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383 results on '"Sakurai, Yuko"'

3. Sample Complexity of Learning Multi-value Opinions in Social Networks

Author

Shinoda, Masato, Sakurai, Yuko, Oyama, Satoshi, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Aydoğan, Reyhan, editor, Criado, Natalia, editor, Lang, Jérôme, editor, Sanchez-Anguix, Victor, editor, and Serramia, Marc, editor

Published
2023
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4. Gini Index based Initial Coin Offering Mechanism

Author

Guo, Mingyu, Wang, Zhenghui, and Sakurai, Yuko

Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract

As a fundraising method, Initial Coin Offering (ICO) has raised billions of dollars for thousands of startups in the past two years. Existing ICO mechanisms place more emphasis on the short-term benefits of maximal fundraising while ignoring the problem of unbalanced token allocation, which negatively impacts subsequent fundraising and has bad effects on introducing new investors and resources. We propose a new ICO mechanism which uses the concept of Gini index for the very first time as a mechanism design constraint to control allocation inequality. Our mechanism maintains an elegant and straightforward structure. It allows the agents to modify their bids as a price discovery process, while limiting the bids of whales. We analyze the agents' equilibrium behaviors under our mechanism. Under natural technical assumptions, we show that most agents have simple dominant strategies and the equilibrium revenue approaches the optimal revenue asymptotically in the number of agents. We verify our mechanism using real ICO dataset we collected, and confirm that our mechanism performs well in terms of both allocation fairness and revenue.

Published
2020

5. Mechanism Design for Public Projects via Neural Networks

Author

Wang, Guanhua, Guo, Runqi, Sakurai, Yuko, Babar, Ali, and Guo, Mingyu

Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract

We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a sufficient condition on the prior distribution for the conservative equal costs mechanism to be the optimal strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism. For general distributions, we propose a dynamic program that solves for the optimal mechanism. For the excludable public project model, we identify a similar sufficient condition for the serial cost sharing mechanism to be optimal for $2$ and $3$ agents. We derive a numerical upper bound. Experiments show that for several common distributions, the serial cost sharing mechanism is close to optimality. The serial cost sharing mechanism is not optimal in general. We design better performing mechanisms via neural networks. Our approach involves several technical innovations that can be applied to mechanism design in general. We interpret the mechanisms as price-oriented rationing-free (PORF) mechanisms, which enables us to move the mechanism's complex (e.g., iterative) decision making off the network, to a separate program. We feed the prior distribution's analytical form into the cost function to provide quality gradients for training. We use supervision to manual mechanisms as a systematic way for initialization. Our approach of "supervision and then gradient descent" is effective for improving manual mechanisms' performances. It is also effective for fixing constraint violations for heuristic-based mechanisms that are infeasible.

Published
2020

6. Robustness against Agent Failure in Hedonic Games

Author

Igarashi, Ayumi, Ota, Kazunori, Sakurai, Yuko, and Yokoo, Makoto

Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract

We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also show that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality., Comment: 17 pages

Published
2019

7. Mitigating Fairness and Efficiency Tradeoff in Vehicle-Dispatch Problems

Author

Ota, Masato, Sakurai, Yuko, Guo, Mingyu, Noda, Itsuki, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Dignum, Frank, editor, Mathieu, Philippe, editor, Corchado, Juan Manuel, editor, and De La Prieta, Fernando, editor

Published
2022
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12. Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Oyama, Satoshi, Guo, Mingyu, Yokoo, Makoto, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Baldoni, Matteo, editor, Dastani, Mehdi, editor, Liao, Beishui, editor, Sakurai, Yuko, editor, and Zalila Wenkstern, Rym, editor

Published
2019
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13. Solving Coalition Structure Generation Problems over Weighted Graph

Author

Watanabe, Emi, Koshimura, Miyuki, Sakurai, Yuko, Yokoo, Makoto, Goos, Gerhard, Founding Editor, Hartmanis, Juris, Founding Editor, Bertino, Elisa, Editorial Board Member, Gao, Wen, Editorial Board Member, Steffen, Bernhard, Editorial Board Member, Woeginger, Gerhard, Editorial Board Member, Yung, Moti, Editorial Board Member, Baldoni, Matteo, editor, Dastani, Mehdi, editor, Liao, Beishui, editor, Sakurai, Yuko, editor, and Zalila Wenkstern, Rym, editor

Published
2019
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18. A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints

Author

Hattori, Hiromitsu, Yokoo, Makoto, Sakurai, Yuko, and Shintani, Toramatsu

Subjects
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the remaining endowment of money must be explicitlyrepresented in each state, and the calculation of the optimal biddingstrategy becomes time-consuming when the initial endowment of money mbecomes large.In this paper, we develop a new problem formalization that avoids explicitlyrepresenting the remaining endowment, by assuming the utility of a user canbe represented in a quasi-linear form, and representing the payment as astate-transition cost. Experimental evaluations show that we can obtainmore than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time. Furthermore, we havedeveloped a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding strategy underbudget constraints, and have experimentally confirmed the efficacy of thismethod., Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2001)

