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Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in the topic of a meaningful life among philosophers, psychologists, and the general public. Yet despite this interest, the thinker who is perhaps most closely associated with meaning and mental health, the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, has been largely overlooked by academic researchers. This article offers some redress to this situation by exploring the status of his central idea, the Will to Meaning, by locating it within contemporary philosophical discussions of Meaning in Life, and examining the coherence of the difference elements of Frankl's published works. A combination of biographical, historical and philosophical analysis, including reference to the thinkers who helped his ideas, such as Kierkegaard and Scheler, provides a constructively critical account of Frankl's existential theory of meaning. It is suggested that Frankl's theory, with amendments, provides a useful contribution to contemporary discussions in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El resentimiento es un fenómeno emocional complejo que afecta a la estructura existencial de la persona que lo sufre: a su modo de percibir, de relacionarse con otros y de encontrarse a sí misma en un mundo compartido. Desde la psicopatología se entiende como un rasgo desadaptativo de ciertos trastornos de la personalidad, y desde la teoría moral como una reacción negativa ante valores positivos y vitales —según el punto de vista parcial de Nietzsche, que minusvalora la vivencia de daño y sufrimiento que está en su origen. Un acercamiento fenomenológico a la vida emocional resentida, de la mano de la fenomenología de Max Scheler y del relato en primera persona de Jean Améry, descubre el resentimiento como metamorfosis de la existencia personal, que puede adquirir un sentido trágico. Esta interpretación del fenómeno responde a la quiebra de la esencia de la simpatía, como forma de relación interpersonal básica, y a su reconstrucción como sentido básico de la justicia.

The reassessment of intentionality as "tendency" or "drive," already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we develop an analysis of the relationship between intentionality and the history of capitalism based on Scheler's commentary on Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic. We first show that psychology is a means of overcoming the ruinous alternative between materialism and idealism, due to its central position in the genesis of social phenomena: capitalist individuals are driven to work by psychological incentives that are determined as much by the content of dogma as by the social conditions of its practice. We then show that Scheler's phenomenology describes a historical intentionality at variance with the intentionality that aims at axiological essences: capitalism substitutes love with a pseudo a priori contingent that determines intentionality on the basis of ressentiment and anxiety, the very anxiety that Weber, through the figure of the Puritan abandoned by a hyper-transcendent god and appalled by his soteriological status, was making into a history. In this way, we try to indicate, in the company of Scheler, the phenomenological tools for thinking intentionality not as the aim that would always have already disposed of an intuitive given, but as an instance of essentialization constantly thwarted by the historical process, which deviates from the phenomenological aim of essences – as if Scheler were making use of what could be called a negative phenomenology.

