Search

The Internet of Things (IoT) is an innovation in technology. Continuous advancements based on the IoT cloud have revolutionized the lives of humans, and remote health monitoring of patients is no exception. The Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) allows physicians, other health care providers and patients to observe the medical data electronically. Therefore, security in remote medicine has always been a serious challenge. Recently, to make a secure communication system, biometrics-based schemes have played a crucial role in IoT, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), etc. are gaining popularity due to their authenticity and high security properties. Many key agreement schemes have been presented in this literature. These schemes are only for authorized access to medical services and initiate a session to negotiate a shared essential between users and servers. Recently, Xiong et al. and Mehmood et al. presented key exchange methods for healthcare applications that claimed these schemes provide greater privacy. However, we show that these schemes suffer from privacy issues and key compromise impersonation attacks. In this paper, to remove such restrictions, a novel scheme (ECKCI) based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with KCI resistance property was proposed. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the ECKCI not only overcomes problems such as key compromise impersonation attacks in previous protocols, but also resists all specific attacks. Finally, a suitable equilibrium between the performance and security of ECKCI in comparison with recently proposed protocols was obtained. Also, the simulation results with the Scyther and ProVerif tools show that the ECKCI is safe [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In today's competitive landscape, manufacturing companies must embrace digital transformation. This study asserts that integrating Internet of Things (IoT) technologies for the deployment of real-time location systems (RTLS) is crucial for better monitoring of critical assets. Despite the challenge of selecting the right technology for specific needs from a wide range of indoor RTLS options, this study provides a solution to assist manufacturing companies in exploring and implementing IoT technologies for their RTLS needs. The current academic literature has not adequately addressed this industrial reality. This paper assesses the potential of Passive UHF RFID-RTLS in Industry 5.0, addressing the confusion caused by the emergence of new 'passive' RFID solutions that compete with established 'active' solutions. Our research aims to clarify the real-world performance of passive RTLS solutions and propose an updated classification of RTLS systems in the academic literature. We have thoroughly reviewed both the academic and industry literature to remain up to date with the latest market advancements. Passive UHF RFID has been proven to be a valuable addition to the RTLS domain, capable of addressing certain challenges. This has been demonstrated through the successful implementation in two industrial sites, each with different types of tagged objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A smart grid is an electricity network that uses advanced technologies to facilitate the exchange of information and electricity between utility companies and customers. Although most of the technologies involved in such grids have reached maturity, smart meters—as connected devices—introduce new security challenges. To overcome this significant obstacle to grid modernization, safeguarding privacy has emerged as a paramount concern. In this paper, we begin by evaluating the security levels of recently proposed authentication methods for smart meters. Subsequently, we introduce an enhanced protocol named PPSG, designed for smart grids, which incorporates physical unclonable functions (PUF) and an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) module to address the vulnerabilities identified in previous approaches. Our security analysis, utilizing a real-or-random (RoR) model, demonstrates that PPSG effectively mitigates the weaknesses found in prior methods. To assess the practicality of PPSG, we conduct simulations using an Arduino UNO board, measuring computation, communication, and energy costs. Our results, including a processing time of 153 ms, a communication cost of 1376 bits, and an energy consumption of 13.468 mJ, align with the requirements of resource-constrained devices within smart grids. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authentication protocols are often used in smart grids to deliver the necessary level of security. A huge number of clients in such a system, however, provides the attacker with the ability to clone them, for example. Device fingerprints, or Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF), have been investigated as an authentication feature to thwart such attacks. In order to accomplish the necessary security in smart grid neighborhood area network communications and to prevent unwanted physical access to smart meters, a former study designed a lightweight authentication system in this way. The suggested protocol uses PUFs to reduce physical attacks. As a consequence, the server/meter impersonation attack is one of the many assaults that this protocol is thought to be secure against. On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that no security solution should be trusted unless its security has been verified by independent researchers. As a result, this paper assesses the security of this protocol against a typical adversary who has access to or influences over the messages carried over the public channel. This study demonstrates that the attacker is simply capable of impersonating the server for the meter and vice versa. In addition, the suggested attacks desynchronize them, making the adversary the only one capable of interacting with the meter in the role of the legal server rather than the latter. Each of the proposed attacks is extremely effective, and their success probability is almost 1. Finally, a modification is suggested that successfully fixes the protocol's security weaknesses. The security proof of the improved protocol has been done through the Scyther tool. The computational cost comparison shows that the overhead of the proposed protocol compared to the former scheme is 4.85%, while it withstands various attacks, including traceability, desynchronization, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and secret disclosure attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authenticated key agreement is a process in which protocol participants communicate over a public channel to share a secret session key, which is then used to encrypt data transferred in subsequent communications. LLAKEP, an authenticated key agreement protocol for Energy Internet of Things (EIoT) applications, was recently proposed by Zhang et al. While the proposed protocol has some interesting features, such as putting less computation on edge devices versus the server side, its exact security level is unclear. As a result, we shed light on its security in this paper through careful security analysis against various attacks. Despite the designers' security claims in the random oracle model and its verification using GNY logic, this study demonstrates that this protocol has security weaknesses. We show that LLAKEP is vulnerable to traceability, dictionary, stolen smart glass, known session-specific temporary information, and key compromise impersonation attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that it does not provide perfect forward secrecy. To the best of our knowledge, it is the protocol's first independent security analysis. To overcome the LLAKEP vulnerabilities, we suggested the LLAKEP + protocol, based on the same set of cryptographic primitives, namely the one-way hash function and ECC point multiplication. Our comprehensive security analysis demonstrates its resistance to different threats, such as impersonation, privileged insider assaults, and stolen smart glass attacks, along with its resistance to sophisticated assaults, such as key compromised impersonation (KCI) and known session-specific temporary information (KSTI). The overhead of the proposed protocol is acceptable compared to the provided security level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]