Published
2013

19. Aggregating Crowd Opinions Using Shapley Value Regression

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Kawahara, Jun, Oyama, Satoshi, Hutchison, David, Series Editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series Editor, Kittler, Josef, Series Editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series Editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series Editor, Mitchell, John C., Series Editor, Naor, Moni, Series Editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series Editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series Editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series Editor, Tygar, Doug, Series Editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series Editor, Kaenampornpan, Manasawee, editor, Malaka, Rainer, editor, Nguyen, Duc Dung, editor, and Schwind, Nicolas, editor

Published
2018
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22. Crowdsourcing Mechanism Design

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Matsuda, Masafumi, Shinoda, Masato, Oyama, Satoshi, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, An, Bo, editor, Bazzan, Ana, editor, Leite, João, editor, Villata, Serena, editor, and van der Torre, Leendert, editor

Published
2017
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23. Coalition Structure Generation for Partition Function Games Utilizing a Concise Graphical Representation

Author

Zha, Aolong, Nomoto, Kazuki, Ueda, Suguru, Koshimura, Miyuki, Sakurai, Yuko, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, An, Bo, editor, Bazzan, Ana, editor, Leite, João, editor, Villata, Serena, editor, and van der Torre, Leendert, editor

Published
2017
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25. Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets

Author

Guo, Mingyu, Sakurai, Yuko, Todo, Taiki, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Baldoni, Matteo, editor, Chopra, Amit K., editor, Son, Tran Cao, editor, Hirayama, Katsutoshi, editor, and Torroni, Paolo, editor

Published
2016
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31. Strategy-Proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility

Author

Ihara, Takamasa, Tsuruta, Shunsuke, Todo, Taiki, Sakurai, Yuko, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Chen, Qingliang, editor, Torroni, Paolo, editor, Villata, Serena, editor, Hsu, Jane, editor, and Omicini, Andrea, editor

Published
2015
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32. Flexible Reward Plans for Crowdsourced Tasks

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Shinoda, Masato, Oyama, Satoshi, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Chen, Qingliang, editor, Torroni, Paolo, editor, Villata, Serena, editor, Hsu, Jane, editor, and Omicini, Andrea, editor

Published
2015
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35. Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for the k-Winner Selection Problem

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Okimoto, Tenda, Oka, Masaaki, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Goebel, Randy, editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Wahlster, Wolfgang, editor, Boella, Guido, editor, Elkind, Edith, editor, Savarimuthu, Bastin Tony Roy, editor, Dignum, Frank, editor, and Purvis, Martin K., editor

Published
2013
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36. Incremental Set Recommendation Based on Class Differences

Author

Shirai, Yasuyuki, Tsuruma, Koji, Sakurai, Yuko, Oyama, Satoshi, Minato, Shin-ichi, Hutchison, David, editor, Kanade, Takeo, editor, Kittler, Josef, editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., editor, Mattern, Friedemann, editor, Mitchell, John C., editor, Naor, Moni, editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, editor, Pandu Rangan, C., editor, Steffen, Bernhard, editor, Sudan, Madhu, editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, editor, Tygar, Doug, editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., editor, Weikum, Gerhard, editor, Goebel, Randy, editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Wahlster, Wolfgang, editor, Tan, Pang-Ning, editor, Chawla, Sanjay, editor, Ho, Chin Kuan, editor, and Bailey, James, editor

Published
2012
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37. A Compact Representation Scheme of Coalitional Games Based on Multi-Terminal Zero-Suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams

Author

Sakurai, Yuko, Ueda, Suguru, Iwasaki, Atsushi, Minato, Shin-Ichi, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, Goebel, Randy, editor, Siekmann, Jörg, editor, Wahlster, Wolfgang, editor, Kinny, David, editor, Hsu, Jane Yung-jen, editor, Governatori, Guido, editor, and Ghose, Aditya K., editor

Published
2011
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42. Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations

Author

Ohta, Naoki, Conitzer, Vincent, Ichimura, Ryo, Sakurai, Yuko, Iwasaki, Atsushi, Yokoo, Makoto, Hutchison, David, Series editor, Kanade, Takeo, Series editor, Kittler, Josef, Series editor, Kleinberg, Jon M., Series editor, Mattern, Friedemann, Series editor, Mitchell, John C., Series editor, Naor, Moni, Series editor, Nierstrasz, Oscar, Series editor, Pandu Rangan, C., Series editor, Steffen, Bernhard, Series editor, Sudan, Madhu, Series editor, Terzopoulos, Demetri, Series editor, Tygar, Doug, Series editor, Vardi, Moshe Y., Series editor, Weikum, Gerhard, Series editor, and Gent, Ian P., editor

