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This forum is about race and racism in critical security studies, as well as the latter’s reparative possibilities. Racism is a ubiquitous ailment in many societies and manifests itself differently under varying circumstances (Clair and Denis, 2015; McWhorter, 2019). It is a complex phenomenon that is sometimes hard to define or dismiss. In most cases, racism may be invisible, systemic or structural. For the purposes of this article, racism includes bigotry, prejudice or discrimination against people on the basis of identity, usually race, ethnicity or culture. The above terms are problematic and require explanations, but these cannot be provided in such a short article. Racism may be directed against people who are in a majority, as was the case in South Africa for over a century until the 1990s. It may also be directed against a minority, as is the case in the USA with regard to blacks, in China with regard to Uighurs, and in Myanmar in relation to the Rohingya. This definition of racism is minimalist and may not cover racism in some circumstances...

The outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020 provided cover for some states to take strict and hostile measures against refugees and asylum seekers, thereby privileging self-regarding policies. However, this article shows that the international refugee regime continues to be supported by many states and international actors seeking to emphasise cosmopolitan and ‘other’-regarding policies. The article has important implications for study and policy around refugees, and for human rights and security practitioners., The outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020 provided cover for some states to take strict and hostile measures against refugees and asylum seekers, thereby privileging self-regarding over other-regarding or cosmopolitan-oriented policies. The hostile measures, which have included detentions, pushbacks and other refugee deterrence actions not only appeared to shake the refugee system, but they increased the vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees who continued to be exposed to torture, drownings at sea, trafficking and sexual violence. This development, which included a fine-tuning of some measures that had been hatched before the emergence of COVID-19, appeared to set back efforts to nurture the bonds of global human solidarity and expand moral and ethical boundaries beyond state borders. However, the international refugee regime continues and is supported by many states and other international actors that seek to emphasise cosmopolitan and other-regarding policies. The resilience of the refugee system underlines the fact that international society has a practical and moral basis to challenge exclusionist policies towards asylum seekers and refugees, prevent future harm that might result from asylum deterrence policies and develop more humane forms of international refugee governance.

In the past few decades, Kenya has benefitted considerably from its improved relations with China. Chinese investments in infrastructure, education, and ICT have opened up greater opportunities for development. Moreover, the availability of diverse and affordable goods has enabled many Kenyans to engage in more commercial activities. This economics-driven diplomacy has been shaped by Kenyan and Chinese political leaders, shifts in the structure of the international system after the Cold War, and the evolving interests of both countries. However, Kenya’s diplomacy is based on a weak knowledge base, as few Kenyan policy makers speak Mandarin and understand China’s diplomatic history. Moreover, China’s investment patterns, which differ from those of Kenya’s traditional Western partners, could negatively impact on Kenya’s commercial domination of eastern Africa. Thus, while Kenya–China relations have promoted some of Kenya’s policy objectives, they also contain the potential to undermine some of Kenya’s other long-range goals.

The continuing political crisis in South Sudan has been explained almost exclusively in terms of internal power dynamics. This article goes beyond the domestic focus and examines the manner in which the imbroglio has exposed weaknesses in South Sudan's sovereign statehood. It argues that it was the failure to uphold empirical and popular sovereignty that, in part, precipitated the problem. Therefore, it suggests that a resolution ought to involve a re-examination of the relationship between popular, empirical and juridical sovereignty. This article posits that a renegotiation of South Sudan's sovereignty, involving co-governance, would deliver good governance, strengthen economic management, facilitate state-building, and enhance regional security.

In their book, Gridlock: why global cooperation is failing when we need it most, Hale, Held, and Young argue persuasively why post-World War II institutions delivered the global cooperation anticipated but ended up creating other serious problems for international society. They explain how the successes of earlier cooperation efforts produced greater multipolarity, institutional inertia, institutional fragmentation, and some difficult problems that, in turn, paved the pathways through which the governance gap between the multilateral system and global needs became wide. However, their book, whose thesis revolves around the nature and functions of global institutions, fails to define the term ‘institution’. This essay argues that had the authors elaborated institutions, their argument would have been much stronger.

Australia's engagement with Africa during the Rudd and Gillard governments was primarily driven by the national interest, which revolved around three issues: humanitarianism, support for mining corporations, and the United Nations Security Council seat. This article argues that there is a need for the Abbott government to retain the same depth and breadth of relationships with Africa. It is in the interest of both Australia and African states for the Australian government to remain committed to humanitarian objectives and to help African countries meet some of their Millennium Development Goal targets. Moreover, the continued support of Australian mining corporations operating in Africa, especially through the training of African policy makers in mining governance, is good for both Africa and Australia. Finally, Australia's continued success in multilateral diplomacy will depend on support from all parts of the world, including Africa. Australia's success at the multilateral level will, in turn, result in...

