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The ability to infer others' prosocial vs. antisocial behavioral tendencies from minimal information is core to social reasoning. Aesthetic motivation (the value or appreciation of aesthetic beauty) is linked with prosocial tendencies, raising the question of whether this factor is used in interpersonal reasoning and in the attribution of mental capacities. We propose and test a model of this reasoning, predicting that evidence of others' aesthetic motivations should impact judgments of others' prosocial (and antisocial) tendencies by signaling a heightened capacity for emotional experience. In a series of four pre-registered experiments (total N = 1440), participants saw pairs of characters (as photos/vignettes), and judged which in each pair showed more of a mental capacity of interest. Distractor items prevented participants from guessing the hypothesis. For one critical pair of characters, both characters performed the same activity (music listening, painting, cooking, exercising, being in nature, doing math), but one was motivated by the activities' aesthetic value, and the other by its functional value. Across all activities, participants robustly chose aesthetically-motivated characters as more likely to behave compassionately (Exp. 1; 3), less likely to behave selfishly/manipulatively (Exp. 1; 3), and as more emotionally sensitive, but not more intelligent (Exp. 2; 3; 4). Emotional sensitivity best predicted compassionate behavior judgements (Exp. 3). Aesthetically-motivated characters were not reliably chosen as more helpful; intelligence best predicted helpfulness judgements (Exp. 4). Evidence of aesthetic motivation conveys important social information about others, impacting fundamental interpersonal judgments about others' mental life and social behavior.

Without conscious thought, listeners link events in the world to sounds they hear. We study one surprising example: Adults can judge the temperature of water simply from hearing it being poured. We test the development of the ability to hear water temperature, with the goal of informing developmental theories regarding the origins and cognitive bases of nuanced sound source judgments. We first confirmed that adults accurately distinguished the sounds of hot and cold water (pre-registered Experiments. 1, 2; total N = 384), even though many were unaware or uncertain of this ability. By contrast, children showed protracted development of this skill over the course of middle childhood (Experiments. 2, 3; total N = 178). In spite of accurately identifying other sounds and hot/cold images, older children (7-11 years) but not younger children (3-6 years) reliably distinguished the sounds of hot and cold water. Accuracy increased with age; 11-year old's performance was similar to adults. Adults also showed individual differences in accuracy that were predicted by their amount of prior relevant experience (Experiment 1). Experience may similarly play a role in children's performance; differences in auditory sensitivity and multimodal integration may also contribute to young children's failures. The ability to hear water temperature develops slowly over childhood, such that nuanced auditory information that is easily and quickly accessible to adults is not available to guide young children's behavior. HIGHLIGHTS: Adults can make nuanced judgments from sound, including accurately judging the temperature of water from the sound of it being poured. Children showed protracted development of this skill over the course of middle childhood, such that 7-11-year-olds reliably succeeded while 3-6-year-olds performed at chance. Developmental changes may be due to experience (adults with greater relevant experience showed higher accuracy) and the development of multimodal integration and auditory sensitivity. Young children may not detect subtle auditory information that adults easily perceive.

