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Distributed control is an effective method to coordinate multiple components in a microgrid. It usually has mandatory requirements for communication graph topology; changing the topology unexpectedly could disrupt the operation of a distributed controller. A denial of service (DoS) attack blocks communication channels to cause variations in communication graph. Unforeseen topology changes render a controller to receive incomplete system information. Control decisions made based on incorrect information can lead to significantly reduced grid supporting capability. As a result, the vital power balance between generation and load may be challenged. Determining power balance requires steady-state power flow analysis; however, the cyber-induced steady-state analysis is not well studied in the literature. In this article, we show that a cyber–physical microgrid with unknown DoS attacks has augmented uncertain power flow equations, whose special structure creates new computational issue to determining power balance. To deal with the issue, we develop a novel cyber-induced microgrid model: the cyber–physical system is transformed into a pure physical model, where the disruption effects of DoS in the cyber layer are shown to be equivalent to the variations of the physical model parameters. With the transformed system, we develop a sufficient condition to ascertain the system power balance under unknown DoS attacks. In addition, practical insights for resilient distributed control design are shown as well.

The flexibility provided by High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) systems can be further extended by Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMAPC) systems. WAMPAC systems enable many HVDC applications and, on the other hand, inevitably introduce cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. In this work, a security domain layer and decision framework is reported to detect and mitigate the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting HVDC stations. Specifically, a rule-based cyber-attack detection method is introduced and implemented on Raspberry Pi and tested on the real-time HVDC simulation facility on the real-time digital simulator (RTDS) platform at ABB U.S. Corporate Research Center.

The wide area measurement, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system enables high voltage direct current (HVDC) systems to provide advanced grid applications in various areas such as transient stability improvement, wide area damping control, and maximum power transfer improvement. However, the WAMPAC system inevitably introduces an enlarged attack surface from the perspective of a would-be cyber attacker. In this paper, two cyber-attack detection methods are proposed to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks toward HVDC controllers through WAMPAC systems: 1) learning based method and 2) model based method. The performance of the two methods is evaluated on Kundur's two-area system.

As semiconductor digital logic and analog I/O bandwidth operates close to 10Gbps ranges, semiconductor package technology requires much tighter attenuation and timing budgets. To overcome electrical performance degradation while maintain cost-performance BOM models, it is required to consider the effect of PBGA package substrate Cu plating bars. In this paper, we analyzed the electrical performance based on the effect of Cu plating bars.