Australia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is primarily driven by self-interest. Australian prime ministers, foreign ministers, diplomats and other political leaders have asserted on various occasions that their goal in the region has always been to promote Australia’s national interests while at the same time helping some of the states in the region meet some of their needs. However, Australia has not pursued self-interests to the exclusion of global values and norms. This article examines Australia’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and explains how governments have tried to align national interests with global values in the region since the Cold War ended.

Africa's poverty partly stems from the lack of strong scientific, technological and knowledge bases. The abundance of natural resources on the continent has been of limited value to the African people because they do not have the tools with which to turn their resources into consumable wealth. To rectify this situation, African policy makers would have to undertake various measures. First, they need to define the type of knowledge their countries require. Second, they ought to establish conditions for nurturing strategic leaders who will, in turn, seek the right forms of knowledge to tackle Africa's problems. Third, policy makers need to build the political and legal frameworks that encourage the absorption and application of scientific innovations. Fourth, African leaders ought to revamp the universities, establish regional research centres, and take capacity building more seriously. It is these measures that will facilitate Africa's meaningful participation in global knowledge flows. Above all, knowledge creation should aim at attaining human welfare, participatory democracy, peace building and socio-economic justice.

Terrorism and counter-terrorism measures have undermined the norms, rules and institutions that underpin security in Africa. Through the use of indiscriminate violence, terrorism has maimed and killed innocent people, threatened jobs and various social activities, and dented democratic processes of resolving conflict in society. Similarly, military and legislative counter-terrorism measures have caused the deaths of innocent people, undermined democratic governance and eroded civil liberties. In the face of these problems, African states need creative and innovative approaches to combat terrorism. A sustainable counter-terrorism strategy should focus on institutions, development and social justice.

Following postnational signs is one of way of moving ‘beyond nationalism’, and this requires a critique of the moral and ethical foundations of the modern political community. However, moving ‘beyond nationalism’ is by itself not necessarily superior to operating within national boundaries. The important issue is how we can improve the human condition by following postnational signs or moving beyond nationalism. The route through human rights is one of many, but it is ethically appealing because it has the potential to broaden the scope of human emancipation and strengthen social bonds across the globe. Promoting human rights can provide a platform for the deconstruction of the nation-state, which will subsequently expose its totalizing effects, especially its strategies for ensuring that the boundaries of territory, nation, citizenship and sovereignty are coterminous.

I am pleased that Bellamy and McDonald have explained why they used an altered version of solidarism. Had they cited the post-1977 sources, rather than Hedley Bull's 1966 paper, in their article, my reaction would have been different. However, they have responded with further charges. Given space constraints, I respond to some, but not all, of their charges. This rejoinder is divided into five parts. The first defines the English School (ES), while the second discusses security in the ES. The third addresses the claim that I portrayed human security as a threat to the ES and the fourth examines the argument that I regard ES texts as sacred. The final part speculates about what we might learn from this debate.

Although English School (ES) theorists have played a significant and explicit role in security studies, Bellamy and McDonald claim that this has not been the case. However, they fail to show how they have arrived at their conclusion. Moreover, Bellamy and McDonald conflate solidarism with cosmopolitanism, with the result that they wrongly claim that some theorists are ‘weak’ while others are ‘deep’ solidarists. In addition, their attempt to view human security as a reflection of solidarist trends in the ES is welcome, but their method risks undermining the ES. I propose that an ES perspective on security needs to incorporate elements from three streams of thought: pluralism, solidarism and cosmopolitanism. I contend that security ought to be viewed as people centred and that it should be embedded within international society's norms, rules and institutions.

While the events of 11 September 2001 violated universally accepted rules, norms and institutions, US unilateralism since then has threatened the vitality of global governance. By weakening the rules, norms and institutions that constitute global governance, the George W. Bush administration has inadvertently created more room for future terrorism. What the United States and international society should do to undermine the bases of terrorism is to enhance international rules, norms and institutions. Global governance is the most effective antidote against terror.

Security and state sovereignty need to be understood as two sides of the same coin. Without security, state sovereignty cannot be realized and vice versa. Security and state sovereignty are part of the global understandings, institutions, and rules that are continually being negotiated by global actors, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. While some analysts and policy-makers have claimed that state sovereignty is absolute, indivisible, and inalienable, the transitional societies of Cambodia and East Timor have demonstrated that sovereignty can be shared among several entities, including the United Nations. Moreover, developments in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere show that states, international organizations, and other global actors continue to redefine the meanings and understandings of security and sovereignty in their interactions with one another.