Dance is a universal human behavior and a crucial component of human musicality. When and how does the motivation and tendency to move to music develop? How does this behavior change as a process of maturation and learning? We characterize infants' earliest dance behavior, leveraging parents' extensive at-home observations of their children. Parents of infants aged 0-24 months (N = 278, 82.7% White, 84.5% in the United States, 46.0% of household incomes ≥ $100,000) were surveyed regarding their child's current and earliest dance behavior (movement by the child, during music, that the parent considered dance), motor development, and their own infant-directed dance. We found that dance begins early: 90% of infants produced recognizable dance by 12.8 months, and the age of onset was not solely a function of motor development. Infants who produced dance did so often, on average almost every day. We also found that dance shows qualitative developmental change over the first 2 years, rather than remaining stable. With motor development, age, and more time dancing, infants used a greater variety of movements in dance, and began to incorporate learned, imitated gestures (80% of infants by 17.9 months). 99.8% of parents reported dancing for or with their infants, raising questions about the role of infant-directed dance. These findings provide evidence that the motivation and tendency to move to music appears extremely early and that both learning and maturation lead to qualitative change in dance behavior during the first 2 years, informing broad questions about the origins of human musicality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Similarity of behaviors or attributes is often used to infer social affiliation and prosociality. Does this reflect reasoning using a simple expectation of homophily, or more complex reasoning about shared utility? We addressed this question by examining the inferences children make from similar choices when this similarity does or does not cause competition over a zero-sum resource. Four- to six-year-olds (N = 204) saw two vignettes, each featuring three characters (a target plus two others) choosing between two types of resources. In all stories, each character expressed a preference: one 'other' chose the same resource as the target, while a second 'other' chose the different resource. In one condition there were enough resources for all the characters; in the other condition, one type of resource was limited, with only one available (inducing potential competition between the target and the similar-choice other). Children then judged which of the two 'other' characters was being nicer (prosocial judgment) and which of the two was more preferred by the target (affiliative inference). When resources were limited (vs. unlimited), children were less likely to select the similar other as being nice. Children's initial tendency to report that the target preferred the similar other was also eliminated in the limited resource scenario. These findings show that children's reasoning about similarity is not wholly based on homophily. Instead, by reasoning about shared utility - how each person values the goals of others - children engage in flexible inferences regarding whether others' similar preferences and behaviors have positive or negative social meaning.

How do people detect lies from the content of messages, and design lies that go undetected? Lying requires strategic reasoning about how others think and respond. We propose a unified framework underlying lie design and detection, formalized as recursive social reasoning. Senders design lies by inferring the likelihood the receiver detects potential lies; receivers detect lies by inferring if and how the sender would lie. Under this framework, we can predict the rate and content of lies people produce, and which lies are detected. In Experiment 1, we show that people calibrate the extremeness of their lies and what lies they detect to beliefs about goals and the statistics of the world. In Experiment 2, we present stronger diagnostic evidence for the function of social reasoning in lying: people cater their lies to their audience, even when their audience's beliefs differ from their own. We conclude that recursive and rational social reasoning is a key cognitive process underlying how people communicate in adversarial settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A growing literature shows that music increases prosocial behavior. Why does this occur? We propose a novel hypothesis, informed by moral psychology: evidence of others’ musicality may promote prosociality by leading us to judge musical individuals as having enhanced moral standing. This effect may be largely indirect, by increasing perceptions of how intelligent and emotionally sensitive musical individuals are. If so, simply knowing about others’ musicality should affect moral evaluations, such as wrongness to harm. Across four experiments (total N = 550), we found supportive evidence. Information that an animal or person had the capacity and motivation to engage with music led participants to judge these entities as more wrong to harm than matched neutral or non-musical counterparts. Similarly, knowing that a person was not musical made people judge them as less wrong to harm than neutral or musical counterparts. As predicted, musicality was positively associated with perceptions of capacities for emotionality and intelligence, and these broader factors partially mediated the relationship between musicality and wrongness to harm. These effects were not influenced by participants’ own musicality. Thus, non-moral attributes like musicality can impact moral consideration, carrying implications for social behavior and for interventions to promote prosociality.

Many studies argue that synchronized movement increases prosocial attitudes and behavior. We reviewed meta-analytic evidence that reported effects of synchrony may be driven by experimenter expectancy, leading to experimenter bias; and participant expectancy, otherwise known as placebo effects. We found that a majority of published studies do not adequately control for experimenter bias and that multiple independent replication attempts with added controls have failed to find the original effects. In a preregistered experiment, we measured participant expectancy directly, asking whether participants have a priori expectations about synchrony and prosociality that match the findings in published literature. Expectations about the effects of synchrony on prosocial attitudes directly mirrored previous experimental findings (including both positive and null effects)-despite the participants not actually engaging in synchrony. On the basis of this evidence, we propose an alternative account of the reported bottom-up effects of synchrony on prosociality: the effects of synchrony on prosociality may be explicable as the result of top-down expectations invoked by placebo and experimenter effects.

