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This chapter discusses drones as an example of a dual-use technology and explores the relationship between their design, their use, and the resulting values expressed in a new context of use. It provides an overview of theories such as value-sensitive design (VSD) with a better understanding of why dual use raises ethical issues. The chapter explains drone technology, and the approach of van Wynsberghe for a variety of reasons. It explore how drones fit the value hierarchy of a military context and how drones may or may not fit the value hierarchy of a military context and how drones may or may not fit the value hierarchy of a civilian context. The chapter explores the idea that the use of drones to replace police officers may also be in the best interests of citizens, where the scandals of police brutality in the United States against African American males. It discusses drones in different civil domains: agriculture, rescue and disaster management, policing, and city governance.

When should humans enhance themselves? We try to answer this\nquestion by engaging in a conceptual analysis of the nature of different\nactivities. We think that cognitive enhancement is morally\nimpermissible in some practice-oriented activities, such as some\neducational activities, when it is the case both that cognitive\nenhancement would negatively affect the point of those activities (i.e.\nlearning through a certain kind of effort ) and that we have good reasons\nto value that point. We then argue that cognitive enhancement should\nbe allowed in two groups of cases, namely in practice-oriented activities,\nsuch as recreational activities on which little moral value or social\nimport hangs, and in some prominently goal-directed activities, such as\nhigh-responsibility professions, the goal of which has significant moral\nor social value. Finally, we argue that the use of efficacious and relatively\nsafe cognitive enhancers may even be obligatory in those highresponsibility\nprofessions under certain special circumstances.

In this paper we sketch a new theory of human capacity – the Institutionalistic Theory of Capacity (ITC). According to ITC human capacities for actions are normatively defined powers deriving from a status or a role, i.e. powers deriving from a position within a normative structure. ITC stresses the inherently normative character of capacity attribution, thus challenging the strong naturalistic claim that human capacities could be fully analyzed by science. The concept of human capacity entails the possibility of failure: an agent occupying a role may fail to perform in accordance with a capacity actually possessed by the agent. Starting from a reflection on the logic of how technical artefacts (mal-) function, we show how ITC can make sense of failure, and why strong naturalistic views cannot., Methode - Analytic Perspectives, Vol 2, No 2 (2013): New perspectives for the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The term ‘Responsibility’ has different senses, as it may designate: a duty deriving from a role; the condition of who possesses the capacities required to be attributed the moral consequences of their actions; the position of who has carried out blameworthy actions or omissions; the position of who has to respond for damages (or benefits) caused by their behavior. Many see blameworthiness or culpability – the so-called ‘moral responsibility’ – as the paradigmatic sense of responsibility, and claim that this can be philosophically justified only through a metaphysical conception of “free will”. However, attributions of blameworthiness and culpability – taken as a whole – are morally justified mainly through their positive effects in terms of their reducing unwanted behavior. Indeed, in their more specific applications, attributions of culpability involve moral issues which cannot be solved without a reference to the metaphysics of personhood, the metaphysics of mind and action as well as to normative evaluations of justice and fairness. A similar conceptual structure is to be found in the other senses of responsibility. Responsabilità può significare molte cose: possedere obblighi legati a un ruolo, avere le qualità richieste per partecipare al "gioco" delle attribuzioni delle conseguenze delle proprie azioni, aver compiuto azioni od omissioni degne di biasimo oppure, più semplicemente, doversi fare carico di danni (o benefici) causati ad altri col proprio comportamento. Molti ritengono che le attribuzioni di colpevolezza e biasimo (la "responsabilità morale") – punto di partenza privilegiato della ricerca – siano moralmente accettabili soltanto sullo sfondo di una concezione metafisica del "libero arbitrio". In realtà, prese come sistema, esse sono moralmente giustificate soprattutto in virtù dei loro effetti positivi in termini di prevenzione di comportamenti futuri indesiderati. Certamente, nelle loro applicazioni specifiche, esse pongono anche molti altri problemi morali, non risolvibili senza il riferimento a considerazioni "metafisiche" su aspetti del concetto di persona, sulla natura della mente e dell'azione, nonché a valutazioni normative di giustizia ed equità. Analoga struttura ha l'analisi degli altri sensi di responsabilità.