely. Moreover, the study underscores important lessons for the Inter-American Human Rights System. Current concerns about a compliance "crisis" at the IACtHR partly reflect a failure to distinguish between reparation types and the Court's preference for reparations requiring protracted implementation. By modeling compliance life cycles, our study opens a promising research avenue that can facilitate effectual and timely policy intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantifying the timing and content of policy changes affecting international travel and immigration is key to ongoing research on the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and the socioeconomic impacts of border closures. The COVID Border Accountability Project (COBAP) provides a hand-coded dataset of >1000 policies systematized to reflect a complete timeline of country-level restrictions on movement across international borders during 2020. Trained research assistants used pre-set definitions to source, categorize and verify for each new border policy: start and end dates, whether the closure is "complete" or "partial", which exceptions are made, which countries are banned, and which air/land/sea borders were closed. COBAP verified the database through internal and external audits from public health experts. For purposes of further verification and future data mining efforts of pandemic research, the full text of each policy was archived. The structure of the COBAP dataset is designed for use by social and biomedical scientists. For broad accessibility to policymakers and the public, our website depicts the data in an interactive, user-friendly, time-based map. Measurement(s) border policy Technology Type(s) digital curation Factor Type(s) country • temporal interval Sample Characteristic - Environment Coronavirus pandemic Sample Characteristic - Location global Machine-accessible metadata file describing the reported data: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.16438932 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the effect of foreign aid on the survival of autocratic regimes? Extant work about the effect of foreign aid on the recipient's political regime has come to contradictory conclusions. Current findings display the full spectrum of possibilities from a democratizing effect to the enhancement of authoritarian survival. While some studies suggest that foreign aid strengthen autocrats and their incentives to cling to power, others have focused on specific periods and donors, thus finding a democratizing effect of foreign aid. In this article, we argue that the effect of foreign aid on autocratic survival does not operate in a direct way, but it is conditional on the levels of political leverage exerted by democratic donors vis-à-vis the autocratic leaders. This leverage, we find, is defined by the capability of democratic donors to back conditionality with effective political pressure. More specifically, we find that given similar levels of aid, autocratic recipients that are highly dependent on the United States—a quintessential democratic donor with extensive political influence—have a shorter survival rate when compared to those with which the United States has weaker ties and thus lower leverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]