When interacting with infants, humans often alter their speech and song in ways thought to support communication. Theories of human child-rearing, informed by data on vocal signalling across species, predict that such alterations should appear globally. Here, we show acoustic differences between infant-directed and adult-directed vocalizations across cultures. We collected 1,615 recordings of infant- and adult-directed speech and song produced by 410 people in 21 urban, rural and small-scale societies. Infant-directedness was reliably classified from acoustic features only, with acoustic profiles of infant-directedness differing across language and music but in consistent fashions. We then studied listener sensitivity to these acoustic features. We played the recordings to 51,065 people from 187 countries, recruited via an English-language website, who guessed whether each vocalization was infant-directed. Their intuitions were more accurate than chance, predictable in part by common sets of acoustic features and robust to the effects of linguistic relatedness between vocalizer and listener. These findings inform hypotheses of the psychological functions and evolution of human communication.

Dance is a universal human behavior and a crucial component of human musicality. When and how does the motivation and tendency to move to music develop? How does this behavior change as a process of maturation and learning? We characterize infants' earliest dance behavior, leveraging parents' extensive at-home observations of their children. Parents of infants aged 0-24 months (N = 278, 82.7% White, 84.5% in the United States, 46.0% of household incomes [greater than or equal to]$100,000) were surveyed regarding their child's current and earliest dance behavior (movement by the child, during music, that the parent considered dance), motor development, and their own infant-directed dance. We found that dance begins early: 90% of infants produced recognizable dance by 12.8 months, and the age of onset was not solely a function of motor development. Infants who produced dance did so often, on average almost every day. We also found that dance shows qualitative developmental change over the first 2 years, rather than remaining stable. With motor development, age, and more time dancing, infants used a greater variety of movements in dance, and began to incorporate learned, imitated gestures (80% of infants by 17.9 months). 99.8% of parents reported dancing for or with their infants, raising questions about the role of infant-directed dance. These findings provide evidence that the motivation and tendency to move to music appears extremely early and that both learning and maturation lead to qualitative change in dance behavior during the first 2 years, informing broad questions about the origins of human musicality.

Pietraszewski proposes four triadic "primitives" for representing social groups. We argue that, despite surface differences, these triads can all be reduced to similar underlying welfare trade-off ratios, which are a better candidate for social group primitives. Welfare trade-off ratios also have limitations, however, and we suggest there are multiple computational strategies by which people recognize and reason about social groups.

People expect others to take efficient paths toward goals. Inefficiency changes how we categorize actions, leading us to see actions as play (Chu & Schulz, 2020), or as movements performed for their own intrinsic value (Schachner & Carey, 2013). Here we find that performing actions for their own value (e.g., aesthetic value), versus for instrumental purposes, provides social information about others. In a pre-registered experiment (N=360), participants judged which character in a pair was more compassionate, or more selfish/manipulative. For one key pair (among distractors), both characters performed the same activity (music, painting, eating, exercising, math, being in nature), and we manipulated why: Either for its own aesthetic value, or as a means-to-an-end (instrumental value). Across all activities, aesthetically-motivated characters were judged as more compassionate and less selfish/manipulative than instrumentally-motivated characters (p’s

Although most U. S. children can accurately count sets by 4 years of age, many fail to understand the structural analogy between counting and number - that adding 1 to a set corresponds to counting up 1 word in the count list. While children are theorized to establish this Structure Mapping coincident with learning how counting is used to generate sets, they initially have an item-based understanding of this relationship, and can infer that, e.g, adding 1 to "five" is "six", while failing to infer that, e.g., adding 1 to "twenty-five" is "twenty-six" despite being able to recite these numbers when counting aloud. The item-specific nature of children's successes in reasoning about the relationship between changes in cardinality and the count list raises the possibility that such a Structure Mapping emerges later in development, and that this ability does not initially depend on learning to count. We test this hypothesis in two experiments and find evidence that children can perform item-based addition operations before they become competent counters. Even after children learn to count, we find that their ability to perform addition operations remains item-based and restricted to very small numbers, rather than drawing on generalized knowledge of how the count list represents number. We discuss how these early item-based associations between number words and sets might play a role in constructing a generalized Structure Mapping between counting and quantity.

Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding at larger scales than grooming and other bonding mechanisms available in ancestral primate societies. We combine cross-disciplinary evidence from archeology, anthropology, biology, musicology, psychology, and neuroscience into a unified framework that accounts for the biological and cultural evolution of music. We argue that the evolution of musicality involves gene-culture coevolution, through which proto-musical behaviors that initially arose and spread as cultural inventions had feedback effects on biological evolution because of their impact on social bonding. We emphasize the deep links between production, perception, prediction, and social reward arising from repetition, synchronization, and harmonization of rhythms and pitches, and summarize empirical evidence for these links at the levels of brain networks, physiological mechanisms, and behaviors across cultures and across species. Finally, we address potential criticisms and make testable predictions for future research, including neurobiological bases of musicality and relationships between human music, language, animal song, and other domains. The music and social bonding hypothesis provides the most comprehensive theory to date of the biological and cultural evolution of music.

Listening to music activates representations of movement and social agents. Why? We ask whether high-level causal reasoning about how music was generated can lead people to link musical sounds with animate agents. To test this, we asked whether people (N=60) make flexible inferences about whether an agent caused musical sounds, integrating information from the sounds’ timing and from the visual context in which it was produced. Using a 2x2 within-subject design, we found evidence of causal reasoning: In a context where producing a musical sequence would require self-propelled movement, people inferred that an agent had been present causing the sounds. When the context provided an alternative possible explanation, this ‘explained away’ the agent, reducing the tendency to infer an agent was present for the same acoustic stimuli. People can use causal reasoning to infer whether an agent produced musical sounds, suggesting that high-level cognition can link music with social concepts.

Artifacts – the objects we own, make, and choose – provide a source of rich social information. Adults use people’s artifacts to judge others’ traits, interests, and social affiliations. Here we show that 4-year-old children (N=32) infer others’ shared interests from their artifacts. When asked who had the same interests as a target character, children chose the character with a conceptually similar object to the target’s – an object used for the same activity – over a character with a perceptually similar object. When asked which person had the same arbitrary property (bedtime, birthday, or middle name), children did not systematically select either character, and most often reported that they did not know. Adults (N=32) made similar inferences, but differed in their tendency to use artifacts to infer friendships. Overall, by age 4, children show a sophisticated ability to make selective, warranted inferences about others’ interests based solely on their artifacts.

Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding at larger scales than grooming and other bonding mechanisms available in ancestral primate societies. We combine cross-disciplinary evidence from archeology, anthropology, biology, musicology, psychology, and neuroscience into a unified framework that accounts for the biological and cultural evolution of music. We argue that the evolution of musicality involves gene-culture coevolution, through which proto-musical behaviors that initially arose and spread as cultural inventions had feedback effects on biological evolution because of their impact on social bonding. We emphasize the deep links between production, perception, prediction, and social reward arising from repetition, synchronization, and harmonization of rhythms and pitches, and summarize empirical evidence for these links at the levels of brain networks, physiological mechanisms, and behaviors across cultures and across species. Finally, we address potential criticisms and make testable predictions for future research, including neurobiological bases of musicality and relationships between human music, language, animal song, and other domains. The music and social bonding hypothesis provides the most comprehensive theory to date of the biological and cultural evolution of music.

