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Background: Shad Karanas mentioned in Ayurveda are the means for attaining the state of Dhatusamyata. Samavaya is the sixth Karana among these and it provides the knowledge of relation between Dravya, Guna and Karma. This kind of knowledge becomes the basic tool in the field of diagnosis as well as in the selection of proper drug. Aim: To assess the Samavaya relation between Ama and its Hetu and Lakshanas along with Practical evaluation of Samavaya by using Pippalimula on Ama. Materials and Methods: The study comprising of total 23 patients of Ama and divided into two groups. Pippalimula tablet (each of 500 mg, 2 tablets four times daily) was administered in Group A (n = 13) while Group B (n = 10) was treated with placebo tablet (each of 500 mg, 2 tablets four times daily) for the duration of 10 days. Results: After the completion of treatment, all the parameters of Group A showed statistically highly signifi cant results, whereas in Group B some parameters showed significant results and others were insignificant. Conclusion: The study specified the Karanatva of Samavaya as the Laghu, Ruksha and Ushna Gunas which were present Samavayatvena in Pippalimula, and were absent in placebo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the responses on the problem of the one over the many in the contrast of Indian and Huayan Buddhists. It mentions that most Indian Buddhists infer that wholes are unreal while Huayan Buddhists argues that the inherence relation between a whole and its collection of parts does not need to be eternal. It cites that the Nyaya-Vaisesika School's thesis says that two different distinct entities can occupy the same space simultaneously, provided that there is inherence.

Many friends of the category of particularised qualities subscribe to the view that particularised qualities have a unique bearer in which they inhere; no such quality then can inhere in two different entities. But it seems that this idea is flawed, for there are apparent counterexamples. An apple's redness is identical with the redness of its skin, though the apple is distinct from its skin. So it seems that a principle of bearer-uniqueness has to be modified, maybe by excluding certain unwanted cases. However, I argue that the need of a modification is not a direct consequence of the supposed counterexamples. Their dangerous potential for the principle arises if one takes the genitive in expressions of the form ‘a's F-ness’ to signify the relation of inherence. I propose an alternative view: The genitive signifies a relation which is indeed closely related to inherence, but which is, contrary to inherence itself, partitive. That is, it may hold between a particularised quality and another entity because it holds between the quality and a part of the entity. If one regards the ontologically interesting relation of inherence as non-partitive, one can still adhere to an unrestricted principle of bearer-uniqueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the article "Inherence" by G. E. L. Owen in which he argues against the attribution to Greek philosopher Aristotle in the philosophy that there are individual properties which cannot be found in more than one subject. Particular focus is given to the conflation of Owen's description of a person's hair with two poems by different authors Danny Deever and Oscar Wilde. Lines from the two poems are presented.