The aim of this essay is to examine the parallel Scheler assumes between the individual person and collective person (or culture). I argue that Scheler's early and late analyses of the experience of aging and death inform his idea of history and what it means to be at the "end" of one's own history. An aging culture is one afforded with the opportunity to reckon with its past and take responsibility for its failures and prejudices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Our work, of which this article is a partial assessment, intends to explore the historical and current debates, real or virtual, between Philosophical Anthropology (Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen) and Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenologies in the twentieth century in France and Germany and beyond. One of our guiding threads to cross this complex theoretical heritage is the hypothesis of Blumenberg who, in his Description of Man, situates the germ of an “anthropological turn” of phenomenology in 1913, a turn that Gehlen’s philosophical and “empirical” anthropology will radicalize and finalize in 1940 in Man. His place and Nature in the World. This turn is associated with a paradigmatic shift (from ontology and metaphysics to anthropology) that allows to consider the anthropological condition of phenomenology, that is to say of the phenomenologist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the ontological bases for ethical behaviour between human animals and non-human animals drawing on phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy. Alongside Singer and utilitarianism, I argue that ethical behaviour regarding animals is most effectively justified and motivated by considerations of sentience. Nonetheless, utilitarianism misses crucial aspects of sentience. Buddhist ethics is from the beginning focused on all sentient beings, not solely humans. This inclusivity, and refined interrogations of suffering, means it can furnish more nuanced understandings of sentience. For phenomenology, sentience includes the capacities for self-awareness and, I will argue, a plural self-awareness; the 'I' belongs to a 'we', and the 'we' is constitutive of the 'I'. This 'primordial we' provides the basis for rethinking the moral relations between human animals and non-human animals. I contend finally we thus have an ontological basis in 'interanimality' to explain why we most often do and should care about all sentient beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the contemporary ethical debates have put in value the rational feature of feelings because of the estimative intentionality that is implied in them. In this context, some claim that the intentionality of emotions is a kind of value perception, as Phenomenology stressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly Max Scheler, by analysing emotional Feeling [Fühlen] in the frame of emotional life. In order to extend the context of this philosophical debate, and after describing Scheler's phenomenology of feelings of the intentional and non-intentional emotional life, firstly, we defend theaxiologicalandemotionalintentionalityasdoubleintentionality that—in our understanding—Scheler analyses phenomenologically, while taking distance from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl's intentional structure of estimative emotions. And, secondly, we propose a tentative interpretation of the link between estimative and emotional double intentionality as livingstructureofethicallife, in the light of Martin Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to introduce Scheler’s philosophy of values and to offer a critical point of view of his theory of values, which is not very thematized in the Czech or Slovak context, although the concept of values is widely used especially in the field of professional ethics. The article therefore deals with an author who is quite fundamental to the topic. It will also point out some of the problems that the thematization of values has brought to ethics, which may help to explain why the philosophy of values has not made much headway in the field of ethics. In the introduction we will touch on the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of values and evaluation. We will then briefly discuss Kant’s formalism, which was the primary impetus for the emergence of material value ethics. We will then outline the conception of values in Max Scheler, who can be considered the founder of the philosophy of value or axiology. Furthermore, we will then conclude with an attempt to summarize the whole value issue, pointing out the problematic points of this theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to demonstrate Max Scheler's anticipation of and continued relevance to a burgeoning trend of essence-based accounts of modality, chief among them being Kit Fine's landmark 1994 "Essence and Modality." I argue that Scheler's account of the material a priori not only anticipates the picture of essence-based modality suggested by Fine, but moreover offers resources with the potential to resolve key challenges for the Finean program. In particular, Fine's account runs into problems in explaining how formal logical necessities are to be grounded in essences, challenges that put pressure on the essentialist to adopt a non-propositional account of the nature of logical principles. I argue that one such account can be found in Scheler's notion of the material a priori, according to which all necessary propositional truth is grounded in a realm of experientially given yet a priori "phenomenological facts." After showing the general rapprochement between Scheler's and Fine's accounts of regional modality, I then turn to address Scheler's attempt to ground formal logical principles in essences. On Scheler's picture, propositions expressing formal logical truths are true in virtue of the domain of essences in two senses: (i) In terms of what Scheler calls objective necessity, they are true insofar as they coincide with the essential facts and interconnections shared by all possible regions of being; (ii) In terms of what he calls subjective necessity, they are true in virtue of these same essential facts and interconnections insofar as they have become "functionalized" into law-like patterns of cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I contend that the core intuition that resides at the basis of Scheler's metaethics is expressed through the formal axiological distinction between things, goods, and values. I pursue a twofold aim: 1) to show that Scheler implicitly operates within Husserl's concept of 'unitary foundation' when describing how values inhere within goods; 2) to compare Scheler's metaethical argument concerning the independence of a world of goods with Hare's 'indiscernibility argument'. Scheler's reversal of Hare's argument confronts us with the formal-ontological difference between the analytic account of supervenience and the phenomenological account of unitary foundation. My argument is based on the formalization of the second type of unitary foundation that Husserl outlines in his Third Logical Investigation. The second type of unitary foundation is usually conflated with the first type of unitary foundation, as a result of the gross mistakes found in Findlay's English translation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean-Paul Sartre is often portrayed as a philosopher whose ethics would inevitably have subjectivist or relativist outcomes. Yet, even in Sartre's early works there are several stances that blatantly belie this image, relying rather on an objectivist conception of value that he notably draws from Max Scheler. The aim of this paper is thus to investigate the influence of Scheler's moral reflection on Sartre, arguing how it can represent an original and fruitful starting point to approach Sartrean ethics. To this aim, we will first report on and discuss some passages from Sartre's early works where this debt is most noticeable. Then, we will provide an overview of the Schelerean legacy, arguing how it represents for Sartre the very opening of the ethical issue addressable in phenomenological terms, avoiding the dead end of Hume's and Kant's more classical positions, while at the same time being consistent with other peculiar themes of Sartrean philosophy, namely existence and historicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A problem in teacher education is how to make learning about inclusive education meaningful so that it is more than just another idea for pre-service teachers to study and has deep and lasting effects on their practice as educators. One innovative approach developed at Deakin University is the provision of the Teaching for Diversity Workshop, involving a series of embodied drama-based activities, in which pre-service teachers encounter issues of inclusion and disability through working with not only academics but also people with disabilities, who become their lead teachers and mentors. This article is about the development and enacting of this with actors from Fusion Theatre in Melbourne, Australia. This article, through the voice of its creator, Jo Raphael, details a series of narrative vignettes that were selected following conversations between the co-authors as they reflected on the workshop as a learning encounter. Using the ideas of "fellow-feeling" from Max Scheler and "alterity" from Emmanuel Levinas, the article considers the genesis of the workshop and theorises the high level of student engagement and ethical commitment evident in the workshops, including joyful laughter, embodied participation, positive risk-taking, acclamations of beauty and a palpable shift from apprehension at the beginning to high levels of interaction. Thus, there was considerable disruption of students' beliefs about disability as agency was distributed to those with disabilities. It is clear from the data that participatory and embodied approaches in teacher education, including the use of applied drama approaches, are highly effective for overcoming barriers and promoting inclusivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artículo discute las considerables semejanzas entre las concepciones de la persona defendidas por Husserl, Scheler y Stein, según las cuales la persona es un valor absoluto que se ejercita en tomas de posición. Para los fenomenólogos clásicos (Husserl, Scheler y Stein), la ética concierne a la persona en su totalidad, incluyendo las dimensiones afectiva y racional, el intelecto y el corazón, así como la volición. Las personas se distinguen por su agencia libre, por su capacidad para reconocer normas, y por su habilidad para interactuar responsablemente con otros agentes personales en el contexto del mundo-de-la-vida comunitario e histórico.