Without conscious thought, listeners link events in the worldto sounds they hear. We study one surprising example: Adultscan judge the temperature of water simply from hearing itbeing poured. How do these nuanced perceptual skillsdevelop? Is extensive auditory experience required, or arethese skills present in early childhood? In Exp.1, adults wereexceptionally good at judging whether water was hot vs. coldfrom pouring sounds (M=93% accuracy; N=104). In Exp.2, wetested this ability in N=113 children aged 3-12 years, and foundevidence of developmental change: Age significantly predictedaccuracy (p

Although most U.S. children can count sets by 3.5 years of age, many fail to understand that adding 1 to a set correspondsto counting up 1 word in the count list (i.e., the successor function). Initially, children have piecemeal knowledge of thisrelation, and do not understand that it holds for any number. Although generalized successor knowledge emerges around6 years of age, it is unknown when children’s item-based learning begins, and therefore when they begin learning relationsbetween number words – a critical precursor to mathematical reasoning. Here, we explore the timescale and mechanismsunderlying this knowledge in 2- to 4-year-old children. We find that these children have established item-based mappings,but that they are unrelated to count list knowledge. Instead, we show evidence that the origins of successor knowledgemay lie in mappings made between non-symbolic set representations and known number words.

Do children use objects to infer the people and actions that created them? We ask how children judge whether designswere socially transmitted (copied), asking if children use asimple perceptual heuristic (more similar = more likelycopied), or make a rational, flexible inference (Bayesianinverse planning). We found evidence that children use inverseplanning to reason about artifacts’ designs: When children sawtwo identical designs, they did not always infer copyingoccurred. Instead, similarity was weaker evidence of copyingwhen an alternative explanation ‘explained away’ thesimilarity. Thus, children inferred copying had occurred lessoften when designs were efficient (Exp1, age 7-9; N=52), andwhen there was a constraint that limited the number of possibledesigns (Exp2, age 4-5; N=160). When thinking about artifacts,young children go beyond perceptual features and use a processlike inverse planning to reason about the generative processesinvolved in design.

People use objects to make social judgments about traits of owners. Do people seek social information in a rational waysuggestive of Bayesian inverse planning? In two experiments, participants aimed to learn about a stranger. Each trialshowed two sets of objects; the stranger had chosen one from each set, but their choice was hidden. Participants judgedwhich would help them learn more about the stranger: Revealing their choice from set A or B? Participants selected setsrationally, identifying sets with a greater range of options as more informative: Larger sets over smaller; sets varying instyle over sets varying only in color (Exp.1). Participants also took into account constraints: They chose sets as moreinformative when all options were functional vs. when some were not (Exp.2). People consider the generative processbehind objects selection, using inverse planning to reason about the informational value of others objects.

How do children reason about people presented over videochat? Video chat is a representation, like a picture; but is alsoa real social interaction (the partner sees and hears you). Dochildren understand the nuanced affordances and limitations ofvideo chat? We tested 4-year-old children’s reasoning, askingif a person over video chat (vs. a live person; photograph) couldsee, hear, feel, and physically interact through the screen.Children judged that a person over video chat can see, butcannot feel nor receive an object, through the screen. Theperson over video chat was judged to hear more often than aphotograph, but less often than a live person. Preschoolchildren are not limited to considering a stimulus fullyrepresentational, or fully present; instead, they understandvideo chat as a medium that blurs the boundaries ofrepresentation and reality, allowing for a mixture of life-likeaffordances and picture-like limitations.

People design their speech acts with their listeners in mind,accounting for their knowledge and other mental states. Is thisability specific to spoken language and co-speech gesture, ordoes it appear in pantomimic gestures as well? We ask whetheradults flexibly shift their silent gestures to emphasize relevantinformation, representing different features of the target indifferent contexts. In a two-item reference game, adultsgestured to a partner to indicate which object was the target.Item pairs differed in one of three features (size, shape,pattern). We found that adults were more likely to gesture afeature when it was relevant to distinguishing the two possiblereferents, versus when it was not. Thus, adults flexiblymodified their gestures to meet their partners’ needs,emphasizing the relevant feature. These data lay a foundationfor future work on the development of use of theory of mind ingestural communication in childhood.

