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Cognitive offloading refers to the use of physical action and the external environment to simplify mental demand. One form of this-intention offloading-involves the use of external reminders to support delayed intentions. Both beliefs of poor memory ability and a preference to avoid cognitive effort lead to offloading intentions rather than using internal memory. Schizophrenia is a population with deficits in prospective memory and to overcome this difficulty, neuropsychological interventions can propose external aids such as reminders. However, it is unknown what motivates individuals with schizophrenia to spontaneously use reminders. Twenty-seven individuals with schizophrenia and twenty-seven non-clinical individuals were recruited to perform a prospective memory task, with two levels of difficulty, by deciding whether to use reminders or their internal memory. The proportion of reminder use, performance (hits and errors), subjective effort and metacognitive beliefs were recorded. The results show a non-optimal use of reminders in the schizophrenia group: this group used more reminders than the non-clinical group when the task was easy but did not increase reminder usage when the task became more difficult. Individuals with schizophrenia perceived the task to be more effortful than the non-clinical individuals in the easy task, but also had a high estimation of their memory ability. Reminder usage in schizophrenia is atypical and non-optimal. This may relate to effort and metacognition but the direct influence of these factors remains to be demonstrated. The overall results open perspectives on the neuropsychological treatment of prospective memory in this population., (© 2024 The British Psychological Society.)

This study explored the role of metacognition in the so-called "age-prospective memory (PM) paradox" by investigating the accuracy of younger and older adults' predictions of their future PM performance in time-based tasks performed across laboratory and naturalistic settings. Metacognitive monitoring was assessed by asking participants to make judgments-of-learning (JOLs) on an item level for both the prospective (remembering that something has to be done) and retrospective (remembering what to do) components of PM. In terms of PM performance, the results for the prospective component revealed an age deficit in the laboratory-based task and an age benefit in the naturalistic task, in line with the age-PM paradox. In terms of metacognition, important age differences were found across settings. In particular, the results pointed to poor resolution of JOLs made by older adults in the laboratory and by younger adults in the naturalistic setting. This suggests that younger and older participants could not discriminate between items they would later hit or miss but did so in different settings. Furthermore, although both age groups exhibited overconfidence in the naturalistic setting, this bias was significantly stronger for the younger adults. This might explain the observed differences in performance. That is, the advantage older adults have in naturalistic tasks may stem from a better ability to predict performance in this setting compared to younger adults, who tend instead to heavily overestimate their capabilities and may therefore not engage in appropriate strategies or planning. These findings speak to the functional relevance of metacognitive monitoring processes for PM performance and suggest considering metacognition as a key factor in explaining the age-PM paradox., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Inter-brain synchrony occurs between individuals who feel connected socially, but how synchrony relates to felt connectedness under naturalistic social interaction has remained enigmatic. We hypothesized that inter-brain synchrony between naturally interacting individuals might be associated with the internalization of a social identity, a link between an individual's personal identity and the social group to which the individual belongs. A convenience sample of sixty participants were split into dyads and interacted naturalistically on a social task. Through mapping EEG oscillatory waveforms onto a conceptual model categorizing the formation of a social identity within a naturalistic conversation, greater inter-brain synchrony was observed in the emergent stage within the formation of a social identity compared to earlier stages, where a social identity was not present. We provide evidence for greater neural synchrony related to higher socio-psychological connectedness during the development of social identity under naturalistic social interaction., (© 2024 The Author(s). British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The British Psychological Society.)

Research into prospective memory suggests that older adults may face particular difficulties remembering delayed intentions. One way to mitigate these difficulties is by using external reminders but relatively little is known about age-related differences in such cognitive offloading strategies. We examined younger and older adults' ( N = 88) performance on a memory task where they chose between remembering delayed intentions with internal memory (earning maximum reward per item) or external reminders (earning a reduced reward). This allowed us to distinguish (a) the absolute number of reminders used versus (b) the proreminder or antireminder bias, compared with each individual's optimal strategy. Older adults used more reminders overall, as might be expected, because they also had poorer memory performance. However, when compared against the optimal strategy weighing the costs versus benefits of reminders, it was only the younger adults who had a proreminder bias. Younger adults overestimated the benefit of reminders, whereas older adults underestimated it. Therefore, even when aging is associated with increased use of external memory aids overall, it can also be associated with reduced preference for external memory support, relative to the objective need for such support. This age-related difference may be driven at least in part by metacognitive processes, suggesting that metacognitive interventions could lead to improved use of cognitive tools. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as 'intention offloading'. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals' ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Individuals have systematic biases in their offloading strategies that are stable over time. Evidence also suggests that individual differences and developmental changes in offloading strategies are driven at least in part by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Previous research has shown that older adults can have difficulty remembering to fulfill delayed intentions. In the present study, we explored whether age differences in prospective memory are affected when participants are permitted to set reminders to help them remember. Furthermore, we examined whether metacognition can influence the use of such strategies and help older adults compensate for age-related memory decline. In this pre-registered study (N = 88) we administered a computerized task requiring a sample of older (aged 65-84) and younger (aged 18-30) participants to remember delayed intentions for a brief period, manipulating the possibility of setting reminders to create an external cue. Performance of the older group was significantly poorer than the younger group. Moreover, older adults were overconfident in their memory abilities and did not fully compensate for impaired performance, even when strategic reminder setting was permitted. These findings suggest that older adults possess limited metacognitive knowledge about their prospective memory limits and may not fully utilize cognitive offloading strategies to compensate for memory decline. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The technological advancement that is rapidly taking place in today's society allows increased opportunity for "cognitive offloading" by storing information in external devices rather than relying on internal memory. This opens the way to fundamental questions regarding the interplay between internal and external memory and the potential benefits and costs of placing information in the external environment. This article reports the results of three pre-registered online experiments investigating the consequences of prior cognitive offloading on A) subsequent unaided ability, and B) strategic decisions whether to engage in future cognitive offloading. We administered a web-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions for a brief period and manipulated the possibility of setting reminders to create an external cue. Earlier cognitive offloading had little effect upon individuals' subsequent unaided ability, leading to a small and nonsignificant drop in subsequent performance. However, there was a strong effect on participants' subsequent likelihood of setting reminders. These findings suggest that the short-term impact of cognitive offloading is more likely to be seen on individuals' strategy choices rather than basic memory processes.