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The COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic crisis combines the worst characteristics of previous crises. It features a simultaneous supply and demand shock; domestic, regional, and global scope; a projected long duration; and a high degree of uncertainty. What can be expected for recovery from the pandemic crisis across the world? This brief first assesses the projections of economic activity in 2020 and 2021 and the domestic and international conditions that will constrain and drive a possible recovery. It then discusses the potential shapes of the recovery (or lack thereof) for specific country conditions. Finally, it explores the need to balance short-term and long-term concerns, arguing in favor of policies that focus on sustained recovery, rather than quick but debt-fueled and short-lived gains. Drawing on the lessons from past crises, the brief concludes that sustained economic recovery is possible only when the underlying causes are addressed and the foundations of growth are protected. For the pandemic crisis, this implies mitigating the spread of the disease to manageable levels while keeping the economy sufficiently active. In the short term, economic policy should focus on preventing further poverty, averting unnecessary business closures, and avoiding lasting damage to human capital and productivity. In the long term, policy reform should address the structural vulnerabilities that the pandemic crisis has exposed. This includes reforms to expand labor and business formalization; to improve the coverage and adequacy of social protection; to extend financial inclusion to elderly, rural, and poor people; to promote digital transformation across society; and, most basically, to improve access to and quality of public health care.

Growing informal employment in Russia raises concerns about fiscal sustainability, productivity, and social protection. Cutting through various data and definitions, this report finds one consistent outcome: informal employment is on the rise. As of 2016, Russia’s informal employment was estimated to range between 15.1 and 21.2 percent. The fiscal loss of underpayment by informal workers is estimated at between 1 to 2.3 percent of GDP. However, Russia’s share of informal employment is not that high when compared to other middle-income countries. In fact, countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkey, who have a similar GDP per capita as Russia, exhibit higher informal employment rates – 30 and 33 percent, respectively. Informal employment is a pervasive phenomenon in Russian labor markets, and its growth cannot be solely attributed to changes in the sectoral or demographic composition of the labor force. Rather, informality appears to have been growing across all sectors and particularly among workers without at least some tertiary education. Migrants tend to be more informal: the 2016 share of informal migrant workers (only partially captured in the surveys) was 26.2 percent, versus 15.7 percent of Russian workers. The increase in informality is attributed mainly to the lack of formal job creation, which in recent years, was close to zero. The report focuses on three aspects that affect informality: labor market regulations; taxes and benefits; and labor mobility.

Russia is a country of global importance and great diversity. The world’s largest transcontinental country spans eleven time zones and is the ninth most populous country in the world. Russia is the main trading partner for many of its more than a dozen neighbors. It is richly endowed with natural resources, which underscores its importance as a global commodity exporter. But how wealthy is Russia, really? Drawing upon the important distinction between wealth and income, this report for the first time, comprehensively measures Russia’s national wealth.

This paper examines the past and future trajectory of the Russian Federation's potential growth: the speed at which an economy could grow if all resources were utilized efficiently. The findings show that it peaked before the 2008 global financial crisis and continued to decline up to 2017. The estimated potential growth rate was 3.8 percent in 2000-09 and 1.7 percent in 2010-17, a 2.1 percentage point decline. The most recent deceleration was due to a slowdown of productivity growth and a shrinking potential labor force, rather than a shortfall in capital accumulation. For its future trajectory, under the baseline scenario, Russia's potential growth is expected to continue its gradual downward trend, from 1.5 percent in 2017 to 1.3 percent in 2022. It is expected to recover gradually thereafter, primarily driven by stabilization of the labor force. The simulations of proposed reform measures currently being considered by policy makers, including a combination of pension reform, more migration, higher investment, and gradual acceleration of total factor productivity growth, can double Russia's potential growth rate to 3.0 percent by 2028. Under the assumptions discussed in the paper, pension reform, increases in migration, investment, and productivity contribute 0.4, 0.2, 0.6, and 0.3 percentage points, respectively, to the increase in Russia's potential growth rate. Potential growth is found to be most sensitive to changes in total factor productivity growth, suggesting that reforms that increase productivity may have the most impact on boosting Russia's potential growth.

As globalization has intensified, multinational enterprises' investments have become a sophisticated set of financial transactions that are difficult to monitor and classify by the home and host countries. In some cases, what is classified as foreign direct investment is rather "indirect foreign direct investment," channeled through a third country. Indirect flows have increased significantly in recent years, now accounting for almost 30 percent of global foreign direct investment flows. Indirect foreign direct investment flows also capture the flow of domestic funds channeled through offshore centers back to the local economy in the form of direct investment, also known as "foreign direct investment round tripping." These investments do not offer the benefits of typical foreign direct investment, and may lead to tax revenue and welfare losses. Round tripping is mostly channeled through offshore financial or transshipping centers. In most cases, domestic companies round trip their investments to benefit from preferential treatments reserved for certain countries and their firms. The most important policy measure to reduce round tripping activity and mitigate its impact is to improve the business environment for all firms; this can foster domestic and foreign investment, and may, to some extent, also curb foreign direct investment round tripping. Nevertheless, countries also need to adapt to the new playing field for foreign direct investment, and recognize the trade-offs of their national policies on capital flows. National policy measures must be complemented by international actions. At the same time, all indirect foreign direct investment flows should be closely monitored, something that is best conducted in coordination with international partners.