Although most U. S. children can accurately count sets by 4 years of age, many fail to understand the structural analogy between counting and number -- that adding 1 to a set corresponds to counting up 1 word in the count list. While children are theorized to establish this Structure Mapping coincident with learning how counting is used to generate sets, they initially have an item-based understanding of this relationship, and can infer that, e.g, adding 1 to "five" is "six", while failing to infer that, e.g., adding 1 to "twenty-five" is "twenty-six" despite being able to recite these numbers when counting aloud. The item-specific nature of children's successes in reasoning about the relationship between changes in cardinality and the count list raises the possibility that such a Structure Mapping emerges later in development, and that this ability does not initially depend on learning to count. We test this hypothesis in two experiments and find evidence that children can perform item-based addition operations before they become competent counters. Even after children learn to count, we find that their ability to perform addition operations remains item-based and restricted to very small numbers, rather than drawing on generalized knowledge of how the count list represents number. We discuss how these early item-based associations between number words and sets might play a role in constructing a generalized Structure Mapping between counting and quantity.

How do people use human-made objects (artifacts) to learnabout the people and actions that created them? We test therichness of people’s reasoning in this domain, focusing on thetask of judging whether social transmission has occurred (i.e.whether one person copied another). We develop a formalmodel of this reasoning process as a form of rational inverseplanning, which predicts that rather than solely focusing onartifacts’ similarity to judge whether copying occurred, peopleshould also take into account availability constraints (thematerials available), and functional constraints (whichmaterials work). Using an artifact-building task where twocharacters build tools to solve a puzzle box, we find that thisinverse planning model predicts trial-by-trial judgments,whereas simpler models that do not consider availability orfunctional constraints do not. This suggests people use aprocess like inverse planning to make flexible inferences fromartifacts’ features about the source of design ideas.

The human ability to deceive others and detect deception haslong been tied to theory of mind. We make a stronger argu-ment: in order to be adept liars – to balance gain (i.e. maxi-mizing their own reward) and plausibility (i.e. maintaining arealistic lie) – humans calibrate their lies under the assumptionthat their partner is a rational, utility-maximizing agent. Wedevelop an adversarial recursive Bayesian model that aims toformalize the behaviors of liars and lie detectors. We comparethis model to (1) a model that does not perform theory of mindcomputations and (2) a model that has perfect knowledge ofthe opponent’s behavior. To test these models, we introduce anovel dyadic, stochastic game, allowing for quantitative mea-sures of lies and lie detection. In a second experiment, we varythe ground truth probability. We find that our rational modelsqualitatively predict human lying and lie detecting behaviorbetter than the non-rational model. Our findings suggest thathumans control for the extremeness of their lies in a mannerreflective of rational social inference. These findings provide anew paradigm and formal framework for nuanced quantitativeanalysis of the role of rationality and theory of mind in lyingand lie detecting behavior.

Human-made objects (artifacts) often provide rich socialinformation about the people who created them. We explorehow people reason about others from the objects they create,characterizing inferences about when social transmission ofideas (copying) has occurred. We test whether judgments aredriven by perceptual heuristics, or structured explanation-based reasoning. We develop a Bayesian model ofexplanation-based inference from artifacts and a simplermodel of perceptual heuristics, and ask which better predictspeople’s judgments. Our artifact-building task involved twocharacters who built toy train tracks. Participants viewed pairsof tracks, and judged whether copying had occurred. Ourexplanation-based model accurately predicted on a trial-by-trial basis when participants inferred copying; the perceptualheuristics model was significantly less accurate. Efficientdesign ‘explained away’ similarity, making similarity weakerevidence of copying for efficient tracks. Overall, data showthat like intuitive archeologists, people make richexplanation-based inferences about others from the objectsthey create.