The paper focuses on the philosophy of war and, particularly, on Ortega y Gasset's review of Scheler's work, The Genius of War (1915). The scope of this paper is to show that Ortega y Gasset's analysis of Scheler's view on war stems from his initial interest on topics that he will further develop in more mature works, though his review will result in a radical criticism on Scheler. The paper analyses Scheler's view on war and Ortega y Gasset's position in three points: phenomenology of war - where Ortega y Gasset generally agrees with Scheler's meaning of war; ethics of war - where Ortega y Gasset criticizes Scheler because he considered violence as not an essential element of war; metaphysics of war, where Ortega y Gasset makes his criticism even stronger, since Scheler hypostatizes the State and its own rights: this reduces war to the reversal of the power of rights into the rights of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his last book René Girard depicts apocalypse as disclosure of mimetic violence that is world-ending. He claims that in times of violent pandemic we are not called to fight for this world, but follow Christ in his withdrawal from the world. However, such an assertion creates serious theoretical and practical issues for the effort to heal interhuman relations from the virus of mimetic hostility. I argue for the importance of restoring a foundational distinction between passionate love and acquisitive mimetic desire from the forgotten regions of Girard's oeuvre. With Max Scheler's interpretation of Stendhal's concept of l'amour passion, I explore in each thinker a fundamental insight about possibilities of transforming violent contagion through empathy and loving commitment to the world. I conclude that respective "passive" and "active" approaches to the contagion of mimetic rivalry and violence are necessary and equally valuable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the close similarities between Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's concept of the person as an absolute value that exercises itself in position-takings. Ethics, for the classical phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler, and Stein, concerns the whole person, including the affective and rational dimensions, intellect and the heart, as well as volition. Persons are distinctive for their free agency, capacity to recognize norms, and ability to interact responsibly with other personal agents in the context of the communal and historical life-world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that phenomenon of empathy (Einfühlung), described by Edith Stein, and phenomenon of sympathy (Mitgefühl), analysed by Max Scheler, offer complementary insights into the essence of intersubjective link and into the conditions of possibility for experiencing the Other (Fremderfahrung). Stein's and Scheler's phenomenological analyses took place in the context of Husserlian researches on intersubjectivity problems, following a critical attitude towards modern theories of sympathy and towards Lipps' psychology of empathy as well. However, Scheler's and Stein's standpoints got also together on the basis of a philosophical affinity and a critical shared position with regard to Husserl's transcendental constitution of phenomenology. According to Stein to empathize involves a particular kind of apperception that actualizes the original contents of living experiences of the alien body in a non-original way, whereas for Scheler to sympathize refers to the manner of feeling with others some shared emotions, in an original way, thanks to inner perception of the living life of the neighbour, as another condition of possibility for the Fremderfahrung. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar algunos aspectos ideológicos de la concepción de la tecnología y del ser humano que subyacen en el transhumanismo. Se intentan demostrar estos aspectos a la luz de la antropología filosófica de Scheler, Plessner y otros autores mediante los siguientes argumentos: la crítica a la concepción neutral de la tecnología, el rechazo de la idea del ser humano como homo faber y la errónea comprensión transhumanista de la vida y la muerte. A partir de una puesta en discusión de este movimiento con la antropología filosófica se comprueba que no hay ningún cambio de paradigma dentro del transhumanismo y que las viejas concepciones del ser humano que habían sido defendidas por la Modernidad siguen estando presentes.