This report comes at a crucial time when the unprecedented global refugee crisis, most notably in Europe and the Mediterranean, has not only focused the world’s attention on the plight of refugees, but has also led to the politicization of refugee influxes. With an average of 24 people worldwide being displaced from their homes every minute of every day (UNHCR 2016), the debate surrounding the refugee crises is on the minds of many, ranging from governments and policy-makers to citizens, refugees, and host communities alike. Worldwide displacement is currently at an all-time high as war and persecution increase; one in every 113 people is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum (UNHCR 2016). In the past five years, at least 15 conflicts have erupted or reignited, and while protracted and harrowing wars have broken out in the Middle East, eight of these conflicts have been in Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Northeastern Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Burundi) (UNHCR 2015). To compound matters, developing countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Kenya are now hosting the largest share of refugees: they are home to nearly 90 percent of the world’s refugees (UNHCR 2016). This report, which provides an original analysis of the economic and social impact of refugees in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp on their Turkana hosts, therefore comes at an opportune time and could resonate with governments and policy makers beyond Kenya’s borders. In particular, the methodology authors have developed enables us to run policy scenarios in a rigorous manner, ranging from encampment to decampment (i.e. camp closure) scenarios, and the potential to apply this methodology in other refugee situations around the world is particularly advantageous.

Existing work on China's economic influence in Africa refers to Africa in broad terms, thereby generalizing the results to an extent that is unhelpful for policy-makers in a specific country. Moreover, the emphasis is on oil exporters. This paper remedies this by focusing on a single, oil-importing country: Kenya. The paper examines China's economic presence in Kenya and some of the popular myths surrounding Chinese economic activity. The first myth is that Chinese companies do not employ local workers. In fact, 78 percent of full-time and 95 percent of part-time employees in Chinese companies are locals. Second, although China represents a large potential market for local exporters, the study finds that China has a better chance of expanding its exports to Kenya than Kenya does to China based on existing specializations. This may change with recent oil discoveries in Kenya, increasing the space for Kenyan exports to China, as well as from China's shift to a consumption-driven economy which will increase demand for services, a growing strength of Kenya's economy (World Bank Country Economic Memorandum 2016). The paper emphasizes that Kenyan policy makers should be less concerned about bilateral trade imbalances and worry about Kenya's overall trade balance. However, the Standard Gauge Railway and Thika superhighway experiences suggest that Chinese firms offer relatively few technology transfer or supplier opportunities for local firms and academia. Third, the popular focus of Chinese competition is on the impact on well-organized Kenyan producers and not on consumers, thereby underestimating the benefits Kenyan consumer derive from the availability of more affordable Chinese goods. The paper concludes with policy directions for improving export competitiveness and transparency in infrastructure projects, and local content.

Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, pp.231-290; 2012

The authors use the night lights (satellite imagery from outer space) approach to estimate subnational 2013 GDP growth and levels for 47 counties in Kenya and 30 districts in Rwanda. Estimating subnational GDP is consequential for three reasons: First, there is strong policy interest in seeing how growth can occur in different parts of countries, so that communities can share in national prosperity and not get left behind. Second, sub-nationals themselves want to understand how they stack up against their neighbors and competitors, and how much they contribute to national GDP. Third, such information could help private investors to better assess where to undertake investments. Using night lights has the advantage of seeing a new (and more accurate) estimation of informal activity, and being independent of official data. However it may underestimate economic activity in sectors that are largely unlit (notably agriculture). Indeed, we find that the association between nightlights and GDP is stronger where unlit agriculture accounts for a smaller part of overall economic activity. With these caveats in mind, our analysis yields some interesting results. For Kenya, our results affirm that Nairobi County is the largest contributor to national GDP. However, at 13 percent, this contribution is lower (of 60 percent) as commonly thought. For Rwanda, the three Districts of Kigali account for 40 percent of national GDP, underscoring the lower scale of economic activity in the rest of the country. To get a composite picture of subnational economic activity, especially in the context of rapidly improving official statistics in Kenya and Rwanda, the authors note the importance of estimating subnational GDP using standard approaches (production, expenditure, income).

This paper uses the night lights (satellite imagery from outer space) approach to estimate growth in and levels of subnational 2013 gross domestic product for 47 counties in Kenya and 30 districts in Rwanda. Estimating subnational gross domestic product is consequential for three reasons. First, there is strong policy interest in how growth can occur in different parts of countries, so that communities can share in national prosperity and not get left behind. Second, subnational entities want to understand how they stack up against their neighbors and competitors, and how much they contribute to national gross domestic product. Third, such information could help private investors to assess where to undertake investments. Using night lights has the advantage of seeing a new and more accurate estimation of informal activity, and being independent of official data. However, the approach may underestimate economic activity in sectors that are largely unlit notably agriculture. For Kenya, the results of the analysis affirm that Nairobi County is the largest contributor to national gross domestic product. However, at 13 percent, this contribution is lower than commonly thought. For Rwanda, the three districts of Kigali account for 40 percent of national gross domestic product, underscoring the lower scale of economic activity in the rest of the country. To get a composite picture of subnational economic activity, especially in the context of rapidly improving official statistics in Kenya and Rwanda, it is important to estimate subnational gross domestic product using standard approaches (production, expenditure, income).

The magnitude and persistence of growth in gross domestic product are topics of intense scrutiny by economists. Although the existing techniques provide a range of tools to study the nature of growth and volatility time series, these usually come with shortcomings, including the need to arbitrarily define acceleration spells, and focus on a particular frequency at a time. This paper explores the application of"wavelet-based"techniques to study the time-varying nature of growth and volatility. These techniques lend themselves to a more robust analysis of short-term and long-term determinants of growth and volatility than the traditional decomposition techniques, as demonstrated on a small sample of countries. In addition to having desirable technical advantages, such as localization in time and frequency and the ability to work with non-stationary series, these techniques also make it possible to accurately decompose the association between growth trajectories of different countries over different time horizons. Such"co-movement"analysis can provide policy makers with important insights on regional integration, growth poles, and how short and long term developments in other countries affect their domestic economy.