People often believe that orderly structures were created byagents. We examine the cognitive basis of this tendency,asking if learned associations or causal reasoning drives us tolink order with agents. Causal reasoning predicts thatknowledge of an alternative physical-mechanical causeshould ‘explain away’ orderliness, weakening the link withagents. In a preregistered experiment, we manipulated thecontext to provide (or not provide) a physical-mechanicalexplanation for orderly outcomes, and participants judged ifan object or agent had been present. We compared outcomesdiffering in (a)levels of orderliness and (b)whether contextprovided an alternative explanation. We found thatenvironmental context ‘explained away’ orderliness, such thatparticipants observing order inferred agency only when therewas no alternative explanation. The link between order andagents is moderated by causal reasoning, and is malleable: Itcan be weakened by understanding alternative causalmechanisms by which order could arise.

Young children in Western cultures tend to endorse teleological (function-based) explanations broadly across many domains, even when scientifically unwarranted. For instance, in contrast to Western adults, they explicitly endorse the idea that mountains were created for climbing, just like hats were created for warmth. Is this bias a product of culture or a product of universal aspects of human cognition? In two studies, we explored whether adults and children in Mainland China, a highly secular, non-Western culture, show a bias for teleological explanations. When explaining both object properties (Experiment 1) and origins (Experiment 2), we found evidence that they do. Whereas Chinese adults restricted teleological explanations to scientifically warranted cases, Chinese children endorsed them more broadly, extending them across different kinds of natural phenomena. This bias decreased with rising grade level across first, second, and fourth grades. Overall, these data provide evidence that children's bias for teleological explanations is not solely a product of Western Abrahamic cultures. Instead, it extends to other cultures, including the East Asian secular culture of modern-day China. This suggests that the bias for function-based explanations may be driven by universal aspects of human cognition.

Infants and adults are thought to infer the goals of observed actions by calculating the actions' efficiency as a means to particular external effects, like reaching an object or location. However, many intentional actions lack an external effect or external goal (e.g. dance). We show that for these actions, adults infer that the agents' goal is to produce the movements themselves: Movements are seen as the intended outcome, not just a means to an end. We test what drives observers to infer such movement-based goals, hypothesizing that observers infer movement-based goals to explain actions that are clearly intentional, but are not an efficient means to any plausible external goal. In three experiments, we separately manipulate intentionality and efficiency, equating for movement trajectory, perceptual features, and external effects. We find that participants only infer movement-based goals when the actions are intentional and are not an efficient means to external goals. Thus, participants appear to infer that movements are the goal in order to explain otherwise mysterious intentional actions. These findings expand models of goal inference to account for intentional yet 'irrational' actions, and suggest a novel explanation for overimitation as emulation of movement-based goals.

Recent reports have suggested that many published results are unreliable. To increase the reliability and accuracy of published papers, multiple changes have been proposed, such as changes in statistical methods. We support such reforms. However, we believe that the incentive structure of scientific publishing must change for such reforms to be successful. Under the current system, the quality of individual scientists is judged on the basis of their number of publications and citations, with journals similarly judged via numbers of citations. Neither of these measures takes into account the replicability of the published findings, as false or controversial results are often particularly widely cited. We propose tracking replications as a means of post-publication evaluation, both to help researchers identify reliable findings and to incentivize the publication of reliable results. Tracking replications requires a database linking published studies that replicate one another. As any such database is limited by the number of replication attempts published, we propose establishing an open-access journal dedicated to publishing replication attempts. Data quality of both the database and the affiliated journal would be ensured through a combination of crowd-sourcing and peer review. As reports in the database are aggregated, ultimately it will be possible to calculate replicability scores, which may be used alongside citation counts to evaluate the quality of work published in individual journals. In this paper, we lay out a detailed description of how this system could be implemented, including mechanisms for compiling the information, ensuring data quality, and incentivizing the research community to participate.