Copyright of Phainomena is the property of Phenomenological Society of Ljubljana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Intersubjectivity impairment has been considered the main pathogenic nucleus of schizophrenia. Enriching this concept with references to Scheler's phenomenology, our hypothesis is that schizophrenic subjects are affected by a deeper impairment: the inability to resonate with unipathic affectivity. Fragmentation of the Leibschema, valueception impairment, and the lack of vital impulse are, in our hypothesis, the original alterations of the schizophrenic bodily experience from which all relational impairments originate. Our proposal is, therefore, to enhance a psychotherapy that does not only focus on the verbal level, but endeavors to touch the patient's Leib, focusing on emotional sharing and on the development of a sense of cohesion of one's body as the starting point for accessing intersubjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with two essays written by Max Scheler after Der Formalismus in which he affirms the priority of value over theoretical being, but clarifies that this priority should not be confused with the denial of the classical thesis of the foundation of value in theoretical being. To this end, Scheler understands the priority of value as a priority of givenness versus the ontological priority of theoretical being. In this article, I use Edmund Husserl's notion of focused consciousness (aktuall Bewußtsein) to show that value priority is a priority of focused givenness, due to the ability of value to focus the subject's interest. Then, I show that Scheler's position can already be traced back to Der Formalismus, which makes it possible to interpret this author's central work in a more interesting way. Finally, I relate the priority of value with the priority of love, also advocated by Scheler. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Agora (0211-6642) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Después de que Friedrich Nietzsche expusiera el fenómeno del resentimiento mediante un supuesto desenmascaramiento de un complejo emotivo oculto, autores posteriores, como Max Scheler y René Girard, matizaron el análisis nietzscheano aplicándolo a diversos ámbitos antropológicos y sociales. Muchas de las principales aportaciones de estos análisis contemporáneos encuentran sus precedentes en autores anteriores, modernos y medievales. Seis siglos y medio antes de Scheler, Tomás de Aquino ofrece en dos cuestiones de su Summa Theologiae dedicadas a la acedia y la envidia una serie de precisiones conceptuales y observaciones psicológicas que coinciden en gran parte de su fondo y, en ocasiones, en la forma, con ciertas caracterizaciones del resentimiento. Demostramos, apoyándonos en numerosas referencias textuales, los paralelismos entre la fenomenología scheleriana del resentimiento y la exposición tomasiana de los vicios capitales.