As we enter the twenty-. rst century and the third millennium, International Relations1 (IR) is arguably more fragmented than it was 50 years ago. Realism, which has been closely identified with the discipline since the 1940s, is still dominant in North American IR, but even there it is increasingly regarded as just one of the paradigms.2 Most textbooks now include sections on liberalism, neoliberalism, international society, postmodernism, feminism, post-structuralism, constructivism and critical theory (see Jackson and Sorensen 1999; Nossal 1998; Baylis and Smith 1997; Brown 1997). A distinctive feature of recent IR debates is that most theorists tend to address more critically such themes as science and interpretation; objectivity and subjectivity; norms and practices; and materialism and idealism. Very little is assumed or taken for granted. While these debates have provided platforms for previously marginalised Western viewpoints, they have also unfortunately produced cult-like mentalities. Many scholars talk of ‘opening space’ when all they do is provide an ‘opening’ on one side and a ‘closure’ on the other. Others appear to find it attractive to accuse earlier theorists of closure even when they have not engaged broadly the writings of these earlier thinkers. I am of the view that one cannot be serious about ‘opening’ when one insists that certain phenomena cannot be studied scientifically or vice versa. The emancipatory power or hegemonic status of any theoretical framework should not be taken for granted. Indeed, anti-essentialism, like rationalism, has the potential for both closure and opening.

Recently, some analysts have accused the United Nations of eroding the sovereignty of its members. However, these critics often ignore the fact that the creation of the United Nations was itself one incident in the process of reinterpreting sovereignty which has gone on for centuries. Before 1945, sovereignty was often reinterpreted to fit the changing norms and institutions. As a principle which legitimises political control and helps enhance international security, sovereignty often reflects the prevailing notions of international order. While the Security Council has tried to redefine sovereignty after the cold war, the UN Charter remains a constraint on such reinterpretation. If the Charter is not amended to reflect post-cold war changes, the international society might be split between supporters of the Charter principles of sovereignty and those who seek change.

AUTHORITARIAN leaders and single-party régimes of all shades increasingly came under great pressures between 1990 and 1993 to liberalise and permit more participation in the political process. This transformation, which was part of what Samuel Huntington described as ‘the third wave of democratisation’,1stemmed from sustained efforts by domestic political forces in African states, albeit assisted by a variety of demanded requirements from international financial institutions and industrialised countries, as well as by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. According to the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, the ‘new resolve to establish new attitudes, arrangements and structures’ came directly out of the exhaustion of the cold war.2In other words, the promotion of democracy in Africa was part of the so-called peace dividend.3Expectations for political evolution throughout the world were so high that some analysts predicted the emergence of ‘an international democratic order’.4As Keith Somerville has observed: ‘Africa entered the 1990S in a mood of hope and expectation’.5

As this chapter was being concluded in late 2010, two very pertinent political developments took place in Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the development was negative, while in Kenya, the development appeared to be positive and most analysts believed it was likely to reduce the crisis of governance.1

Sudan achieved an Islamic revolution recently without violence. Through a ‘creeping’ revolution that started in the 1970s, Islamic fundamentalists have consolidated their power through wealth and systematic control of the civil service, the economy, the judiciary and the armed forces. The fact that the major political parties in northern Sudan, except the Communist Party, have been affiliated to religious sects does not mean all Muslims support the Sharia. Fundamentalists comprise 20% of Sudan's Muslim population, but they are richer, better organised and more highly motivated. The implementation of the Sharia has been accompanied by the entrenchment of dictatorial rule, a weakening of institutions, the erosion of civil liberties, the aggravation of the civil war in southern Sudan and an ever‐worsening economic malaise. The revolution has also caused apprehension in Washington and some African and Arab states, but there is as yet no evidence that Sudan poses a direct threat to its neighbours.

War‐or‐Peace in North‐East Africa?. Peter Woodward, London: Conflict Studies No. 219. 1989. 29pp. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic. Edmond J. Keller, Bloomington: Indiana Un...

Although Somalis speak one language and belong to the same ethnic group, they are deeply divided along clan lines. These clan and lineage differences have weakened government institutions and led to civil wars. President Siad Barre, now advanced in age, can neither command the respect of major clans nor exercise much power, and his threats come not only from resistance forces, but also from his family and clan. The armed forces, which are run like ethnic militias, are demoralised and poorly equipped, with the result that they are totally unable to stop the civil wars. Due to the segmented nature of Somali society, there is no solution in sight to the country's political problems.