Published
2009
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45. De novo Inflammatory Bowel Disease in Kidney Transplant Recipients: A Single-Center Case Series Study

Author

Ogata, Masatomo, Kato, Masaki, Miyauchi, Takamasa, Murata-Hasegawa, Marie, Sakurai, Yuko, Shinoda, Kazunobu, Yamazaki, Hajime, Shibagaki, Yugo, and Yazawa, Masahiko

Abstract

Introduction:Gastrointestinal complications are common after solid organ transplantation. New-onset inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) after transplantation (de novo) is a major differential diagnosis of diarrhea after liver transplantation (LT) because of its high incidence in the field. However, the incidence of IBD after kidney transplantation (KT) remains unknown. Methods:This case series comprised six de novo IBD patients who had undergone KT at our hospital from April 1998 to December 2020. In this period, 232 KT recipients were identified. Participants were analyzed based on their colonoscopy diagnoses. Detailed clinical information regarding both KT- and IBD-related symptoms or outcomes was obtained, and we calculated the incidence of de novo IBD from the date of KT. Results:Of the 232 recipients in the median observation period of 6.1 (interquartile range: 2.6, 10.8) years, six recipients (one with Crohn’s disease and five with ulcerative colitis) were diagnosed with de novo IBD. The incidence of de novo IBD after KT was 355.8/100,000 person-years (95% confidence interval, 159.8–791.9 per 100,000 person-years). Bloody stools and diarrhea did not always occur, with bloody stools occurring in three and diarrhea in 2 patients at the time of diagnosis. No recipient developed graft failure or extraintestinal complications (e.g., IBD-related nephritis or arthritis). Conclusion:Despite a small sample size, this study’s results indicate that the incidence of de novo IBD after KT may be similar to that after LT and higher than that in the general population. Larger studies are required to validate these preliminary findings.

Published
2023
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46. Retroperitoneal Hemorrhage in Patients with COVID-19 Undergoing Hemodialysis: Three Case Reports

Author

Oka, Hideaki, primary, Homma, Yoshito, additional, Nishino, Yuki, additional, Suemori, Koichiro, additional, Sato, Norio, additional, Sakurai, Yuko, additional, Sekimoto, Mizuki, additional, Ando, Shota, additional, Iwamoto, Saki, additional, Iwamoto, Takaki, additional, Kondo, Mika, additional, Kamimura, Taro, additional, Nakano, Toshiaki, additional, and Kitazono, Takanari, additional

Published
2022
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48. Sample Complexity ofLearning Multi-value Opinions inSocial Networks

Author

1000050271044, Shinoda, Masato, 1000010396137, Sakurai, Yuko, 1000030346100, Oyama, Satoshi, 1000050271044, Shinoda, Masato, 1000010396137, Sakurai, Yuko, 1000030346100, and Oyama, Satoshi

Abstract

We consider how many users we need to query in order to estimate the extent to which multi-value opinions (information) have propagated in a social network. For example, if the launch date of a new product has changed many times, the company might want to know to which people the most current information has reached. In the propagation model we consider, the social network is represented as a directed graph, and an agent (node) updates its state if it receives a stronger opinion (updated information) and then forwards the opinion in accordance with the direction of its edges. Previous work evaluated opinion propagation in a social network by using the probably approximately correct (PAC) learning framework and considered only binary opinions. In general, PAC learnability, i.e., the finiteness of the number of samples needed, is not guaranteed when generalizing from a binary-value model to a multi-value model. We show that the PAC learnability of multi-value opinions propagating in a social network. We first prove that the number of samples needed in a multi-opinion model is sufficient for (k−1)log(k−1) times the number of samples needed in a binary-opinion model, when k (≥3) is the number of opinions. We next prove that the upper and lower bounds on the number of samples needed to learn a multi-opinion model can be determined from the Natarajan dimension, which is a generalization of the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension.

Published
2022

50. Modeling Higher-Order Adaptive Evolutionary Processes by Multilevel Adaptive Agent Models

Author

Treur, Jan, Baldoni, Matteo, Dastani, Mehdi, Liao, Beishui, Sakurai, Yuko, Wenkstern, Rym Zalila, Computer Science, Baldoni, Matteo, Dastani, Mehdi, Liao, Beishui, Sakurai, Yuko, and Wenkstern, Rym Zalila

Subjects
Order (exchange), Computer science, business.industry, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, 050602 political science & public administration, Artificial intelligence, 050207 economics, business, Causal pathways, 0506 political science, Network model
Abstract

In this paper a fourth-order adaptive agent model based on a multilevel reified network model is introduced to describe different orders of adaptivity of the agent?s biological embodiment, as found in a case study on evolutionary processes. The adaptive agent model describes how the causal pathways for newly developed features affect the causal pathways of already existing features. This makes these new features one order of adaptivity higher than the existing ones. A network reification approach is shown to be an adequate means to model this.

Published
2019

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