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Detecting the presence of an object is a different process than identifying the object as a particular object. This difference has not been taken into account in designing experiments on the neural correlates of consciousness. We compared the electrophysiological correlates of conscious detection and identification directly by measuring ERPs while participants performed either a task only requiring the conscious detection of the stimulus or a higher-level task requiring its conscious identification. Behavioral results showed that, even if the stimulus was consciously detected, it was not necessarily identified. A posterior electrophysiological signature 200-300 msec after stimulus onset was sensitive for conscious detection but not for conscious identification, which correlated with a later widespread activity. Thus, we found behavioral and neural evidence for elementary visual experiences, which are not yet enriched with higher-level knowledge. The search for the mechanisms of consciousness should focus on the early elementary phenomenal experiences to avoid the confounding effects of higher-level processes.

Studies on the neural basis of visual awareness, the subjective experience of seeing, have found several potential neural corre- lates of visual awareness. Some of them may not directly correlate with awareness but with post-perceptual processes, such as reporting one’s awareness of the stimulus. We dissociated potential electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness from those occurring during response selection and thus co-occurring with post-perceptual processing. The participants performed two GO-NOGO conditions. In the aware-GO condition they responded with a key press when they were aware of the stimulus and withheld responding when they were unaware of it. In the unaware-GO condition they withheld responding when they were aware and responded when they were not aware of the stimulus. Thus, event-related potentials could be measured to aware and una- ware trials when responding was required and when not required. The results revealed that the N200 amplitude (180–280 ms) over the occipital and posterior temporal cortex was enhanced in aware trials as compared with trials without awareness. This effect (visual awareness negativity, VAN) did not depend on responding. The amplitude of P3 (350–450 ms) also was enhanced in aware trials as compared with unaware trials. In addition, the amplitudes in the P3 time window depended on responding: they were greater when awareness was mapped to GO-response than when not, suggesting that P3 reflects post-perceptual process- ing, that is, it occurs after awareness has emerged. These findings support theories of visual awareness that assume a relatively early onset of visual awareness before P3.

Chromatic information is processed by the visual system both at an unconscious level and at a level that results in conscious perception of color. It remains unclear whether both conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information depend on activity in the early visual cortex or whether unconscious chromatic processing can also rely on other neural mechanisms. In this study, the contribution of early visual cortex activity to conscious and unconscious chromatic processing was studied using single-pulse TMS in three time windows 40-100 msec after stimulus onset in three conditions: conscious color recognition, forced-choice discrimination of consciously invisible color, and unconscious color priming. We found that conscious perception and both measures of unconscious processing of chromatic information depended on activity in early visual cortex 70-100 msec after stimulus presentation. Unconscious forced-choice discrimination was above chance only when participants reported perceiving some stimulus features (but not color).

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.