The article discusses Wojtyła’s position regarding the Schelerian a priori. Both Wojtyla and Scheler recognize the notion of a priori. But Wojtyła seeks an equilibrium between the a priori of duty (i.e., regardless of experience), on the one hand, and the exclusivity of the a priori values (aside from all normativity), on the other hand. The author concludes that Wojtyła points to the truth of man, which includes a concrete duty to realize the good by the acts of voluntary choice.

Against the confusion that we find in the literature, we must distinguish between «sensation» and «feeling», in order to decide in which field the pain is included. The article defends Stumpf and Husserl`s thesis that pain (physical pain) is basically sensation. But, in agreement with Scheler, the article also defends that there are sensible feelings in addition to «pain-sensation». These could be named «displeasure» (unintentional) and «dislike» (intentional). Among the feelings of dislike there are some with transcendent intentionality, which are those linked to «exhibitive sensations» (sight, hearing…). But there is also a feeling of «dislike» linked to pain-sensation, which has an «immanent intentionality» (and whose affective base is «displeasure»). Dislike and displeasure linked to painsensation can be referred to as «pain-feeling», but must be clearly distinguished from «pain-sensation».

Die Analyse des Ressentiments, wie sie Nietzsche, Scheler und Adorno vorbereitet haben, stellt eine Strukturlogik bereit, die Analogien zur Verlaufsform der heutigen Populismen anbietet. Daraus lässt sich auch eine Position gewinnen, die in der Diskussion um einen „emanzipatorischen Populismus“ berücksichtigt werden sollte.

The metaphysical foundation of Hans Jonas’ ethics of responsibility is grounded on certain presuppositions: everything theoretical (founded on the reason or intellect) is considered to be objective, while every content of value (founded on affectivity) is considered to be merely subjective. Taking account of Max Scheler’s critique of these same assumptions in Immanuel Kant’s ethical formalism, it is my purpose to discuss them and to show how they implicitly dismiss the true foundation of morality, which lies in an objective as well as affective knowledge of material value qualities — intentional objects given in acts of feeling (Fühlen).

Max Scheler’s phenomenology of religion aimed at a renewed philosophical approach to the problem of God, willing to unify the modern need for a personalization of religion with the traditional objectivism and realism which, ever since the days of Thomas Aquinas, had been basic for Catholicism. For this purpose, Scheler argued for a return to an original level of the experience which could enable a new approach to the religious phenomenon, which could consider it at the level of a «living evidence», answering to the exigence of realism for which phenomenological philosophy was calling, thereby founding an original natural theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La celebración del centenario de la publicación de las Meditaciones del Quijote ofrece la oportunidad única de reflexionar sobre una obra que creó un nuevo tipo de reflexión filosófica contemporánea en lengua castellana, reflexión caracterizada por una forma de “ontología del presente”.

In Max Scheler's non-formal ethics of value, "good" is a value but by no means a "non-moral value"; rather, it is a second-order "moral value," always appearing in the realization of first-order non-moral values. According to the relevant notion of the a priori of phenomenology, whilst all the non-moral values are given in "value cognition," the moral value of good is self-given in "moral cognition". The reflections and answers offered by Scheler's non-formal ethics of value on "What is good?" constitute the foundation of a phenomenological "meta-ethics". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]